If good is associated with purpose, how can there be an objective good? Good would be determined relative to one's intention, and intentions vary. — Metaphysician Undercover

That sounds ad hoc. Why is purpose subjective? The purpose of the eye is to see, and that of the nose is to smell. It would be objectively wrong to believe that the purpose of the eye is to smell, and that of the nose is to see.

All I am saying is that a thing's perfect nature cannot be other than what the thing is, or else that is not that thing's perfect nature it is something else's perfect nature. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you reconcile this idea with the idea that there is a worse, better, and best circle?

That's an objective good, good is in the object, by virtue of being the object which it is, it is good. — Metaphysician Undercover

This definition of 'good' effectively makes the term superfluous: any thing is by definition a good thing, and a bad thing would be a contradiction.

Now we might relate one object to another, and say that one is better according to some principle like a "purpose", and come up with a relative, or subjective good. — Metaphysician Undercover

This almost sounds like what I am saying in the OP, with the exception that you make all purposes subjective, and I make them objective. We should therefore clarify this.

Conscience apprehends "good" which comes to us from the source of "other". It doesn't apprehend the purpose because the purpose inheres within the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

No sir. If the "other" can judge a person as being good or bad, it follows that the purpose known is the human purpose; not the other's purpose. Here is an analogy: The purpose of a tugboat is to tow larger boats. Say the tugboat does not know its purpose, but we do. We can judge the tugboat by its action, relative to its purpose. Note that it is its purpose and not ours, even though we know it and it does not. The same goes for the conscience and the "other" when judging humans.

Hmmm... This post is quite large, and you are correct that this is not really related to the main topic of this discussion any more. We can pursue, but how about we focus on one specific passage for now? Your choice. Better to have quality than quantity. I respond below to the three passages that I can interpret. What hidden truth do you see, and why?

Genesis 2:4-7: This passage seems to me to be not fully literal but partially literal, where the human body comes from evolution (dust of the ground) and the human soul comes from God (the breath of life).

Proverbs 3:13-20: Why not interpret this passage literally? Wisdom, the ability to judge things rightly, is surely a good thing to obtain and grow.

John 12:23-24: Jesus tends to speak in parables but then also tends to explain them right away. In this case, he explains it in John 12:25 "Those who love their life in this world will lose it. Those who care nothing for their life in this world will keep it for eternity." In other words, one ought to treat things according to their proper value, and so to value eternal things more than temporary things. And letting go of worldly obsessions requires a sacrifice, a small death.

Doesn't it seem more logical that it is actually impossible that there is a being with the best of that property, because this would mean that the being would have to have a number of different degrees of that property at the very same time, to satisfy what every different person considers as "the best" of that property? — Metaphysician Undercover

When we talk about the good, I mean specifically the objective good. I agree with you when it comes to subjective goods like best song or best flavour of ice cream. But when it comes to objective goods, like best circle, hammer, math homework or health, that best is objective, and hence not a matter of opinion. Surely you must agree that the best circle is something like this, and not this.

What is a being's perfect nature? Any being is the being which it is. If it were something other than the being which it is, it would not be the being which it is. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

This type of belief forces you to forfeit terms like change, good, and potentiality; which is absurd.

Change: For you, a being could not change because the changed being is no longer that original being. Yes, in actuality, a being is the being which it is. But all (or most?) beings belong to species which make them in potential to change.

Good: You would need to forfeit terms like good, bad, better, worse, etc; because for you, all beings are perfect beings as you said. This means there is no such thing as a bad health state, but only "the health state which currently is".

Potentiality: Surely you understand the metaphysical difference between the terms actual, potential, and non-potential. When I close my eyes, I actually cannot see, but I potentially can see. In contrast, a tree actually and potentially cannot see. Furthermore, a human that is blind or deaf is a bad thing because it is part of human nature to have the ability to see and hear. In contrast, a tree that cannot see or hear is not a bad thing because it is not part of its nature to see or hear.

So we must dismiss the premise of good according to purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with everything you have said up to that point. The distinction is between metaphysics and epistemology. As per the definition of good, if there is a real degree of good, then there is a real purpose, regardless if we know it or not. Indeed, if we don't know the purpose, then we cannot know or judge what is good; unless the judgement comes to us by another which knows the purpose.

So, at first we don't know our purpose so we cannot judge of what is good. But we are told what is good by another which we call conscience. Assuming that our conscience speaks the truth, then what is judged to be good is a real good. This therefore implies a real purpose, which the conscience must know. We then can find our purpose through inductive reasoning based on data from conscience. Once we know our purpose, then we can judge of what is good, which should coincide with the judgement from conscience because it all comes from there in the first place.

Having learned some astonishing secrets hidden cryptically, allegorically and in code in the OT, that part of your statement holds true, however I have never seen the NT confirm or explain the secrets hidden in the OT. Thus for me, we still have the situation where the masses (Sheeple) are being hoodwinked about what the Bible is saying and they are not being given the truth. It's a sorry state. — Pilgrim

Did somebody read Dan Brown :wink: ? Jokes aside, do you have an example of passage in the OT that is not clarified in the NT? I myself am not all that familiar with the OT so I could learn something too.

[...] I don't believe he has proven or deduced that the maximum property is this being, he has only proved that the maximum property exists. — Pilgrim

You are correct that the argument only proves merely a slice of the christian God. In fact, christians believe that a complete picture of the true God is only possible through Jesus, not through reason alone. That said, we can associate this source of moral goodness with the christian God based on the Bible:

• 1 Peter 1:16 "Be holy, because I [God] am holy."
• Mark 10:18 "Why do you call me good? - Jesus answered - No one is good except God alone"

[...] See, judging goodness requires knowing the purpose of something, and I have admitted that conscience serves "a purpose", so now we need to know "the purpose" of conscience in order to know that what conscience determines as good, is really good. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are still not quite on the same page. First, I think we can both agree that this conscience, this moral compass, is real (not necessarily truthful but we do perceive something). Next, the assumption is that it is also truthful; its info is correct. As such, its purpose is clear: to inform us on which behaviour is morally good and morally bad. Next, based on particular data from conscience, we induce general moral laws like the Golden Rule or Kant's Categorical Imperative. Finally, based on the common language that what we call a "good person" is a morally good person, we deduce that the human purpose is to abide to the general moral rules.

As the definition dictates, the degree of goodness is judged according to the designated purpose. This requires knowing the purpose. Conscience tells us that there is "a purpose", and free will allows us to choose "the purpose", so we have a number of possible purposes to choose from. The degree of goodness is therefore dependent on the choice of purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

If a being is able to choose its own purpose, then that purpose is merely subjective, which means it has no objective purpose; and by extension, the degree of goodness, relative to that subjective purpose, would also be subjective. Furthermore, if conscience judges our behaviour, then we do not get to choose our purpose over what our conscience tells us.

Instead, with the assumption that our conscience is truthful, we are able to determine if a person is truly morally good. It is also able to tell us if a person is a good person, for to be a good person is to be morally good. From this, we can deduce the human purpose which is to be morally perfect. Yes, free will gives us the freedom to choose, not our purpose because it is objective, but rather choose to accept or decline our purpose of moral perfection; which itself is not changeable.

I will respond to the rest of the post at a later time.

The "ought to" part simply implies that the benchmark maximum exists albeit notionally (as the 'ought to' could just be an ideal or concept). It doesn't for me imply that the benchmark can be reached. [...] — Pilgrim

'Ought' is different than 'should'. 'Ought' means 'should' specifically in the moral sense, in the sense of duty, obligation; in the sense that we are labelled as good if we do, and bad if we don't. Your superman example is an example of should, but not an example of ought, because as you said, it is not currently possible to ignore the effects of gravity, despite the benefits it could bring.

Example: The rich ought to donate to the poor, because it would be in accordance with the Golden Rule, and they can. On the other hand, the poor ought not to donate to the poor or the rich, because they cannot. See the story of Rich man and Lazarus for support from the Bible on this.

I pause here to ask whether the actual source property itself, love, goodness, life-energy, whatever, must in any sense be an actual being rather than just being that simple thing/property itself. [...] — Pilgrim

Another clarification on definitions. In Aristotelian language, a 'being' is not necessarily a living organism (which would be a living being) or person, but simply a thing in the sense that that which is not a being is nothing. So the being with the maximum property as its essence can be just that, the maximum property.

If God is deemed the actual personification and true source of love or goodness then by definition God can not be evil or produce evil. If the source is true and pure there can be no evil within it. — Pilgrim

Yes, that follows.

That being the case the entire set of books in the OT would seem to be in gross error for they describe a God who is, at least to our minds and set of values, inherently evil. — Pilgrim

The conventional interpretation of the Bible in Christianity is that the New Testament should be interpreted literally, and the Old Testament should be interpreted figuratively, in the sense that agrees with the NT. Thus the OT is like the section with riddles, and the NT is like the section with the answers. It sounds like a cop out, but Jesus says himself in the NT: "Don't suppose I came to do away with the Law and the Prophets. I did not come to do away with them, but to give them their full meaning." Pascal gives a good explanation for this in his book The Pensées.

It comes from "outside" of the person, but that "outside" is really through the "inside". — Metaphysician Undercover

I accept the clarification.

[...] So as much as "conscience" may lead us in specific directions, we cannot validate that it is leading us in the right direction [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

While your argument is valid, its conclusion unreasonable, as it fails the Law of Parsimony. It is like saying that although we all perceive the same boat at the horizon, we should not conclude that it is real because there is always the possibility of collective hallucination. Yes, it is possible, but the former hypothesis is simpler than the latter.

More importantly however, let's recall why conscience was brought up. The argument from degree is based on the hypothesis definition that good is the measure of how close a being gets to its perfect nature or function. You attempted to falsify it by pointing out that we perceive persons as being more or less good despite not knowing the human purpose. Thus conscience was brought up to explain how we are able to perceive goodness in persons without the need to know human purpose. Whether or not conscience is a reliable source of data, its existence is sufficient to counter the objection.


Regarding the terms ideal, quantity, quality: I don't mind trying to adjust the terms to apply to your meanings. As for me, I can find other terms to fit my meanings as intended in the OP. Thus what I meant by 'ideal' or 'maximum degree' can become 'perfection' or 'best'.

Hello Mr White.

To clarify the position in the OP, opposing Aquinas, I do not believe that there must exist a being with maximum property for all beings with degrees of a property. I only claim that it must be the case for some properties, like colours and objective goodness.

If there exists a maximum value for a quality or attribute and if the beings in the universe are moving in the direction of that maximum, i.e. actively trying to attain that maximum position (in Christian terms, to be more like Jesus/God) then it stands to reason that eventually over time, that maximum position will become flooded. — Pilgrim

Yep, I now agree with you. The Law of Parsimony made me lean towards the hypothesis of a single being, until a better reason is provided, and you provided a good one. Furthermore, I forgot about the principle that "ought implies can", and as such, if we ought to be morally perfect, then it implies that the moral good to the maximum degree can be reached.


Regarding being with essential quality vs being with accidental quality: I confess I got ahead of myself on that last post, where I made assertions without much explanations. I should backtrack and explain my reasoning.

• As per the argument in the OP, there must exist a being with moral perfection. This being must have that quality essentially, as part of its essence, for if it was not essential, then the being could have it removed and there would not be a being with moral perfection at all times; which there is.
• Other beings may possess the quality of moral perfection, but that quality is only accidental (not essential) because these beings existed prior to the quality reaching maximum degree. E.g., a bad person remains a person despite being bad, but the being with moral perfection cannot remove its moral goodness without ceasing to be.
• The being that possesses moral perfection essentially must be the source of moral goodness in other beings that possess it accidentally, for two reasons: (1) because without some knowledge of moral perfection, we could not know how to progress towards it. (2) An act is considered moral only insofar that it was done with the intention of moral goodness. Unintentional acts cannot be considered either morally good or bad. And intention of x implies the knowledge of x. Therefore the essential being acts as the source that informs us of its existence.

If this were the case then what motive or value is there in other beings striving to reach the "maximum quality" if in truth it is impossible to achieve on the basis that they don't have the quality inherently or "essentially"? — Pilgrim

Why be morally good? As morality is about "what we ought to do", the question is self-explanatory. Because we ought to do what we ought to do. To return the question, why not be satisfied in becoming like God as opposed to becoming God? If it not part of our nature to have the ability to become God, then this desire is literally unnatural.

But how to arrive at any kind of consensus about what is good, absent something like a Platonic view or its equivalent? — Wayfarer

We need first to establish what good is in general. My definition of good refers to any type of good that is objective, not merely moral good. Thus it applies to circles, hammers, homework, health, morality, or really anything that has a nature, an identity. People may not all agree about the moral system, but all can agree that this circle is a better circle than this circle. Thus I believe that the definition of good is fitting. Once established, then we can move on to the next objections.

This is just a vicious circle, using goodness in human beings to determine the human purpose, in order to use the human purpose to identify goodness. To say that so and so is a good person would require already that one has an idea of the human purpose, if goodness is determined relative to the human purpose. So we can't look for good human beings to determine what the human purpose is because we wouldn't know how to identify a good human being without already knowing what the human purpose is. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see your point; but we need here to introduce another notion to show that the reasoning is not circular: Conscience or Moral Compass. When we observe a person as being morally good or bad, this is information that comes to us, not from us. This makes sense because if the moral judgement of men came strictly from men, then the whole exercise would be circular and pointless, like a prisoner being its own judge.

The reasoning thus goes like this: Through conscience, we acquire information that some persons are better than others; and from this, we induce the human purpose; which coincides with the moral ideal.


Regarding the quantity-quality-ideal topic: I now see there was indeed a misunderstanding, mainly in these terms. It is odd to define 'ideal' as the scale rather than as the maximum degree of a property. In common language, the ideal grade for a homework is clearly 100%, not the percentage scale. You define 'quantity' as "that which can be measured", and thus cannot be infinite; but a length can be measured, and the length property can go to infinity. In common language, 'quantity' simply means that we can put numbers to it, and numbers go to infinity. You define 'quality' as "that which cannot be measured as a definite quantity", and therefore can go to infinity; but 'red' is a quality, not a quantity, and we know that there is a pure red, and red to the maximum degree.

Let's take your example of heat. It has a relative scale, K, a minimum, 0 K, and is measurable and quantifiable. Yet, we know that there is no such thing as a maximum heat in K, for we can always add one more K to the previous measurement. On the other hand, nothing can be more red than the pure red.

If the units are arbitrary, then there is no real quantity. The quantity is relative to the arbitrary scale, there is a possible infinity, and no maximum. If the units are real, then there are real limits, no infinity, and a maximum, there is a quantity in an absolute sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you give examples of what you call real units vs arbitrary units? As I understand it, it doesn't make sense: Say I am counting spoons. A spoon is a real unit. Yet there is no possible maximum number of spoons.

Hello.
You bring up valid points.

Regarding the possibility of many beings with the maximum degree of a property, rather than just one: It is indeed possible for many beings to fully actualize a property, thereby reaching the maximum degree. But two counterpoints:
(1) If we don't know this, then it is more reasonable to infer a single being rather than many, due to the Law of Parsimony or Occam's Razor, stating that the simplest hypothesis that explains all the data is the most reasonable one.
(2) If the ideal is essentially made of that one property only, (e.g. the ideal red), then there can only be one ideal being with that property, as per the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. Other beings with that property may also reach the maximum degree, but they have it only 'in participation', where as the ideal being would have it 'essentially', and would be the source of that property in others. (This is admittedly getting quite technical).

Regarding the possibility of everything constantly changing: This is impossible, for the statement "nothing is eternal" cannot be eternally true, and is therefore a self-contradiction. As such, some things must be eternal, that is, do not change. But can maximum goodness change? No, by definition of the term 'maximum'; that is to say, a "changing maximum" is a contradiction.

Hello all.
I think you are all roughly bringing up the same topic, namely, that we may need to presuppose a platonic view of reality in order to buy into the argument from degree. I could be wrong but I suspect this is not as critical as you make it out to be. Rather, all we need to agree on is the definition of the term 'good' as used in the common language.

My hypothesis definition of good is: "the measure of how close a being gets to its perfect nature or ideal".
Admittedly, the terms 'being' and 'nature' need to be defined too:
Being: literally a thing; such that whatever is not a being is nothing. E.g. a rock, a dog, jumping, red.
Nature: Identity; the kind of thing that it is. E.g. A hand-drawn circle, insofar that we intended to draw a circle, has the nature of a circle, although it is not a perfect one. A cat with three legs still has the nature of a cat, although a perfect cat has four legs.

Once the definition of the term 'good' has been accepted or rejected, the rest of the argument becomes straightforward. With that, can you falsify the hypothesis definition of 'good'? To do so, we just need to find a example of the term 'good' used in the common language where we know no ideal exists. A Socratic Dialogue around the term good, if you will.

A "quantity" is always a number of units. If the units are not real, then neither is the quantity. If you have a quantity which consists of unreal, or false units, then this is not a real quantity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see. Real quantities imply real units. Although real, some can be man-made or arbitrary, such as 1 m in length, 1 kg in weight, etc. Anyways, I suggest dropping this side topic to focus on the main one.

You are defining "goodness" in a way so as to support your position. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it supports my position, but it is not done arbitrarily for that aim; rather, the definition comes from the Socratic Method using the examples in the OP. To refute it, we would have to find an example that does not fit the definition. And you have attempted to do that with the example on human purpose. See below for the response on this.

But if you define it in a utilitarian way, you judge goodness by a quantity — Metaphysician Undercover

And what unit of measure would the utilitarian use? Note that the definition is for goodness in general, and not merely for moral goodness.

So if we follow your definition, we would have to assume that there is a purpose for human beings, in order that a human being could be judged as good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that follows.

In order to judge the goodness of any human being, or any human act, we'd need to know this purpose of human existence, and position the person, or act, relative to it. But clearly we do not know this purpose, and we do not judge goodness in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

A valid point. And now let me blow your mind :cheer: .
Through inductive reasoning, we can find the human purpose based on what we observe to be a good human being: A large majority considers Mother Teresa to be a better human being than Hitler. This is based on their moral behaviour and nothing else. So the human purpose would coincide with the moral ideal, which is God as per the argument from degree. As such, the christian argument from degree and the above corollary agree perfectly with the christian view on the human purpose, which is based on the Great Commandments in the bible: (1) Love God with all your mind, heart and soul; and (2) Love your neighbours as yourself. In other words, aim all your acts for the end of the moral good, which is done in practice by following the Golden Rule.

"Maximum" is a term which applies to things which are measurable, as is "quantity". To say that there is a "maximum" is to say that there is a "quantity", and this is to say that the thing is measurable. But you define "goodness" as a quality. So by talking about a maximum goodness you talk about goodness as a quantity, when you have defined it as a quality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suspect a misunderstanding either from me or from you; because as I understand your comments, I have already addressed these objections in my previous post. I'll try again, and maybe you can clarify. A maximum cannot imply an absolute quantity because absolute quantities are theoretically infinite, and so no maximum is theoretically possible. It can only imply a relative quantity, a percentage, where the maximum is 100%. I suppose you could also call it a quality insofar that relative quantities don't have any units. But as a relative quantity, I see not contradiction.

Hello.

If I understand your post correctly, you are saying all the examples in the OP include degrees of goodness and a defined maximum, where as the moral good only includes degrees of goodness and no defined maximum, is that right?

That is correct that the maximum moral goodness is not defined, and the OP merely attempts to prove its existence. This is done by using inductive reasoning from the examples to the definition of good in general, and then using deductive reasoning from the definition of good to the existence of maximum moral goodness. Thus it is possible to prove the existence of a being without fully knowing its essence.

Understood. But I don't think the Argument from Degree presupposes the theory of universals (although they are not incompatible). All we need to agree on is the definition of goodness, which is: the measure of how close a being gets to its perfect nature or ideal.

Unless you are saying that this ideal is the same as the universal? Regardless, do you disagree with the definition? It is backed up by the examples given in the OP.

Judgement for quantity requires the assumption of a fundamental unit, or unity, as a particular, an individual. So the soundness of this judgement, the judgement of quantity, is based in the reality of the assumed unit. The assumed unit allows for a first, the one, then the other numbers of the quantity may follow. [...] That the ideal must be real can only be known intuitively and cannot be proven with logic, but that the unit, the individual or particular must be real, in order that there is a quantity, can be proven with logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting. I am not familiar with this notion of "fundamental unit". Can you give examples to illustrate that the unit must be real in order to have a quantity?

it is based in the assumption that to judge for goodness requires the existence of the ideal (maximum) for goodness. I don't think that this assumption is sound because we can judge for quantity without the ideal (maximum) for quantity. — Metaphysician Undercover

But we know it is the case for goodness, straight from the definition of goodness: the measure of how close a being gets to its perfect nature or ideal. Under such a definition, an ideal must exist for the judgement of goodness to apply. This definition is backed up by the examples given in the OP. Do you disagree with it?

But notice that the reality of the ideal is not necessarily based in a maximum, as Aquinas describes. The reality of the ideal is the grounding principles for the system of gradation. When Aquinas talks about a "maximum" for goodness, this implies the character of a quantity, and this gives the argument an unsound premise to begin with. — Metaphysician Undercover

What he means about maximum is not a maximum absolute quantity but a maximum in actuality from potentiality; or to say the same thing in a different way, a grade of 100%, which can be seen as a relative quantity, relative to the perfect nature or ideal.

He can only mean it this way, since we have already established that absolute quantities do not have a maximum.

How do we do this? Could it be that perfect moral goodness cannot exist? — darthbarracuda

If perfect moral goodness could not or did not exist, then it would not be possible to rightly judge a being to be morally good; because, as described in the OP, a being is called good insofar as it gets close to its perfect nature.

Or did I misunderstand your last post?

Hello.

I admit I have trouble reading your post. Are you saying that a real proof requires a physical observation of the thing inferred?

Hello MU.

I don't think the argument from gradation is properly represented here, P1 seems a little simplistic. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with your representation of the argument. This is essentially what I was attempting to describe too, though it may not have come out that way.

The argument may not be sound though because in the case of quantities, the ideal is "infinite". So with quantities the ideal escapes the maximum. What is required to make the argument sound, is to establish an acceptable distinction, a categorical division, between quality and quantity, such that a quality cannot be reduced to a quantity. If qualities are really quantities, then the ideal is infinite, there is no maximum, and the argument is unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are on to something when making the distinction between qualities and quantities, and I also agree that when it comes to quantities, there cannot be an ideal because there is no maximum. However, it is not necessary to prove that qualities cannot be reduced to quantities. What is necessary is to prove the existence of the ideal for goodness. Your way is indeed a means to that end, but not the only one. I use a different approach in the OP by showing that the judgement of goodness is possible only if an ideal exists.

My objection to P1 can be illustrated by objecting to this part of your argument. There are no perfect circles in the world. Every circle is slightly elliptical, they never have a perfectly uniform radius. The point being is that the existence of imperfection does not entail that perfection must exist. — darthbarracuda

That's a valid point. Slight correction: The existence of imperfection does entail the existence of perfection, though sometimes only from our minds rather than from reality outside the mind. I accept the possibility that perfect circles are man-made (I am not certain about this but this would be off-topic). Now a man-made being entails that we know its essence. E.g., we must conceive the essence of a hammer before we build one.

In the case of moral goodness, we have not fully apprehended the essence of perfect morality, and therefore this being cannot be man-made. Instead, we deduce its existence from the existence of imperfect moral goodness.

The only problem with this line of reasoning is [...] with the fact that the "technical" metaphysical concepts involved [...] are quite alien to thinkers raised on "modern" and "Postmodern" philosophy and require extensive explication — gurugeorge

You are correct, when it comes to the aim of persuasion rather than to seek truth. This is why I used the terms nature and function rather than formal and final causes (only added in one line for the fans of Aristotle); but there is always room for more clarity.

The added wrinkle is that objective morality, in the Aristotelian/Thomist system, is itself related to degrees of perfection (the moral person seeks to actualize their potential, the form of them, as best they can). — gurugeorge

Maybe I misunderstand your point here; because as I understand it, that is also my point in the argument; that the potential of moral goodness in persons is the potential to achieve moral perfection.

Hello.

This argument is reminiscent of the Ontological Argument isn't it? — gurugeorge

This argument reminds me of the ontological arguments of Anselm and Descartes. — darthbarracuda

It is different in that the Ontological Argument aims to prove the existence of Perfection (a being perfect in every way) based on the essence of Perfection (which fails because we have not apprehended the essence of Perfection). It starts with the essence of Perfection and ends with its existence.

In contrast, the Argument from Degree starts with the existence of imperfection and ends with the existence of perfection, and specifically for morality.

That's right. Correct in the sense of grammar or syntax; not in the sense of knowledge, understanding, or truth. Have we reached an agreement on that point?

But the fact that we use the word "red" to talk about a range of different colours might be sufficient to convince a reasonable person that there is no one thing to which the word "red" points. — Banno

Not so. That range of colours must have that form of red to a more or lesser degree, in order to truly call that range red. "This has red" is true. "This has red" is false. Therefore the former range must have a thing which the latter range does not have; and this thing must be defined, that is, must have limits, because it does not appear in the latter range.

This is your theory in a nut shell? An essence of red, a Platonic Form of red, something like these examples, but not actually these examples; and while these examples exist in the world, the true form exists... where? in your mind? In my mind? Somehow, shared between minds? Think of the ontological and epistemic complexity here. — Banno

"In the mind" insofar that the subject has apprehended the object. Otherwise, only in reality. Where? In no physical location because forms are not physical, but that is a great discussion for another time. :wink:

And you offer this as somehow simpler that the claim that we just use the word to talk about different colours. — Banno

As per Occam's Razor or Law of Parsimony, we should side on the theory that is the simplest AND can explain all the data. My theory is not simpler than yours, but explains all the data, which, correct me if I am wrong, is not the case with yours. How does your theory explain the fact that some statements are true and some are false?

A statement is said to be true if its meaning or message is reflective of reality. In order to do that, the meaning of the words, which the statement is made of, must point to things in reality too. E.g. the statement "This apple is red" is true only if the thing I am referring to is truly an apple and is truly red.


Side note: how do you upload images and videos directly to the post?

Do you really take Mr Edison's use to be nothing but syntactic? — Banno

Yes. Not only is it possible, it is asserted by Mr Edison himself: "In this video, I have no idea what I am talking about." He says purple is his favourite colour by association with Prince, which he likes. Whatever purple is, it must be good because Prince is good.

To what does the word "purple" point, for Tommy? — Banno

Nothing. The word is to him meaningless. That is the point. As he stated in the previous video, he knows a colour is a physical property of objects which we perceive with our eyes (and later our memory), but cannot go any further than that. Thus the blind can know the material cause but not the formal cause of colours.

Again, these videos prove my point, and appear to disprove yours, namely that words need not to point to beings we experience, in order to be meaningful. If you are correct, then how do you explain Mr Edison's statement: "There is this whole part of vocabulary [colours], of language, that doesn't mean anything to me"?

It can't point to a archetypal purple swatch, as you suggest with red and blue. — Banno

As purple is not a basic colour, it has more than one essential property: red and blue. But purple still has an archetype or form. We know this because, again, we observe some colours to be more purple than others. And for a thing which degree does not go to infinity, a more and less implies a most. Like an arrow aimed closer to the target until it hits the bullseye.

I understood you to be claiming that any and every word points to something - which you call a "being"; and further that this "being" is in some way individual, giving the meaning of the word. It would follow that if there were someone who could not understand what some given word pointed to, then that person could not understand the meaning of the word; and that therefore, they would not be able to use the word. — Banno

You are correct about my position.

They would not be able to use the word meaningfully. They can say the word (from hearing other people use it), but not understand it; which is precisely what Mr Edison says. The key distinction is between saying vs understanding. Before I learned to speak english, for it is not my first language, I could sing along to a few english songs, though I would not understand what I was saying at the time.

You now have the choice of finessing your theory using ad hoc material; or you can accept the falsification. — Banno

I continue to choose finesse. :wink:

So one move open to you is to suggest that Edison can only use colour words syntactically, but without the semantics that can only come from knowing what the words point to. — Banno

If this means roughly the same as being able to use words in a sentence that is grammatically correct but not understanding it, then yes, that is what I am saying. But don't take offence. Mr Edison said it himself:
"There is this whole part of vocabulary, of language, that doesn't mean anything to me. Over the years people have tried and tried to explain color to me and I just don't understand it. [...] Stuff I picked up from hearing about it." You seem to be bluntly ignoring the testimony from Mr Edison himself, and I don't understand why.

You misunderstood; the notion of innate ideas was yours, I was just pointing out that Edison obviously learned to use colour words, and was not born with an understanding of them. — Banno

You are misquoting me. Here is the full quote:

I believe that fact is wrong, but for the sake of argument, let's say it is right. Would this not suggest that we have Innate Ideas, as per Plato and against Aristotle and Hume? — Samuel Lacrampe

From the full quote, you should be able to pick up that this is not my position, and that I am deducing it from a fact that you brought up. Moreover, I already clarified this in my last post. Shall we move on?

So "red" points to a web page? You don't mean that. Nor do you mean that "red" points only to that shade of red, which will be different on your computer than on my laptop, and even on my laptop varies as I move from room to room. There is no being to which the word "red" points, and in virtue of which it gains a mythical thing called a meaning... All there is, is the different and changing ways in which the word is used. — Banno

No, I don't mean that. And thanks for giving me the benefit of the doubt. Gotta celebrate those small steps towards progress.

There is a being which is pure red, close to this, and then there are different shades of red which are composed of pure red and other colours. Pink=red+white. Brown=red+black. Orange=red+yellow. Purple=red+blue. Finally, green has no red in it. The fact that some things are red (to a more or lesser degree) and some things are not red is sufficient to demonstrate that 'red' points to a being with essential properties.

Hello.

If I understand you correctly, then I think we are saying the same thing in different ways. For when I say "everything that is real is logical", it is a way of saying, for my lack of better words, "logic is a truth-preserving guide to reasoning (about reality)". Logic/illogic indeed technically only applies to minds that can reason, and reasoning logically is the method to predict how reality behaves prior to observation.

And this post should be read in a tone of voice that is somewhat contemptuous of the able bodied telling the disabled what they can and cannot do. — Banno

If this is about my statements about blinds, these should be taken as statements of facts, not statements of judgement. Anyways, if I have offended you, then I apologize for that, for my intent is not to offend.

... Did you watch the video? :brow:

He literally says "What is [color]? I don't know. [...] I don't have any concept of what it is. There is this whole part of vocabulary, of language, that doesn't mean anything to me. Over the years people have tried and tried to explain color to me and I just don't understand it."

If I had know about this video before, I would have showed it to you to prove my point; that we get meanings from experience, and to experience is to experience something.

He uses them correctly in most cases — Banno

I am starting to think your position is merely that people can use words in a sentence that is grammatically correct, even if they don't understand the meaning of the words. If that is all you are trying to say, then no dispute here.

And notice that your argument above, for some sort of innate ideas, simply falls apart when you talk to a blind person. Edison's use of colour is not innate; nor is it complete. But it is there for you to see. — Banno

Banno, please try to understand your opponents' position prior to arguing against them. Right now, you are attacking a straw man, because I said that it was your fact, which I disagreed with, that suggested the existence of Innate Ideas. This is not my position. I side with Aristotle and Hume who claim that we obtain our ideas and meanings from experience, and this video proves my point.

What is pointed to by Edison's use of "red"? — Banno

'Red' points to this, which he has not apprehend. That is his whole point. He said "When somebody says 'something is red' to me, I don't quite get it. [...] Stuff I picked up from hearing about it". He says he does not understand, but can repeat what others told him.

A red sports car and a red sunset need not be the same colour. Yet they are both red. — Banno

Red comes in many shades. They both have some shade of red.

...and yet they do indeed use these words. How can that be, if your account is right? — Banno

I believe that fact is wrong, but for the sake of argument, let's say it is right. Would this not suggest that we have Innate Ideas, as per Plato and against Aristotle and Hume? That without the need of experience, every man, blind or sighted, already knows the idea of colours a priori? Well this still would not change my point that words point to things, in this case, to ideas that we know a priori; am I wrong?


I read up on this a bit. This is indeed astonishing. "She was able to enjoy music by feeling the beat and she was able to have a strong connection with animals through touch".

But I am not sure if she would have been able to perceive the animals' colours; although she may have been able to somewhat perceive the tone of the sounds from the vibration frequencies.

The sky is blue, but not all of it, and not the same shade f blue — Banno

Yes, the sky need not be completely blue, and there may be multiple shades, all referred by the word 'blue'. But both cases have some portion of blue, which makes the statements true. If the sky for a particular day was completely orange, then the statement would be false. If meanings did not have some essential properties, then how could we differentiate true from false statements?

Take salty: an adjective which points to a flavour. I had a porterhouse yesterday that had been salted on one side before cooking. It had little in common with the salty smoked bacon I had for breakfast, nor with the Pad Thai; indeed, that saltiness is complimented with umami, a taste I could not name apart from "salty" when I was a child. What is the being these have in common? — Banno

I am not sure I understand the point you are trying to make. It is either true or false that you perceive the porterhouse, smoked bacon, and pad thai as 'salty', used as one common meaning. If true, then indeed the flavours must have one thing in common, even if the flavours are not exactly the same, inasmuch as there are different shades of blue. It may be true that the porterhouse, bacon, and pad thai are more salty than avocados; inasmuch as the colours turquoise, aqua, and azure are more blue than the colour orange.

Hello.
It depends what is meant by "intrinsically disordered". Maybe it only means homosexuality is an unnatural condition, which would be more of a statement of fact than a statement of judgement of the person.

I agree that war is intrinsically evil, but not necessarily immoral.

P1: The first principal of morality is "do good and avoid evil". In other words, "act in such a way so as to maximum the resulting good and minimize the resulting evil".
P2: Saving lives is intrinsically good, and taking lives is intrinsically evil.
C: Going to war that is expected to result in saving more lives in the long run than not going to war is good; and not going to war in that case is evil.

Hello. I agree with most of what you wrote.

Real Truth is inaccessible to us — Kaiser Basileus

What about, as you mention later on, logical necessities? Truth does not contradict truth; therefore any self-contradicting statements are necessarily false; therefore any negation of self-contradicting statements are necessarily true. E.g. "Timeless objective truths don't exist" = self-contradiction; therefore "Timeless objective truths exist" = true.

Also, what about first principles, such as the laws of logic? Knowledge of logical necessities implies that we have a priori knowledge of the laws of logic as being true, for we cannot logically prove the laws of logic to be true. And in the off chance they are not part of eternal truths, then we are all screwed.

Hello.

Have you heard of the Just War Theory? It gives a list of criteria to judge not only if going to war is just, but can also judge if not going to war could be unjust.

E.g. if the Nazis decide to commit genocide against the Jews, it could be your nation's moral duty to declare war against them to save other lives.

Hello.

I am not sure I understand your position. Are you saying a beast is moved to intercourse by pleasure or by the aim to procreate? My guess is the former, as it appears a lot of beasts, especially the males, don't take care of their offsprings.

Hello.
I can tell you the christian position on this topic, which is not necessarily my position (I am on the edge myself).

Christianity has nothing against homosexuality as such, and is only opposed to particular types of sexual intercourse. According to christianity, the functions or ends of intercourse are (1) procreation, (2) union among two people in a marriage, (3) pleasure. And the act must be used with these ends in mind, in the order shown.

The problem with homosexual intercourse is that it can meet ends (2) and (3) but never (1). As such, it is misused. Note however that this is no worse than heterosexual intercourse for the end of (2) and (3) only.

Also, christianity (at least most branches) sees nothing wrong with being a homosexual without the act of intercourse, as it recognizes that the condition is involuntary, and therefore cannot be blameworthy. At worse, it sees it as an unnatural condition like being blind or deaf.

Actually I agree with you. Instead of saying "at the start of the discussion", I should have said "as they come in the discussion". And then, only the key words are important, like 'being' in our previous discussion.

To add to this, I claim that to obtain general truths, like "x is always y", then it is important to find the essence of x, that is, its essential properties.