Why do we describe all neutrinos using the same predicates? Has the problem been addressed by using different words?

So it is of course true that F=MA whether or not anyone is aware of that fact, but, knowing such facts determines how we view the world. So i'm referring to 'mind' here, not as 'your mind' or 'my mind' or 'the contents of conscious thought', but the very framework of understanding within which anything we deem 'real' exists. — Wayfarer

So are you arguing for conceptualism here? I'm not quite clear what you're saying. Are you saying that it is necessary for any mind to understand the world in terms of abstractions such as 3? But this is only a feature of minds making sense of the world?

So universals are necessary for minds (ones that employ abstractions - leaving aside questions of animal intelligence). But this fact doesn't mean that F=MA is something in the world?

My inclination would be to say that science does not require universals to exist. But, perhaps, if we believe that science is a good basis for ontology, then science strongly suggests that universals do exist. — Moliere

Okay, I can agree with this. Can we then say that science requires the utilization of universal concepts to build its theories? Now If science isn't a good basis for ontology, the question becomes could scientific theories in principle be replaced by just talk of particulars? Or perhaps in that case, science is just a useful tool, and not an accurate model of reality.

But on a scientific realist account, electrons, spacetime and energy all exist, and that's strongly suggestive of universals existing.

But I don't think there's some kind of mystical inventory that has all these universals floating around somewhere in abstracta, that reeks of pseudoscientific superstitious nonsense. — darthbarracuda

It is a problematic notion, but the alternative is to explain all our universalizing in terms of particulars only. Because if the particulars can't do the job, then that means the abstracta is necessary, somehow.

aybe universals represent all that is physically possible, that is, all the different forms that matter can be construed. In which case they would exist in the same way the laws of logic exist, out of abstraction. — darthbarracuda

That sounds promising.

Does 'the law of the excluded middle' exist independently of mind? How could it? It's only perceptible to a rational intelligence. — Wayfarer

I don't know. Can particulars be and not be X? If not, then is the law of excluded middle an observation derived from that fact?

Trees are real to us humans, and many other terrestrial creatures. If you were a being whose body consisted solely of energy, and whose vision consisted of - I don't know - beams of neutrinos, then the whole notion of 'a tree' might be unintelligible to you.

Scientific realism starts with an image of the Universe. It is mediated by strict protocols, and the like, but it is nevertheless an image. It works, it is consistent, predictive - but when you're talking about fundamental existents, you can nevertheless call such things into question. — Wayfarer

Thing is that the problem of universals applies to fundamental constituents as much as it does complex objects like trees. What makes a neutrino a neutrino? All neutrinos have the same properties. Well, how is that possible? How can multiple particulars share the same properties? Or, how is it that you have the same properties across multiple particulars?

That's what scientific realism means. What 'realism' meant in the context of the 'realism v nominalism' debate was something completely different to that, and it is important to understand how 'scientific realism' came about, and how it fits into the overal history of ideas, when you make statements like that. — Wayfarer

I'm pretty sure that Plato and Aristotle's position on universals was the equivalent of being mind-independent. For Plato, they existed in a non-spatiotemporal realm. For Aristotle, they were to be found in particulars.

The nominalists and conceptualists claimed that universals were products of the mind, be they names, sets or concepts. They weren't out there in the world somehow.

So, I have been contending that Platonism, as traditionally conceived, is incoherent, that is all. — John

Ah well, okay. I wonder how a Platonist might go about defending their position.

Well, what if the universe is inherently mathematical, as Max Tegmark maintains? Would that be a form of Platonism, except that we happen to live there? I'm just curious as to what that would imply. In that case, the physicist is the one leaving the cave, with help from mathematicians.

You're asking why it is a brute fact. It has no explanation because it's brute. It is good by definition. — WhiskeyWhiskers

And what distinguishes that line of argument from mere existence by definition? We can apply bruteness to anything we like and then when challenged, just say that it's true by definition.

Therefore if physics is about particulars then the truth of its theories depends on the existence of the particulars, not on the mind-independent existence of the abstractions that we require to make sense of the particulars. — Michael

Back to this again. Why do physicists need abstractions to make sense of particulars? What is it about those particulars which leads to abstract conceptualization schemes? Obviously because there is resemblance of some kind. But what does that resemblance amount to? How is it to be explained, since we are dealing with particulars?

I still don't understand the difference between being mind-independent and being a mind-independent thing. — Michael

From doing some reading, I'm able to clarify my response. Universals exist if the same properties and relations exist among particulars. The exact same properties and relations are not themselves individual things, as they are not numerically distinct and don't have a specific location.

However, a different approach to dealing away with universals does posit tropes, which themselves are abstract particulars, numerically distinct and existing in only one location. Each particular thing has or is made up of particular tropes.

But it's the aboutness that determines whether not the theory is correct. Therefore if physics is about particulars then the truth of its theories depends on the existence of the particulars, not on the mind-independent existence of the abstractions that we require to make sense of the particulars. — Michael

Maybe, but it's the abstraction being a requirement part that worries me. What you're saying is that reality has no need for our abstractions. They are not part of the ontological furniture of the world. And yet we need them to make sense of the world.

Hmmm. I'm not sure what that means. It is either a statement on the nature of intelligence, or a problem for nominalism.

That the concept of matter is an abstraction is not that matter is an abstraction. — Michael

But the concept matter is abstracting over all instances of matter, which are particulars that have the commonality of rest mass. So physics, while being about particulars, relies on abstraction to make sense of those particulars.

That tends to be what I think, but I won't deny there are moments of intense pleasure, or just feeling real good after feeling crappy where I think to myself that all I care about is feeling good.

But then if I could be wireheaded to sit on my couch all day, everyday, doing nothing but blissing out, and assuming my needs were met, is that what I really want?

I don't think so. So then it becomes the question of whether pleasure is what I want, or pleasure is an indicator of what I want. And I think it's often the latter.

That being said, there have been experiments with rodents in which they push a button that induces intense pleasure from electrodes in their brain directly stimulating their pleasure center. The rodents will do this at the expense of eating or drinking until they die.

They argue that a universal must be a mind-independent thing to be real but also that to be a particular is to be a mind-independent thing, and so they're saying that a universal must be a particular to be real. But of course that makes no sense. — Michael

It doesn't, if to be real is to be a mind-independent thing, where thing is a particular. But independent just means it doesn't depend on us thinking or perceiving Y, if you like.

For example, colors are real if they don't depend on organisms like us seeing stuff. If they are out there in the world. But colors are not things. They are properties of things. If they're real, which I'm not stating. But there are and have been color realists.

But as I said before, if one wants to deny that they're real then one needs to deny that they're a real Y (whatever that Y is). — Michael

Okay, so what is the Y for particulars? Particulars are a real ____?

Aren't universals said to be abstract? Science doesn't say that matter, space-time, atoms, and so on are abstract. Science says that they're concrete things (i.e. particulars). — Michael

But the concepts "matter", "spacetime", "atoms", etc are abstractions over particular instances. Take time, for example. It is an abstraction from various events. We notice a commonality, and so we say there is this time dimension in which stuff happens. And there is an order to it. The past flows into the present which flows into the future. Of course that's everyday talk based on how we experience stuff happening.. The physical notion of time is a bit different. But it is an abstraction.

As is General Relativity, for that matter, with it's talk of gravity curving spacetime across the universe. Of course it's also mathematical equations backed up by experiments which can be put in such and such terms, but math itself is an abstraction, and so are all scientific equations.

If you're asking "are universals real?" is you asking "do universals exist independently of us?" then you're asking "are universals mind-independent things?". — Michael

But I didn't ask if universals are "things". I stated that they are real if they exist independent of us.

And what is a particular? Is it a mind-independent thing? — Michael

Materialists would say yes. But "particular" is a concept we utilize to denote unique objects. Maybe it's a universal as well?

Then you're asking "are universals particulars?" — Michael

And now we're close to abusing language. But it is an interesting angle to argue. I could argue for "particular" being universal and you could argue that realism amounts to universals being particulars. I'm not sure where that gets us. Is this a Wittgenstein approach to dissolve the issue?

I'm not making that move, and that's not what it means to be an idealist. — Michael

To be is to be perceived, which makes things mind-dependent, yes? I brought that up because one can deny that particulars are real, and therefore, what is the Y for particulars?

I don't see how that follows. — Michael

Because all of our scientific concepts make heavy use of universals. Matter, spacetime, atoms, etc are all universals. So is DNA, species, evolution, brain, mind, information, computation, etc.

Those are good points. The context is hedonism and TGW's comments on it. So the good is pleasure and the bad is pain. Therefore living well must have something to do with obtaining more pleasure while minimizing pain.

A non-hedonistic approach to living well might be more complicated, at least in concept. I wanted to know how one was supposed to live well by knowing what is good, which of course depends on what it means to "live well" and "good".

You offer "mind-independent thing" as an example? But isn't that that the definition of a particular? So you're asking "are universals real particulars?" — Michael

I'm not asking that. I'm asking whether they are something we cooked up as part of our making sense of the world, or whether they exist somehow independent of us. And if universals are something we cooked up, then the world isn't how we think it is. It's just a bunch of particulars. Which means our scientific understanding is wrong, however useful it may be to us. As is our everyday talk with all it's universals.

You have to say "X is(n't) a real Y". — Michael

"Particulars aren't real." You can certainly make that move. It's called idealism. So what is the Y for particulars if realism is the case? Themselves? Then that is the same for universals.

Yeah, but it's important to use words precisely in these kind of discussions, or mass confusion results. Realism in philosophy denotes mind-independence. Maybe they should have come up with a more technical term, since obviously dreams and hallucinations do occur. But then what isn't real under that usage? Unicorns happen in our minds as well. And culture. But nobody says they are real.

I imagined a pink unicorn, and that did happen (hypothetically speaking), but it wasn't real. That's the proper use.

Another way to frame the universal debate is to ask how God would view the universe if nominalism is the case. Because then it's just particulars, and our naming schemes would be misleading from the omniscient perspective. You might say that even though naming and categorizing things is very useful to us, it deludes us into thinking there is something more to the endless particulars we call the universe (the universal of all particulars).

We have the gall to say things like "the speed of light prohibits anything with mass accelerating to C". God would find are notions of laws amusing, I would guess. And our equations quaint. If God is a nominalist.

This is nonsense; neutrinos ( their effects at least) can be measured, as can time and space; that's how we make sense of these things. — John

Problem is, those are universals. You're abstracting over the entire cosmos to derive "space", and over all rate of change to denote "time", and the "building blocks" of "matter" to discuss "neutrinos".

The big problem nominalism has is how we can understand the world without using universals. You can say that space, matter, time, energy, laws, atoms, etc are just names for particulars, but that's not how they are used in science. Time isn't just a bunch of events, rather it's a dimension (another universal) related to space, influenced by gravity (again a universal), and driven by thermodynamics and how things were in the Big Bang.

You could probably say that our entire understanding is based on universals. It is our ability to abstract which allows us to reason, draw inferences, and conceptualize. That doesn't resolve the issue of whether and how universals are real, but it does demonstrate that they are indispensable to thought.

Start by asking what it means for a universal to be real before you ask whether or not they are real. — Michael

For universals to be real, they must have a mind-independent existence. That's what realism essentially means. X is real if it does not depend in some way on our perceiving or conceiving it. Dreams are obviously mind-dependent, as are hallucinations. After that, it gets controversial.

Are particulars real? If that particular tree does not depend on me or anyone else perceiving or thinking about it, then it is. But what about the term "tree"? Does that denote an abstraction which only lives in human thought and language? Then it's not real. It has no existence independent of us.

The challenge for the realist qua universals is to show how they could be mind-independent. Do they live in the particulars as Aristotle thought? Do they have their own "realm"? If so, how do our minds come to know about them? And so on.

In any case, it's not the job of an ethical doctrine to tell what to do: as I've argued, I don't think this demand even makes sense. — The Great Whatever

Sure it is, otherwise, what's the point in having ethics? That we don't always live up to our ethical standards is a different matter.

Nothing can tell you what to do, only doing something can make you do something. — Teh GreatWhatever

But it can and it does, otherwise I'd just do whatever the hell I wanted all the time without consideration for what's right. But I don't do that., and neither do most people.

don't think these are important questions. What matters is what you are going to do, not what you should do, since even if you resolve the latter, you won't have taken even a step toward resolving the former (since you can just do what you shouldn't anyway), which is all that actually matters. — The Great Whatever

Assuming that what I'm going to do isn't influenced by what I think I should do. Which it is, for everyone but sociopaths.

We suffer because we're animals with nervous systems.

However, I disagree with your assessment that pain is not suffering. If physical or psychological pain was not uncomfortable to us, than we would not have a problem with it. — darthbarracuda

Pain can be suffering. I guess it depends on the degree and the significance. I can feel discomfort going for a long walk, but I wouldn't consider that suffering. The net result is that I feel good. But if my car broke down in the middle of nowhere and I had to walk for hours when I needed to be somewhere, then it would be considered a greater discomfort. Not suffering per se, but an inconvenience I'd be upset about, at least for a little while, depending non how important being somewhere was.

Each day we deal with a lot of things; life is a kind of burden that requires meaning to keep going. So it is worthwhile to look into mitigating these kinds of experiences. — darthbarracuda

That's true. Life isn't ideal for most of us. The question is whether it needs to be ideal to be worth living, which sounds like a ridiculous standard. It can be worth living and problematic at the same time. The question becomes at what point do problems overwhelm a person's life and make it not worth living?

It's like the difference between having to work a job you hate to make ends meet, and having a career that you love. Doing work that you're passionate about will not always be easy or pain-free, and it can have it's own disappointments, but if you love it, it will be worth it to you. But a meaningless job (other than for money) can be soul crushing, and any discomforts you face doing it become very undesirable.

I agree with BC. It's not pain or the striving of the will that causes suffering, it's when you lose purpose and become hopeless. It's the feeling that life is meaningless and filled with remorse, or what have you.

What constitutes winning?

What are we doing here? Feuding, arguing or sophistry? — bert1

Actually I have a better answer. You can think of it as verbal sparring. People sharpen up their positions going toe to toe with each other. And in the process, they learn.

What are we doing here? Feuding, arguing or sophistry? — bert1

So many questions! Personally, I like to argue topics that interest me. Feuding happens sometimes with certain posters as a result. Particularly if you're always arguing opposing views.

It's still informative, and sometimes I'm forced to reevaluate my thinking. Also the shock a Landru or a TGW gives the system can be enjoyable.

Was it? How do you know? — bert1

Really? That's answering a question with a question.

How is it possible to correct a question? — bert1

Easy. You tell the person they asked the wrong question, or phrased it incorrectly.

I don't care what most online discussions are. — bert1

So you expect people to be different just because the topic is philosophy? (That's a rhetorical question).

Doing philosophy is exactly an exchange of of information and viewpoints. — bert1

Is it? Is that what professional philosophers do? Or do they also advance their own positions?

An exchange of information is wikipedia or SEP.

So, lets try again,

What constitutes winning? — bert1

I already gave you an answer. You don't like it, okay. *shrug*

Also, I'd like to point out that your question was an attempt at defending your position by pressing mine. But I didn't really ignore your question. I just corrected it by emphasizing the try part, which is what people are doing when they argue, whether online or in person. It's not like anyone is keeping score, but people still argue their POV.

LOL, because your question missed the point, as does your complaint. Most online discussions aren't simply an exchange of information and viewpoints (how very "AT"), rather they are informal debates between different positions and/or feuding posters, which involve all sorts of strategies.

I said "try to win", since I'm referring to your average contentious discussion anywhere online. Try, because there isn't really winning, not in the official sense, but posters can declare themselves the winner, and they can gain reputation amongst other posters. Or it could just be a matter of telling oneself that attacks from the opposing view point were fended off.