What's your definition of violence? — TheMadFool

Nullify or weaken someone's freedom by acting through physical force, threat, technique, hierarchy, ideology, manipulation of language or abuse of weakness.
More simply: through the use and abuse of power.

I think that Merriam-Webster's dictionary and others, by hiding the usual uses in politics and social sciences of the terms of institutional violence, structural violence or symbolic violence, is a typical case of the latter. Depriving the victim of violence of a conceptual resource for his or her defense.

philosophy is about the fundamental topics that lie at the core of all other fields of inquiry, broad topics like reality, morality, knowledge, justice, reason, beauty, the mind and the will, social institutions of education and governance, and perhaps above all meaning, both in the abstract linguistic sense, and in the practical sense of what is important in life and why

I like this definition. It hits the spot.

In my opinion, when specialists in other fields are engaged in clarifying fundamental concepts that are not included in their own work, they are going into philosophy, even when they are using their own scientific knowledge. An example: when Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg and others discussed the real content of quantum mechanics they were doing philosophy, and they knew it!

Philosophy is not Ethics

I hold that there are analogues to the physical sciences, what we might call the ethical sciences, that I consider to be outside the domain of philosophy, in that they appeal to specific, contingent hedonic experiences in the same way the physical sciences appeal to specific, contingent empirical experiences.

Starting here because we'll have to start somewhere.
I think we have to distinguish two things: morals and ethics.

Morality is a system of rules of what must be done, which starts from a more or less coherent idea of good.
Ethics is an explanation of the meaning of that good that is included in every system of morality.

One example: the Homeric world is dominated by the concept of success and honor. It is good what leads to triumph (of the warrior mainly) and gives him honor among his peers.
An ethical question: is the concept of Homeric virtue compatible with the morality of modern responsibility?
Non-philosophical question: was Homeric morality better?
Philosophical-ethical question: are there objective criteria for evaluating the morality of different cultures?

I don't think there is a scientific system of ethics because there is no way to prove empirically that good is this or something else. Hedonism, which you quote, is not a scientific system but a particular (philosophical) conception of what the moral good is. What experiment can prove this? You don't have to experiment at all to see around you that many people are not governed by the principle of pleasure. You don't have to experience anything to see that many of those who are governed by the principle of pleasure do things that others say are morally wrong. Ethical reflection is needed on this point, which according to your own criteria, will be philosophical (not experimental).

The question remains whether prescriptive moral activity can be philosophical or falls outside its scope.

Caramba, what a long comment! Let me to get a time to read it.

For the moment I am surprised that it excludes ethics, which is a part of philosophy universally admitted by philosophers themselves. I'll take a closer look.

Violence, it seems, is defined as physical force intended to damage or destroy a person. — TheMadFool

What I'm driving at is that violence seems to be born of a materialistic philosophy - a physical object annoys you and you attack that object physically — TheMadFool

You have a very limited view of violence. The father who hits his child does not do so to destroy him, but to correct him. And he is violent. In the same way, the champions of violence are not exactly materialistic. The Holy Inquisition and other Christian institutions - if we stick to only one well-known religion - rank first in destroying people and they did it for their own good. And they were violent people.

Broaden your concept. Don't restrict it to physical violence or perverse intent to destroy. You'll see that there are many other, more subtle forms of violence alongside us.

Is that possible to show explicitly that a teacher is exercising a sort of micro-power while teaching a class? She is not entirely focused on controlling the marginal students of her class. — Number2018

Actually, a teacher does a lot of things. Wiping wet noses, for example. But his institutional task is mainly to evaluate, classify and exclude. These are forms of domination sustained with institutional violence. This violence is often symbolic when the teacher qualifies with categories of scholars: "He lacks intelligence", "She is lazy", "He is not prepared for...", "She lacks discipline".... Or even more sophisticated means: IQ and other "objective" tests.

There is an ancient refrain in Spain: "Letters with blood enters" (La letra con sangre entra). It continues being true in some way.

Foucault tried to make it clear that his conception of power has nothing in common with its violent or repressive theories. — Number2018

Not exactly. He was against the marxist-anarchist theory of the class state as center of any repression. His model is a network without a unique focus. With his panoptic model he gives is an account of repression that has not ever resort to physical violence. See his criticism of asylums coercions as electroshocks, straitjackets or lobotomies. What is new in him is that the same model included also behaviourism, a form of control that uses psychological techniques more than violence.
In addition he distinguished power from domination. The first occasional and the second institutional. He himself was present in some demonstrations against the violence of domination. And eventually recognised that pure power also has some links with violence.

So, for example, does a psychologist (who is completely unaware of being an instrument of power) apply “the techniques of controlling, monitoring and punishing” while consulting a patient? — Number2018

Of course, he does when passing over the patient freedom. Of course, he does when passing over the patient freedom. Foucault was very critic with the legal powers of "experts" in psychiatry and other "sciences", for example.

Could you bring a few concrete examples? — Number2018

Institutional and structural violence:

Violence can be physical and psychological. It can characterize personal actions, forms of group activity, and abiding social and political policy. This book includes all of these aspects within its focus on institutional forms of violence. Institution is also a broad category, ranging from formal arrangements such as the military, the criminal code, the death penalty and prison system, to more amorphous but systemic situations indicated by parenting, poverty, sexism, work, and racism. — Deane Curtin & Robert Litke : Institutional Violence

Overt and covert violence:
Violence comes in four basic forms according to two criteria: a first criterion indicates that the violence can be personal or institutional, while a second criterion indicates that it can be overt or covert. Thus, institutional violence is often presented as overt institutional violence, as in a war, or as hidden institutional violence, as in poverty. Hidden institutional violence is also said to be structural, in opposition to personal violence.

There are types of violence that occur in both forms. Gender-based violence, child abuse, or racial discrimination, for example, can take the form of blatant personal violence (for example, violence against children), but also in the form of covert institutional violence. For example, legitimizing gender-based discrimination in the workplace or the denial of health rights based on a worker's origin.

Symbolic violence.
The negative prejudices and stereotypes that are reproduced by institutions are a central factor in institutional violence and a trigger for personal violence.

Symbolic violence encourages the adoption of discriminatory or coercive positions in ideology, economics, gender relations, destruction of nature, etc. It is based on an extensive network of values assimilated from childhood and then reinforced by society's legal norms to inculcate in us an oppressive culture because it is uncritical and prepares us for passive and/or active submission to unfair structures. For example, public stereotypes about the immigrant or atheist can support the passivity of authorities in the face of labour exploitation or a legislation or practice that prevents access to public office based on religious beliefs.

One author who has studied this at length is Michel Foucault: the micro-powers, as he calls them. They are authoritarian systems that generate an apparently rational discourse aimed at social exclusion. This happens in the school, the family, the business, the asylum, the hospital, etc. Brutal and visible repression is no longer exercised -or not limited to- but rather a pressing and permanent control to modify behaviour. In his view, the very concept of "man" and the sciences associated with it are a result of the techniques of controlling, monitoring and punishing the marginal elements of populations. It is not necessary to accept the latter in order to recognize the presence and effectiveness of micro-powers and techniques of domination in today's society (capitalist totalitarianism).

How Sartre's perspective on violence was different from the 'classical' marxist view? — Number2018

There is a big difference between Sartre and Marx: Sartre did not believe in historical determinism and had a "pessimistic" view of violence. If the origin of violence is scarcity and scarcity is the inevitable state of historical societies, the end of capitalism would not mean the end of structural violence against the dominated. Sartre has a vision of history as a permanent struggle towards a moral rather than a historical end. Socialism is a project, not an inevitable stage. Or to put it another way, class violence is a phase of violence proper to the human condition.

But look how poetically you express this! — path

You're the one who said it: poetry. (Bad poetry in my case. Writing in English costs me sweat and blood.)

So, philosophy is not poetry. What's the difference?
Of course, you can use metaphorical philosophical terms to innovate or change the philosophical outlook. Existentialists and postmodernists are brilliant at this. Anxiety, being there, deconstruction... But there is a difference. Poetry doesn't analyze its own demolition of language. The poet writes:

Its flowers the tenderness of patient minds,
And every evening I slow down a reduction of the blinds. — Wilfred Owen

And he allows you to look for any sense in your way.

The philosopher writes:

Man is a useless passion. — Jean-Paul Sartre

And then he explains this. That is, the analytical task.

I think that rather than presenting the positive method of philosophy it is easier to say what philosophy is not: it is not science, poetry, religion, rhetoric... Why not?

One point: the characteristic of philosophy is that it is a kind of thought that questions itself. How many books of scientists are there who ask themselves what science is?
This implies a first conclusion: there is not a single philosophical method.

Note that you use metaphors of poison and honey here. I suggest that human cognition is largely metaphorical, or let's say meta-floral. In your speaking for pure Cartesian-ism...and against the poison/honey of rhetoric and floral games, you use figurative language.

What if a 'pure' non-figurative non-rhetorical language or rationality was a fiction from the very beginning? — path

Hey, you don't ask too many questions without answering them?

I was very conscious of using metaphors. I am not opposed to the use of metaphors, nor to ironies, unless the thought gets caught up in them. The problem is inconclusive thinking. Not because it is always possible to reach some port, but because the journey is meaningless if it does not go somewhere.

I use metaphors because I'm not a philosopher among philosophers. I am not writing philosophy but comments in a forum of philosophy fans. Which are two different things.

The problem with philosophy is that it gets bored with itself. The spleen. So much effort for what? No First Cause, no essence, no ideal world, no Being as Being, no synthetic a priori... What a frustration! You get tired of playing Captain Ahab, sailing tirelessly through the seven seas in search of a white whale that no one sees until it kills you. So we let ourselves be carried away by the paradoxes, the ironies and the beautiful metaphors. It is weak thinking, which is the end of philosophy dissolved in pure poetry - almost always bad poetry, I am sorry.

I don't just call for Cartesian clarity and distinction but analytical pruning too. Or writing novels.

Are we speaking about the method of philosophy, is it not?

Despite my sympathies for Bourdieu, I wonder whether broadening the concept of violence so much does not detract from institutional violence. I do not deny that there is a violence anchored in ideology and its vehicle is language. But what needs to be analysed is the way in which this symbolic violence is linked to the real violence of the institutions with the myriad of almost invisible micro-violences that make up the society of imperial capitalism.

In my opinion, we must turn here to a philosopher who is unjustly forgotten today, Jean-Paul Sartre.This oblivion is due in large part to the fact that he dedicated himself to attacking institutional violence as a class phenomenon and to defending the counter-violence of the dominated - with more or less success. And, always in my opinion, he gave an explanation of why violence is an inevitable fact in human relations. Neither good nor bad in itself, but as a part of the human condition. This explanation is focused on scarcity. He is not the first to point in that direction, but I think he did so with a very interesting lack of prejudice.

Reading Sartre is not easy. Especially his last writings before he went out of his mind. But I found it useful.

whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or "suggestion," which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments — Nietzsche

Very sharp words, but the (non)curious thing is that Nietzsche believed that his truth about the truth was the true truth and he defended it so passionately that he went so far as to say true brutalities.
May the god of the philosophers save us from the relativists who only preach the relativism of others.

In my opinion, it is admirable the capacity of the one who tells the truth in a beautiful way. It makes our hair stand on end. But we must not forget that Beethoven's Ode to Joy has been sung to praise freedom, as the official song of the Europe of the Merchants and as the national consolation of the defeated Nazis (as told by Primo Levi). Consequently, does Pythagoras' theorem improve somewhat if it is sung with Bach's music or is it declaimed with rhetorical emphasis?
The philosopher must be committed to the truth, not to floral games. It is not bad at all that he calls our attention with beautiful phrases, but later, once we are awake, we better dedicate ourselves to see what is really behind the music.

To continue with what we were, Nietzsche is exciting. I've had to buy some Nietzsche's books twice because I had unbind them from reading them so much. But sometimes I think it's pure poison. And there seem to be many people who swallow the poison happy if it is flavored with honey. And that's the danger of rhetoric and aesthetics.

I'm very sorry, but in matters of form, I'm for pure Cartesianism.

What I dislike about the pejorative use of 'sophistry' is it's one way we might hide ourselves from such perspectives. It's in our interest to keep our network of beliefs and desires sufficiently stable. — path

I side much more with Aristotle's view on this matter, viewing logic and rhetoric as complimentary to each other, not in competition. — The Codex Quaerentis: On Rhetoric and the Arts

I don't know if certain doses of rhetoric are necessary. But I think that turning philosophy into rhetoric is dangerous. Even if it's a parody, the outcome is to turn thought into tweets. Short and forceful discourses that let no space of calm thought. This is the new rhetoric for the 21th century.

The pejorative sense of “sophistry” that I’m aware of, the one associated with a negative sense of “rhetoric” (which I wasn’t intending to use, but David Mo seems to mean), seems to be of discursive partners who are uninterested in discovering together what is or isn’t actually a correct answer to the questions at hand, but instead simply in WINNING: convincing everyone that they were right all along, whether or not they really are. — Pfhorrest

I was referring to Plato's vision of sophistry. (True sophistry was something else.) In Platonic interpretation sophists are individual relativists.Therefore, discourse - all discourse, in fact - is not aimed at finding some kind of truth, but only at persuading the listeners. In that sense, the Sophistry is a real and present problem for all those who think that some kind of truth must be sought in philosophy, even if it is never found in its pure state.

For example, Rorty. According to him, there is no truth in philosophy. Philosophical discourse only aims at persuading new generations when a particular discourse becomes old. In my opinion this view is dangerous because it omits the fact that behind a language there is always an ideology. Changing discourses without a critical analysis of ideologies is pure conformism and marketing that left relations of domination intact. And this is an unconventional problem.

World Coronavirus Ranking.
North America: Donald Trump - 105,016 dead (overall winner by a landslide)
Europe: Boris Johnson - 39,045 dead
South America: Jair Bolsonaro - 29,937 dead.

Winning team:
New Trio Las Calaveras with "La muerte" (Death) (Negationist-Ultraliberal huapango).

International Mental Health Test:
Will this famous Trio Las Calaveras win the next elections in their countries?
Bets are allowed. I hope I'm wrong. Hope is free. But the reality is bien chingada, (Arturo Ripstein).

I think it is frequently not by solving but by dissolving an apparently intractable problem, — Pfhorrest

I agree that the art of rhetoric is important, and I suggest that it's always been central. — path

I think that if we analyse what Socrates was doing in the 5th century BC we will find a straight line with the philosophy of the 21st century: to analyse and criticise language. Dissolving problems, if you will. What language? Any language, but especially the language of the search for meaning. Against the ontological pretensions, I believe that the foundations of philosophy lie in a basic question: What to be done?

Continuing with Socrates, I believe that the main method of philosophy is not rhetorical but dialectical. Large discourses with persuasive rhetorical intentions - in a sophistic way - are the negation of philosophy. Any book on philosophy that manipulates opposing ideas to improve its own is a false philosophy. An honest philosopher always dialogues with his rivals, concedes their points and tries to criticise his thesis with the same rigour as those of others.

It's the last part that has me thinking you're more of a positivist. — Xtrix

That's because you don't know what positivism is. (Make a note of that). If I were a positivist I would say that all possible knowledge comes down to science and that all human problems can be solved by science. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that all "objective" knowledge -about facts in the world- comes down to science. Which leaves the field open for other types of knowledge, including philosophy. What I agree with the positivists is that metaphysics, more specifically ontology, is a false science that has done much damage to the reputation of philosophy. But Kant already said this in his Critique of Pure Reason: a scandal. And he was not a positivist.

Because I (1) don't believe any of those criteria are "precise," and (2) I see both philosophy and science as also similar in certain respects:

1) They are so precise than you had been unable to put an example of a philosopher using this methods. 2) Don't change of subject. No one is speaking of some similarities (although your list includes some wrong similarities -is world rational???) We are speaking of many things that separate science from philosophy.
— Xtrix

But if they're philosophers, then they don't study ethics or beauty or knowledge in a vacuum. If they do, then yes I wouldn't consider them philosophers at all. I'd call them perhaps "teachers" or even "scientists," concerned with whatever domain of beings they're interested in without any questioning of being. — Xtrix

At this point one begins to get dizzy from your continuous changes of position. You did not define philosophy as being "concerned with some aspect of being", but as an occupation on the " Being qua Being", that is, what is universal in being. Obviously, all philosophers who have dedicated themselves to a specific philosophical specialty and not to metaphysical ontology, do not concern themselves with the being qua being and remain outside your definition.

Anyway, to say that philosophers deal with "being" is false or useless. If you specify a little, philosophers who deal with ethics, for example, do not deal with being, but with what should be. And the analytic philosophers do not deal with being but with language. Of course, if you put norms and language into being, everything is being and your definition is perfectly useless. Because the aim of a definition is clarity, but also distinction.

Well then please point them out -- I'm happy to learn. — Xtrix

I'm sorry I don't have time for the huge task of correcting your comments. I'm probably not qualified either. But if this is any indication: you did not understand (I think you still do not) the concept of intuition in Kantian philosophy and its consequences in contemporary philosophy. Nor did you know the importance of controlled experimentation in the emergence of the New Science. You claim to be Heideggerian, but you do not handle the concepts of the ontological and ontic as Heidegger does. Etc., etc., etc.

I find very interesting the study of ancient philosophy. It is a sensitive subject to me for family reasons. But if you don't understand that current philosophy is very different you are lost. And what I was trying is to speak of philosophy now. What philosophers do now?

Perhaps take up your inquiry there, I am otherwise busy. — Pop

I was afraid of that. You don't know how to answer my questions and that makes you very "busy".

Superposition cannot be described as material.
Quantum fields cannot be described as material. — Pop

Why not?
What means "matter" for you?

Consciousness is an evolving concept. — Pop

I think it's good that the meanings of a word evolve, as long as it's not in a confusing way.
If we equate "consciousness" with "mind", I do not see how we can distinguish the whole of thought activities with the subset of self-awareness thoughts.

Please do not confuse consciousness with mind! They are two words with different meanings.

Consciousness is not a thing so much as a phenomena. A whole body , immaterial phenomena. However cellular microtubules sound promising as a possible location where the main action takes place – on an immaterial quantum level. — Pop

I think we have a problem. This thread is confusing consciousness with mind. Put it simply, consciousness is the mental state of realizing or to be aware of the position of the 'I' among things. Mind is the faculty of thought.

Second, there are no immaterial quanta. Quantum mechanics is physics and deals especially with the behavior of elementary particles, which are matter, that is, mass and energy. If you want to say that the mind is an elementary particle you are going to have problems. I don't see an electron being aware of anything. But your main problem is that mind would not be immaterial.

Because it is locked onto the body and is deprived of sensation. — EnPassant

If the soul were something different from the body, it would have no problem depriving itself of the senses. It would be freer. But the soul's dependence on the senses is such that by depriving itself of them it ceases to function and decomposes. And I say soul because the theory of the body as a prison of the soul is typical of Christian Platonism via St. Augustine.

Of course you can give that theory a religious mythical content and resort to poetic images (the idea of prison is), but you cannot support it with any kind of evidence. All evidence points to the fact that the mind, if you take away everything that comes from the body (starting with sensations), is a total vacuum. Try describing the mind without the data from the senses and you will see what you have left. Nothing. Consciousness is always consciousness of some external thing.

The mind is aware by itself. The body, which is an imitation of a mind, — EnPassant

An imitation? I'd say the mind is the body in action. Without my eyes, my fingers and my kidney, consciousness would be nothing and the mind would have nothing to do. Do you know what happens to the mind in a process of sensory deprivation? It goes crazy.

Consciousness is not a physical thing like blood or oxygen, we know where those are held. It is an actualization of things that are physical and metaphysical including senses, memories, and concepts such as time — Outlander

I agree with your first sentence.
But I don't understand the concept of actualization here. Neither does "metaphysical". In what sense is consciousness metaphysical? I see it as being closely linked to the physical conditions I have just specified: the nervous system, bones, muscles and action. (Bones and muscles are a way of simplifying the reference to the body).

Consciousness is not a thing with point coordinates in space. Consciousness is a state of mind and body distributed among my nervous system, muscles and bones. It is composed of perceptions and actions that place my Ego in the world.
Consciousness is empty. It is intentional: that is, it is the consciousness of something. If you look for its content you will only find the world. Rather, its way of acting in the world. The consciousness of the consciousness says nothing. It's an absurdity because it would take us to infinity: consciousness of consciousness of consciousness of consciousness and so on.
Consciousness has been compared to the stage of a theatre. If the actors don't come in there's nothing.
Since the world doesn't have a nervous system, bones and muscles, it seems impossible to me that the world has any kind of consciousness. As far as elephants are concerned, it's a controversial issue.

Synonyms: being aware of. Antonyms: mechanical behaviour, subconscious, reflex.

philosophy is ontological while science is ontical. That's not the same thing, no, but you can't do one without the other. — Xtrix

No science deals with the Being as a Being. Each science has its own particular field. If you think the opposite, give an example. Do you know of any scientific article published in a scientific journal dedicated to the Being as a Being?

Therefore, scientists who study a parcel of reality (I prefer to talk about reality than about the undefined Heideggerian Being) do not care at all about the "being as being". They work on atomic particles, allergies, nebulae or electric cars. And nothing else. If you want to say that at certain levels scientists are interested on questions traditionally attributed to philosophy, the concept of matter, of truth or the role of induction in science, this may be true. It is also true that these questions cannot be answered today without scientific knowledge. Philosophy of science is a meeting point. But this meeting point is as far from Heidegger's metaphysics as two different galaxies that get away more and more.

So citing what "contemporary philosophers do" is a good argument against philosophy being ontological. Why? — Xtrix

Because if you exclude by definition most of the class of objects that are usually called X, what the hell should we call them? That's what's called making a persuasive definition. An anti-philosophical vice.

Philosophy is what contemporary philosophers do. This is essentially your response to my (and Heidegger's) statement that philosophy is ontological. — Xtrix

If you define philosophy as ontology (which I don't know if it's Heidegger's or your own invention) you leave out of philosophy most of today's philosophers, who don't talk about being as such, but about particular issues such as ethics, for example. I already told you that. I repeat it now. Your definition is exclusive, that is, a bad definition.

If I've made mistakes, you've certainly not demonstrated them in this discussion — Xtrix

I could point out a few things you've written that an expert in philosophy would not have said. You haven't studied philosophy in a faculty and it shows. It's not serious. I'm not a philosopher by profession either, and this is not a forum for professionals. But I'm not trying to belittle amateurs like me. It's not humility. It's common sense. Because sometimes they can show me that I'm arguing about things that I don't master and if I've pretended before that I'm the wisest I'd be very embarrassed. It's a matter of self-esteem.

I'm not saying philosophy and science are the same. — Xtrix

You can define them any way you like, without evidence, and be satisfied with that. If you want them to be completely separate, that's fine. — Xtrix

So we're now appealing to intuition and common sense? Come on. I prefer a historical perspective, with plenty of evidence. — Xtrix

The point stands exactly as it was at the beginning of this digression: philosophy and science do appear very different, but there's no rule or method to determine which is which - — Xtrix

Maybe this is all a matter of common sense. Don't be so dismissive of common sense, because even philosophers use it. Sometimes quite badly. But the intuition of which the text I quoted spoke was not that of common sense, but the old philosophical intuition, that of Kant or Descartes: the immediate grasp of something as evident in itself. Or do you have many reasons for distinguishing white from black? Do you not distinguish them immediately? It would be surprising.
However, apart from the intuitive clarity with which one immediately sees that science and philosophy are not the same, according to the author of the text, I think I have given you plenty of reasons to justify that distinction. But you have preferred not to see them. Don't blame me.

There is no rule for you to differentiate philosophy from science because when some more or less precise criteria are given - even by yourself - you turn a blind eye.
The debate would be quickly closed if you gave the example of a philosopher who supports his philosophy with experimentation, who expresses his theories in a mathematical way or who makes precise predictions. A book about this Being as Being preferably. Applying your own criteria to your own definition of science.

You can't do it. Therefore, you try to cheat. You take some philosophers of the past who were also scientists-when science and philosophy were not clearly differentiated, as Pfhorrest told you- and put their books under the old name of "philosophia naturalis". Of course this is not a special subject of study. There is no faculty of Philosophia Naturalis in the world. No subject, no science. If you want to invent a name for this nothing I suggest "Totumlogy". or "Totum Revolutum". Because for the "science" of Being as Being there is already a name: Ontology. And it has nothing to do with Physics or Biology, but it is a particular branch of philosophy. Well differentiated, by the way. It is a name from the times when many priests disguised as philosophers were trying to say the scientists and free thinkers what they could think and what they couldn't. A timeworn name, it is clear. I think this is the main reason why today is not a very popular name among philosophers.

tween science and philosophy, and I don’t agree at all that philosophy is just about speculation. Speculative philosophy happens when philosophy tries to cross over into the domain of science, without “doing as the scientists do” when there. — Pfhorrest

I totally agree. Thank you for your clarification.

And this is not a good argument. — Xtrix

It's a very good argument that you only solve by getting rid of most of the contemporary philosophers. If you give a definition of philosophy that does not correspond to what philosophers do, you eliminate the philosophers and the definition fits you.

The dog is an animal that flies low when it rains.
Hey, dogs don't fly.
I'm not interested in dogs that don't fly.

That way it's easy to make "natural philosophy" dictionaries.

Principles of Philosophy, by Descartes. — Xtrix

You've chosen the worst example of all for your interests. Descartes was fully aware of the difference between his metaphysics and his treatise on optics. In the former his reasoning was philosophical-metaphysical, in the latter he boasted of having done a hundred experiments before affirming a thesis. According to your own definition you will not find in the Metaphysical Meditations -or the Principles of Philosophy if you like- any trace of falsiability, predictive power, duplicability, use of mathematics, and so on... which according to yourself are properly scientific activities. When Descartes proposes a universal method is not thinking in pure science, but a philosophy similar to science in rigor. Of course, he failed because he was thinking in deductive forms. He was not for nothing the clearest example of 17th century rationalism.

And the same for any book of philosophy that you can quote here. Two different methods two different branches of knowledge.

Because if they are so clearly distinct, why the confusion about which is which? — Xtrix

Just because France and Spain have relations does not mean that they are the same state. Ditto for philosophy and science.

The term intuitive in philosophy does not mean apparent as opposite to essential. Intuitive is immediate, without the need for supporting reasoning. Just as intuitively I see that black is not white. In any case you yourself contributed some characteristics which do not intuitively point out the difference between philosophy and science. Let's stick to them. I'm doing it and it seems like I'm creating some problems for you that you don't know how to solve. See your incorrect view of Descartes above.

You have to know something about these subjects beforehand, and this means not only knowing the questions and problems about which they're concerned, but their history as well. — Xtrix

Because of the mistakes you make, I don't see that you know so much about the history of philosophy in general and of that of the last centuries in particular to give lessons to others. This is a forum for philosophy amateurs and we all have our limits. To discuss it in depth, go to a postgraduate master's degree. You will see that things are quite different.

I doubt that anyone here is claiming science and philosophy to be mutually exclusive in any particular respect. — bongo fury

As I said above, it is very difficult to find words without any vagueness, except for well-defined concepts in science. But giving a rude example, you know perfectly well the difference between black and white, although you probably won't be able to discern whether some greys are blacker than whites. Or you know exactly where a boundary is crossed even though you could not tell exactly whether a person is on one side of the line or the other.
Citing some confusing examples to invalidate a definition of a word would mean throwing away the dictionaries.

Try 'The Pattern Paradigm'. — A Seagull

I took a look at the sample pages in Google Books. At least in these I haven't found any example where the author starts from a mathematized hypothesis, establishes precise predictions and checks them in the experience. I think this is not an example of a philosopher using the scientific method.

Proponents of eudaimonia and of virtue ethics don't decide what is good from their absolute interior, — Ciceronianus the White

Not the proponents of eudaimonia, of course. Because they combine virtue with duties (See Aristotle or Marcus Aurelius). Your refusal to include duties, your extremist concept of virtue does.

This makes being good sound like an exchange, or bargain-- — Ciceronianus the White

I didn't mean to, obviously. I was pointing out a logical link between duty and right. You turn it into reciprocity as causality. Don't change the premises, please.

For me, it's the concept of moral rights which invites selfishness, — Ciceronianus the White

Conflict is the essence of human relationships in times of scarcity. It will arise whenever individualism is encouraged against community. Rights theory, like any other theory, will encourage conflict when rights are seen only in an individualistic way and cooperation when the emphasis is on collective rights. A basic human problem is to find the right balance between them.

And this is a problem of morality, not of philosophical theories of morality.

Why not just be good, or do the right thing, without looking to some divine command or law, or something else beyond your control or belonging in some sense to someone else, as compelling you to do so? — Ciceronianus the White

Not that I should be good because someone has a right. It's that choosing to be good involves analytically recognizing the rights of others.

This has nothing to do with the autonomy of my moral will. As you know, the greatest defender of good as a duty, Kant, was at the same time the defender of moral autonomy.
But it has to do with misunderstanding moral autonomy. Freely choosing the good does not mean being outside all external control. You should read Caligula by Albert Camus, which illustrates the idea very well. Moral choice implies the feeling of the collective, because the moral good is a collective property. My freedom ends where the freedom of others begins. And the moral good cannot be decided from my absolute and abstract interior. I am good in relation to others who are good in relation to me. The opposite is a metaphysical individualism that only leads to selfishness which, although it pretends to be rational, has nothing moral about it.

What happens is that in the present time, anyone who puts forward the rights of the collective as the foundation of the individual is accused of being a socialist, if not worse. We live in times of people who think they are monads.

Yes, he is. His writings are not restricted to the history of science. — Xtrix

Well, I don't see any writings on history in his bibliography either. A historian who doesn't write history books is quite rare.

It appears "intuitively fairly clear," yes. — Xtrix

Science is "ontical" in that it studies various domains of beings: nature, matter, life, humans, etc

Philosophy, or metaphysics, is ontological in that it thinks being. — Xtrix

By the way, this is not a good distinction. Most contemporary philosophy does not deal with Being as Being, but with particular branches: philosophy of science, anthropology, philosophy of history, ethics, etc. You have an archaic concept of philosophy as the old metaphysics.

Experimentation is often involved in the natural sciences, but a great deal isn't. Controlled, careful observation is also important. I'd say the peer review process is also a very important one. Falsiability, predictive power, duplicability, the use of mathematics, and so on...all very important. — Xtrix

. It's only a vaguely defined word, — Xtrix

Let's get down to more serious business.

You're falling into an absolute contradiction. A clear distinction cannot be vague. Clear and vague are antonyms.
You give a good and clear list of characteristics that distinguish between philosophy and science. There is no science of the Being qua Being, but many philosophers (in the past) dealt with it. There is no philosopher (qua philosopher) who supports his philosophy with experimentation, who expresses his theories in a mathematical way or who makes precise predictions. If you know of a book on philosophy written in this way I would like to know about it.

The fact that some connection can be established between philosophy and the natural sciences (in the field of theoretical physics, or the interpretation of scientific theories, for example), that there is an undefinition in some special cases does not support your theory that science and philosophy are not clearly differentiated activities.

They are, and the obsession to erase all distinction lies in the hidden attempt to grant philosophy powers that it does not have.

Well, it is conceivable that in principle one could have a duty that is not toward another person, — Pfhorrest

I suppose it would be a duty to himself or something similar. But that kind of duty is not considered moral. By definition we understand that morality is a way of regulating our relationships with others. If what I do does not affect anyone, it can hardly be said to be moral or immoral. See how those who oppose suicide try to refer it to the harm it creates to other people, the family, good customs, etc. Or relate it to a state of mental derangement. In other cultures, suicide is even considered honorable.

But like I've said before, a major difference is that one is ontological, the other ontical. Here I agree with Heidegger. — Xtrix

The difference between ontical and ontological in Heidegger is as confusing as everything about him. I'd like to know how you understand it.

That leaves us only in disagreement about the existence of a scientific method as being the distinguishing factor between philosophy and science. — Xtrix

I thought we had reached a conclusion about the clear difference between observation and controlled experimentation.
If you have understood that, you will arrive at a clear difference between philosophy and science in terms of method: the use of controlled experimentation (or controlled observation in its absence) to test the validity of statements.
Not that the scientific method is reduced to that. But it is a first step.

Chomsky is also a historian. — Xtrix

Chomsky's not a historian. To make an occasional reflection on the history of a problem does not make him a historian. The article you quote does not even refer to the scientific method but to mind-body dualism.

All you're doing is defining anything that can't be "proven" as "metaphysical." — Xtrix

No. I'm excluding from science everything that can't be proven by controlled experience. Metaphysics is just another case. And that is not a matter of mere definition. It's a real difference between ways of knowing: it can be proven or not.

I'm also very impressed that you put his full name. — Xtrix

If you had quoted him correctly you would have saved me minutes of searching through pages that referred to the Islamist state.

"Intuitively fairly clear." Sure, who would disagree? — Xtrix

So you recognize that there is a clear difference between the method of science and that of philosophy? Case closed.

You still haven't shown there is a method. — Xtrix

Hey, didn't you say there was a clear difference between the scientific method of experimentation and observation? Now there is no difference?

So they apply this "method" how? Unconsciously? — Xtrix

One can speak in prose without knowing the difference between prose and poetry. . Moliére.