One thing I really like is Heidegger's hermeneutic approach: you start from the asking of whatever question, and you don't skip right over how the question is asked, and why, and by whom, and what they think they're up to, but start there, with that vague understanding. And it's fascinating to see how he treats this not just as methodology but as part of the essential structure of the world: we ask vague questions about things we kinda already understand because some of what we understand or could understand is hidden, and that's part of what we investigate too. — Srap Tasmaner
Exactly, and with the emphasis on "hidden." I think the aim of phenomenology, in Heidegger's hands, is aimed precisely at that: what's hidden, what's concealed. There's much in life that we take for granted, after all.
He's aware of Kant's criticism - so go on and explain why he appears to nevertheless use existence as a first order predicate: Beingness. — Banno
But remember Heidegger is not doing mathematical logic, and so far as I know doesn't use "being-ness" - at least not in B/T or Intro to Metaphysics. I've invoked that term here, as I have "is-ness," but only in an attempt to understand. Heidegger isn't treating being as a predicate.
...constant presence...
— Xtrix
So now we have three ways of talking about existence: this; subject of a predicate; and something like member of the domain of discourse. — Banno
Well there are many more ways I'm sure, but the thesis is that underlying these various Western interpretations is a fundamentally Greek one: constant presence,
ousia. That's the claim.
My previously expressed qualm about "presence" is that it apparently preferences time over space - my prejudices, from my previous life as a student of physics, lead me to think that as far as possible we ought treat them in much the same way. So the being of this armchair extends back to when to was constructed, and forward to when it is destroyed. But also sideways to the bookcase and downwards to the floor. — Banno
I agree with you that it should be treated the same way, from the purview of physics. But let's put that aside for a minute and just see if there's any truth in the claim itself (made above, about presence). I think there is, especially if we do a historical and "hermeneutical" analysis of Greek texts (in which this interpretation is said to originate).
If we do agree that there is truth to this claim, you then rightly anticipate the next question: what do we mean by "time"? But again, before we get into that I want to make sure we're on the same page, because it's a very big claim to make indeed.
Is there a preference for temporality, or is that a misunderstanding on my part? And if so, why? — Banno
Well here I have to nitpick a little bit, because in Heidegger "temporality" will not mean "time" exactly. But I think you mean time in the sense of physics, so in that case no, time isn't preferred. Temporality is preferred -- and we can get into that afterwards, it takes up a lot of pages in Heidegger as you know ("time" is right in the title, after all).
My next criticism would be that presence reduces to being a member of a domain of discourse. That woudl need some filling out, but basically it is saying that the things we talk about ar in a sense given - a familiar notion for you, I suppose. But if I am right, nothing is added to the analysis of being by including presence. — Banno
I'm not sure how to proceed here, because I'm not sure what "member of a domain of discourse" really means frankly. But just to be clear what the claim is: I'm not saying being is presence, I'm saying being was
interpreted as essentially meaning that which is constant, stable, unchanging -- that which arises and is there before us, "present" before us. That is to say:
Ousia -- this often gets translated as "substance" but it has connection to Plato's "idea."
You're right -- my fault. It's funny, because I was about to put what he was referring to in brackets, but had to run out. The "proof" he's referring to is the existence of the outside world. Here's the prior paragraph:
Kant presupposes both the distinction between the 'in me' and the 'outside of me', and also the connection between these; factically he is correct in doing so, but he is incorrect from the standpoint of the tendency of his proof. It has not been demonstrated that the sort of thing which gets established about the Being-present-at-hand-together of the changing and the permanent when one takes time as one's clue, will also apply to the connection between the 'in me' and the 'outside of me'. But if one were to see the whole distinction between the 'inside' and the 'outside' and the whole connection between them which Kant's proof presupposes, and if one were to have an ontological conception of what has been presupposed in this presupposition, then the possibility of holding that a proof of the 'Dasein of Things outside of me' is a necessary one which has yet to be given would collapse.
I don't want to be "quoting scripture" either. I posted this because I came across it when reading something else in the text, and thought it pertinent. I don't consider citing Heidegger to be settling anything -- but he does word things well on occasion.