I feel like you think I'm saying there's nothing to be upset about or something. I am upset about Biden's ascent, but it seems like you're extra upset about elements about that that you don't understand correctly.

I don't know what you mean about how I "just" googled it. I knew the general facts that Bernie had more delegates than Biden from California and was securely in the lead even though the could was still ongoing, I just didn't know what the exact current numbers are because they're always changing, so I just looked those up right now before I posted.

Biden "won Super Tuesday" nationwide because he got more delegates nationwide from the states that were voting on that day, and pulled into the lead nationwide for total delegate count. Googling "democratic primary delegate count" right now shows the current numbers as 881 for Biden, 725 for Bernie, nationwide. As I said before, it's 210 Bernie vs 162 Biden in California. So Bernie won California on Super Tuesday (they're just still calculating by exactly how much), but not nationwide.

Could have early stage dementia. Sort of like Reagan. — Bitter Crank

Reagan had dementia? Now that I don't recall.

Oh dear.

Primary elections aren't winner-take-all by state the way the general election is. Delegates are appointed proportional to the actual vote count, so completing the vote count matters. Currently Bernie has secured 210 delegate and Biden 162 delegates (from that google link above, again). There's 43 left to appoint, so if they go in the same proportions as they have so far Bernie will probably get another 24 and Biden another 19. But the exact numbers do matter, and might be different.

I don't follow what it is you're not buying. Who is saying all the votes have to be tallied up before what? I mean, eventually they do need to be tallied, but it's pretty clear what the final tally (for California) is going to look like already, and that prediction is being reported. What are you seeing to the contrary, and where?

I mean, I just googled "did bernie win california" to get those numbers above and the results are showing lots of big-name news agencies reporting an expected win for him there.

I feel like I'm missing out on some news item that this is in response to, because last I saw Bernie has consistently been reported to win the clear majority of delegates from California (34% to Biden's 27%). And the reason the California vote is still being counted up is because we Californians can vote by mail right up to the day of the election, so those vote-by-mail ballots are still coming in and still being tallied. From what I've heard the late voters tend to lean more toward Biden than Bernie, but that's not possibly enough to tip the scales of California in his favor, with only about 5% of votes left to tally and Bernie leading by 7% right now.

Unfortunately, even California's enormous number of delegates doesn't look like enough to top the scales nationwide in Bernie's favor. It's still possible for him to win, but he'd need landslide victories in a bunch of states that are not his strong ground to do so, so I'm expecting the worst.

(And because somehow saying that someone is likely to lose seems to magically make people vote against them... wtf people, this isn't a guessing game, you don't "win" by voting for the worse-but-more-likely-to-win option! If someone, like me, says the better candidate is likely to lose, that means you need to go out there and vote for them even more!)

Hmm, I am unconvinced by that placement of philosophy of education. Why does education belong with physical science more than ethical sciences? Why does it belong with knowledge of reality more than acquisition of language? All six domains seem to include specific subjects that are taught and learned, I don't see what makes one section different in respect to education? — ZhouBoTong

Those are good points. I guess I was thinking of it as belonging there because that's the facet of education that I've focused on in my own essays, but yeah, there is learning to be done in every field. My first thought is that perhaps philosophy of education spans and intersects all of the fields, in the same way that history (which you'll note is not depicted on that chart) spans and intersects all fields. And really, much of education in any subject just is learning the history of that subject, getting caught up on what has already been studied so far, so those seem to fit together well.

Ok, I think I get this. We all have the ability to do philosophy, but that is not to say everyone uses this ability? There needs to be intention? Sorry if I take everything you say and try to put into dumber words...that is just how my brain confirms it is understanding...but I would guess it often leaves something out from the original message. — ZhouBoTong

No problem, paraphrasing like that is an important part of learning, or communication in general. And yeah, I think you understood me correctly.

Thanks for the feedback! I'm glad it was mostly understandable. :)

From the novice perspective, there were words (not many) I had to look up (like fideism), but that seemed fair. Otherwise you would be defining terms the whole time, so it seemed ok to expect a little effort from the reader. — ZhouBoTong

I did define fideism when I first used it in the book, back in the chapter Against Fideism. I do try to avoid making people look up unusual words, but I also assume that people are reading the whole thing from beginning to end.

First, I like the way that hexagonal chart comes together, but is that supposed to represent all philosophy? Or just showing the correlation between a few of the major philosophies? Most "philosophies" I can think would fit into one of the categories, but say, 'philosophy of education' doesn't seem to fit anywhere...and I would assume we could think of a few more? — ZhouBoTong

Yeah, that is intended to be representative of all of philosophy, though of course many of those sections could be further subdivided, especially the "Knowledge & Reality" and "Justice & Morality" ones. I would put philosophy of education in the "Knowledge & Reality" section, as education is about the institutes of knowledge (and a later essay in the book is even titled On Academics, Education, and the Institutes of Knowledge).

You say that all that is needed to 'do' philosophy is personhood, and the potential topics are vast...does this mean that ANY serious thinking counts as philosophy? I guess that is reasonable, but seems a bit weak? (not sure if weak is the right word, vague? incomplete?...??) — ZhouBoTong

Nah, I don't mean that any serious thinking counts as philosophy, just that the faculties needed to do philosophy are the same faculties that constitute personhood. Those same faculties can be applied to things other than philosophy, though all at least tangentially related to it in the ways elaborated on in this essay.

On a related note, you mention an important aspect of philosophical thought, "This reflexivity allows you to look upon your thoughts in the third person as though they were someone else's thoughts that you were judging, allowing you to assess the validity of the inferences you make, and so to do logic, to tease apart the relations between your various ideas." I have social problems that I think very much stem from me doing WAY too much of what you describe here. That being said, I have also found this reflexive analysis of our own thoughts to be so repulsive to many people that you can actually see pain on their faces when they are challenged to explain their thinking. Does this suggest a decent chunk of the population just has no interest in philosophy because they have very little interest in the "why's" of life? — ZhouBoTong

I think that's probably right that a decent chunk of the population has little interest in philosophy, but I don't think it's out of any kind of inherent disinterest, but more out of a feeling of overwhelm and helplessness. Like how when you get really behind on something, even a little something like keeping up with your email inbox, it seems so daunting to even approach what has become an enormous task that people get driven away and therefore the task gets even bigger in a vicious cycle.

I suspect that for a whole lot of people, the task of examining their own thoughts and feelings is like that. They take a peek in their own mind, see a huge mess that they can barely begin to even comprehend never mind to improve upon, get stressed and overwhelmed at the very prospect of beginning such an enormous project, and "NOPE!" out before even beginning it, because they have more important things to do like relaxing enough tonight to get to sleep early enough to be awake enough in the morning to do their job well enough to keep getting paid enough to keep paying their landlord to let them stay inside their home instead of getting kicked out onto the street.

For most of them, I imagine, even that chain of implications is too daunting to think about, and just "relax enough to get to sleep" is about all they've got the mental strength left to handle. This isn't their fault, but the fault of the harsh world we live in, and I believe that if people were less traumatized by life, far more of them would be inclined, and able, to do things like philosophy.

Yeah this really needed an "other" option.

I live in a solid blue state so I usually vote 3rd party (usually Green) because to do otherwise would be to throw my vote away. If the Democrats ever nominate a candidate that at least moves them in the right direction, like Bernie, then I'll vote for them as a reward.

But f I lived in a swing state, I would vote for whoever got the Democratic nomination just to stop the Republican candidate (so long as those nominees continue to stand for the things their parties generally stand for), so I answered "Biden" in this poll.

I've been in agreement or near agreement with you most of the times I've read your posts. And, which is even more important, when I've disagreed with you, I've still thought you pretty reasonable. — Artemis

That's nice to hear! I can't remember having any disagreement with you, and I think I remember us agreeing some times too.

I think an issue is that there is a tendency to only then reply to someone when you do disagree. "Like buttons" could give us a more accurate idea of whose ideas are garnering agreement.... Buuuut that would be undesirable for other reasons. — Artemis

I've adopted something I saw @180 Proof doing, which was replying with approving emojis in lieu of a "like" button. :up: :clap: :100:

@fdrake had some interesting comments on a similar line of thought in that same other thread I mentioned earlier:

I arrange the forum into a few tendencies.

There's the Wittgenstein monster.
There's the libertarian keyboard warriors.
There's the leftist keyboard warriors.
There's the mystics.
There's the denizens of the shoutbox/Lounge.
There's the weirdo continental metaphysics people.
There's outright bongclouds.
There's the "learn math better" machine.
There's the first fumblings in philosophy group, who are mostly new posters.
A related group to the above, the Personal Theory of Everything group.
There's the Pierce advocacy group.

We're missing a few we had at the old place. At least they're not represented much any more.

There was the jaded academic tendency.
There were the logic bots.
There was the Heidegger/destruction of metaphysics fanboy club.

And there are the ever present lurkers.

Edit: I forgot the "Interminable discussion of god therapy group" — fdrake

Philosophers also work with true statements, so it's not a belief system — xyzmix

Belief is not incompatible with truth. Knowledge is (at least) true belief.

how about starting with what it means to think philosophically? and what one's mind is actually trying to do when thinking philosophically? The answer to these would also show the way to answer your questions. — Bilge

That is a good approach, and is basically starting with metaphilosophy, which is also how I get to those basic philosophical archetypes I describe above, by introducing a single error in one direction or another away from the principles I conclude are necessary to do what philosophy is aiming to do:

I strongly suspect that such chains of inference at least tacitly underlie many philosophical views: those who see the rejection of fideism for criticism leading (so they think) to cynicism and thus nihilism, and to the rejection of transcendentalism for phenomenalism and thus (so they think) to nihilism again, rightly reject nihilism and thus (as they think necessary) phenomenalism with it, along with cynicism and thus (as they think necessary) criticism along with it, embracing transcendentalism and the fideism that it entails as their only hope (so they think) against nihilism. Conversely, those who see the rejection of nihilism for objectivism leading (so they think) to transcendentalism and thus fideism, and to the rejection of cynicism for liberalism and thus (so they think) to fideism again, rightly reject fideism and thus (as they think necessary) liberalism along with it, along with transcendentalism and thus (as they think necessary) objectivism along with it, embracing cynicism and the nihilism that it entails as their only hope (so they think) against fideism. This confusion of liberalism with fideism, or equivalently of criticism with cynicism, and likewise of phenomenalism with nihilism, or equivalently of objectivism with transcendentalism, leads many people, I suspect, to see the only available options as a transcendent fideistic view, or else a cynical nihilistic view. The differentiation of those superficial similarities and so the opening up of possibilities besides those two extremes is the key insight at the core of my entire general philosophy, embracing objectivism without transcendentalism, criticism without cynicism, liberalism without fideism, and phenomenalism without nihilism. — The Codex Quaerentis: Commensurablism

Where what philosophy is trying to do is:

... the pursuit of wisdom, not the possession or exercise thereof. Wisdom, in turn, does not merely mean some set of correct opinions, but rather is the ability to discern the true from the false, the good from the bad; or at least the more true from the less true, the better from the worse; the ability, in short, to discern superior answers from inferior answers to any given question. — The Codex Quaerentis: Metaphilosophy

That pleases me. :)

An old version of my own philosophy book used to take kind of a similar approach, and shades of it still remain in the current version. That old version was going to be a dialogue between characters who each represented internally-consistent versions of broad strains of philosophy. As I described them in another thread recently:

So basically you've got:

- 1. The fideistic archetype

- 2. The nihilistic archetype

- 3. The scientistic/libertarian "silicon valley brogrammer" archetype, who is like a tempered version of 1 about descriptive matters and like a tempered version of 2 about prescriptive matters

- 4. The constructivist/Marxist "social justice warrior" archetype, who is like a tempered version of 2 about descriptive matters and like a tempered version of 1 about prescriptive matters

- Someone like 3 about descriptive matters and like 4 about prescriptive matters

- Someone like 4 about descriptive matters and like 3 about prescriptive matters — Pfhorrest

I'm curious which if any of those groups you'd put me into (and who else might be representative of the others).

metaethics - Non-Identity Eudaimonic Naturalism — 180 Proof

Can you elaborate on what you mean by "non-identity" here? That's the only part of this I didn't (think I) understand.

:clap:

Sounds great, thanks!

I’m sorry to hear you’re not feeling well, and I totally understand that you need to give your mind a rest. I’ve been feeling down a lot of the past few days myself because of unusually late wintry weather, though since I live in a normally sunny place I’m expecting it to pass soon, and it’s nowhere near as bad as it sounds to be there. Hope you feel better soon!

Hi Forest!

Just curious, how would you defend your belief system? For instance, which domain would you draw from ( logic/deductive or inductive reasoning, cosmology, phenomenology/consciousness, metaphysics, existentialism, cognitive science/psychology).

I would be happy to debate the EOG based upon all of the above disciplines, if you want to start a thread. Up to you. I'm just wondering how an Atheist thinks, since I'm obviously not one. — 3017amen

I don’t feel a need to start a thread of my own just to defend my own view, but I’m happy to explain myself if you want to start one to question it. I gave a brief summary of my view and some brief reasons for it at the end of the post you replied to, if you’d like to quote that in the OP of a new thread or something. I’ll quote it here again for ease of reference:

To cut a lot philosophical arguments short, my current position is that while it is possible that (a) very powerful, very knowledgeable, and very good being(s) could exist somewhere in the universe (but only in the universe, because physicalism; including in some layer of reality outside of what we falsely think is the universe if we are in something like a simulation, for instance), what you're talking about there now is basically an alien, and there is evidently (because Problem of Evil) no such being sufficiently powerful, knowledgeable, and good to fulfill the role of "God" here on Earth. So sure, I'm (weakly) agnostic about the generic existence of nice, smart super-aliens somewhere, but there is definitely no God in the usual sense around these parts. — Pfhorrest

Yeah but I’m forming an analogy with supernatural so I’m going to use “super” for that word too.

But on third or fourth thought I’m considering maybe “nurtural” as the analogue of “natural”, for a number of reasons: “nature” and “nurture” are already juxtaposed in other contexts (where they both mean different things than they do here), their etymologies have connotations of “the way things were beforehand” and “the way we’re making them” that befit the is-ought distinction, “nurture” connotes a focus on “material” wellbeing and caretaking (as opposed to, say, obedient) and also food (obviously related to appetite) that befits the hedonic meaning I’m aiming for, and roots or cognates of “nurture” also have a meaning or “manner or character” that makes it also synonymous with “ethos” and so fitting for the physical : natural :: ethical :: nurtural analogy.

Thoughts?

Take it up with the thousands of years of philosophers who use them differently, not me. I'm just following their convention.

I hate to bump my own things, but I also hate to see this disappear with no comment before I move on to the next. @ZhouBoTong? @bert1? @god must be atheist? @fdrake? @jamalrob? @Mww? @180 Proof?

he thing I value most with others are questions of the kind: 'what about X?' or 'what impacts would taking Y into account have on this?': forging connections, extending the field of inquiry, bringing something new to the table — StreetlightX

Agreed, that was what I found more enjoyable about my time studying philosophy at university.

It's a difference of how to philosophically understand the same objects, not two different classes of objects. Materialists will say all physical things are material, non-materialists will say none of them are.

The difference is that you have a reliable point of reference in the case of physical sciences that's not there for morality. It's not only that those experiences are subjective, it's that those experience are already informed by morality. We do not suddenly wake up when we are 18 or so when we have enough maturity to think about this, and start experiencing good and bad things in a vacuum... we already have been conditioned into some form of morality, which will influence how we value those experiences. So how does that work as an objective science, we measure morality by a moving standard that is itself informed by morality? — ChatteringMonkey

You seem to be thinking of moral beliefs. I'm not talking about that. I'm not saying we base morality on what people think is moral; that has all the problems you just outlined. I'm not even saying we base morality on what people want. I'm saying we base morality on what feels good or bad to people.

It's the difference between "I am hungry" (an experience, an appetite), "I want a burrito" (a desire), and "I deserve a burrito" (moral beliefs). I'm not saying that you thinking you deserve a burrito should be a moral consideration, or even you wanting a burrito should be a moral consideration, but your feeling of hunger should be a moral consideration, and any complete moral plan of action will not just leave your hunger unsatisfied, though it may not give you the burrito you want or agree that you deserve one.

So any procedure for answering moral questions will do, as long as it is comprehensive? No other criteria of success are required? — SophistiCat

If I understand the question correctly then yes, but I suspect this is a trap somehow.

If by that you mean that I haven't read your articles on morality, then no, I haven't. That wasn't the subject of this thread. — SophistiCat

No, I just mean the many words I have already written in this thread.

That sort of Cartesian scheme that you outline doesn't remotely resemble the way science is done. — SophistiCat

What "Cartesian scheme" are you talking about, that doesn't remotely resemble the way science is done? Science is definitely objectivist, and critical (as in skeptical), and phenomenal (empirical), and on most modern accounts at least, what I called "liberal", which in this context basically means falsificationist. All I'm claiming about science is that it operates somewhere within those broad restraints: you're not going to get science done if you're making relativist claims (that reality depends on opinion), appeals to faith or authority, or to evidence beyond observation. I said all of this before, I don't know why I have to repeat myself.

But even if your approach was better at aping science, that still wouldn't make it any better than a cargo cult, because you still aren't thinking about why you do what you do. Why should morality resemble science? — SophistiCat

I'm getting tired of that naked insult there being repeated, and the implication that I'm not thinking about the motives behind this. I already explained them in great length in response to Wayfarer last night.

I'm not just saying "hey, let's copy science! that will work!" I developed general principles about inquiry of any sort, out of more specific principles about both descriptive and prescriptive fields; my epistemology borrows from liberal deontological methodologies, for instance. I then applied those general principles about inquiry of any sort to both inquiry about reality, and inquiry about morality. Not because of a starting assumption that morality has to copy science, but because there's no reason not to apply those general principles of inquiry to one kind of inquiry and not others; they're general principles after all. Those principles applied to inquiry about reality give a broadly scientific method: critical rationalist epistemology and empirical realist ontology. The same principles applied without any modification to inquiry about morality therefore automatically give a moral analogue of that method.

I didn't set out to build a moral science, I set out to investigate questions about how to investigate questions about both reality and morality, and wound up with general principles that could be applied to both. You're the one saying that a special exception should be made for moral inquiry. That's what calls for justification, not just applying the same principles as I would to any other inquiry.

I'm not denying hedonism. I thought I'd been pretty clear about that.

I'm denying that hedonism necessarily means that whatever a majority desires is good, in the same way that I would deny that empiricism means that whatever a majority perceives is true.

Firstly, perceptions are subject to interpretation. But even if we go down to the level of sensations, which aren't, a majority isn't good enough. All of them count.

Likewise, desires are subject to interpretation. But even if we go down to the level of appetites, which aren't, a majority isn't good enough. All of them count.

We don't "do empiricism" by polling people about their perceptions, and we shouldn't "do hedonism" by polling people about their desires. What do we do instead of that, when we "do empiricism"? And how can we adapt that to a better way to do hedonism too?

In any case, when combined with all the rest of my ethical principles, especially liberalism, hedonism just boils down to "if you want to claim that this is wrong, you need to show how it hurts someone". I still get the impression that you think it means people selfishly and short-sightedly over-indulging in the most base and carnal pleasures.

What's the difference? — Zelebg

Physical just means as you say, observable. Empirical. Often times colloquially "materialism" is used synonymously, sure, but there is also a long philosophical history at least from Aritstotle to Locke of treating "material" objects as having some kind of "material substance" that "underlies" their observable properties, or in which those properties "inhere". A non-materialist physicalist considers that nonsense: if you stripped away in your mind all the observable properties of a thing you're imagining, down to just the bare substance, you'd be left imagining nothing, so the notion of a "material substance" apart from its observable properties is incoherent. Physical things are just bundles of their properties, the observable properties are the whole of the thing, there's no unobservable "real thing in itself" to which those properties are stuck. People like Hume and Berkeley argued strongly against that kind of materialism in the Modern era.

I would say that I don’t believe that there is a stegosaurus in my room. — Pinprick

Great. Now would you also say you believe there is not a stegosaurus in your room, or are you undecided about the existence of stegosauruses in your room?

The problem with this issue is that atheists are so intent on pretending that they do not possess "beliefs" — Frank Apisa

Not necessarily. I'm an atheist and I positively affirm that I believe there are no gods, and am happy to defend that.

It's just that someone who does not believe either way still does not believe there are any gods, and so still counts as an atheist. There are different shades of atheism, weak and strong. I'm a strong atheist, but weak atheists are atheists too.

On the question of "Is there at least one god...or are there no gods"...the best anyone can do is to make a blind guess. There is no way whatsoever that one can get to a "yes there is at least one" or "no, there are none" using logic, reason, science, or math. — Frank Apisa

In your opinion. The position you're espousing is called "strong agnosticism", which is the view that not only is it not known to oneself (as in weak agnosticism), but it cannot be known to anyone, whether or not there is a god.

That's far from proven though, and many if not most people think differently, including myself. I was raised in a theist household and so grew up just inheriting a nominal belief in God from my parents, then grew up and realized that the picture of God they held didn't accord with what I had since learned of the world, tried for a long while to figure out some other "better" picture of how God could still exist, for a while even thought I had "proven" that he "must" (in what I now look back on as laughably bad arguments about how we must be in a simulation, basically), eventually ended up identifying God with the universe itself (after proving to my satisfaction that nothing within the universe could count as God and nothing outside the universe can exist) and calling myself a pantheist, before eventually deciding that that was a uselessly confusing label and that nothing I believe differed from the things atheists believe, and just calling myself that instead.

To cut a lot philosophical arguments short, my current position is that while it is possible that (a) very powerful, very knowledgeable, and very good being(s) could exist somewhere in the universe (but only in the universe, because physicalism; including in some layer of reality outside of what we falsely think is the universe if we are in something like a simulation, for instance), what you're talking about there now is basically an alien, and there is evidently (because Problem of Evil) no such being sufficiently powerful, knowledgeable, and good to fulfill the role of "God" here on Earth. So sure, I'm (weakly) agnostic about the generic existence of nice, smart super-aliens somewhere, but there is definitely no God in the usual sense around these parts.

Partially inspired by this conversation, I just added the following two paragraphs to my essay on my general philosophy:

Phenomenalism may superficially sound similar to nihilism (there being nothing more to things than their experiential qualities sounds superficially similar to there being no actual things but only the appearance of them), but as previously elaborated in my essays against nihilism and against transcendentalism, I differentiate clearly between the two, and hold to objectivism. Conversely, while objectivism may sound like it could entail transcendentalism, for the same reasons but in reverse, I have already explained why I think it does not, and still hold to phenomenalism as well. An objective phenomenalism is not nihilistic, and a phenomenal objectivism is not transcendent. Likewise, liberalism may superficially sound similar to fideism (not requiring justification to hold a belief sounds superficially similar to condoning appeals to faith), but as previously elaborated in my essays against fideism and against cynicism, I differentiate clearly between the two, and hold to criticism. And conversely, while criticism may sound like it could entail cynicism, for the same reasons but in reverse, I have already explained why I think that does not, and still hold to liberalism as well. A critical liberalism is not fideistic, and a liberal criticism is not cynical.

I strongly suspect that such chains of inference at least tacitly underlie many philosophical views: those who see the rejection of fideism for criticism leading (so they think) to cynicism and thus nihilism, and to the rejection of transcendentalism for phenomenalism and thus (so they think) to nihilism again, rightly reject nihilism and thus (as they think necessary) phenomenalism with it, along with cynicism and thus (as they think necessary) criticism along with it, embracing transcendentalism and the fideism that it entails as their only hope (so they think) against nihilism. Conversely, those who see the rejection of nihilism for objectivism leading (so they think) to transcendentalism and thus fideism, and to the rejection of cynicism for liberalism and thus (so they think) to fideism again, rightly reject fideism and thus (as they think necessary) liberalism along with it, along with transcendentalism and thus (as they think necessary) objectivism along with it, embracing cynicism and the nihilism that it entails as their only hope (so they think) against fideism. This confusion of liberalism with fideism, or equivalently of criticism with cynicism, and likewise of phenomenalism with nihilism, or equivalently of objectivism with transcendentalism, leads many people, I suspect, to see the only available options as a transcendent fideistic view, or else a cynical nihilistic view. The differentiation of those superficial similarities and so the opening up of possibilities besides those two extremes is the key insight at the core of my entire general philosophy, embracing objectivism without transcendentalism, criticism without cynicism, liberalism without fideism, and phenomenalism without nihilism. — The Codex Quaerentis: Commensurablism

But physicalism is understood in the realist sense of materialism. There is some kind of mind-independent stuff making up the world. — Marchesk

Yeah, but realist doesn't have to mean transcendent. Being mind-independent is not the same thing as being mind-inaccessible. There is (on my account) definitely stuff out there that isn't generated by or contained in our minds, but is entirely constituted of mind-accessible stuff. It's all information, and not all of the information is in our minds, but any kind of information can in principle be copied or modeled or recreated in our minds, which are information-processing machines, themselves constituted of more information (just as every program in a computer is made of data of the same kind that it reads, manipulates, and writes; and tying back to panpsychism, any bit of data can be run as code, but most of it won't do anything of note when run, just like on my account everything has phenomenal experience, but most things have nothing of any note in theirs).

It's certainly incompatible with materialism. A mathematical ontology isn't compatible with there being stuff, so I don't see how it's physical. But I guess if we're allowed to redefine the meaning of "physical" to be whatever is consistent with physical models. — Marchesk

Yeah, physicalism isn't the same thing as materialism. Berkeley called his whole ontology "immaterialism" (though we today call it "subjective idealism"), and yet he still professed physicalism. I am against "materialism" in the same sense that Berkeley is: I don't think there is any more to physical things than their empirical properties, which are just dispositions of them to produce certain experiences in us, by behaving upon us in certain ways upon our interaction with them. (My underlying ontology on how those experiences all get generated and synchronized coherently with each other is drastically different from Berkeley's though, as he basically just said "God did it is observing everything all the time", while mine is more "all things are mutually observing each other all the time").

I don't see where the functional turns into the phenomenal. You have every bit as much a hard problem with functionalism as you do with materialism. — Marchesk

When you're treating the entire universe as just a bunch of informational signals passing between functionally-defined nodes of a single giant informational structure that is our universe, and treating phenomenal experience as just being the recipient of signals from outside of yourself, they mesh together much better than when you treat the rest of the universe as dead billiard balls (hey, even billiard balls can process information if you set them up right) and phenomenal experience as ineffable magic.

:up:

I decided that I was unsatisfied with the lack of parallelisms between any of these (abnegative / austere / ascetic) options and "natural", so I decided to just go for a direct linguistic parallel.

So I've coined the term "superusural", as Latin "usura" and so "usural" bears the same relation to the Greek-derived "ethics" (evidenced by many Romance languages giving their cognate of "use" as a translation of the Greek root "ethos") as Latin "natura" and so "natural" bears to the Greek-derived "physics".

That analogy I wanted to complete earlier is thus:

real : physical : natural
::
moral : ethical : usural

"Utor", the root of "usura", also has meanings of enjoying and experiencing, making it especially appropriate for something related to hedonism, and there are clear implications of usefulness and thence utilitarianism which, while I don't agree with it on all points, at least shares altruistic hedonism with my view.

So henceforth, usuralism is the moral analogue of naturalism, and superusuralism its opposite, like supernaturalism.

This *is* a kind of utilitarianism, as I and others here have said, even though you keep disputing it. The basic definition of utilitarianism is 'the greatest good for the greatest number', and I don't see how you're not saying that. — Wayfarer

I've repeatedly elaborated on how I'm not. That's why I keep drawing the analogy with physical sciences, to illustrate that difference. The physical-science analogue of utilitarianism would be "ask everybody what they believe is real, and declare whatever the majority says to be reality". We adamantly do not do that in the physical sciences, for good reason, and I am vehemently opposed to doing it in ethics either, for the same reasons. Instead, I say, look at what the physical sciences do do instead of that, and adapt that to ethical inquiry, by substituting empirical experiences (experiences that "seem true or false", and upon interpretation give rise to opinions about reality) with hedonic experiences (experiences that "seem good or bad", and upon interpretation give rise to opinions about morality). NB that physical science aims to account for all (replicable) empirical experiences, not just a simple majority, and my ethical science would do likewise with hedonic experiences.

The problem is, that 'the bounds of experience' are very much culturally-conditioned also. If you're in a culture that values spiritual experience, then such experiences are by nature not out of bounds.There are ways of disseminating them, ways of navigating them. That's one of the meanings of culture. — Wayfarer

If those "spiritual experiences" are replicable -- if someone else can go and do the same things that someone who claims to have them did, and also have them, the same ones -- then they're perfectly admissible in my ethical system (and my take of science, for that matter, if the experiences are of a descriptive rather than prescriptive nature). If they're not replicable, then they're useless as a common grounds for questioning which opinions are the right or wrong ones (you're back to just opposing claims about who had which experience and which was legit), and only then ruled out as putting some things beyond question.

At the end of the day an ethical philosophy has to provide for an unqualified good - something which is good as a matter of fact, not opinion. — Wayfarer

Absolutely. Which is why saying either "there is no matter of fact, there is only opinion" (nihilism) or "you'll just have to take [arbitrary source]'s word that this is the matter of fact" (fideism) cannot possibly work. The first for obvious reasons, the second for the only slightly-less obvious reason that's as old as the Euthyphro: what if "the gods" (different arbitrary sources appealed to as authoritative) disagree, how do you choose which one to listen to?; and even if they do all agree, are they right because they know of some good reason to think as they do (in which case it's that reason that really matters to us, and they're just messengers), or is just any arbitrary thing they say right by definition (in which case, how is that any better than mere opinion)?

I’m a panpsychist like you, as you know, and I support MUH. They fit together very nicely in my view: if everything is a mathematical structure, and physical reality, which is to say empirical reality, is just the structure of which we are a part, with which we are in communication, then phenomenal experience is just the input into our function of signals from other functions of that structure, which in turn have their own inputs that constitute their own phenomenal experiences, and outputs that constitute their behaviors, which constitute all of their observable, empirical, physical properties. To do is to be perceived, to perceive is to be done unto, and to do or perceive or be perceived or be done unto is to be.

To justify this, the author presents two possibilities based on the following argument — StarsFromMemory

And then he criticizes that by criticizing the view that there is one particular place somewhere in the causal chain that the experiencing happens, which by the end he seems rather resoundly against with the whole flipped-vision-goggles scenario.

Which you pretty much say here:

The key point here is that both the possibility are derived assuming 'Cartesian theater theory' because the narrator assumes the following sequence of events : — StarsFromMemory

Hence, both the possibility the author derives rests on a widely criticized philosophical presupposition. If the Cartesian theatre theory is not true, then the possibility of qualia correction does not even arise and hence qualia inversion must follow. (if sensations don't accumulate in one place to be processed) — StarsFromMemory

I don't see him making that conclusion, and I don't follow how you can make that conclusion. Qualia inversion is only possible if Cartesian theater theory is true and the second of those two correction-scenarios is the case. If Cartesian theater theory is false, then there isn't any one place in the causal chain where the experiencing happens, and so if beginning-to-end you have the same results, the overall experience is the same. Like the people with the upside-down goggles said: asking whether they're rotating the image in their mind or rotating their body movements to match the upside-down image is incoherent to them, they're the same thing to them.

There should be a distinction. One would mean changing perception to ensure no change in behaviour is required, and the other would be changing behaviour to ensure no change in perception is required.

However, I think what you meant was, that we cannot empirically know which one it is. — StarsFromMemory

No, I'm saying that, according to your article, the people who had fully adapted to wearing upside-down goggles reported that there was no difference between those two scenarios to them. The question of whether it was their perception or their behavior that had adapted was deemed incoherent, by them, who had done the adaptation. Which suggests that Cartesian theater theory is false (there isn't one place in the chain where the experiencing happens), and so qualia inversion isn't actually a thing.

Would the function of pain in an organism for whom survival is not of prime importance be vastly different than the function of pain is us? — StarsFromMemory

Yes, of course. Pain is what I term an "appetitive" experience, an experience of something seeming good or bad (in this case, bad), an imperative experience, one that commands you, rather than an indicative experience, that merely informs you. We have appetites that command us to do things that contributed to our survival and reproduction, because we descend (with inheritance) only from creatures that did likewise, because creatures that did otherwise did not survive and reproduce to leave any successors to inherit those features. If somehow a creature were to come into being through a process other than evolution, so that such features did not preclude such beings from coming to exist as they would an evolved species, then those creatures could in principle have completely different appetites than we do, or none at all. (My computer, for instance, probably doesn't experience anything vaguely like pain, and probably would not, unless we carefully programmed it to).

Naturalism certainly starts with the axiom of 'nothing beyond nature' . You yourself start with that presumption — Wayfarer

I don't start from it, I derive it from the earlier methodological principle of criticism. You can't possibly test claims about things beyond all experience ("beyond nature"), so any claims about that are inherently unquestionable, and so violate the principle to hold everything open to question ("criticism").

That principle (criticism) in turn is an application of an even deeper, practical principle that I've sometimes termed "humility": always assume in every endeavor that failure is still possible, or equivalently that success is not guaranteed. Applied to the endeavor of inquiry, that means always assuming there is a possibility that your answers might be wrong, i.e. holding them open to questioning.

That principle (humility) is in turn an application of the even deeper practical principle to always try. If you assume success is guaranteed, or that failure is impossible, then there is no need to try; trying tacitly assumes that you need to try and can't just sit back and win with no effort.

Another practical application of that first principle to always try, one on par with "humility", which I've sometimes termed "hope", is to always assume in every endeavor that success is still possible, or equivalently that failure is not guaranteed. For the same reason that in trying, you must tacitly assume that there is a point to trying, and aren't just doomed to failure no matter what.

Applied to the endeavor of inquiry, that means always assuming that there are genuine answers (not mere opinions) to be found, even if you haven't found them yet. That ("hope" applied to inquiry) is the principle I call "objectivism".

And a consequence of that, on par with phenomenalism (that principle you're disputing, about nothing being beyond experience), is a principle I call "liberalism", which says to allow people to hold any opinion as their preferred possible answer until it can be shown wrong, because to do otherwise would, via infinite regress, require holding no opinions to be possible options at all; or else, contra criticism, starting with some things being just beyond question.

Those four things derived from "always try", applied to ethics specifically, mean:

- Assume it's possible to find genuine answers to moral questions
- Don't just take anyone's word for what they are, question everything
- Take everything as "possibly good", i.e. permissible, until it is shown bad
- Show things bad by appealing to repeatable experiences of them feeling bad

That's really the core of my whole ethical system, and the rest is just details.

I think this is an interesting question and I'm disappointed it didn't get any responses back when.

I lack time to think of an answer right now, but maybe I will get to one later.

Is there a stegosaurus in your room right now? Probably not. So which do you believe: that there is a stegosaurus in your room, or that there's not? Hopefully, you believe that there is not. (You could in principle believe neither, if you're unsure, but that's almost as crazy as believing that there is one, so hopefully you don't only lack belief that there is one but also possess belief that there is not one).

Strong atheists have the same kind of belief about gods as you (hopefully) do about stegosauruses in your room. (Weak atheists just lack belief that there is).

They also believe, like you probably do, that there are trees outside and that the midday sky is blue and that Paris is the capital of France, and all kinds of other things, so they definitely don't believe in nothing, and their beliefs aren't even all negative like your belief abut stegosauruses in your room are.

Yes, but those philosophical presuppositions are entirely justified while the presuppositions required for the correction of qualia before it becomes conscious have been widely abandoned — StarsFromMemory

...no? All that part you quoted about the problems of the Cartesian Theater view is questioning the presuppositions that lead to the conclusion that qualia inversion occurs, and therefore supporting my position that it doesn't.

I think the most illuminating part of that paper is the bit about people wearing vision-rotating goggles, where the people who have fully adapted to the upside-down view of the world to the point that they can do all the normal things people can do with right-side-up vision report that the very question of whether they've learned to internally perceive the upside-down view as right-side-up or just learned how to control their bodies to account for an apparently upside-down world is simply incoherent. There isn't a clear distinction between mentally flipping their perception and flipping their body movements to compensate for their flipped perception: it's the same thing, changing the behavioral output is the same thing as changing to perceptual input.