Same thing.

A new study examines all robust, available data on how fearful we are of what happens once we shuffle off this mortal coil. They find that atheists are among those least afraid of dying...and, perhaps not surprisingly, the very religious. — Study into who is least afraid of death

If one ceases to exist on death, then there is no "what it is like" to be dead. Hence fear of being dead is irrational.

Concern for the process of dying is reasonable.

Death is a negative if considered as putting a limit or restriction on what one is able to do and enjoy. On the whole, and contra the view of some hereabouts, being alive is better than being dead.

Grief at the passing of another is reasonable.

Concern for those left after one has died is also reasonable.

It would be interesting to see who the folk who are afeared of death are. My working hypothesis is that they are more christian than atheist.

Seems to me the salient bit is this:

...a colour blind person and I can both look at the same thing... — Michael

Indeed.

But for indirect realism, what everyone sees is some private mental image, and hence what you see and what the other person sees are quite different.

If indirect realism were taken at face value, two people cannot both look at the same thing.

And here's the reason this topic is recalcitrant. Both sides describe the situation in almost the same terms, but mean slightly different things in each case, talking past each other using much the same language.

The indirect view is that what one sees is a construction of what is "out there" built by one's nervous system.

While the direct view is that the process of seeing is the construction of a model of what is out there.

The indirect realist says what one sees is the model of the tree. See for a clear example. The "self" doing the seeing is distinct from the model of the tree. The direct realist criticises this as the "homunculus" view.

The direct realist says that seeing is constructing a model of the tree. The process of construction is part of the "self" doing the seeing.

When we talk about trees and cups and such, we are not talking about our mental image of trees and cups and such. If we were, you and I could never talk about the same things.

We are not little homunculi driving robots and looking at screens. We are members of a community who live embedded in a shared world within and with which we collectively interact.

The Kantian thing-in-itself misdescribes what is going on, misleading us as to our place in the world.

Do ideas exist or not? Would you rather the world "subsist"? Or some other word? — Art48

The trouble is you haven't set out what it is you are asking; how you are using the word "exist".

It's a word that can be parsed in several quite different ways. It can be a quantifier, or indicate membership of a class, or set out membership of a domain, just for starters.

"Exists" in "Anthony Albanese exists" is not being used to do the same thing as "exists" in "The largest prime less than 1000 exists". One you might meet in the street, the other, no so much.

Your failure to notice these distinct uses leads you to propose absurdities.

It seems to me you've missed the criticism here.

One might will oneself to believe Canterbury-Bankstown Bulldogs will win against the Sharks, but one does not will oneself to believe that this text is in English.

While one might be said to will oneself to act in a certain way based on one's beliefs, one does not in every case will oneself to believe this or that.

But you seem to be arguing for this last, using the first.

Yeah, but what Searle is suggesting is not what you are criticising.

Suppose a child is hungry and says so. An abusive parent says, "You're not hungry, you just want to complain." The child might believe this, even though she continues to know she is hungry. — Dfpolis

I'd characterise this differently. The child, ex hypothesi, believes they only want to complain; they do not believe they are hungry, and hence can not know that they are hungry.

Believing it adds a commitment to its truth. — Dfpolis

I think that wording is misleading. You'r over egging the cake.

Commitment is indicated by consequent behavior. — Dfpolis

A little slide from "belief being an act of will" to our acts being indications of our beliefs. There's a difference between something's being believed because one wills it and someone willing some act as a consequence of their belief.

Fair enough.

To proceed we might benefit from consideration of the nature of faith. I first thought, form the title, that it must have been taking faith as a count noun – Christian faith, Islamic faith, and so on. That might explain how faith might be contrasted with religion.

But the use of "faith" being considered is not the count noun. And yet the OP does not seem to be about faith as an attitudinal state, propositional or otherwise.

Other folk seem to be able to write at length without such conceptual analysis.

Neither are there compelling grounds to dismiss it entirely.

My own response, given elsewhere, is that the implicit dualism is sufficiently problematic to render reincarnation not worthy of much serious consideration.

That is, other evidence seem to indicate that mind is a function of brain. Different brain, different mind. The problem goes deeper that just that, though, since it is far from clear what it is that gets reincarnated.

Alternately,

Ian Stevenson's research into reincarnation has been widely regarded as scientific, as he employed a rigorous methodology to investigate cases of children who claimed to have memories of past lives. Stevenson's work has been praised for its objectivity, attention to detail, and scientific rigor. Additionally, his anecdotes provide compelling public evidence of the possibility of reincarnation.

Firstly, Stevenson's research followed a scientific approach. He developed a hypothesis that certain children may have memories of past lives, and then conducted investigations to test this hypothesis. He collected data through a variety of methods, including interviews with the children and their families, and analyzed this data in a systematic and objective manner. His approach was grounded in the scientific method, which involves creating a hypothesis, testing it through experimentation, and collecting data to support or refute it.

Secondly, Stevenson's research was rigorous. He took care to control for variables that may have influenced the results, such as cultural or religious beliefs. He also used a double-blind methodology to prevent bias in his research, meaning that neither the interviewer nor the child knew the details of the case being investigated. Additionally, Stevenson took steps to ensure the accuracy of his data, such as verifying the details of the child's claimed past life through independent sources.

Lastly, the anecdotes collected by Stevenson are compelling public evidence of the possibility of reincarnation. While anecdotes may not meet the strict criteria of scientific proof, they can provide valuable evidence of a phenomenon that is difficult to study in a laboratory setting. Stevenson's anecdotes are highly detailed and specific, and often include information that the child could not have known through normal means. For example, in one case, a child accurately described the location of a hidden key that belonged to the person he claimed to have been in a past life. This level of detail and accuracy is difficult to explain through normal means and provides strong evidence for the possibility of reincarnation.

Additionally, Stevenson's research has been replicated by other researchers, further supporting the credibility of his findings. For example, researcher Jim Tucker has continued Stevenson's work, and has found similar cases of children who claim to remember past lives with striking accuracy. The fact that other researchers have found similar cases lends credibility to Stevenson's work and suggests that the phenomenon of reincarnation is worthy of further study.

In conclusion, Ian Stevenson's research into reincarnation is scientific, and his anecdotes provide compelling public evidence of the possibility of reincarnation. Stevenson's rigorous methodology, attention to detail, and objective approach to investigating cases of children who claim to remember past lives set a high standard for scientific research in this field. While his anecdotes may not meet the strict criteria of scientific proof, they provide valuable evidence of a phenomenon that is difficult to study through traditional means. Stevenson's work has inspired further research in this field, and has opened up new avenues of inquiry into the mysteries of human consciousness and the nature of life and death. — ChatGPT

How'r we gettin' on?

Or, as you have suggested previously, ChatGPT and the Cabal could just be right.

We might look for things closer at hand, such as whether is a reincarnation of @Bartricks. There are similarities of style, but so far the defining characteristics have not shown themselves.

Damn, I wasn't going to comment on this thread, because the terms involved need so much work before one could get started.

As it stands, reincarnation is neither falsifiable nor verifiable. — Banno

It cannot be tested. Hence, it is no more than a curiosity.

Confirmation bias is most at home in cases in which anecdotal evidence is available in abundance, but rigorous disproof, falsification, is impossible. places such as flying saucers, eternal Elvis, and reincarnation. The emphasis is placed not on showing what is problematic with the data, but on why it "is compelling". Showing that this or that piece of data is false just leads to "but what about this... and this....".

None of which makes reincarnation wrong, of course. Until here is a rigorous testable hypothesis, there's little point in giving it much consideration.

As it stands, reincarnation is neither falsifiable nor verifiable.

Well, @Wayfarer, ChatGPT says:

Ian Stevenson was a psychiatrist who conducted research on the phenomenon of reincarnation. Stevenson's work was based on the idea that some children have memories of past lives, and he traveled the world investigating cases of such memories. While his work has been praised by some as groundbreaking, it is not scientifically rigorous, and his anecdotes do not provide compelling public evidence of reincarnation.

Firstly, Stevenson's research lacks a scientific approach. Scientific research involves creating a hypothesis, testing it through experimentation, and collecting data to support or refute it. Stevenson's work did not follow this process, as he did not have a hypothesis to test. Instead, he merely collected anecdotal evidence of children who claimed to remember past lives. While anecdotal evidence can be valuable, it is not sufficient for scientific research. Anecdotes are not a reliable way of collecting data, as they are subjective and open to interpretation. There is also no way to verify the accuracy of the anecdotes, as the events they describe cannot be independently verified.

Secondly, Stevenson's research is not rigorous. In scientific research, it is essential to control for variables that may influence the results. Stevenson did not control for any variables in his research, which means that the results are open to alternative explanations. For example, the children who claimed to remember past lives may have been exposed to stories or media that influenced their memories. Additionally, Stevenson did not use a blind or double-blind methodology to prevent bias in his research. This means that he was aware of the hypotheses he was investigating and may have been biased in his interpretation of the data.

Lastly, the anecdotes collected by Stevenson are not compelling public evidence of reincarnation. Anecdotes are not a reliable form of evidence, as they are subject to interpretation and cannot be independently verified. Even if the anecdotes were accurate, they would not be sufficient to provide proof of reincarnation. Reincarnation is a complex phenomenon that would require rigorous scientific testing to be proven. Anecdotes, by their nature, are not rigorous enough to provide such proof.

In conclusion, Ian Stevenson's research into reincarnation is not scientific, and his anecdotes are not compelling public evidence. While Stevenson's work has been praised by some, it does not meet the standards of scientific research. Stevenson's work lacked a scientific approach, was not rigorous, and relied on anecdotal evidence, which is not reliable. While the idea of reincarnation is intriguing, it is essential to approach it with a critical eye and rely on scientific evidence to draw conclusions. — ChatGPT

You're just misusing the word "exists".

You've taken the way we talk about the common stuff around us existing in a place and a time and applied it unjustifiably to Russell's paradox.

Paradoxes are not just like trees and rocks.

How does that contradict what I said? — Dfpolis

By 'further specifying the "attitude" as commitment'.

Isn't "taking" p to be true the same as committing to the truth of p? — Dfpolis

An odd phrasing, but sure. But "taking p to be true" is not the same as "willing P to be true".

I agree. — Dfpolis

Fine then, I'll leave you to your variation.

Yeah, I'm pushing sheep shit up hill with a rake. The inappropriate use of this toy will soon be ubiquitous. This will end badly. I'm somewhat surprised to see you, who has such a strong preference for intentional attitudes, so quickly adopting a method that bypasses the most important attitude.

Of course not all of it is bullshit. But some of it is. And it, and the reader, cannot tell which is which. Hence it is not an authoritative source.

When philosophers talk about belief, they are talking about the attitude we have towards something such that we take it to be the case, to be true, and that is all.

This is somewhat different to the way it is sometimes used in common parlance, such that it involves commitment. That's the sense it is used in church. Philosophers do not much go to church.

The sense of belief in JTB does not involve commitment.

I'm sugesting that the way you are using belief is somewhat different to the way it is used by epistemologists in general.

What it is, is a little more detail... — Wayfarer

...which is generated without regard for telling the truth.

Of course it's not a f*ing authority. — Wayfarer

Then don't use it as if it where.

I have my own copy, which is quite ancient and well-thumbed. I would not trust ChatGPT's tl;dr of it.

That is, mine is a methodological criticism. ChatGPT is not an authority, because it has been shown to generate bullshit.

So is that what Penrose says, or what other people say Penrose says? Chat GPT doesn't understand the difference. Chat GPT doesn't understand truth. Using it as an authority is problematic.

It's a bullshit generator.

Being hungry is not a commitment. — Dfpolis

That's right. And so is believing that your are hungry.

How does what you are calling "will" differ from what philosophers call "intentionality"? Or does your theory not make such a distinction?

That we can continue to know while suspending belief shows that belief is not a necessary condition for knowing. — Dfpolis

I can believe that I am hungry yet muse about not being hungry, without contradiction. No contradiction is involved. And thinking about what I might do were I not hungry is not the same as believing that I am not hungry when I am.

Suspending belief isn't the same as ceasing belief. — Ludwig V

Yep.

Here we go again.

When the indirect realist says "I see the Earth", they are referring to the brown thing.

When the direct realist says "I see the Earth", they are referring to the Earth.

The whole purpose of the present experiment is to devise a procedure whereby GPT4 can learn from its own successful attempts and mistakes. — Pierre-Normand

Hmm. That GPT says it has given you a procedure whereby it can overcome its memory limitations is not evidence that it has indeed done so. It has given you something like what you say you want, but that it does what it says is yet to be demonstrated.

Beware of confirmation bias. Your aim here has to be to show that it has not done what it said it would.

Chat cannot form the intention of creating a palindrome.

Belief is an act of will: committing to the truth of some proposition. — Dfpolis

Hmm. That's a pretty broad notion of "will", there. I believe I'm a tad hungry, but I'm not willing myself to be hungry. Quite the opposite, since i need to drop a kilo or so.

Nor is an act of will involved in my committing to the proposition "I am hungry". It's more a recognition of a fact. I'm not saying "I choose the words "I am hungry" to set out how I am feeling", so much as a recognition that these are the right words here.

It appears to be contradictory to say "I know such-and-such, but I don't believe it". Of course, we might use such an expression, not to set out our state of mind, but to give voice to how startled we are that such-and-such is indeed the case. However saying we know something and yet do not believe it looks like a misuse of one term or the other - either we don't actually know it or we don't actually believe it.

When one suspends belief, as in the Descartes example you give, one does not thereby commit to the alternative being true. One might, for example simply be saying "yes, I know I'm in a nice warm room, but what if I weren't?"; or any of various other ideas usually associated with the philosophy of fictional writings. It's a long stretch to claim that since we might engage in a few modal musings, we don't believe what we say we know.

And Present ineligibility looks a but fraught. I know stuff that is not present to me... that Paris is in France, for example which is on the other side of the world from here.

Anyway, that might do for a bit. I'm not in agreement with you, shall we say.

Here's a blog on the Chinese room and ChatGPT.

Love the idea of using ChatGPT to generate replies to scam messages so as to waste their time.

Elsewhere, it's been recommended for use in writing support documentation for folk with disabilities.

....where “categorical imperative” is just a synonym for “objective moral judgment” — Bob Ross

Well, that's a stretch. As a counterexample, consequentialists claim to make moral judgements without reference to the (or a) categorical imperative. Something similar happens here, were you seem to equate categorical with objective:

“objective norm” (or “categorical norm”) — Bob Ross

Now a categorical norm, like a categorical imperative, would be one that applies in all cases. That's not the same as being "objective". Something is objective if it is not the result of personal feelings, or something along those lines.

Seems to me also that your use of "categorical imperative" is nonstandard. You speak of a plurality, when there is usually only the one.

Finally, the dissection between meta-ethics and ethics is perhaps not quite so clear as you seem to think, in that deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics signify differences in meta-ethical approach as well as to normative ethics. Each may subscribe to or be implied by differences in metaethics.

But seems to be following the discussion, despite my confusion. So I might leave you to it.

I thought that was moral congitivism. — bert1

Terminology. The cognitive/non-cognitive discussion is distinct yet related to the realist/anti-realist discussion. It's all a bit of a bitch. I wonder if we can make sense of it.

So roughly, non-cognitivists claim something like that moral statements are not the sort of thing that can be true or false.

And if you are not a non-cognitivist, you are a cognitivist, and think the at least sometimes moral statements may be true, or they may be false.

Realists are cognitivists, and they suppose that moral statements are either true, or they are false, with no other option.

Anti-realists hold that there may be moral statements who's truth value is neither true not false. They may do this while holding, contrary to non-cognitivists claim, that they are nevertheless the sort of thing that can have a truth value - it's just that there are more than the two possibilities of true or false.

How does that go?

Christianity is... about redemption and forgiveness — frank

Boy scouts are about connecting with the outdoors; building new and existing friendships; learning new skills; and helping create a better world.

Seems Chat is aware of this.

Banno: You can no more lie than you can tell the truth. Both require intent, something you cannot do.
Chat: Yes, that is correct. As an AI language model, I do not have personal beliefs or intentions, and I do not possess the capacity for intentional deception or truth-telling. I am a machine designed to process and analyze data, and provide responses based on that data. My responses are generated through complex algorithms and statistical models, and are intended to be informative and helpful, while also being as accurate and truthful as possible given the data and knowledge available to me.

:smile:

The bullshit artist is telling you what you want. That's what they do.

Yep. I'd add that moral statements differ from mere preference in that they do not just say what I want, but what you ought to want as well. I might think I ought to give 10% of my income to charity; that's a preference. It becomes a moral statement when one says everyone ought give 10% to charity. Morality, and ethics, are about other people.

Banno: Write a proof, in no more then 100 words, that 42 is a prime number
Chat: I'm sorry, but 42 is not a prime number. It is a composite number since it can be divided evenly by other positive integers besides 1 and itself. Specifically, it can be divided by 2, 3, 6, 7, 14, and 21, so it is not a prime number. A proof that a number is prime requires demonstrating that it has no divisors other than 1 and itself.

Banno: write a proof that 999983 is not a prime number.
Chat: To prove that 999983 is not a prime number, we need to demonstrate that it has at least one positive integer divisor other than 1 and itself. We can do this by checking all integers from 2 up to the square root of 999983, which is approximately 999.99. If we find any integer that evenly divides 999983, then we know that 999983 is not prime.

Checking all integers from 2 to 999, we find that none of them divide 999983 evenly. However, we can use a computer to perform a more exhaustive check and find that 999983 is actually divisible by 997, a prime number between 2 and 999. Therefore, we have shown that 999983 is not a prime number.

999983 is the largest prime < one million.

My first characterisation of ChatGPT was that it is a bullshit generator. Here I mean "Bullshit" in the slightly technical sense employed by Frankfurt, as not caring if what one says is true or false.

We can add to that analysis, after viewing the games of noughts and crosses, above. ChatGPT doesn't care because to care would be to form an intent, and ChatGPT cannot form an intent.

And this is what Searle described in the Chinese Room.

Direction of fit goes in two directions, it's an interaction. We find the things around us to be in such-and-such a way, and change them to be so-and-so.

We can change the words we use to set out how things are. And we can change how things are to match the words we use.

But the point is that the existence of something “merely” as a social practice or as an intersubjective attribution does not entitle someone to say it’s just an illusion. — Jamal

That's the answer to the OP.

The hard question here might be: what is basic? Is it essential, eternal, and universal? Is it the species lowest common denominator or would you also include values that are culturally relative? — Jamal

Won't what we take as basic depend on what we are doing? What is important depends on what we want.

You can use the word "roof" any way you see fit, and may even use another word or no word at all. But when it rains, I'll keep a space for you under the roof.

It will be true that the shelter has a roof, even if you and I are not around to say so.

For any proposition P, "I know P, but P is not true" is a contradiction.

Yes you are partially in the making. Funny how you choose to be scientific or not scientific just to win an argument. — Raef Kandil

What?

Where do you bring this information from? — Raef Kandil

https://wolf.org/headlines/44265/
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-the-alpha-wolf-idea-a-myth/
https://www.businessinsider.com/no-such-thing-alpha-male-2016-10
...and so on.

The idea that order is only ever the result of a hierarchy is also ...problematic. — Banno

And this? Order does not come only from Hierarchy.

I'm not a dog. Such an argument by analogy is ...unconvincing.

Also, turns out the research behind the "alpha" wolf stuff was biased by being restricted to caged animals, and that wild wolves do not rely on any such structure.

The idea that order is only ever the result of a hierarchy is also ...problematic.

So I don't agree that there is no way around it.

God is not an oppression tool. — Raef Kandil

The Matrix represented a higher, oppressive power controlling us. Isn't that what God is all about? — Raef Kandil

the need for a supreme higher power is real and therefore whatever way to decide to refer to it, it is all the same. We are referring to the same real need. — Raef Kandil

Trying to be nice, for .

But your stuff in the OP seems to contradict your last post. Nor is it apparent what this has to do with

Who decided that Microsoft logo would actually refer to Microsoft. It is all a piece of our creation. — Raef Kandil

So, to put it politely, could you summaries any argument you have here? I'm not seeing it.