The "Greeks' concept of morality" is the morality as lived by the Greeks, right? — ChatteringMonkey

It's not like that. It's one thing what you do, it's another what you know about what you're doing. I doubt very much that in archaic Greece there was any discussion about whether morality was based on wisdom or truth. Or something similar. At least I don't remember it in Homer.

Morality for them was between religion and tradition. If that is what you mean by traditional Greece, that limits it to the world of myth, in which case any reference to moral reflection is superfluous, including Aristotelian. And our debate is also superfluous.

A simple question: Can one be obligated to do something AND free to not do it? — TheMadFool

Yes. Because moral obligation is not a physical necessity. Pantagruel answered you in the same way. In the moral sense you decide what rules you must follow. Even if you say reason obliges you, you can choose irrationally. In the physical sense of necessity your decision is previously determined by cause. Only in this sense "obligation" is opposed to freedom. I don't know if it's the same in English, but in Spanish to call physical necessity an obligation sounds strange.

What would be the point of having the concept of obligation if it dictated action? — Pantagruel

In behaviorism the decision to do anything is determined. There is no such thing as freedom. Therefore the concept of obligation is just a euphemism for a series of hidden causes: conditioned reflex. Skinner tried to demonstrate this in a very popular book: Beyond Freedom and Dignity. In its time it impacted me, but today that behaviorism seems untenable to me.

Wider conceptually, like the concept 'fruit' is a wider concept than 'apple'.... it includes more things. — ChatteringMonkey

Sure, but what I was asking was what.

Greek culture was among other things, the Homeric myths, tragic plays, a pantheon of flawed Gods — ChatteringMonkey

Are we talking about Greek culture or Greek morality theories? The problem started when someone spoke of the Greeks' concept of morality being more Aristotelian than Platonic. We weren't talking about cults and myths.

As for concepts of morality, leaving aside religious and mythological concepts, which do not have a theory of morality, properly speaking, it is a problem that arises with Greek democracy. There are three basic conceptions: the Sophistic, the Platonic, and the Aristotelian. All three were later developed in different forms and all three were rooted in Hellenistic culture as fundamental pillars. Along with the other cultural traditions you cite, of course. To say that Socratism was not a component of Greek culture is not very accurate. And to base your argument on the fact that it was condemned, even less so. Its survival in subsequent centuries implies that it was not so far removed from Greek culture. And Platonism was even less so when it coalesced into such important forms of culture as Neo-Platonism which affected Christianity itself.

Indeed, Athens erected a wake condemning the death of Socrates years after his death. But this doesn't mean anything. Socrates' death was political and his subsequent vindication was political too.

liken this state of affairs to a man who's forced (obligated) to behave in a certain way by force, say, with a weapon. — TheMadFool

You keep mixing two different concepts of obligation or necessity.

If I adopt a rule (not just a moral one) that I believe I must fulfill for a certain purpose because it is the best, I am not giving up my freedom. I am making my freedom concrete in the world in the form of possibilities to carry it out in one act. I insist, this happens with any norm for action.
My freedom is still present at any time because I can either renounce to the norm, to the proposed end or modify the conditions of application of the rule. This has taken place not only at the time of choosing the rule, as you say, but also while I am still applying it. I insist that this refers to any rule.

In other words, the rule is valid only as long as I freely accept it.
As I am constantly accepting and applying standards, both instrumental and moral, political, social, etc., your theory would make freedom abstract, totally inapplicable.

Your example of the gun diverts attention from a different problem.

And plato was no example of the traditional Greek view on morality... — ChatteringMonkey

The Greek tradition was not uniform. There were several opposing tendencies. The Platonic tradition was one of the most important. As you know it reached Hypatia of Alexandria or St. Augustine in the Christian era through Neoplatonism. You have no reason to exclude it.

I don't know what civic virtue or modern revolutionary morality you are referring to? — ChatteringMonkey

I am talking about the civic virtue of the revolutionaries and enlightened people who exalted the duty of citizenship towards the country and the people. See the famous paintings of David, The Oath of the Horatii and The Lictors Bring to Brutus the Bodies of His Sons . They are very graphic representations of that civic philosophy that they exemplified in the Roman virtue, which was not individual, but collective.

Again, I'm not saying that virtue can have no eye for the collective, I'm just saying that it goes further than that.... it a wider idea. — ChatteringMonkey

Every moral system includes the individual and the collective. Whether it is a system based on virtue, duty or consequences. When you talk about "it's wider" I don't know what you mean. If you don't mind, you could explain. Thank you.

The idea of obligation either to perform or not perform a morally significant act flies against the principle of freedom of will in re moral responsibility. — TheMadFool

Moral obligation and psychic necessity are different concepts. Moral obligation functions on the level of duty and necessity on the level of causality. Therefore, moral obligation implies free will. You can do what you think is your duty or not for different motivations. If you are psychically determined to kill your father, you will kill your father yes or yes. You can do bad things even though you think they are bad in a moral sense. Because of selfishness, unwillingness, bad passions or other reasons.
It is another thing to claim that every psychic decision is determined, but this is a different problem.

What I meant by my questions, which you have not been able to answer, is that raising an opposition between virtue, duty and consequences is a false dilemma. It is the classic false dilemma to which some philosophers are so fond of trying to justify their particular ideology by giving it an aspect of rationality.
To put it briefly: a reasonable morality is justified on the basis of a network of virtues, duties and consequences that cannot be formalized as if it were a problem of logic. The proportion is random and depends on circumstantial factors that are impossible to predict and systematize. To try to do so would be to enter into casuistry, which is the usual vice of those who have a bureaucratic concept of ethics and little moral sense.

In your opinion. I have a different opinion of your outburst.

Moral obligation come from a community or collective, whereas virtue is more centered around the individual. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't understand this opposition. And the civic virtue that was the basis of modern revolutionary morality? Wasn't it a virtue oriented towards the collective?

For the Ancient Greeks, morality was understood as being concerned with wisdom, not truth. Aristotle always said ethics is a practical science, not a precise one, and so we should not expect mathematical certainty. — Wolfman

Like every generalization there are holes and very big in this case: Plato. Plato believed in the unity of being and ought in the form of knowledge of the Good which was the supreme Idea. According to him, this was implicit in Socratic intellectualism.

Thus, when the rules of the Polis were established - and in this the Platonists were experts - a political morality was being applied that developed into rules. Although the perfect ideal was unattainable in the cave world (ours), the constitutions that were drawn up in the Academy tended towards that Good that begins with a capital letter.

Therefore the moral rules are not alien to Greek world.

Aristotle is more complex but he also speaks of “a standard and measure”. This is so because in my opinion the appeal to virtue is not contradictory to the search for moral rules. In any case, it qualifies the dogmatic vision of them.

Virtue is more concerned with generally building a good moral character, and so seems to apply even to acts where other people are not involved. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't quite understand. If virtue is moral it should imply some kind of action with respect to others. I don't know how a character that doesn't behave well towards others can be moral.
Could you explain a little more the opposition between moral virtue and moral action? Thank you.

I have read some of Russell's books on morality. I have never read a reference to the "four cornerstones" of the scientific method applied to morality.
I didn't know William K. Clifford. I consulted the article dedicated to him in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I have not seen any reference to the "four cornerstones" of the scientific method applied to morality.

Perhaps if you can offer a specific example of their science-inspired moral philosophy we can get out of this impasse.

So, by me saying "borrowing the four cornerstones of falsifiability, verification, replication and predictability from the scientific method to apply to the method of thought in order to come to rational conclusions of a situation", does that sound like "using the entire scientific method to research moral choices"? — Christoffer

Is there a branch of knowledge that is based on these "four cornerstones" and is not science? I don't know of any.

Ignore the argument in the first post, it is outdated. — Christoffer

As I told you, the problem is that your first comment had a clear (and wrong) meaning and after modifying it it has become a series of vague and confusing phrases. Like the ones I pointed out to you and the paragraph that follows.

Not if moral acts in themselves aren't good or bad. We can establish a foundation around well-being and harm that you then use when addressing all data points surrounding a certain choice. If you exhaust and maximize the data to the best of your ability and question your own biases when doing so while strictly following a ruleset of the well-being/harm foundation you are acting morally good by the process of thought itself. The act and consequence has nothing to do with this, it can be a bad consequence and it could be a bad moral act, but the argument I am describing is proposing that the morally good or bad is within the act of calculating, not the act that is calculated out of it. That the act of actively making the effort of epistemic responsibility is what is morally good, not the consequences of the calculated act or the calculated act itself. — Christoffer

I don't know what it means that acts are moral "in themselves". An act will be moral if it meets certain conditions that you refuse to specify clearly. However, it follows from the above paragraph that for you an act is morally good if it is strictly inferred from a set of rules (ruleset) based on well being.
In the end you are saying the same thing that you said at the beginning, but in a more inconcrete way.

My objections, therefore, still stand. For the above to make sense, you will have to specify the concept of well being, the precise set of rules that you are proposing, why the well being that you have defined is the basis of morality. You will have to explain how you evaluate different concepts of welfare that men have. Etc.

As long as you don't do all this, your proposal remains in the field of indefinition and doesn't seem to lead anywhere. If you try it you will find all the difficulties that it entails. You will realize that these difficulties have already been dealt with in moral philosophy many times without finding a solution that satisfies everyone. Therefore, talking about things like "scientific" or "strictly" does not have much future in the field of ethics. With apologies from Sam Harris, Dawkins, de Waal and others like you who seem to be excited by this possibility.

The scientific method (verification, falsification, replication, predictability) is always the best path to objective truths and evidence.
A person using the scientific method in day to day thinking is a person living by a scientific mindset, i.e a scientific mind.
A person living by a scientific mind has a higher probability of making good moral choices that benefit humans and humanity.
Living with a higher probability of good moral choices is to be a person with good morals. — Yourself

You wrote this yourself in your opening remarks. It corresponds exactly to the objections I made to you. I think your attempts to avoid those objections have made your ideas more confused, rather than more precise.

It does not make sense to say that you are not talking about using a scientific method but about the fundamentals of a scientific method. It is the same thing, and that is what your opening comment says when you say that "method (verification, falsification, replication, predictability) is always the best path to objective truths". It does not make sense for you to pretend to oppose objectivity to probability. The objectivity of the scientific method that, according to you, the scientific mentality applies, is established in your first commentary. It does not make sense that you now talk about "calculating the probability of a moral act". The probability of what? Of its frequency, of its intensity or of its goodness? What you mean here is to objectively calculate the probability of one act being more moral or better than another ("A person living by a scientific mind has a higher probability of making good morals"). And it does not make sense for you to say that you do not put the value on the act but on the method. In the first comment you specifically talk about the method you propose achieving good moral choices and good morals. In other words, morality is a property of the acts and beliefs (mentality) of the person who uses the scientific method applied to the field of morality.

I think that before recommending to others that we go over your previous comments you should do so yourself. I confirm the criticisms I have made to you previously.

-To know which acts are better than others you need to know what makes a good act and what makes a bad act. In other words, what you mean by "good" in a moral sense.
-You have not given a single observable and measurable characteristic that allows you to decide that an act is good.
-If you want to evaluate which acts are better than others in a scientific way, you must establish a quantification of that distribution of traits that make moral an act or choice.

Why not start your own thread about morality? — Christoffer

Let's clear up some confusion because you look a little confused:

1. Subject of the thread you proposed: if a scientific method ("scientific mind") can objectively establish which acts are morally better ("priority").
I have explained to you in my last comments why your proposal is incomplete and unconvincing. Therefore, I have not set the subject aside. It seems that you have not understood what I was saying. I will give you a summary of my opinion.

2. To know which acts are better than others you need to know what makes a good act and what makes a bad act. In other words, what you mean by "good" in a moral sense. Just as you need to give a quality label to a product or study which product is better than another, you need to define what "quality" is.
Not only have you not done so, but you say you don't need to do so. Incomprehensible.

3. If that method you propose is scientific and objective, it will be based on a set of observable and quantifiable "good" properties. I don't think I need to explain to you what objectivity is and that science is based on observation and measurement. Otherwise your method will be neither objective nor scientific. It would be like proposing a quality criterion for a product based on the subjective tastes of the sellers. You have not given a single observable and measurable characteristic that allows you to decide that an act is good.

4. Any concept of quality, including morality, depends on a set of characteristics that are combined in different ways. That is, in different proportions. If you want to evaluate which acts are better than others in a scientific way, you must establish a quantification of that distribution of traits. A typical case in moral philosophy is the combination of the lesser good for the greater number and the greater good for the lesser number. In my opinion this problem has no scientific solution. If you are able to provide it, you should do so. Which you haven't done.

Consequently, I am not asking you to define an absolute moral good (a metaphysical claim that few defend today outside the sphere of religion), but to point out a number of serious shortcomings in your proposal. Instead of pretending that I don't understand it without saying why -a too obvious rhetorical flaw-, I would appreciate it if you would provide the answers to my objections. That would get our debate back on track.

I haven't proposed any moral standards. I've proposed a theory for a moral method of calculating moral acts. — Christoffer

Objection: You cannot qualify an act as moral if you do not have a concept of what is moral and what is not. You cannot put a moral act prior others (the human community over the personal interest, for example) if you do not have a criterion of priority or hierarchy of some over others in the form of a rule (Choose x before y). You cannot claim to have an objective method for deciding which act is moral and which is a priority if you have not defined the objective validity of those criteria. And this implies a universal or a priori rule, as Kant would say.

This time you have reason to feel that you are being referred to.

ADDED: Whether you establish this by imagining situations in which you would act in one way or another is irrelevant to the theory. Dis/agreement of your theory with your acts is a subject that follows the fixation of the ethical theory you defend.

Not sure that you fully understand what I argue for in this thread. — Christoffer

You take everything I write as replicas of your writings. I don't. I usually present ideas of my own. Rather than repeat that you have not said that, it would be good if you said where you disagree with my comment, in the assumption you have understood it. If what I say is not in contradiction with what you write or if you agree I suppose there is no need to say it.

For the rest, I believe that the concept of morality that I have suggested includes the definition of the different ethical schools as well. That's why I mentioned rational egoism that might seem contrary to my definition. It is one thing for them to differ in the justification or explanation of morality and another thing to start from the same (or similar) concept of morality.

I'll add something else about your "method" when I have time.

We can only propose a method used for each moral dilemma dynamically. If the method always leads to a probability of good choices, it is a moral obligation to use such a method in order to act morally good — Christoffer

I agree. There's no magic moral solution. What is moral are the conditions that make a moral choice possible. What are those conditions?

That we cannot find what is good or bad moral acts. — Christoffer

I'm not sure what you mean. A definition of "morality" is possible by picking up the common usage of "moral good"; a strict/scientific determination of how this definition applies is impossible.

Morality is an adjective that applies to the acts and rules that define a specific type of good: the moral rule is regulatory of human relations, informal, universal and unconditional. That is, it is applicable without conditions to everyone in the same circumstances. It is not moral good if is useful in order to obtaining something else and does not admit other exceptions that the rule itself admits.

A typical feature of the moral rule is the distinction between private and common interests. A moral rule excludes any act exclusively directed to private interests without taking into account the interests of others. Even the theory of rational egoism rejects behavior that does not incorporate common interests as part of rational morality.

So much for the definition. In practically any culture you will be considered a good person if you behave according to these conditions.

Now, some problems of appliacability.

I would argue that it's a form of priority. — Christoffer

You're partly right. If moral rules imply two different interests, mine and others', a major problem is proportion. It's easy to determine where the ends of the line are. It's more difficult to establish the borderline between the moral and the immoral. This is the vanishing point when many morals deflate in the face of selfishness. Albert Camus, one of the most famous moralists of the 20th century said: "If I have to decide between my mother and justice, I choose my mother. There may be a problem-trap in Camus' words, but it is complicated.

A second problem is the hierarchy of values. Not all values have the same value. It would be immoral to put my personal whim above a human life. It is not so clear that we do not make this choice many times in our lives in a less dramatic way.

I do not believe that there is a scientific yardstick for these uncertainties. Rational debate on them is advisable; scientific solutions are not possible. If you have this yardstick, I would like to know it. It would alleviate many of my daily concerns.

NOTE: And we have not yet entered into a particularly vexing case: what do we do with the cynic who refuses to follow any moral standards? Phew.

Rather than discussing the detail of the proposal, I would like to point out two difficulties of principle that are valid for any attempt to solve moral problems scientifically. And this is true for Sam Harris and other illustrious backgrounds such as Spinoza, utilitarians or B. F. Skinner.

1. A technical impossibility: human affairs are not predictable. You cannot objectively predict effects from causes as in physics. If these were the case it would be awful. Imagine predictable tools in Hitler's hands. Human slavery would be warranted.
2. There is not logical contradiction in preferring the falling of the whole world before I have a toothache. That is to say, you cannot deduce "to ought" from "to be". Unless you scientifically establish that the lowest good of the highest number is preferable to the highest good of the lowest number. And with what yardstick do you measure the greater or lesser good. But the utilitarians have been trying to solve this question for centuries, without success so far.

That is why I am afraid that in ethics we will always find approximate answers that will convince more or less good people.

But it's hard to build a school around something so insular like that. Were there academic Sartreans ever? — csalisbury

Yes. There's even an academic journal devoted to him: : Sartre International Studies.

Who else has so fallen from grace? — Banno

Every philosopher who does not enter the Olympus of Anglo-Saxon philosophy. In the mid-20th century, there were channels of communication between Europe and the Anglo world. Today there is a wall higher than the Berlin Wall. The one who does not write in Anglo-Saxon journals does not exist. The one who is not quoted in Anglo-Saxon journals goes on into the world of Oblivion.

It is not a question of ideology ...only. It is a question of cultural domination mechanics.

A friend translated a book by Deleuze. It was a translation much appreciated by the critics and quoted by experts. Privately he admitted that he hadn't understood anything he was translating. The same thing happened to me with the original. It's just that we weren't true believers.

Thank you.

I don't see what you see... Vision problems?

The most famous things he said and wrote are ugly things. — ZzzoneiroCosm

What if we're ugly and we don't want to see it?

With Sartre it is like with Freud, everyone abominates them, but everyone uses concepts like bad faith, condemned to be free, hell is the others, etc. that have come from Sartre. There must be be a reason for that.

There are videos of Derrida just saying he was a bad philosopher, and Heidegger apparently thought he was an idiot. — Snakes Alive

Derrida's views on other philosophers seem irrelevant to me. I have only read half of Derrida's book about the gift and I found it insufferable pedantry. Post-moderns are usually like that.

As for Heidegger, he began by praising Sartre's intelligent insight on his philosophy, and moved to insults when he realized that Sartre was also criticizing him. He was an insufferable egomaniac. Sartre criticized him for defending a hidden theology that despised man. If you have read only some pages of Being and Time you will have realized that the first criticism is accurate. As for the second, Heidegger confirmed it to the letter when he began to exalt Hitler.
It seems to me that Sartre still has a lot to say for anyone who has the patience to read his writings, which are not always easy or, of course, entertaining.

By the way, two months BV (Before Virus) I attended a performance of Nekrassov in my town in a theater filled to overflowing and long minutes of applause. Sartre lives! I was surprised.

What makes Sartre the black beast of most philosophers of his time and of today is his defence of the revolutionary path to socialism and of violence against colonialism. His insistence on the responsibility of intellectuals is not to the liking of contemporary intellectuals who live very well on the heights.

I was tempted to ask if anyone still reads Being and Nothingness. But of course no one ever actually read Being and Nothingness. — Banno

Not only have I recently re-read Being and Nothingness, but I'm reading the Critique of Dialectical Reason right now. I guess I am getting prematurely senile.

Farging PRACTICE, fercrissakes — Mww

What language is this?

A move sequence can certainly exist as a possibility. — BitconnectCarlos

Ah well. I thought you were defending platonism.

The reality exists and the teacher passes it down. — BitconnectCarlos

No. The future does not exist as reality but as possibility. Sartre called it the nothingness that is within being. It is beautiful.

cognition is the result of the logical substitution of the matter of that object into the universal form of objects in general. — Mww

I don't know what this means. You know something if you have an idea about it that you can rationally justify. Knowledge differs from belief because belief cannot be rationally justified. I don't know what matter and universal form have to do here. Is this Aristotelianism? Does this mean that to understand something you have to explain it in terms of a universal law?
It is generally accepted that knowledge of the objects of this world has to do with experience. This has to be precised, but it is the starting point.

it must adhere to the LNC in order to for a truth claim to be valid — Mww

Since I don't know what the LNC is I don't know what you're talking about.

Haven’t you ever just sat there and thought about stuff, cognizing this and that one right after another, actually quite endlessly, without telling anybody about it? — Mww

Language is not just talking to someone. It's talking to yourself also. According to psychologists, when you are "sitting in an armchair" thinking your mind works in terms of words and images. Thoughts don't exist without that. Not to mention that our speculation from a couch depend on a previous history of socialized verbal contacts.
I don't know what this has to do with the objectivity or subjectivity of our thoughts. I am afraid we are wandering.

And we don’t experience feelings; we experience the objects responsible for the invocation of feelings. — Mww

I suggest you go to Google Scholar and search for "experience of emotions". I suppose you will change your mind about this. It is totally different to see a lizard than to be afraid of a lizard. The difference between a direct complement (that which is seen) and a circumstantial complement (that which causes an emotion). Because the lizard exists outside the mind (as a thing or phenomenon) and the emotion does not.
That both knowledge and emotion contain a subjective part and a reference to an object does not mean that the emotion is not experienced or that there are no important differences between one thing and the other.

The object you know has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with how you know it, except such object must actually be available for you to know about. The mechanisms for knowing are in your head, that to which the mechanisms are directed is outside your head. How can the external object direct the internal mechanism? — Mww

It would be a miracle if something generated exclusively in my head allowed me to manipulate objects outside of my head. And here's the thing about knowledge. Which is not mere speculation but an effective way of moving in the world.
The link between object and subject is the praxis.

Otherwise, the object is telling me what I know which is the same as directing my intellectual capacities, so if I get it wrong, it is necessarily the object’s fault. But no, if the object is telling me what it is, how could I get it wrong, assuming my capacities are operating properly? — Mww

False problem: the object does not dictate the knowledge. Knowledge is the interaction between object and subject. The mistake is the disagreement between them

eah, yeah, I know.....objects absolutely must tell the brain something definitive about themselves — Mww

Nobody thinks that way.
.

Ahh yes. The search for external social group validation for one's beliefs. — Isaac

No. I was referring to the basic intuition that one does not fully exist if one does not realize oneself in the world. The opposite is the spleen of the romantics. Or isolation as the worst of punishments. It makes you crazy.

But if you want to get into the other subject, too, we validate ourselves (not our thoughts alone, but who we are) in social interaction. By attacking or joining forces. The myth is that of Robinson. When you validate something empirically you are doing it from a culture that imposes its social norms on you. You are not alone with your test tubes, even if it seems so.

For both, we need a concept of truth that is produced in interaction with the world and with others. Reality is what resists to me and what I shape. Individually and socially.

Then comes determining the qualities of that interaction that make me think in terms of objectivity. But only after I have established these truths phenomenologically. As a statement, not as an elaboration of a truth.

Now - get off my couch and pay the receptionist on the way out. — Isaac

Your couch? This is a no man's land.

Why? What does this add to the methods we already have? — Isaac

Curiosity, I suppose. Amazement is the mother of science. Moreover, because of the consequences in practice. Belief in the reality of my actions is the surest antidote to apathy and spleen.

Of course, a scientist can live with being a subjectivist. But you can't be madly in love with your girl if you think your girl doesn't exist. Except if you are Edgar Allan Poe and we know how Poe's stories ended. Bad, very bad.

A mathematical truth has nothing of prediction or experience — Isaac

Leaving aside merely formal propositions, for now. — David Mo

Mathematics is formal science. Not prediction. A theorem is not predicted, but deduced from axioms.

I assume we are speaking of objectivity because of the objects in the world.

But I wasn't talking about using perceptions to define 'truth'. I was talking about using perception to distinguish 'true dog' from 'false dog'. There is no general case which covers 'true x' and 'false x'. — Isaac

There is no single method of reaching the truth, but there does seem to be a single concept of truth. It is universal insofar as it designates certain characteristics common to all methods of obtaining a true proposition. Leaving aside merely formal propositions, for now.
All methods of obtaining truth refer to propositions based on intersubjectivity, experience and prediction. That goes for your dog and for an electron. This is what we mean with "Give me a proof of this".

Then comes the discussion about whether the truths thus obtained are objective or not.

That's basically what I mean by "objective." If you want to argue that everything is mind-dependent and ultimately dependent on some type of universal mind that grounds all existence that's fine with me and your view is credible to me. — BitconnectCarlos

I'm not trying to say that.
First of all, you have too much confidence in the absolute exactitude of chess computers. The possibilities for the development of the Sicilian Defense are endless. At one point in the '85 confrontation between Karpov and Kasparov the Whites played Bg2. Experts disagree as to whether this was a basic error or why. Neither do the chess computers. Therefore, if the best solution exists it is not in anyone's brain, artificial or otherwise. We have two options: whether it exists as a mere possibility of a current set of conditions of a conventional symbolic system or it exists in another world.

This last possibility has many disadvantages. For example: limiting ourselves only to the human brain, there is an infinite possibility of imagining formal systems from Tac-tac-toe to Ryemann's mathematics. Objectivity would be an infinity of infinities. Outside of human measurement. How do you know that infinity exists? What is your inhuman faculty that allows you to grasp its existence?

We don’t use truth as a mark of existence of real objects, for they are necessarily presupposed by the cognition of them. It is, after all, impossible to cognize any real object that doesn’t exist. — Mww

You have simply transferred the problem of truth to the problem of "cognition". You've changed one word for another. "When I state a true proposition?" is equivalent to "When I have a cognition of a thing?" With the aggravated problem that you can't recognize and communicate a "cognition" if you don't speak about it through propositional language.

What they are an experience of, and thereby what they are known as, depends solely on the logical form of truth intrinsic to human thought. — Mww

Do you mean to say that my experience of an emotion and that of a lizard is subjective? This is what it seems to say, since the form of my cognition is something subjective, which does not depend on the known object. This does not seem to me to stand up. It seems that the object I know has something to say about the way I can know it.

But this is just tautology, — Isaac

Of course definitions are tautologies. But they are useful or not. It's a question of meaning and reference.

Yes, perception is a simple criterion. It's more or less useful in everyday life. But it is useless in propositions about electrons or force fields. This is where the problem of true propositions begins.

If you have thought that defining truth is simple, you are wrong.