Now you're sounding like TGW. I don't get my philosophy from television shows or McDonald's ads. — Sapientia

Where do you (think you) get your philosophy from?

That is correct. But generally it is not a good idea to inflict harms when the alternative is something indifferent. Thus, the fact that I am not being hit by a hammer is neither good nor bad, it causes neither pain nor pleasure. But it is a bad idea to cause myself pain (a bad) by smacking myself with a hammer.

Special pleading is not nuance. You can claim that your position has been qualified intelligibly to avoid a bad result, but this does not mean you succeed in doing so or understand how to do so.

I am not saying that. There is no one to save.

how do you get around the lack of pleasure being a bad thing? — darthbarracuda

Lack of pleasure is neither good nor bad, it is indifferent.

That giving birth forces someone to undergo incredible amounts of suffering, and so it's better not to do that.

But I'm not claiming that anti-natalism saves people from suffering.

And just to clarify, in that quote, I was talking about the opportunity for people to judge the worth of their lives and whether or not to continue to live, not the opportunity to decide whether or not they want to be born. — Sapientia

This is not what anti-natalism is about. It is about birth.

I didn't say that the opportunity is being taken away from anyone, let alone anyone that doesn't exist. The opportunity, or at least it's possibility, would simply be taken away: post-extinction, it would no longer be a possibility for anyone to live a worthwhile life. — Sapientia

You cannot take away an opportunity to live, without taking it away from someone. It makes no sense to say it is just 'taken away.' What does that even mean?

Also, just to shove this in your face again, because you keep doing it:

than to take away the opportunity altogether. — Sapientia

No opportunities are being taken away by not procreating. There is nobody to take such opportunities away from. Get it?

It's unfortunate that no one else would get the opportunity to live a worthwhile life. To say that it's unfortunate is not to suggest that there are disappointed non-existent people or anything like that. That would be an idiotic interpretation. — Sapientia

Okay, then answer this: unfortunate for who? Can something be unfortunate simpliciter, without being unfortunate for anyone? Think carefully, and consider what you yourself have said, before you call something 'idiotic.'

Obviously. I said as much myself in the next part of what you quoted. — Sapientia

That is not what you say. What you say is:

The answer to your question, to reiterate an earlier point, is that it's better, in my view, to give them the opportunity to decide for themselves, once they're able to do so, than to take away the opportunity altogether. — Sapientia

If the issue is that of being born (and what else could it be, given that we are discussing anti-natalism), there is no way to give such an opportunity, since there is no one to give such an opportunity to. In other words, the qualification 'once they're able to do so' does not make any sense.

Hopefully you can see from this what I mean by your numerous confusions.

And that is where we disagree. This is where the disagreement is substantial, and can't be resolved merely by correcting a trivial misunderstanding, unlike the other issue, although apparently I haven't been able to get through to you on that one, and it has grown tiresome. — Sapientia

You claimed, falsely, that the only option was... (well, what Im not sure, since as I just pointed out, your suggestion is literally incoherent). You are simply wrong that there is no other option, since there is one, viz. not procreating. Perhaps you think such an option is not 'reasonable?' But okay, why? And why should I care?

The answer to your question, to reiterate an earlier point, is that it's better, in my view, to give them the opportunity to decide for themselves, once they're able to do so, than to take away the opportunity altogether. — Sapientia

It is not possible to give someone the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they want to be born.

Given that there's no other realistic alternative for the living, since we cannot consult non-existent people or babies, that's the best option. — Sapientia

The other option is not to procreate, which is also the best option.

It's only bullshit on stilts if its meaning matches a foolish misinterpretation. For the last time, I'll explain the nuance, so please pay close attention:

To state that you're robbing a possible future generation, in the way that I have done so, is to express in a figurative manner something which can be expressed in the conditional mood, which avoids the contradiction which would be implied by a literal version of the aforementioned statement.

Hence, I am not guilty of implying that nonexistent people are being robbed, which is obviously a contradiction, because nonexistent people cannot be robbed. Rather, I am expressing a point that I've already made, namely that if we purposefully brought about the early extinction of humanity after the current generation had died, then we would, as a consequence, be removing the possibility of future generations. I am further saying that this would, as a consequence, also remove the possibility of said future generations experiencing a worthwhile life or even anything worthwhile at all, which, in my judgement, would be unfortunate.

Note my use of "if... then..." and "would" which are key indications of a statement in the conditional mood. I'm certainly not implying that future generations are missing out, or that they do object.

I'm not speaking on their behalf; I'm pointing out that we can obtain some knowledge about what their life would probably be like if they were to exist, and that we can use that knowledge to make a judgement. The funny thing is, you're doing exactly the same thing. The only difference is that we reach different conclusions. — Sapientia

If future generations are not missing out, then no one is missing out, and therefore there cannot possibly be anything to object to.

You cannot simply claim over and over that you understand that unborn people don't exist, and then go on to make claims that can only be sensibly interpreted if you do believe this. My guess is that you want to make such claims, but have been beaten back by obvious and appropriate objections, and are now scrambling for a way to say the same thing without claiming that you're saying it.

If not, please inform me in what way not robbing anyone of anything can possibly be 'unfortunate.'

It isn't up to you or any other individual to decide the worth of the lives of everyone that lives, or has lived, or will probably live. — Sapientia

Okay, so why then is natalism, which makes precisely such a decision, justified?

Notice the absurdity of your position: to not have a child because you fear the child's life might not be worth living is to decide for a nonexistent person unjustly; yet to actually have a child and so decide for a real person this same thing, but in the opposite (your favored) direction is fine because...?

I mean, what the hell are you even talking about? Insofar as your argument works, it shoots you in the foot, and insofar as it doesn't, you should stop bothering with it.

I'm not insisting otherwise, but just seeing why, in principle, unborn babies couldn't enjoy the kind of existence that some attribute to fictional characters. I'm asking for more nuance and sophistication in our ontology, which I see as opposite of asserting vulgar views. — Shevek

Because unborn people aren't fictional characters? I don't understand the relevance of this question. As an example, Frodo Baggins is a fictional character. If you want more nuance, you should do it with a hypothesis that is at least plausible -- though I suspect the call for 'nuance' is here as in so many cases just a red herring that will license the denial of obvious truths (like that unborn people don't exist).

They're at least necessary to be clear on our terms and what we mean by being and existence. — Shevek

'Being' and 'existence' are ordinary words of English. They don't need to be defined, and I'm not using them technically. If you understand the language, you need no definition (and in fact I could not provide one, since their meaning is not up to me, as if I made them up), and if you don't understand the language, then we can't have this conversation anyway.

The plea for definition is only relevant when one is inventing technical terms for some technical purpose. But that is not what is going on here.

For example, you could be an eternalist who would say that unborn (presently nonexistent) babies exist. — Shevek

I could, but then I would be saying something patently false, and in general I try to say true things, not false things. 'Presently nonexistent babies exist' is a contradiction -- duh.

You can't just keep reasserting a premise that's under question. You have to make some argument. — Shevek

You cannot decide to make whatever premise you want 'under question' by assaulting it with a slew of specious views and then insist that the discourse move where you want it to, though. I have every bit as much right to think that your purported objections to an obvious fact are red herrings and not worthy of consideration, as you do to insist that we ought to entertain that nonexistent people exist. That may end up with us parting ways without a productive discussion -- but then, insofar as you were serious in your claims (which perhaps you aren't -- this, like so much of philosophical discussion, already has the air of an idle game and round of 'position-citing'to me), you will still walk away considering something obviously false to be a possibility, which is your loss & not mine.

And yet there are all sorts of people out there that think pain is good, because it teaches them a lesson, helps them grow, or they're just good old-fashioned masochists. If you think they're mistaken somehow, you have to explain why. — Shevek

What they think doesn't matter -- they're wrong.

They are mistaken because the phenomenon itself, i.e. pain, is bad on its own terms, and this is indifferent to whether they say it is good or bad. We are interested in the thing itself, not people's opinions about it, so citing their opinions as if it had some sort of bearing is absurd.

Why not? What would qualify an unborn person being a fictional character? Does it have to be in a published novel or short story? What about unpublished narratives? Or narratives that exist in the space of conversation? — Shevek

I feel like this question isn't worth answering. I don't need a complete account of fiction to know unborn people aren't fictional characters. To insist otherwise IMO is not to understand what fiction is, not even in a technical sense, but just in a vulgar sense.

But it does seem like a kind of existence that has effect. — Shevek

I mean, I disagree, but then, I think modal realism is fundamentally confused and is not really an account of modality so much as a science fiction story.

And then we get into broader questions of ontology, when we ask "what is there?" or what it means to exist. — Shevek

These are not necessary to know unborn people don't exist. If your theory says otherwise, that is evidence agains your theory.

Simply stating 'unborn babies don't exist' doesn't solve anything. — Shevek

It states a truth and removes confusions from the conversation that Sapientia, and other commentators, are prone to.

You're essentially just saying your metaethical view is true by bare assertion. This is a form of argumentation that has little purchase in my mind. — Shevek

It isn't 'my metaethical view.' Again, what metaethical view you have doesn't really matter. Pain's still going to be bad on its own terms without any care for your philosophy.

They can enjoy a particular kind of existence, as fictional characters. — Shevek

No. Unborn people are not fictional characters.

Or barring discussions on the existence of fictional entities, or modal realism — Shevek

Even if one were a modal realist, unborn people would not be actual, and only actual entities can be affected by actions in the actual world.

they can still be quantified as negative existentials that are nonetheless causally efficacious. — Shevek

A negative existential is a kind of statement, not a kind of person. If a negative existential is true of an unborn person, this just means, as I've said, they they don't exist. Sapientia has difficulty wrapping his head around this -- he claims to understand it, and then makes posts that are only intelligible if he does not.

I'm obviously jumping into this discussion very late, and perhaps someone brought this up before, but why should we look at suffering as something defective with the state of things? There are other ethical frames, such as Nietzsche's, that see suffering as a necessity for any meaningful form of human transcendence. Pleasure or pain might take particular values only in an instrumental sense. — Shevek

What is good or bad does not depend on an impotent 'ethical frame.' It doesn't matter what ethical frame you have, suffering is still bad, precisely because it doesn't care whether anyone 'looks at it' as bad. What you think, or how you look at it, doesn't matter -- suffering is bad on its own terms, and no alternative belief system tat claims it isn't can change this, as if mere belief or framing could stop reality.

Pleasure and pain are intrinsically good and bad, while everything else can only be extrinsically so.

Also, there is no baby to be thrown out.

Unborn people do not exist.

Unborn people do not exist.

Unborn people do not exist.

You guys keep appealing to emotion and cherry picking negative aspects. — Sapientia

Life is mostly misery, there is little joy, for some people none. To focus on joy is cherry picking.

Pleasure also plays its part in propagating misery, of course, and is in the end a servant to it.

My life has been okay. By most standards pretty easy, probably.

And yeah, one problem is that each generation forgets the thrashing.

Heh, you haven't met many parents I guess! A lot of sadsacks out there.

The only thing that convinces people is life beating them. There's no point in moralizing at all.

Why it is anyone's duty to just feel shitty about the world all the time? What does that accomplish? — Wosret

It is not your duty to do anything; but it would be nice if you didn't procreate. What that would accomplish is not brining another generation of misery into existence because of whatever whims make you decide to do so. In other words, it's a matter of basic compassion -- if you think that's boring or lame or doesn't make you feel radical or whatever, fine, but there are real consequences to reproducing, and it'd be nice if you didn't.

I'm reading over your post and I don't really see anything else?

So if I understand your 'argument,' there's no hope for pessimism because joy is all around if you watch lots of TV?

Yes, I already gave examples regarding suffering. It happens just as a result of living, with no special circumstances needed. Joy is not like this; in fact, no one really knows how to experience it. There is no well-attested 'way' to do it, as evidenced by your banalities about 'being open' to it: in contrast to that, I can give concrete, non-banal advice about how to suffer horribly, because it's easy.

No, joy is also inevitable, commonplace, and comes just as a result of living. You'd have to go out of your way to completely avoid it, and even that would likely fail. — Sapientia

So you think joy just sort of falls out of the sky? It's literally hard to avoid? It just happens as a result of being alive?

http://www.newser.com/story/147889/death-rates-spike-on-birthdays.html

pfffttHAHAHAHA

Boredom and suffering are inevitable, commonplace, and come just as a result of living, whereas there is no surefire, or even easy, or often even possible, way to experience joy, and even if there is it is the exception.

So, for instance, say your goal was to experience extreme suffering. This is a really easy goal! There are so many ways to do it, you have an embarrassment of riches. Hit yourself with a hammer! Lick a cop! Put your hand in a fire! You can't go two steps without tripping over a way to accomplish that goal! In fact, you can just literally sit still and it will happen thanks to starvation! Everything tends toward extreme suffering perfectly naturally in the absence of other precarious and constantly applied controls.

Now suppose your goal is to experience joy. There is not even one reliable method of doing this, and people write lots of superfluous books claim to have found such a one. I cannot give concrete advice toward meeting such a goal, as I did above. All I can do is spout idiotic platitudes, none of which have any grounding in reality, and many of which you can find in threads such as these.

That's certainly what people say about life in the popular mythology, and what maybe you write on a Hallmark card or Facebook post, but whether it's true is another matter. Birthdays are actually a locus of depression - maybe suicide too, I don't have stats on that, but it wouldn't surprise me.

My own impression is that if you lot people's lives, and their mood, not what they say about these things (or say they say about them...), they're pretty sad, both in the psychological sense and in the sense of pathetic, desperate, etc.

I think a significant portion of the human race, perhaps the majority, lives day to day with no joy in their lives to speak of.

It's practically impossible to live an average life without any joy. — Sapientia

I guarantee you that at this moment, millions of lives are transpiring without any joy. I'd say billions, but let's be conservative.

What I don't understand is the argument that there is some necessary and fundamental flaw in the world that makes it impossible to justify bringing in new life. So I'd like to ask a different question. In what fundamental ways would this world have to change in order to justify natalism (in the sense that it is morally permitted, though not required to have children)? — Sinderion

Our existence in the world is at the same time fundamentally passive and fundamentally coercive. Passive because we can't choose to be born, and our primary, if not only, mode of experience is suffering -- things incorrigibly happen to us, and our being alive is shot through with pain, which is an experience that is terrible by its own criterion. We move about in response to that pain, and in so doing we interact with, i.e. cause (coerce) pain in, other people. The world, such as it is, just is that interlocking coercive institution of endless pain. If you somehow took that away, there would be no intelligible 'world' as we know it, and so the idea of fundamentally fixing the world to be something other than this doesn't make sense.

Yes, it's also forcing them to experience joy and many other things. — Sapientia

Suffering is guaranteed, joy is unlikely.

Also, to suggest that a real parade of suffering ought to be continued indefinitely in service of a fantasy that one day it will end is absurd.

My own responses to this:

1) I think it's a non-trivial question whether it is possible for life to be fundamentally different from how it is now, that is, without being something other than life. It may be that there is something wrong with the structure of life or the world as such, such that there is no way to improve it in a fundamental way, as if it were a matter of stepping out of a hailstorm and into a house. Life could be better or worse, sure, and I'd rather be wealthy and healthy than poor and miserable -- but even the wealthiest and healthiest are guaranteed to be miserable at many points, and I think probably far more even than people are willing to admit (no one who goes on about how their life is worth living or the goods outweighs the bads wants us to actually watch them at every moment to see if their claim holds water). This is basically Schopenhauer's position, and in advocating what is essentially the destruction of the world, he is calling for 'Nothing,' but a relative Nothing, that is, what is Nothing to us, because all we know is life and its miseries. If such a radical solution or transformation were possible, I don't think philosophy has much of anything to say about it, though religion might. I myself favor a kind of Gnostic Christianity in this respect, and metaphorically the world is cast as a kind of prison or labor camp.

2) I don't think any laws should be implemented, because generally going from 'I want X to be the case' to 'there ought to be legislation mandating that X is the case' is fallacious. Laws don't have any real control over the way the world goes -- we can't legislate anything that's a real problem, like hunger, out of existence, it doesn't work that way. There's little correlation in my view between who runs a government or how and what goes on in the relam of the governed. Put simply, governments are not only impotent to stop such problems, but would likely, if we're talking about large-scale coercive measures to stop people from breeding, simply exacerbate and multiply human suffering. Even the question of whether the anti-natalist position entails some sort of legislation arises from a very fundamental delusion, that governments have a sort of world-shaping power by which they can through legislative intent change very basic features about the world.

But wait, you got your beliefs from...

"Blah blah from my life experience and thinking" pffffffHAHAHAA

I imagine it would differ for different people, but for me, I'd say the obvious important criterion is sentience, in the sense of being able to suffer. Plants can't do that, so their existence or nonexistence is intrinsically indifferent, although it might have extrinsic worth to some sentient being. For animals, it's harder -- clearly they can suffer, though they can't suffer in quite the range of ways that humans can. On the other hand, they don't have the capacity to self-consciously recognize that they are suffering and voluntarily seek an end to it. Is it right to 'force' beings who do not want help to be 'helped' in such a decisive and violent way, given that left to their own devices they would continue reproducing? I don't know -- it may be that these questions don't matter much, and are just the result of anthropomorphizing animals.

That is, the notion of doing something 'wrong' or 'unjust' to an animal, as a being who on it own merits does not recognize or desire anything like rightness, justice, etc. may just be a category error, while causing them to suffer is still terrible because their suffering, even on its own / their own merits, is still genuinely awful. There's a way in which I think as humans, animals aren't our problem, but if the whole planet were destroyed so all life became unsustainable, I wouldn't be like 'oh boo hoo!' about it, I have no abstract commitment to animals surviving. What's important to note here is that neither would animals be sad about the prospect of being annihilated.

The funny thing about bizarre works of fiction, especially dystopian science fiction (which I took some time to read a bit of earlier this year -- neat stuff), is that there's nothing really fictional about it. What is described in those scenarios has close analogues in everyday life and the institution of birth. It really is a kind of bizarre, nightmarish institution. People get weirded out by babies growing in tubes, but they already get grown in tubes -- tubes inside of women! AHHH!

Look, someone's upset the article's about them (notice that the working class is "them").