This boulder has the capacity for experience, but it differs in two important ways from us: 1) it lacks self-reflection on those experiences; 2) it does not experience qualia. — Relativist
Agreed on point 1, but completely disagreed on point 2. The capacity for experience is exactly the capacity to experience qualia. Qualia just are are occasions of experience. (And on my ontology, if you read that web of reality thread too, absolutely everything is made out of such occasions of experience, which I hold are identical to physical interactions: to be is to do, to be is to be perceived*, so to do is to be perceived*, and conversely to perceive* is to be done-unto).
*(I'd say "experience" rather than "perceive", but Berkeley's adage uses "perceive").
I can write a hundred sentences describing the pain, but nothing I say will be equivalent to the raw experience. — Relativist
Agreed. But that says nothing at all about what kinds of things can have such experiences.
Not all matter is wet, even in the slightest degree, but liquids usually are. — bongo fury
Sure, but wetness is an aggregate product of particles interacting in the normal ways all particles interact, so there's nothing new about wetness above and beyond the stuff all matter could already do; being wet is just one of the kinds of things matter was already capable of doing.
Phenomenal consciousness is defined in opposition to that kind of process. Nothing that the ordinary mechanical properties of matter can build up to, including the full complex and nuanced behavior of a human being, can constitute phenomenal consciousness by itself, as it is defined by the people who came up with the idea.
So if we want to say that everything that does instantiate that fully complex and nuanced behavior of a human being must have phenomenal consciousness like a human being (i.e. that philosophical zombies are not possible), then we either have to say that something wholly new pops into existence from nothing like magic, or say that there was something already there for it to be built up out of, something besides behavior -- a first-person experience.
rocks don't have experiences. What is it like to be an electron? is a nonsensical question — RogueAI
You're just arguing by assertion here. It sounds absurd to you to think that this could be the case, so you insist that it is not... but then if you follow through on that back through the chain of implications it ends up requiring even more absurd things. Basically: Rocks have some kind of experience, or else humans don't, or else magic happens. Saying humans don't have experiences or that magic happens are far more absurd than saying there is some trivial prototypical first-person perspective of a rock that's not even worth speaking of.
What is is like to be an electron? Well, let's start with a human and go from there. What's it like to be a human brain disconnected from a body? What's it like to be such a brain that's asleep, or heavily sedated on drugs? Basically, take what it's like to be a normal able-bodied awake adult human being and start stripping aspects of that away. Well before you get down to the level of an inert hunk of matter that used to be part of a brain, you've gotten something so distant from ordinary human experience that we don't have the words to describe it.
It's something we're already experiencing right now, underneath everything else we're experiencing right now, but it's such a trivial part of our experience that we never need speak of it. It's a little like the sound of your own heartbeat, or the sight of your own nose: it's technically always there in your experience but you never need take note of it
because it's always there. Except, in this case, far more so than that.
Likewise, I think that what it's like to be a rock, or an electron, is such a trivial experience that there's no need to ever say what it's like. But for reasons I've already gone over many times here, we have to affirm that there is something to it, something trivial and non-noteworthy and leave it at that, or else we end up having to affirm even crazier things.
If the claim is that things like rocks have experiences, you're so close to idealism, just go whole hog and ditch the physical. — RogueAI
If you followed the previous thread that this is a successor to, you'll see that my ontology is a kind of phenomenalism, as well as a kind of physicalism. Physical stuff is empirical stuff, and empirical stuff is phenomenal stuff. Phenomenal stuff is "mental" stuff, except it doesn't require that there actually be minds (in the normal, substantive, functional sense) to experience it, only that it be the kind of stuff that minds could experience, e.g. empirical. Any minds that do exist are physical things themselves, and therefore empirical things, and therefore phenomenal things, and therefore "mental" things in the floofy sense just described.
Minds are programs, matter is data, all programs are just made of data, data is all that feeds into and comes out of a program, and all data can be run as a program, but most of it just does nothing interesting when you do.