Trying to figure anything more out about the thing in itself is pointless. You can't, you can only represent it. — Philosophim

And once you represent it, it is the thing...

I've never been able to see the point. It seems to me to conceal more than reveal.

Nor, while we are at it, is it clear how it applies to gloves. Is the supposition that a glove-in-itself, about which we can say nothing, is neither left nor right handed? But then we have said things about it - that it is a glove, and that it is neither left nor right. Very odd.

Generally, the debate is, "Can we know what a thing in itself is?" Can we know what reality is, apart from our interpretations of that reality? And the answer is "No". — Philosophim

So there's that. We can't know what a "thing in itself" is. But presumably we can know what the thing is. So what purpose is there in this philosophical construct, this phantasm, this thing-in-itself? You can't say anything about it, so the story goes - and yet the pages hereabouts are full of it.

Why not drop the thing-in-itself in favour of the thing? At least then we can say something.

How do you represent something unless that 'something' is there? — Philosophim

Sure, we can represent a something. Why would it have to be a "Something in itself", whatever that might be.

We need something 'in itself' to represent. — Philosophim

Why?

Another general comment I might make is that the presumption that some sentences are certain, presumably in virtue of their meaning, is problematic. It's not so much that a sentence is certain, as that it can be treated as certain for the purposes of a given language game. We need to look past meaning to the use to which such sentences are put.

So "Here is a hand" is not so much certain as it stands, but might be treated as certain, for some purpose.

I assume this is directed toward me, so I'll respond. — Sam26

Well, not only you, and not in response to any particular post. I was just setting out a few thoughts regarding the direction of this thread. There's a slide from "here is a hand" not being known right down to a conclusion that hinges are non-propositional and preverbal. But I don't agree that if you get on one end of the slide, you must get off at the other.

No, the relation is to a chosen reference. — frank

Ok. No, it isn't, but Ok.

And so you've joined the ranks of those to whom it's obvious that space doesn't have a left and right. — frank

That an object is left-handed or right-handed is relational. You want to claim that the relation must be to an observer. I've pointed out that this is not so.

"...space doesn't have a left and right" is a nonsense, since left and right require a relation in space.

It's just that directionality does not exist in the wild. — frank

What could that mean? That birds do not fly north for winter?

Frankly, whatever your conclusion is remains obscure.

You seem to be playing with the difference between "absolute" and "relative", and to have realised that "relative" requires that some frame be assumed. But then you jump to the conclusion that the frame requires an observer. That's the bit that is hard to follow.

And as argued above, concluding that minds are special as a result of some argument seems to be superfluous.

The coordinate system gives an orientation. Neither of these require an "observer".

No.

The Wiki article is not so good. Try this:

Chiral objects and figures like hands exist, by definition of chirality, in two distinguishable forms that are mirror images of each other. But, being isometric, the two forms cannot be distinguished if we take only the metric into account. For the distinction of chiral objects we need more than just a metric, we need to introduce an orientation of the space in order to define reflections and mirror images, i.e. we need coordinates. — https://match.pmf.kg.ac.rs/electronic_versions/Match61/n1/match61n1_5-10.pdf

A coordinate system is not an observer.

Anywhere off the plane.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chirality_(mathematics)

Now you have chirality.

Any point.

No. We have a point.

How can you have choosing going on with nobody to choose? — frank

Your observer is reduced to a point. That is all that is needed.

How could this discussion go on without you and I? If your purpose is to prove that there are observers, then it seems to me that your argument is superfluous. That there is a discussion is sufficient.

Being in a quadruped body is the basis for the distinction. — frank

Quadruped? That's my problem then. Not enough feet.

Directionality is something we give to space. It doesn't have that on its own. Some responders to this thread have said that this is blatantly obvious, others like me, arrived at it intellectually... — frank

You reached it as a conclusion to some argument? This?

Consider a container in which a single glove is floating. Is it a right-handed glove or a left-handed glove? We can insert various new items into this space-container, e.g., an anorak, a scarf, a shoe, but only the insertion of a human observer into the space will permit an answer. — SEP on Leibniz

It's wrong. If the glove has a palm and a back then we can tell its chirality. If it does not have a palm and back then inserting an "observer" does not help. The judgement will depend on which side the glove is seen from, not on the fact of there being an observer. It's not necessary to "insert an observer" to settle the issue; simply choosing a point on this or that side of the glove will suffice.

"Directionality" results from there being more than one point in a space. The minimum number of points sets the dimensionality - two points, one dimension, three points, two dimensions, four points, three dimensions. No observer is needed.

But only a conscious being can construct a point of origin or use. — Philosophim

This looks to be a play on "use". Only conscious beings construct. But that tells us nothing about space.

If the conclusion here is supposed to be that space cannot exist without conscious beings, and hence that some form of antirealism must be true, then it is very unconvincing. There's a notion hereabouts that our explanations are incomplete until consciousness is introduced, and an ensuing drive to bring consciousness in to all sorts of discussions, to somehow prove that consciousness is something special. As if the fact of one's own consciousness were not extraordinary enough! As if you somehow need to demonstrate your existence, as well as to live it! But of course you cannot doubt your own consciousness, so all such supposed demonstrations are besides the point. It's an example of a misplaced need for certainty, as if that the glove is left-handed were more evident than that you are conscious. I find such approaches extraordinarily muddled.

Yeah, to some extent the hinge is just the stuff we agree on, but there is an extra step such that the hinge is the stuff about which we cannot sensibly disagree...

So another candidate is Searle's status functions - those things that count as something. You can't doubt that those pieces of paper count as cash without ceasing to play the game of using cash, or doubt that the bishop stays on her own colour without doubting that you are playing chess.

You can however tell that one glove is the chiral opposite of the other. If the gloves have palm and back, then you can certainly tell which is left and which is right. And if they don't, then it doesn't make any difference, since you can turn left into right by the simple expedient of turning the glove inside out.

The supposition is that somehow therefore consciousness is essential to telling left from right, but the case for this cannot, I think, be made. All that is needed is an arbitrary point from which to assess the chirality of the glove.

Yep. And I also agree that hinges get too much attention.

Ok.

Tones listed some of your errors for your benefit. Address yourself to him:

Have a look at the Russell article. Let us know what you think. It takes a more detailed approach to metalogic that we've seen so far, while at the same time being quite broad.

I've made my view pretty clear over the years. There is no "correct" way of thinking in the way supposed by some. Instead we have a range of conversations, growing and spreading in a quite organic fashion. From what little I've understood of your position, you seem to think that Aristotle and a couple of others fathomed the whole of how we ought think, and anything since then is mistaken. I doubt there is a common ground to be found here.

Cheers. I don't disagree with any of that. Yep, Chat GPT confabulates.

The riverbed is bedrock. — Joshs

Nuh. The river bed is silt, sand and rocks. It stays relatively fixed while the river flows past. If it didn't, we wouldn't have a river - we'd have a swamp or a delta or some such.

Ok.

Not authoritative, of course, but

David Hilbert and Wilhelm Ackermann are often credited with formalizing the notion of soundness in their work on formal logic systems in the early 20th century. Their 1928 book "Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik" (Principles of Mathematical Logic) laid the groundwork for formal systems, including the notion that derivations in a formal system should correspond to semantic truths.
However, the soundness theorem is usually associated with Kurt Gödel, who in 1930 proved both the soundness and completeness of first-order logic (predicate logic) as part of his doctoral dissertation. This work demonstrated that if a formula is provable, it is also true in all models, and conversely, if it is true in all models, it is provable. The proof of soundness is typically straightforward compared to the proof of completeness, but both are key results in Gödel's work.

So while Hilbert and Ackermann helped define the formal system, it is Gödel's 1930 work that solidified the formal proof of soundness in the context of first-order logic. — ChatGPT

Have you any thoughts on the OP? Perhaps on "existence is not a predicate"?

Soundness (if G |- P then G |= P). Proof is straightforward by induction on length of derivation. I don't know who first proved it. — TonesInDeepFreeze

isn't that Godel's completeness theorem?

It's not a good idea to consider hinges to be "outside our epistemological framework", anymore than it would be a good idea for a hydrologist not to consider the riverbed. They are rather the foundation on which an "epistemological framework" rests.

Nor is it a good idea to think of hinges as not propositional. if they are not propositional then they cannot fulfil the task set them, which is to show that other propositions are true. They cannot act as a hinge unless they are true.

It's a bit like saying that the hinges of a door must be either part of the door or part of the door frame, and so failing to recognise that they are neither and both.

Nor is it a good idea to think of Gödel's unproven sentences as "outside the system" - they are very much a part of the system.

Again, what you have written shows multiple errors in your understanding of formal logic. And misunderstandings of my post. Experience shows that listing them will only cause you to double down, so I'll leave that aside.

You might benefit from reading Gillian Russell - I've mentioned her to you previously. At issue is if there is a "correct human reasoning" in the way you suppose. She careful shows this to be unlikely, for reasons other than misunderstanding Gödel.

https://gilliankrussell.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/logicalnihilism-philissues-v3.pdf

Your attempt to examine logic without paying due attention to formality is counterproductive.

I'll keep an eye out for further posts from you. Thanks for bringing Irad Kimhi to my attention.

...there are no sentences that are not about some thing, and so not true sentences that are not about some thing — Banno

How would this be an answer to the OP? — Leontiskos

I'm sorry you can't see how it answers the OP. It is at least a beginning. Hence

It's a direct answer, certainly. — J

J apparently can see how it addresses the OP

Existence, at least as qualification, ranges over individuals, while truth ranges over propositions. The OP asks about the relation between existence and truth. Not

...whether all true sentences are formulable within formalism, and it seems a foregone conclusion that they are not. — Leontiskos

...which is too general, too glib. I might reply, in kind, that all (true) sentences can be parsed into propositional logic. "p". Therefore all true sentences are "formulable within formalism".

Similarly, the following shows some misapprehension:

Given that there is no explicit predication of existence (or, I think, truth) within formal logics... — Leontiskos

We have both existential quantification and ∃!. And we have Tarski and all the ensuing work. These are concerted efforts to explore the grammar of truth and existence. First order logic shows that quantification is not a first order predicate, free logic shows the implications of treating existence as a first order predicate. Tarski explicitly makes truth a second order predicate ranging over propositions. Claiming that there is no explicit predication of existence or truth in formal logic is ignorant.

But you are afeared of formalism:

...how could this question possibly be answered by limiting ourselves to formal logics? — Leontiskos

There is no suggestion that we limit ourselves to formal logic. But you might benefit from making at least some use of it. It seems we are repeating the problem seen in other threads, where a lack of literacy in formal languages leads to an inability to set out the issues clearly.

...intentional logic would seem to be a topic that is relevant to the thread. — Leontiskos

Neither of us, nor I suspect anyone else here, have the background in intensional logic (with an "s", not a "t") that is required. I'll just leave here the intuition that more recent developments in treating intensions as algorithms reinforce treating intension as use, and leave it at that.

This post will just rattle your cage. That is probably all that can be done until @J can formulate a more explicit topic.

Ok.

Ok, so is there any evidence that Austin explicitly accepted the Contrast Theory of Meaning? Especially as both he and Wittgenstein advocated looking at use rather than the mysterious, inscrutable "meaning" of a word?

That is, it appears that in thinking of Wittgenstein or Austin as advocating any theory of meaning, Gelner shows he has not understood what they are up to.

So

It does not pay to assume that a word must have an opposite, or one opposite, whether it is a 'positive' word like 'wilfully' or a 'negative word like 'inadvertently'. Rather, we should ask ourselves such questions as why there is no use for the adverb 'advertently'. For above all it will not do to assume that the 'positive' word must be around to wear the trousers; commonly enough the 'negative' (looking) word marks the (positive) abnormality while the 'positive' word, if it exists, merely serves to rule out
the suggestion of that abnormality. — Austin, Plea for excuses, Philosophical Papers, p. 192

Seems to me that there is a difference between holding that every use of a word is dependent on a contrast and holding that this use of a word is dependent on a contrast.

Without looking up the source (pretty sure it's "plea for excuses"), I'm pretty confident that Austin at most holds that some words, not all, suffer this complain.

See also
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14753/austin-sense-and-sensibilia/p1

I hear tell Bluesky was the big winner in Brazil...

I am not aware of either Austin or Wittgenstein explicitly advocating anything close to the Contrast Theory of Meaning - They each advocated close and detailed examination of the use of a word in contrast to such general theories of meaning.

What you suggest seems to be that any theory of meaning must in the end be a Contrast Theory of Meaning, and hence Austin and Wittgenstein must have held a Contrast Theory of Meaning... I'm nto overly content with that.

So I'll maintain that it is up to Gellner to show that they held such a view, rather than up to us to show that they didn't.

Cheers.

I don't have Kimhi's book, so I can't answer any issues raised there directly. In any case it seems what is needed is a thesis, or a series of theses, rather than a thread.

I suggested that there are no sentences that are not about some thing, and so not true sentences that are not about some thing. The obvious response is to ask what "about" is doing here. And so we move to talk of sense and reference, intension and extension, and so on, and the supposed rejection of Frege. The classical solution was, roughly, that an extensional understanding of logic is preferable simply because it is simpler. But there are intensional logics, which as I understand it tend to treat the intension of individuals as propositions; or more recently as algorithms. Speaking roughly, the extension is the thing we are talking about, the intension is the thing we are doing with it.

All this by way of saying that if the point is to improve on Frege, then that's pretty much what logic has been doing; and if the point is to show that Frege is mistaken, then it's somewhat closing the barn door after the horse has bolted.

So where does that leave us?

obably the things I'm worrying about in this OP only arise when one begins to question whether the world reflects these same commitments, and whether formalisms necessarily capture everything we want to say, philosophically. — J

Formalism just obliges good grammar. It shows us how to set things out more clearly.

And of course there is the further issue of whether we can indeed say all the things we want to say - philosophical or not.

Looks like this has to be personal.

...but everyone in the thread proved incapable of these metalogical distinctions. — Leontiskos

Well, as one of those who participated, I'd characterise the interaction differently. You were unable to set out clearly what it was you wanted to show.

That, of course, does not mean that your point, whatever it was, was wrong, but that it could not be addressed.

It was also pretty clear that there were a few points of logic that you did not accept. That does not bode well for a thread such as this.

I am of the opinion that Banno at least somewhat derailed your thread on QV by immediately shifting it away from Sider's ontological realism and towards pure logical formalisms which intentionally avoid questions of ontology. — Leontiskos

It's discourteous to mention without linking.

Formalism seeks clarity in otherwise opaque discourse. In this case, what is shown is that there are no sentences that are not about some thing, and so not true sentences that are not about some thing. That seems a direct answer to the OP. (?)

But you want to play with archaic logic again, a topic in which I have little interest. Enjoy.