What people experience in near death experiences seems to be even a higher state of consciousness or awareness. — Sam26

What reasons do they give for claiming to experience a 'higher state of consciousness'? Is it a self evident experience?

On a similar note, what reasons do we have to claim that our waking state is a higher state of consciousness than our dreaming state? I can think of two reasons:
1. Our waking state is continuous from one day to the next, where as our dreaming state appears to change every night.
2. We can analyze our dreaming state during our waking state, but we cannot (at least I cannot) analyze our waking state during our sleeping state.

In order to have a mental image of stick there must exist a stick somewhere in the past present, or future. — Purple Pond

I agree with that statement, with one picky modification: There need not be a stick, but something external to us. If I have a mental image of a unicorn, it does not follow that unicorns exist (past, present or future), but that I have experienced the basic objects that the image is made of: e.g. a horse + a horn.

To put your argument in a different way:
- Nothing can come from nothing: even our imagination cannot create images from scratch;
- we perceive an external reality;
- therefore an external reality must exist.

This is exactly why we need to find the essence of a living being! With this precedent, what is to stop anyone else from granting human rights to any other objects? Note, I am all for protecting nature, just not to the level of granting human rights.

It sounds like you are asking what is the use of finding the essence of words? It is very useful when it comes to validating or refuting an argument. For an argument can be refuted in three ways:
1. Finding ambiguity in the terms used
2. Finding a false premise
3. Finding a logical fallacy from the premises to the conclusion
Knowing the essence of words is needed for 1 and helps for 2.

Second one is disqualified, because if a particular instance is designed, it is not original cause. — noAxioms

Not if the designer is God, the uncaused causer. But I agree that we should apply occam's razor and postpone this hypothesis until all the simpler hypotheses have been refuted first.

As for having more probability outside of the cosmos hypothesis: Is that realistic? My understanding is that the laws of chemistry are called laws because they apply in all environments, not just in an earthly environment.

Would could you possibly mean by "the virus has life, but it is not alive"? That seems completely contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps, as Cavacava points out, it is the difference between potentiality and actuality? This would differentiate a virus from a cell, and still differentiate a virus from a rock, as the former has potentiality and the latter has no potentiality.

The answer in this case is unclear, but the challenge lies in the data, not in the essence of the word 'tall'. Here is the proof: Remove the fuzziness from the data, say A is 10 m tall to within 5 mm, and B is 2 m tall to within 5 mm. Who is taller? Clearly A.

Your case gives an unclear answer, and my case gives a clear answer. The only difference between the two cases is in the data, not in the essence of 'tall' because the same essence is referred to in both cases. Therefore that cause of the unclearness is in the data, not in the essence of 'tall'.

I see. So scientists may agree on the direct cause of the creation of life, that is, the right ingredients at the right settings, but may differ on the explanation or cause of that cause. And the reason is the high improbability for all the conditions to be just right, is that correct?

From this information, I see only two logically possibilities for the original cause:
1. random event from nature, despite the improbability
2. not-random event, that is, intelligent design

Sorry for the late response on this comment. It sounds like you have the same position as some of us in this post: that simple life of a thing is nothing but the proper functioning of the thing's parts. It follows that a factory, car engine, or even a fire have simple life. That is also my position for a simple life, like simple cells.

I think they may be able to do it, but I don't think they will be able to explain their results objectively, using only a material/objective level of description. — Cavacava

Why is that? If we are able to produce life from material (matter and energy) only, then life is made of material only. Nothing can be created out of nothing. Note I am not including here a human being, which may not only have a life, but also a soul.

'Tall' can still be used as a relation, because saying "Y is tall relative to X" is the same as saying "Y is taller than X". Thus 'tall' and 'taller' have very much the same essence in this case. Also, 'tall' should always be relative to X if we want to say something that is objective and accurate.

Now I agree that in an everyday conversation, people may say "He is tall" (with no relation). In which case, this is more an expression of the subject than a description of the object, and there are indeed fuzzy boundaries to the word. It follows that not all words have essences; but some do, as is the case for "taller", or "tall" when saying "tall relative to X".

That doesn't help, unless you are prepared to say that Albert, who was most recently measured as 1770.1mm tall is 'tall relative to' Gunther, who was most recently measured as 1770.0mm tall, which would be inconsistent with how the word is used. — andrewk

Actually I am prepared to say that. Let's put it this way. Logically, there are only three answers when comparing the height of X and Y:
A. X is taller than Y
B. X is shorter than Y
C. X is exactly equal to Y in height.

If X = 1770.1 mm tall and Y = 1770.0 mm tall, then the right answer is A, not B or C. Logic beats popular opinion.

The article was very interesting.

I don't know anybody that would describe a 1.51m human as 'tall'. — andrewk

You seem to forget that part of the essence of tallness is to be 'relative to X'. Be specific in the object and in X, and you will obtain a clear conclusion. If you ask "Is a 1.51 m human tall?", a reasonable person will ask "Tall relative to what? To a cat, yes; to a giraffe, no." Then you reply "Tall relative to the average human height, which is 1.5 m". Then the person says "Yes, because if the average human height is exactly 1.5 m, the a 1.51 m human is taller (more tall) than the average human height. 0.01 m taller, to be precise." Once again, the fuzziness lies not in the essence, but elsewhere.

but we cannot identify necessary and sufficient conditions for C, which is what an essence is understood to be. — andrewk

Cool. I did not know that this was a way to determine the essence of things.

we cannot identify necessary and sufficient conditions for C — andrewk

Why not? If the premise "object > 1.5 m" is certain, then we can conclude with certainty that the object is taller than 1.5 m. Thus the condition is both sufficient and necessary for the conclusion. How much taller? By the same amount claimed in the premise. What if we are not certain about the premise? Then the conclusion is not certain, but this has nothing to do with the essence.

2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples. We are certain of this principle. What if we are not certain that we have 2 apples + 2 apples? Then we are not certain that we have 4 apples. But this does not make the principle uncertain.

My original point was to refute the claim that "The notion of essence is philosophically defunct." If the goal of your comment is to argue against my point, then I think you are committing the straw man fallacy, because I agree with everything you say, and it does not refute my point.

I agree that if the measurement is fuzzy, then the conclusion about the object's tallness is consequently fuzzy, but this does not change the claim that "tallness" has a clear essence. This is also proven by what you claimed:

I think everybody would agree that somebody whose estimated height is greater than two metres is tall, and that somebody whose estimated height is less than 1.5 metres is not tall. — andrewk

In this case, the data is clear (away from the fuzzy boundaries) and the conclusion is clear. This proves that the essence of 'tallness' is also clear, because if it wasn't, then the conclusion would not be clear, despite having clear data.

This indeed seems to be the logical conclusion if one is a real atheist. Leap of faith for the win!

It sure is. At least this life. Some have hope that the next life, still called "life" will be without suffering.

I will answer just a few of these questions, to keep the comment somewhat short:

Is hair included in the height measurement? Up to you: John is taller than Bob if hair is included. If not, then not. The object whose tallness is measured might lack details, but the concept of tallness is itself clear and does not change.

Is somebody that is 1 micrometre taller [taller] than average tall? Objectively yes, because you even included the word 'taller' in your question. I trust you understand the words in your own question.

What if their excess over the average is smaller than can be measured by any human instrument? You could say the difference in tallness is not perceivable. But perception does not change truth, and thus the tallness of a thing is not dependant on our perception of it.

Do a whole bunch of non-tall people become tall when a 2 metre person dies? As per the essence I suggested, "tallness" is relative to X. So relative to living people, yes; relative to the dead person, no.

Let's generalize: If the statement "the categories typically referred to by words have fuzzy boundaries" were to be objectively true always, then the words used in that statement, and consequently the whole statement itself, have fuzzy boundaries. In other words, we could logically never be certain of this conclusion.

A monotheistic god is not alive by the list above since there is no reproduction. — noAxioms

It is true that my list is only comprised on material properties, and thus is adequate only for material lives such as plants, animals and humans. It does not address possible non-material lives such as angels and God. I suggest to limit the discussion to material life for now. This is only for the sake of taking simpler steps, and not to restrict the whole truth of what life consists of.

Maybe a we will create a truly self-sufficient computer life form that manufactures new members at full size, so no growth, and no organic matter. — noAxioms

Point taken again. I forgot that in the past comments, I already acknowledged that if the life of a simple cell is nothing but "the proper functioning of its parts", then a car engine fits the definition as well as simple cells. And a car engine cannot grow, reproduce, nor is it made of organic matter.

So the new list for material life is as follows:
- proper functioning of the object's parts
- needs a form of energy

Fire fits this list. — Banno

Almost, but not quite: A fire is not made out of organic matter, because it is not matter at all but energy. Granted, organic matter is one of the causes of fire, but not the thing itself, as an effect is a different thing than its cause.

I would argue against this "fuzzy boundary" idea. Let's take the example of 'tall'. I propose its essence to be: "that which is greater in vertical dimension, relative to X". Thus MJ is tall relative to the average human being. Remove the words 'vertical dimension', 'greater', or 'relative to X', and we no longer have the concept of 'tall'. But are any of these words unclear?

So back to what distinguishes a lifeform like a cell from a functioning car... — noAxioms

So you want to find essential properties that distinguish lifeforms from non-lifeforms right? How about these:
- can reproduce,
- can grow,
- is made of organic matter (DNA, carbons, proteins ...)
- needs a form of energy

The notion of essence is philosophically defunct. We simply do not need to be able to present a definition of life in order to do biology. — Banno

'Not needed' does not imply 'impossible'. Essences exist, insofar that words point to real concepts, or real objective meanings. If "The notion of essence is philosophically defunct" is saying that words don't have objective meanings, then this statement is itself meaningless; and that is a self-contradiction.

Not sure how you're defining consciousness. I can be rendered unconscious, yet continue to live. So no, consciousness is not what defines me to be alive. — noAxioms

Consciousness has two separate meanings. One meaning is, as you point out, the difference between being conscious and unconscious, as in being awake or asleep. The second meaning is between a conscious being and a non-conscious being: the fact of awareness by the mind of itself and the world. I was referring to the second meaning.

How about an oyster? It quite seems to have life as a whole and can be killed, yet has no apparent consciousness. — noAxioms

How is it that is seems to have a life as a whole, if it has no apparent consciousness? Having apparent consciousness was my reason to support having a life as a whole. What other reasons are there? Note: I am not here including humans just yet, only animals and lower life forms.

A "dead" car engine can be resurrected, not so for a dead organism it seems. — jkop

Actually, my point was the opposite; that just as a dead car can be resurrected by replacing the deficient part, so can the dead cell, by replacing its deficient part. This seems to logically follow from the definition that the life of a simple cell is nothing more than the proper functioning of its parts.

See the comment string here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/65014

At what point does a zygote attain more of a life than what just a collection of cells have? — noAxioms

This seems to be a good next step to the discussion. I suggest to add the concept of consciousness. If an organism does not an apparent consciousness, say a plant, then there is no reason to believe that the organism attains a life as a whole, as opposed to being a mere collection of living cells.

But if an organism has an apparent consciousness, say a dog, then the truth could be in one of two possibilities:
1. This consciousness is only apparent, and the dog is nothing more than a large system composed of living cells, like citizens in a state.
2. This consciousness is a real thing, and thus a "life" is added to the system. This new life is more than the life of simple living cells, which we have defined earlier as "the proper functioning of its parts".

Thoughts?

One may think of a car engine as an analogy to the living cell. If the air supply, fuel supply or spark plugs malfunction, then the other systems which depend on this one can no longer function either, and the engine "dies". If the life of a simple cell is nothing more than the proper functioning of its parts, then the parallel with a car engine is valid.

All the cells in a cow might be alive, but something else is still missing if there is no way to restore the cell collection as a functioning cow. There is life in the cells, but the cells do not comprise a life anymore. — noAxioms

I suppose some cells are primary for the life preservation of the organism, and some are secondary. If the secondary ones die, then the life is preserved by the primary cells, and these may even sometimes replace the secondary cells by new ones. But if the primary cells die, then the life cannot be preserved and the secondary cells will soon die thereafter.

Interesting. This would explain how a living cell is composed of non-living parts, and how it is created in the first place. Does it however explain the difference between a live cell and a dead cell?

I now see the misunderstanding, in the word 'material'. I understand the word material to mean anything that is observable, or empirical. In that sense, I place matter, energy, arrangements and all the likes in the category of material. As I understand it, you meant only matter when you said "I don't think there is a separate material that distinguishes a live cow from a dead one."

So the living state of an organism is the ability for its primary parts to function properly? Let's say a cell has died because one of its parts has a drastic change in function which is irreversible. Under the above definition, would it follow that the cell would come back to life if the deficient part were to be replaced by a properly working part, like replacing the deficient spark plugs on a car engine? If so, does it follow that there is no difference, with respect to living, between a cell and a car engine?

Yeah, I agree that life can be used in all these meanings in every day discussions. For the purpose of this discussion, I would leave out the third meaning "My life" and retain the first two meanings "spirit or soul" and the more scientific "set of capacities", and then figure out which one is closer to truth.

I see. And so the DNA, proteins, and other cellular apparatus are the properties that distinguish non-living things and living things (and then the degree of living things). I think carbon is another essential material property of all living things. Now what could be the essential difference between live things and dead things? Say a live virus and a dead one.

I don't think there is a separate material that distinguishes a live cow from a dead one. That belief does not preclude that the difference in state is not strictly a material one. — noAxioms

Maybe I am misunderstanding your comment, but as I see it, it does logically preclude a non-material thing:

• A difference exists between a live cow and a dead cow
• There is no separate material that distinguishes a live cow from a dead cow
• Therefore the existing difference is non-material

It could be the case indeed that it is a gradual thing. For my knowledge, would you know what makes viruses a 'borderline case' in contrast to non-borderline cases?

Why would our inability to restore a complex material state imply that it must not be material? — noAxioms

Let X = the body of the cow, and Y = the material thing that gives it life. Then a live cow is X+Y and a dead cow is X without Y. To resurrect the dead cow, we would just need to add the material thing Y back to X to result in X+Y. But this seems absurd. Therefore, Y is not a material thing.

The recently dead cow has life. One can isolate a good cell and grow a new cow from it, just not restore the original cow by most definitions of what makes one cow not the same as another. — noAxioms

It is indeed interesting if we are able to do that. What about restoring a live cell from a dead cell?

I am guessing that 'axioms' is synonymous to 'essential properties'? I would be very interested to know what these axioms are, if you ever find them again.

Hello.
Aristotle tried this definition (I am paraphrasing): If one says it is that which objectively is, and isn't that which objectively isn't, then he speaks the truth; but if one says it is that which objectively isn't and isn't that which objectively is, then he does not speak the truth. In other words, if judgement reflects reality then truth, if not, then untruth. But this explanation seems circular to me, because to say "that which objectively is" is the same as saying "that which truly is".

Pascal says that some concepts are so fundamental that attempting to define them results more in confusion than clarity. I think truth is such a concept, as shown above. Maybe the best is to acknowledge that we all have the implicit knowledge of what truth is, even if we don't have the explicit definition. As such, we can still apply the concept correctly.

inasmuch as they are deductive arguments for the existence of God, then they must be certain. — Thorongil

Deductive arguments yield to conclusions which are only as certain as their premises. I don't know of any deductive arguments for the existence of God which have certain premises. Do you know of any? As a christian, I would like to hear them.

Speaking very roughly, Aristotle held that the ultimate metaphysical objects are those which are never found in the predicate position of any true judgment (e.g. "the statue is the clay"); they are only ever the subjects of judgment (e.g. "God is all things"). — Glahn

That makes sense to me. The relationship between subject and predicate can be seen as a master and slave relationship, in that order. Thus the subject is greater than its predicate. On a similar note, I heard from a christian philosopher that we should never say "God is like X", but should rather say that "X is like God", because God is not mimicking anything, and rather, things are mimicking parts of God.

Maybe the term 'observed' by itself was misguiding in the first meaning. I should say that the object is the thing either observed, or discussed, or thought of, or in other words, the object of knowledge. Respectively then, the subject is the observer, or the speaker, or thinker, or in other words, the thing that knows the object.

Thus when I see or say or think "the ball is red", then the ball is the object, and I am the subject.