Thanks for your efforts. That's an excellent reply. — Banno
:up:
The "claim" is nothing but the commonplace that when what we say is true, it sets out how things are. I have difficulty in seeing how you might maintain that the world is interpreted and yet treat this interpretation as tacit; especially if that tacit interpretation is thought of as not being capable of interpretation in propositional form.
I think the contention isn't that "everything
is capable of being set out in a statement", it's where that capability comes from and how it works.
The notion of a level of interpretation that is not linguistic is counterintuitive.
It might be counterinuitive to you? It isn't to me. I'm quite used to throwing more into the notion of interpretation than speech acts and statements. Eg, vision's involved, seeing-as is an interpretation, and there need be no words in a figure-ground relationship.
It might be worthwhile to make a distinction between linguistic interpretation and language involving interpretation. A linguistic interpretation would be a "setting out in words", a description etc, a language involving interpretation would be an interpretation which is informed by and partially constituted with language. Example; a doctor looking at a lung scan for an abnormality, a linguistic interpretation might be the speech act of making the assertion "There's an abnormality here", a language involving interpretation would be seeing the abnormality due to learning how to do it - from textbooks, demonstrations etc. The latter type is simultaneously more expansive and...
I gather the notion is that the world is already divided into cups and tables before these are spoken of; (the before here being a logical, not a temporal, priority? I understand time plays an odd role in Heidegger's metaphysics...)
construable as logically prior to the other. I claim language involving interpretation is logically prior to linguistic interpretation.
But I think it's worthwhile to note the temporal part too; I don't think this distinction between language involving and linguistic interpretation commits me to a temporal ordering between the two types; like one precedes the other; they're more like styles of engagement, ways of "reading off the world". The predicative as-structure; that which seeks, finds and judges propositions and their content; is very similar to Wittgenstein's "glasses" in the PI.
103. The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe.—Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.
104. We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it. Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality.
The pre-predicative one is more informal and pragmatic, taking off the glasses, the rough ground is blurry but saturated with articulable structure; an encoding in propositional content is one means of articulation. Both the pre-predicative and the predicative seem to be involved in most speech acts, and have distinct styles of content which interweave. Why distinct styles of content? Putting on the glasses of propositional form is a filter, it seeks statements and judgements, it encodes the world in their images. And "we predicate of the thing that which lies in the method of representing (encoding - me) it". If you stop seeing the world in terms of an expectation of sentential logical form, that doesn't stop it from being able to be parsed in accordance with that form. What the routine occurrence in everyday non-glasses-wearing acts does do, however, is show that such logical form shows up in the world (and it is there!) only when using the glasses to see it. It goes from a necessary component of interaction to a contingent one; you can take off the glasses, and the propositional form need not appear. Once you take of the glasses, things still "make themselves manifest" as it were, but are not
outside of the scope of language, language is born in interaction with that rough ground. What is articulated has to be
wrestled into sentences, and sentential form is the referee's count at the pin.
The predicative as structure is a means of representation of the world's articulable content which yields statements and judgements thereof, it summarises, encodes, condenses, judges. Nothing falls apart if you take off the glasses; and you might need them again for reading. The important thing is the glasses can come off; which destroys the monopoly on content which you're imputing to the propositional form. It only seems like a monopoly because you've got the glasses on.
So what I'm reacting to in your position is that you seem to me to be doing the same thing as in 104:
Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality.
"x" is true iff x. As a theory of meaning through
redundancy, of comparing the world to a logical form your vantage point has imputed to it and finding a match - you were looking for one. I have no problem with the match. It's that you're using that to
limit other styles of filtering the world. It seems you are claiming it is the only match, a necessary match. It's like you've got the glasses on and define seeing as seeing through those glasses! So from my perspective:
Well, if it is not propositional, what is it? What other form could it have?
The premises underlying those questions are wrongheaded; the form isn't
of the state of affairs, it's
discovered in seeing the world a certain way. That logical form arises in an interaction; statements have propositional content because we and the world put it there conjointly.
And even if there is some alternative form, that form must be capable of interpretation in propositional form.
I'll grant this, you can put the glasses on, but that only limits how the world shows up when they're on. The appeal for that claim is the logical priority of the pre-predicative; that the glasses can be taken off.
If you want examples of other ways of seeing the world that don't turn around what goes into statements; you're looking at other metaphysical vantage points. Maybe the world looks like interacting objects, manifestations of substance, dynamical systems, actor networks, monads, assemblages... I want to emphasise "other" in "other metaphysical vantage points"; claiming "the world is an object language" is a metaphysical claim.