↪@wonderer1
Can you give any evidence that in what you said there is anything, even just a tiny bit, free from any conditioning of your mind? — Angelo Cannata

If so, why not say so? — Ciceronianus

This isn't responsive though to your attempt to negate the distinction between the object and the perception. Our conversation initially revolved around what you seemed to suggest was the superfluousness of referring to phenomenal states and your equation of the perception of the thing to the actual thing. — Hanover

He's not discussing metaphysics at all, but instead is just trying to hammer out how we use the term "direct" and "indirect"... It says nothing about reality. It just talks about how we talk. — Hanover

You say it's too complicated? — Hanover

You say there are two sorts of perceptions: direct and indirect. — Hanover

What do I bring in my house to have that song? As we've determined, realism demands the song thing be able to exist independent of the perceiver. — Hanover

Then we have to determine somehow which perceptions are most closely correlated to the noumenal flower in order to rank the perceptions from most direct to least direct? — Hanover

Philosophers, it is said, 'are not, for the most part, prepared to admit that such objects as pens or cigarettes are ever directly perceived'. Now of course what brings us up short here is the word 'directly'-a great favourite among philosophers, but actually one of the less conspicuous snakes in the linguistic grass. We have here, in fact, a typical case of a word, which already has a very special use, being gradually stretched, without caution or definition or any limit, until it becomes, first perhaps obscurely metaphorical, but ultimately meaningless. One can't abuse ordinary language without paying for it.

I. First of all, it is essential to realize that here the notion of perceiving indirectly wears the trousers- 'directly' takes whatever sense it has from the contrast with its opposite: while 'indirectly' itself (a) has a use only in special cases, and also (b) has different uses in different cases-though that doesn't mean, of course, that there is not a good reason why we should use the same word. We might, for example, contrast the man who saw the procession directly with the man who saw it through a periscope; or we might contrast the place from which you can watch the door directly with the place from which you can see it only in the mirror. Perhaps we might contrast seeing you directly with seeing, say, your shadow on the blind; and perhaps we might contrast hearing the music directly with hearing it relayed outside the concert hall. However, these last two cases suggest two further points.

2. The 'first of these points is that the notion of not perceiving 'directly' seems most at home where, as with the periscope and the mirror, it retains its link with the notion of a kink in direction. It seems that we must not be looking straight at the object in question. For this reason seeing your shadow on the blind is a doubtful case; and seeing you, for instance, through binoculars or spectacles is certainly not a case of seeing you indirectly at all. For such cases as these last we have quite distinct contrasts and different expressions-'with the naked eye' as op- posed to 'with a telescope', 'with unaided vision' as opposed to 'with glasses on'. (These expressions, in fact, are much more firmly established in ordinary use than 'directly' is.)

3· And the other point is that, partly no doubt for the above reason, the notion of indirect perception is not naturally at home with senses other than sight. With the other senses there is nothing quite analogous with the 'line of vision'. The most natural sense of 'hearing indirectly', of course, is that of being told something by an intermediary-a quite different matter. But do I hear a shout indirectly, when I hear the echo? If I touch you with a barge-pole, do I touch you indirectly? Or if you offer me a pig in a poke, might I feel the pig indirectly- through the poke? And what smelling indirectly might be I have simply no idea. For this reason alone there seems to be something badly wrong with the question, 'Do we perceive things directly or not?', where perceiving is evidently intended to cover the employment of any of the
senses.

4· But it is, of course, for other reasons too extremely doubtful how far the notion of perceiving indirectly could or should be extended. Does it, or should it, cover the telephone, for instance? Or television? Or radar? Have we moved too far in these cases from the original metaphor? They at any rate satisfy what seems to be a necessary condition-namely, concurrent existence and concomitant variation as between what is perceived in the straightforward way (the sounds in the receiver, the picture and the blips on the screen) and the candidate for what we might be prepared to describe as being perceived indirectly. And this condition fairly clearly rules out as cases of indirect perception seeing photographs (which statically record scenes from the past) and seeing films (which, though not static, are not seen contemporaneously with the events thus recorded). Certainly, there is a line to be drawn somewhere. It is certain, for instance, that we should not be prepared to speak of indirect perception in every case in which we see some- thing from which the existence (or occurrence) of some- thing else can be inferred; we should not say we see the guns indirectly, if we see in the distance only the flashes of guns.

5· Rather differently, if we are to be seriously inclined to speak of something as being perceived indirectly, it seems that it has to be the kind of thing which we (sometimes at least) just perceive, or could perceive, or which- like the backs of our own heads-others could perceive. For otherwise we don't want to say that we perceive the thing at all, even indirectly. No doubt there are complications here (raised, perhaps, by the electron microscope, for example, about which I know little or nothing). But it seems clear that, in general, we should want to distinguish between seeing indirectly, e.g. in a mirror, what we might have just seen, and seeing signs (or effects), e.g. in a Wilson cloud-chamber, of something not itself perceptible at all. It would at least not come naturally to speak of the latter as a case of perceiving something indirectly.

6. And one final point. For reasons not very obscure, we always prefer in practice what might be called the cash-value expression to the 'indirect' metaphor. If I were to report that I see enemy ships indirectly, I should merely provoke the question what exactly I mean.'I mean that I can see these blips on the radar screen'-'Well, why didn't you say so then?' (Compare 'I can see an unreal duck.'-'What on earth do you mean?' 'It's a decoy duck'-'Ah, I see. Why didn't you say so at once?') That is, there is seldom if ever any particular point in actually saying 'indirectly' (or 'unreal'); the expression can cover too many rather different cases to be just what is wanted in any particular case.

Thus, it is quite plain that the philosophers' use of 'directly perceive', whatever it may be, is not the ordinary, or any familiar, use; for in that use it is not only false but simply absurd to say that such objects as pens or cigarettes are never perceived directly. But we are given no explanation or definition of this new use - on the contrary, it is glibly trotted out as if we were all quite familiar with it already. It is clear, too, that the philosophers' use, whatever it may be, offends against several of the canons just mentioned above-no restrictions whatever seem to be envisaged to any special circumstances or to any of the senses in particular, and moreover it seems that what we are to be said to perceive indirectly is never - is not the kind of thing which ever could be - perceived directly. — Sense and Sensibilia, pp14-19

The hard part... is going to be addressing the arguments Austin actually presents, and not re-dressing them so that they fit a preconfigured critique. (Austin) is not defending realism against antirealism, but rejecting the very distinction between these two.

This applies also to direct/indirect realism. The danger for this thread is that the discussion becomes just another rendition of that tedious "he said/she said". — Banno

My problem is that I can't imagine what direct perception would be. — Ludwig V

I. First of all, it is essential to realize that here the notion of perceiving indirectly wears the trousers- 'directly' takes whatever sense it has from the contrast with its opposite — p.15

Austin is specifically tearing down philosophy's framing of the issue as both direct or indirect. — Antony Nickles

Is the song not the sound waves? — Hanover

A realist makes no epistemological claim. — Hanover

You say there are certain objects we see directly. — Hanover

What I hear is an interpretation of sound waves. It's for that reason that when you sing behind a wall, I don't hear the song. What do you suppose I hear when I hear the song? — Hanover

What I can say of my perception of the flower is that it has four petals. I don't think I'm inconsistent in my position. — Hanover

The empirical object is something that no one actually sees, because it is a social construction derived from myriad subjective perspectives. — Joshs

Give me a concrete case then of an object that is unimpacted by the perceiver so that you can say object A is described as having the qualities of a, b, and c in all instances. — Hanover

We determined Banno's flower is not one such object and it seems your fish is not either. What then is that object you refer to? — Hanover

How about Banno's flower? It has four petals, a definite height and flowers at a particular time of year.
— Ludwig V
That's just a restatement of naive realism. — Hanover

Any inconsistency between the flower and the perception is defined as distortion. If the radio transmits a song filled with static, we don't say the static was part of the song. We say the song was distorted by the static. If you ask if I'm hearing the song, my answer is I'm hearing parts of the song and parts of other things as well, but, to the extent the song is X, I'm not hearing X. I'm hearing all sorts of other things. — Hanover

We have to determine which part of Object X I am sensing against those perceptions I am having of things imparted upon Object X if we want to distill what Object X is. What is the undistorted X? — Hanover

I've been struck by the lack of clarity in several recent discussions revolving around subjectivity, objectivity, truth and belief. Hence this thread, which I doubt will contain anything new, but only stuff that seems in need of repeating.

Before commencing the main argument, it may be worth pointing out that belief and truth are not the same. One can believe stuff that is not true, as well as disbelieve stuff that is true. Believing something does not imply that it is true, and being true does not imply being believed. I mention this because it is a simple, but ubiquitous error, and may well underpin other problems.

And so to the argument. The words subjective and objective are such that we are prone to allow them to lead us up and down various garden paths. It is especially important, therefore, to keep an eye on their use in mundane contexts.

Certain statements are labeled subjective because they set out an individuals taste or feelings. In contrast, other statements are called objective, as they do not set out an individual's taste, feelings or opinions.

Supose that "I prefer vanilla to chocolate ice-cream" is a subjective fact - or if you prefer, it is a subjective truth. It's truth is dependent on my own taste.

That this text is written in English is not dependent on my own taste or feelings. Hence it is an objective truth.

That's an end to it; don't allow the notions of subjectivity and objectivity to take on any more significance.

in particular, don't pretend that there are either only subjective facts, or that there are only objective facts. — Banno

…just because people seem to assign truth values doesn't mean that that is necessarily what they mean; I — Apustimelogist

Far be it from me — AmadeusD

If moral statements aren't about facts in the first place then they may not be amenable to the T-sentence thing. — Apustimelogist

It remains that we can and do commonly assign truth values to normative statements. We also use these truth values to perform deductions. The oddity here is the denial of all this because of philosophical ideology. — Banno

I would say the question is objective. — Ludwig V

If saying that it is true means that they are saying it is a stance-independent fact... — Apustimelogist

The T-sentence is exactly about truth. It does not address belief.
— Banno

It is a statement of belief. — AmadeusD

You can act without believing your act to comport with truth. — AmadeusD

what is really there — Hanover

I was speaking in terms of the photograph being an accurate representation of the flower. — Hanover

You do not see the UV light. — Hanover

...which is then represented to you in your consciousness. — Hanover

which one is the flower, A or B — Hanover

I do have a phenomenal state in my consciousness and it goes away when I close my eyes, but the flower remains. — Hanover

The part that I'd still be uncertain about, at least, is whether or not they inhabit a different world or not. — Moliere

The forgery example makes clear the significance of subjectivity. — Hanover

Which one is the accurate depiction? — Hanover

...retain its validity. — Hanover

...arbitrary changes... — Hanover

The question then becomes: once I have the phenomenal state of the flower in my consciousness, which one of those still represents the flower? — Hanover

That is, this is indirect realism... — Hanover

It's true that I keep seeing traces or reminders of OLP — Ludwig V

This is a "philosophical" account of morality whose connection to lived reality is dubious at best. For a more reasonable approach see here — hypericin

One ought not keep slaves. It is therefore true that "One ought not keep slaves". — Banno

No, I don't. And i have explicitly covered why not multiple times, so i'm refrain from repeating my very much coherent answer to this charge again. — AmadeusD

It sits on it's own, while completely failing to rise to the status of truth. — AmadeusD

I mean, there are lots of moral anti-realists across the world who would disagree with this sentiment. This rhetoric is not really more than question begging moral facts. — Apustimelogist

You can act without believing your act to comport with truth. — AmadeusD

I would need to be confident in my own ideas to such a degree (one i can't fathom) that my beliefs entail teh truth of them. I just don't make that move. — AmadeusD

That it doesn't establish it's truth. — AmadeusD

I note a very subtle, but incredibly important difference between "..therefore X is true" and "..Therefore S believes X is true". — AmadeusD

"One cannot transmute lead into gold using chemistry." — hypericin

And yet, one ought not keep slaves. It is therefore true that "One ought not keep slaves".
— Banno

I reject your position. — AmadeusD

prosopography — Ludwig V

And in the face of our fundamental fear and desire, to merely offer as alternative the vast complex flawed variety of the world, is rather like saying eat your veg and exercise to someone who just wants a pill. — Antony Nickles

Austin and Wittgenstein both make what they are doing look obvious, so people take the point as simple, or trivial. — Antony Nickles