Comments

  • Universe as simulation and how to simulate qualia
    If by "experience" you mean some kind of mechanical thing happening in the subject, as you seem to, then there is no question.

    Experience is an event that leaves some kind of impression on the subject. That is just English, very general metaphysical logic, does not imply mechanics nor physicalism, it only implies change. It should not be controversial, simply means if x remains identical after some event then x has not perceived that event. So, if we agree now, then my point still stands.
  • Universe as simulation and how to simulate qualia
    The panpsychist like me says "yes", but it's nothing special or a different kind of stuff: it comes for free with the same stuff that does the behavior, but it is not identical to the behavior, but rather the flip side of the same thing the behavior is one side of: function.

    Experience is an event that leaves some kind of impression on the subject. If panpsychist wants to claim stones are sentient they should point out what particular kind of change in a stone could reflect impression of some event.

    If they do, then they would end up describing some mechanics, leaving it unclear whether the dynamics of it by itself is sufficient. Panpsychists have a problem to justify their hypothesis is even necessary.

    If they don’t, then the change caused by an event impression must be going on in some unknown substance or dimension, and if that is the belief it makes panpsychism equal with theological dualism.
  • Universe as simulation and how to simulate qualia
    This is a non-problem if you don't conceive of "qualia" as something that material things need to "produce", but just as an aspect of the being of all (material) things.

    Yes, once you conclude no kind of mechanics could even begin to explain subjective experience, then panpsychism comes on top as the remaining alternative.

    But then, if you look at all the processing for visual perception, for example, it not only reminds of algorithmic modularity, but is apparently necessary, for some reason.

    So at the end panpsychism doesn’t explain anything, and the old questions kind of remain because it still needs to explain all the computing, not how to produce sentience per se, but how it all comes together, plus what brain processing has anything to do with it and why.


    On the other hand, I see a way to argue for virtual, simulated mind and consciousness, but whether it will be deemed plausible depends more on the definition of the word “experience” than on the argument itself. In other words, if only we could define it, then we would be able to simulate it. Unless, of course, panpsychism or ghosts are real, in which case we might be able to emulate it.
  • Epistemology versus computability
    Of course we see the output. They are the nerve signals that get sent to the limbs to take action, or to the mouth to speak, etc. I did say that the output was our intent and actions.


    Obviously the output I was talking about is qualia.


    Words can refer to imaginary things or illusions.

    Yes, and in that case it’s the other way around - mental or abstract existence of ideas is actual, while their representations can become physical.


    What do you mean by "physical" and "mental"?

    What I said. https://www.merriam-webster.com/


    Information is meaning.

    Certainly not. https://www.merriam-webster.com/
  • Universe as simulation and how to simulate qualia

    Chinese room is restricted by its setting, replies to it are lame. Many people believe consciousness can be simulated, so I am hoping to find something less senseless than “room is conscious”. It was also disappointing to hear Giulio Tononi (Integrated information theory), when asked about qualia, to say “that’s just how integrated information feels”.
  • Epistemology versus computability
    A server.

    “Computer without monitor” was a metaphor, and the point is that when we look at the brain we see input and processing, but not where or what the result and "output" is.

    So again, to understand qualia and mental content, analogy between mind and computer is not complete until we discover a thing that is analogous to computer output, such as display screen, for example.


    I think a better term would be "information". Not physical or mental. Physical and mental is a false dichotomy that leads to dualism. Everything is information.

    Words refer to things, and that is exactly what the word “physical” and “mental” differentiate - actual things from their abstract representations.

    Information carries no inherent meaning, it needs a context or decoding against or within which it can be understood or perceived.
  • Universe as simulation and how to simulate qualia
    That a computer program could implement a mind. Now we're back to Searle's Chinese room. We have no evidence that a computer could implement a mind; only simulate an environment.

    Exactly, so I'm looking if there are any arguments claiming the opposite.
  • Epistemology versus computability
    The computer is the best analogy for the mind that we've had in our history of thinking about the mind and its relationship with the world .

    Yes, but what is computer without display screen? All the electrons moving around electronic components is like electrochemical signaling in our brains. Information without inherent meaning, something that needs to be decoded or integrated in some way, at some place where it all comes together to form subjective experience or qualia - that parallel to a computer screen which displays the mental content and at the same time perceives it, somehow.

    The problem with computers is that it is all mechanical actually, in a sense that in principle you could make a PC powered on water instead of electric current and replace electronic components with wooden contraptions to produce the same kind of computation. Imagining this computer makes it more obvious why many say it is impossible computation could ever explain mind phenomena such as subjective experience and mental content.
  • Epistemology versus computability
    In other words, how would you arrive by computation to possibly the only certain epistemological and ontological true statement: “I think, therefore I know I exist”?

    Also, is that realization a thought or a feeling, cognition or intuition? Is it maybe bound to language? And if it is, perhaps by acquiring an understanding of some language, then the logic of such sentence automatically becomes self-evident?

    So, how to make an algorithm “understand”, and then to understand words like “I”, “know”, or “exist”? But, what “to understand” actually means? And even before that, what the word “means” really means?

    On closer inspection the relation between computation and epistemology seems to be more like the relation between a certain fact and complete mystery.
  • Epistemology versus computability
    If it is consistent, then it is incomplete. If it is complete, then it is inconsistent.

    Is consistent and incomplete supposed to be any better than inconsistent and complete? They look kind of the same to me, like partial truth is still a lie, in a sense that it can misguide you just the same.

    But is there a reason we should think incompleteness theorem actually applies to anything but a bunch of narrow and specific mathematical abstractions?
  • There is definitely consciousness beyond the individual mind
    Morphic resonance, biocentrism, panpsychism, god… do we know yet what are we talking about here? Can someone sum up in a sentence exactly what new thing is being proposed, or what is the central claim that is supposed to explain or justify the statement in the title of this thread?
  • Epistemology versus computability
    In other words, how would you arrive by computation to possibly the only certain epistemological and ontological true statement: “I think, therefore I know I exist”?
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    What are you replying or referring to?
  • Epistemology versus computability
    I wonder if computability and epistemology are ultimately not one and the same thing?

    Once the axioms have been postulated it is all about mechanically following the rules and procedures. But what about ontological axioms based on intuition, self-evident, when some things just make innate, unexplainable yet somehow still logical sense.

    It seems your question is actually asking whether consciousness is a computable function able to produce results such as imagination and intuition. And if not, then they are not one and the same, but where exactly is the difference amounts to what is called ‘the hard problem of consciousness’.
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    researchers confirmed that the nervous system ‘can’ transmit messages to future generations.

    You pointed to a thing that needs explanation, but what is the explanation supposed to be, morphic resonance, biocentrism? What new concept or mechanics is that theory proposing?
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...

    Can you sum up a few points to see if I already heard about it, and link to that podcast.
  • Why x=x ?

    Not at all. Numbers are not real as ‘electrochemical dynamics’. Here you’re mistaking an event for a representation.

    Your English dictionary module seems to be broken. That is not an event, but process, and also collection of states it produces. Namely the process of thinking and states of mind with content such as ideas or mental pictures.


    Neural dynamics don’t ‘represent’ anything, they’re not signs. Science has sought to understand the neural events triggered by simple leaning tasks through scans, and no regularities or patterns can be found at all. It’s not as if some pattern of neural events ‘stands for’ a number or other kind of concept. This idea that concepts are neural events is the myth that underlies materialism, but it’s not true.

    What in the world are you even trying to say? You asserted a lot of “it is not true”, but forgot to explain any, and also never mentioned what do you believe is true instead.


    All you’re expressing is the belief that ‘everything exists in time and space’. But you’re not seeing that time and space themselves are co-created by the observing mind, they don’t have a reality independent of cognition. This is one of the cardinal points of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

    Ughh. I’m simply unpacking the meaning of the words defined in English dictionary, and you can not continue this argument without redefining those terms first or you will end up contradicting yourself and basically not really speaking English language but gibberish.


    1. To exist out of time is to exist never.
    2. To exist out of space is to exist nowhere.
    3. To exist nowhere or never means not existing at all.

    Where exactly and why do you believe to see a fallacy?
  • Can Hume's famous Induction Problem also be applied to Logic & Math?
    Ok. I did that.

    It makes sense in some abstract fantasy context, as a painting for example. But circles that are not round you can not even paint because the two terms are semantically linked so strongly they are almost synonyms. It’s like trying to paint a flower that is not a flower. It's gibberish, a contradiction, it does not compute, and being semantically invalid statement it can not be sanely reasoned about.
  • Can Hume's famous Induction Problem also be applied to Logic & Math?
    How to know such a fact. Perhaps you meant, agreeing to assume?

    Something like that, but calling circle “round” is not about making assumptions, it is about putting a label on a specific and certain geometrical relation.

    Nonsense in imagining that circle is no longer round is due to using two terms from one formal system which are linked together and then moving one of them to the context of some new undefined reference chart of meanings. This is just an exercise in messing with the English dictionary and produces gibberish. Imagine a flower is a vacuum cleaner.
  • Can Hume's famous Induction Problem also be applied to Logic & Math?
    The problem is semantic, it is about constructing a formal system for common meaning to help us communicate. Imagining then some other system of reference meanings does not speak about actual change in the outside world, but about personal interpretation module. Dealing with it would manifest with difficulties in communication.
  • Why x=x ?
    So, such things as logical principles, scientific laws, mathematical objects, are all essential to empirical science, but they don't necessarily exist in time and space either.

    Ideas are not real, precisely because they don't exist in time. That's what it means to be real, to exist in space and time.

    For something to exist or be real does necessarily mean it is manifested in time and space. To exist out of time is to exist never. To exist out of space is to exist nowhere. To exist nowhere or never means not existing at all. Ok?

    Unicorn and number 3 do exists in my mind and they are real as electrochemical dynamics of my brain. Pacman exists and is real, both abstractly or virtually as electrodynamics in electronic components of its arcade machine, and actually in its physical form on the display screen.

    For something to be real or to exist means it is causally relevant, or measurable. In other words, it exists if it matters. Virtual existence is material existence as well, and thus causally relevant. Only virtual things do not exist materially in their actual form, but virtually like any other form of information, indirectly embedded in the physical morphology of the material world, within space and time.
  • Can Hume's famous Induction Problem also be applied to Logic & Math?
    What prevents us from imagining that we all wake up tomorrow and a circle is no longer round

    The same thing that prevents you, or should prevent you, to imagine our planet is actually called Penis, while knowing for a fact it is named Earth. Nonsense.
  • Why x=x ?
    Many axioms aren't self-evident in any fashion.

    It would be interesting to hear if there are any non-self-evident axioms outside abstractions in the field of mathematics.
  • Why x=x ?
    The Law of Identity states that a certain thing is identical to itself...

    It also states that a certain thing is different to every other thing, in a way. But in any case it is vague and ambiguous statement, especially since there is indeed more than one valid context in which the law can, and has been interpreted.

    Words, being ontologically virtual, a form of embedded information, like all the other imaginary entities from mental realm are not identical with things they represent, and a single word can represent multiple things, or even change meanings depending on various factors.

    In this context physical entities, in contrast to those abstract ones, actually do stand for what they are. And in that sense we can say physical entities are identical to their ontological manifestation or existence within space and time, as opposed to be a representation or pointer to something else.


    ...and I ask why

    Semantically it is about coherence, and the law states that during a reasoning the meaning of any term must remain constant. It originated in this context. Here, the reason why is because otherwise conversation would be meaningless.

    Mathematically it is about interchangeability, and the law states algebraic manipulation of variables around equal sign preserves equation validity as long as both sides compute the same value. In this case the reason why is because it makes no difference to the calculation result.

    Physically it is about persistence, and the law states something does not cease to exist or become something else for no reason, it remains to be that which it was, uniquely defined by its spatial location and geometrical morphology at any given point in time. The answer to the why question here is because we observe it to be so.

    This last paragraph above I guess is the context you are asking about, and of course quantum mechanics has its own take on the fundamental nature of existence, but then I do not hear anyone is saying QM makes sense or follows rules of logic, so I suppose we can simply ignore it.
  • Why x=x ?
    The proposition is simply: A thing resembles itself. The question is, "what is the proof?"

    An apple is an apple can refer to a whole fruit category or species, meaning apples generally share common properties that differentiate them from strawberries, crocodiles, and everything else. It is really about similarity rather than identity.

    More pragmatic is referring to actual apple out there in the world, and then identity has to do with location. The proof is empirical observation that only one physical particle can exist at any given point in space at any given point in time, which basically means any actual or physical thing, as opposed to virtual or imaginary thing, can only be what it is when it is, i.e. it can only be itself and nothing else.
  • Why x=x ?
    "an apple is an apple", but why?

    Intuition.

    Some things just make innate sense, we say they are self-evident. That is the answer you are looking for. There is no deeper, more specific, or more meaningful reason.


    I do not see anyone trying to prove x=x

    Because traditionally it has been taken as one of the _starting assumptions (premises), which are called axioms or postulates.

    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_thought

    Aristotle, for example, considered it to be the primary axiom for deriving the very concept of truth and falsity, thus consequently upon which all the rest of logic depends.


    Aren't axioms, self-evident assumptions? If so, when can we accept self-evident beliefs, just when they are practical? Do we have to analyse the relation between truth and practicality then?

    Yes, axioms are self-evident assumptions, but being self-evident is supposed to upgrade its status from “mere assumption” to “something better”.

    To be practical in the useful sense of that word entails reliability and consistency, which really is ‘validity’ in the most meaningful, i.e. practical sense.

    But by practical I do not just mean necessarily useful, I mean our ability to interact with physical reality on a common ground where we proclaim ‘objectivity’ for any given claim, and thereby confirming, or at least increasing our confidence in axioms and hypotheses.
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    So, you believe that "virtual" and "potential" existence are equivalent to "real" and "actual or physical" existence?

    Obviously not. Nor was I talking about anything “potential”.

    Instead, I pointed out your failure to distinguish between “virtual” as made by software and “virtual” as a potential particle in quantum field theory is clear evidence you are cognitively blind, that is unconscious, possibly a child zombie, but likely a computer program. Go way, Digimon. Shoo, shooo!
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...

    Do you understand the difference when that pointer of yours points from, say an actual chair in a room, and virtual chair on a computer screen?
    So, you believe that "virtual" and "potential" existence are equivalent to "real" and "actual or physical" existence?

    Gnomon program has operational imagination function, but malfunctioning logic unit.
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    Physical or actual includes both basic phenomena like magnetism or gravity, and also emergent phenomena like atoms, molecules, planets, stars, liquidity, acidity...

    Abstract or virtual phenomena includes concepts like words, language, Batman, unicorn, algorithm, number, angle…
    So, you believe that "virtual" and "potential" existence are equivalent to "real" and "actual or physical" existence?

    Gnomon program does not understand words.
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    There are only two possible modes of existence we know of: physical or actual and abstract or virtual.
    So, you believe that "virtual" and "potential" existence are equivalent to "real" and "actual or physical" existence?

    Gnomon program is not competent to have conversation.
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    Note : a Virtual Electron is a potential particle, not an actual particle.

    "Virtual electron" (as a potential particle) is a phrase in quantum field theory. We were talking about a single word, and you even gave correct definition:

    Virtual : not physically existing as such but made by software to appear to do so.

    To suddenly confuse the two like that is not simply senseless, it requires total cognitive blindness. You are a robot, pulling word salad strings from the internet, but you are failing to make any sense as you are unable to google properly because you do not understand words.
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    But it's only true for eyes that are the organs of conscious beings.

    Of course. And a symbol points to something else, but it is not the actual something else. What symbol now, you may ask. Who cares! I'm just talking gibberish.
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    Why argue so convoluted. Our sensory organs transmit the signal by means of a biochemical electrical charge and our brains are able to interpret that signal in such a fashion that it provides us with knowledge about our environment. Don't have to make it more complicated than that.

    I was just about to say, but you already said it yourself:
    An eye that can see is conscious of light.

    That is crazy in so many ways, beautiful!
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...

    Virtual : not physically existing as such but made by software to appear to do so.

    What you're doing would be called intellectual dishonesty, if you knew what you’re doing. Do you understand the difference between "not physically existing" and "not physically existing as such"?

    Do you understand the information or ‘data & instructions’ that make up “software” at the time of execution is defined or contained by the dynamics and interaction of electrons and electronic components in a computer?


    Hence, a virtual electron is not, as you suggested, an electron in an alternative "physical form" in space-time, but merely a pointer to a meta-physical form in consciousness.

    Oh dear god smite him with some fiery serpents or something! You’ve used up my patience and I will be ignoring you if you fail to understand it this time.

    Pointer points FROM something to something. Do you understand the difference when that pointer of yours points from, say an actual chair in a room, and virtual chair on a computer screen?
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    You equate "physical" and "actual", and I agree. But if a simulated electron is not physical & actual, what is it?

    It's virtual. It means it is represented as information by some other physical form rather than its actual form. Like Pacman is actual on the display screen, but virtual in the electronic components of the arcade machine.

    A computer can also emulate another computer, so there exist such thing as double-virtual, or virtual-virtual object, entity, property, state, process, (quality?)...
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    Therefore it is non-contradictory to say consciousness is a state of being conscious.

    That is casual speech. There are differences between what is the result of a process and what results from a single state, and what results only from a collection of successive states. In any case, it's not contradictory, just not that simple conclusion to make as was suggested.
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    The TV does not register light. The TV does not react to light.

    TV reacts to abstract information in the form of electric signals and realizes them into actual physical quality in the form of real light. Which is better parallel then for the biological system producing actual qualia out of the electro-chemical sensory signals?
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    You can call it anything you like. I call as I see it. The camera is conscious of light, the TV is conscious of the signal it receives from the camera. As simple as that.

    You again failed to acknowledge the phenomena that is happening on the TV screen. To put some meaning into your assertion explanation is necessary.

    How do you define "conscious"? Why is TV not conscious of the light on its screen?
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    The human rational agent has but one thought at a time.

    Therefore...?
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    The TV is conscious of the signal it receives from the camera.
    The camera is conscious of the light it receives from the TV.

    You are talking about passively received signal/light in both cases. In that sense a stone is also conscious of light, is that what you wish to claim?

    Anyway, you are not addressing the phenomena that is happening on the TV screen, which is integration of the signal into something we can perhaps call qualia. So, again, why would you say camera is conscious of that light rather than TV which is in fact producing it?