I disagree with this point, as it excludes the "crazy person" as being someone to which a code of justice or morals would not apply to. If there is someone who likes disrespect, diseases, and dishonesty it does not make them separate from morality, if morality is truly objective. If morals are objective, they would have to apply to everyone regardless of mental state. — Anguis Ex Caelo

Hello Mr Ex Caelo. Morality indeed should apply to everyone if objective. But the necessary ingredient to a moral act is intentions. I.e., if good intentions, then morally good; and if bad intentions, then morally bad. E.g., accidental killing is not immoral, but intentional killing is, despite both acts resulting in the same amount of harm to the victims.

Our crazy person, liking disrespect, may in turn give disrespect to others with complete sincere intentions of doing the good. As such, the act would not be immoral, albeit crazy and dangerous. Note that a crazy person can still be immoral if his intentions are still bad. It's just harder to tell from the outside.

Math, being a system of defining the world invented by humans, is not necessarily objective. It could be argued that the things that math defines are objective, but it does not make math itself objective. Similarly, the things that language defines may be objective, but language itself is not. — Anguis Ex Caelo

Agreed about language; disagreed about math. Numbers are man-made, but the concept they point to are not, and these are still part of math. We can change the numbers 2 and 4, but we cannot change II+II=IIII.

'Clearly objective' to whom? — Marcus de Brun

To all that understand the concept. Do you believe "2+2=4" is right, and "2+2=3" is wrong? If so, then you too believe math to be objective, because only things which are objective can be either right or wrong. On the other hand, subjective things are neither right nor wrong, but only a matter of opinion.

Say that my "legal justification" is that the law is corrupted. Would you not find this legal system wrong?

But you define justice in a manner which people clearly do disagree with -- there are people who believe the death penalty is just, for instance. — Moliere

There are people who disagree on the shape of the earth. It does not make the topic subjective. And if objective, then some people are necessarily in error on the topic.

There are people who also don't think that justice is the most fundamental value. — Moliere

One of the most anyways. I would like to meet such a person who don't think so, and see how they react when experiencing injustice from others.

When confronted with those counter-examples, you say they don't really disagree on values, but rather are making mistakes in reasoning. Why? Because justice is the equal treatment of people, and what they propose violates justice. It's a bit circular. — Moliere

Do you claim that not everyone values respect, honesty, and health? If that is not what you claim, then I don't see what else you dispute in my position.

But the same could be said for the man who believes in the death penalty -- in which case it is you who wish to spare a man's life who justly deserves death, to use your reasoning, that is falling to an error in fact or reasoning. — Moliere

If they are correct, then yes, I am the one in error in this case. But the very fact that there can be an error proves the objectivity of the topic. There cannot be any error on subjective topics, for it is by definition only a matter of opinion.

Why do you believe morality is subjective? Because to do otherwise, is to have a subjective belief about morality. — Marcus de Brun

Hi. Let's use the same logic for a different topic:
"Why do you believe math is subjective? Because to do otherwise, is to have a subjective belief about math".
Math is clearly objective; therefore there is a flaw in the logic.

Add that he assaults himself every time he catches himself looking at him crooked, and wants others to behave likewise. — Cabbage Farmer

People in their right mind do not want to be assaulted. This behaviour does not make him immoral but crazy. We do not send this type of person to jail but to a mental hospital.

See my initial reply to the OP: Rationality and fairness are not in general sufficient to resolve the issue. — Cabbage Farmer

Add human nature. All men want respect, health, and honesty, and dislike disrespect, diseases, and dishonesty (excluding the aforementioned crazy person). Combined with human nature, this justice-based morality is no longer an empty equation but a system with substance.

I've already provided a counterexample to disrupt your position. — Cabbage Farmer

Let's stick to the cake example. You write: "Another says the size of the cake should be proportionate to the weight of the consumers." You can claim that if it was true, but you must justify why it would be true. Is the end goal of sharing the cake survival or pleasure? If survival, then maybe it is true that one must eat an amount proportionate to one's weight, and therefore the just act is indeed relative to weight. But if pleasure, then I see no reason why the claim would be true.

And so to answer my question, if I am unjust to you, e.g. I am your employer and pay you less than the others for the same work, you would not say "it is wrong", but say "I disagree with your choices, inasmuch as I disagree that blue is the best colour". Is that correct?

To my mind the subjective-objective distinction is only applicable to practical situations in which there is a verifiable criterion of truth that is independent of one's feelings about the matter. For example, when betting on the outcome of a football match. Ethical judgements do not fall into this category, since one's feelings are the ultimate arbiter of truth here. — sime

Hello. I dispute the claim that what comes from our feelings is necessarily subjective inasmuch as what comes from our physical senses is necessarily objective (we could be dreaming). I agree that if we believe the criteria to be objective, then the thing the criteria is applied to is objective. But how do we judge the criteria itself to be objective? This seems to result in infinite regress.

First, let's group physical senses and feelings in the same category, because they both serve to convey information about the outside world to the subject. The information they convey may be either objective, that is, attributed to the object, or subjective, that is, merely coming from the subject. Since all info we perceive must necessarily come through our senses and feelings, how do we tell which is objective and which is subjective? By checking if many subjects perceive the same info. E.g., if I see a unicorn and nobody else does, then it is likely not real; but if all subjects present see the unicorn, then it is reasonable to judge it is real, that is, objective.

Same goes for moral senses. If I sense that Mother Teresa's deeds are morally better than Hitler's deeds, and a large majority agrees with this, and although some may be indecisive (due to possible moral blindness), nobody senses Hitler's deeds to be morally better than Mother Teresa's deeds, then it is reasonable to judge that morality is objective.

Our third interlocutor would simply say that a man who murders a million deserves a million deaths. That being impossible to do he deserves the most that we can give him -- one death. — Moliere

As previously mentioned, the Golden Rule is derived straight from justice. Thus anything that breaks the golden rule is necessarily unjust. Our third person observes the rule "Do unto others as they do unto you", which is different than the Golden Rule "Do unto others as you would want them to do unto you". Killing a man breaks the Golden Rule, unless it is done to prevent a yet greater harm, such as killing more people. Our third person breaks the Golden Rule, and is therefore not just.

Sometimes commitments are motivated by good will alone -- it isn't the results of actions, but what they intend to accomplish which compels persons to adopt a particular moral position. — Moliere

Agreed. But if you truly intend to accomplish a thing, then you would necessarily try to find the correct means to accomplish that thing, and discard the means that don't. Say I intend to help people, and find out the means to do so which is in my power to do. Then I will necessarily do it. If I don't do it, then it is either because I don't believe the means to be correct, or because my intentions were not true.

Same for the pacifists. If their intentions is to bring peace and justice, and pacifism does not provide the means to do so, then they will necessarily find another means, or else their intentions were not truly to bring peace and justice.

Unequal treatment among men for a given situation. And this is evaluated objectively.
— Samuel Lacrampe

So far "objective", though, has just been fleshed out as a test in the imagination -- what someone is able to conceive of as being possible or impossible, in the same manner that a triangle cannot have anything but three sides. — Moliere

I think you are mixing up two topics here. The test of imagination only served to determine if there is a case that is morally good yet unjust. But my above quote concerns justice only. 'Objective' means "Independent on the subject of thought, the observer". Two treatments are equal or not, independent on the observer; and therefore justice is objective.

All that happens after having determined what is good or evil. But there are those who disagree on those terms. — Moliere

It is simpler than you think. To summarize my position so far: Criteria for moral judgements are Justice and the Golden Rule (aside from religious authorities, but these only add and don't reduce the previous criteria). Then all humans, due to human nature, know what is good and evil. E.g. Respect, honesty, and health are good. Disrespect, dishonesty, and harm are bad. With that, we have all the ingredients we need to make moral judgements for a given situation. Then if there are disagreements, these can only come from errors of facts or reason.

We can test this with particular examples if desired.

I think you believe in both justice and mercy, and so you attempt to reconcile the two. — Moliere

Not the way we have defined 'mercy', meaning "never punish". I value mercy only when it is just, which simply translates to justice.

But suppose you're in a conversation with three people. And now the third and so far silent conversation partner pipes up and says, "In order for justice to be served, for there to be a balance for what he has done. Having killed millions he also must die -- only by forfeiting his life, after having orchestrated the death of so many innocents, will there be any kind of equality; he would deserve worse if there was something worse to give him" — Moliere

If the third person is sincere, then his error is not a moral but rational one. We appeal to the principle of a just punishment: A punishment is just if (1) it restores justice when possible, and (2) prevents further injustice. Also, if numerous punishments accomplish these ends, then we ought to choose the one that is the least harmful.

Killing a criminal does not restore justice to the victims. It does prevent further injustice from the criminal, but then jail time accomplishes this too and is less harmful.

If everyone were committed to pacifism, then the horrors of war -- including the systematic slaughter of innocent people -- would not exist on our world. — Moliere

And if there were no sinners, then we would all be saints. Can't disagree with that logic, but it says nothing about how to deal with current warriors and sinners. I am not sure how extreme pacifism or 'mercy' as we have defined it, can stop current wars or injustice. As such, I claim rational error again, because the means does not meet the end.

What counts as unjust? — Moliere

Unequal treatment among men for a given situation. And this is evaluated objectively.

And if it is the motivation and the act which are good or evil, and the circumstances are the same (kill or not kill the ex-fascist leader) -- then there must be some reason for our different acts. — Moliere

Indeed there are. I will exclude rational errors here. We all know what is morally good and bad, but free will entails we have the choice to be morally good or bad. Why decline the moral good if we know it to be good? To prioritize other kinds of good such as physical good (e.g. unfaithful sex) or emotional good (e.g. merciless revenge). Now why should we prioritize the moral good over the other kinds of good? By definition of the moral good which is "what we ought to do". In other words, to say "we can do something else than we what ought to do" is a contradiction.

Hello.
So right only means what you choose, and wrong only means what you don't choose, is that correct? So if I chose to be unjust to you, you likely would not choose this, and so the event would be wrong for you, but right for me. Would there be any reason why I should stop being unjust to you?

However, if someone did believe this to be so then they would say that punishing Hitler is immoral. (though could agree to stopping him). Said hypothetical person would say there wouldn't be a point after having stopped him from doing evil, that evil is prevented and that bringing more evil to the world, by way of not observing the value of mercy, only brings more evil and does not bring balance. — Moliere

We are not really in disagreement here, because the end of putting Hitler in jail is to prevent further harm. If the end can be accomplished by another less extreme means, then that is acceptable too. In addition, if the harm done could be repaid, to restore justice, then that should be done too; but this may not be possible when it comes to killing people.

What is the difference, in your set up, between justice and goodness? Aren't they basically the same thing? — Moliere

In this case, I think justice is a necessary and sufficient criteria to determine goodness.

what prevents someone else from holding to another value as having priority to the claim of goodness? — Moliere

P1: If one truly believes an act to be morally good, then they may willingly accept it, despite the harm it may cause them, because moral goodness is believed to be the ultimate end for a lot of people. E.g., one may willingly accept to tell a truth that is damaging to them, if they believe it to be the morally right thing to do.
P2: Nobody willingly accepts injustice to happen to them (unless it is to prevent an even greater injustice); not the saints, not Hitler, nor anyone else in between. This is a posteriori knowledge, but we all know this to be true.
C: Therefore nobody believes a unjust act to be morally good.

The pacifists you speak of may have thought that Hitler could be stopped in a more peaceful way than violence, but I don't believe they sincerely thought it was morally good to not stop him.


You brought up other objections, but if that's okay, let's put them aside to focus on the main ones above.

merciless is to punish offenders within your power — Moliere

So by extension, mercy simply means "not to punish offenders within your power". Let's roll with it.

I claim we cannot imagine an act to be morally good without the will of mercy. Therefore "willing mercy" is a necessary property of moral goodness; therefore "willing mercy" is a necessary criteria to determine if an act is morally good — Moliere

This claim can be refuted if we find a case where the act is not merciful, and yet we judge it to be morally good: Hitler starts killing Jews, and we have the power to stop this. We therefore capture him and put him in jail, which effectively prevents further victims.

Our act is merciless, as defined above, and I judge it to be morally good. Do you? If so, then mercy is not a necessary criteria for moral goodness.

I'd say that the problem with this test is that those with a lack of imagination will come to different conclusions than those with an expansive imagination. — Moliere

Yes but this is a non-issue. As a parallel, think of math. For problems solvable with math, math is an infallible method in theory, even though some people may make errors. To prevent human error, the math reasoning can be checked by different people, as it is unlikely for everyone to repeat the same error; and once discovered and shared, the error is easily seen by everyone. As is the case with math, so it is with the test of imagination. Some people may erroneously believe that "blue" is a necessary criteria for triangles, because they lack the imagination to imagine a triangle that is another colour. But another person can easily show them the error.

Were a triangle given another side then, by definition, it would be a quadrilateral. It just follows from how we set things up at the beginning. — Moliere

You are mixing the word 'triangle' with the concept of a triangle. The word may change but the concept may not. We can arbitrarily change the word 'three' to 'two', but we cannot modify the concept III to II. Similarly, we cannot modify the concept Δ to have four sides.

But if our test for truth by way of necessity is in our imagination then I would claim I can't think of one moral statement which is true in all possible worlds. — Moliere

"An act cannot be morally good if unjust". We have yet to find an example where this is false. I know the examples with mercy were an attempt at this, but I think we can both come to the conclusion that they are incorrect if we agree on the definition of mercy.

Loving yourself means willing the good to yourself. But to will mercilessness towards yourself (out of justice) means you will less good to yourself. You should be merciful to yourself just as you are merciful to others, and forgive them out of compassion regardless of what may or may not be just. This is what it means to love. — Moliere

To recap, we have defined mercy as "Don't over-respond so as to prevent injustice the other way (and also sometimes not fully restore justice)". By extension, mercilessness means "Over-respond so as to produce injustice the other way". Do you agree with these definitions?

As such, mercilessness can never be willed out of justice, by definition of mercilessness. Additionally, being as merciful to yourself as you are to others can never be unjust, by definition of justice.

[...] Might that be possible, in your view? — Moliere

One way to determine a necessary truth is to use "The Test of the Imagination", as Chesterton calls it. If we cannot imagine a subject x without the predicate y, then y is a necessary property of x, and by extension, y is a necessary criteria to determine if the object of enquiry is x. E.g., we cannot imagine a triangle without 3 sides, therefore "having 3 sides" is a necessary property of triangles; therefore "having 3 sides" is a necessary criteria to determine if the object of enquiry is a triangle.

I claim we cannot imagine an act to be morally good without the will of justice. Therefore "willing justice" is a necessary property of moral goodness; therefore "willing justice" is a necessary criteria to determine if an act is morally good.

I love myself, and I care about mercy -- so I act on my conception of mercy regardless of what others may think of me, foolish or not foolish. — Moliere

Let's define the term 'love'. The Christian love, agape, means "willing the good to the object loved".
Thus loving love yourself means willing the good to yourself. But to will injustice towards yourself (out of mercy) means you will less good to yourself than to others, which means you love yourself less than you love others. As such, the statement "I love myself, and I care about mercy, even when unjust to me" leads to a contradiction.

On the other hand, if you love others as much as yourself, it follows that your acts of mercy will always remain just.

While a joke, I did want to note that people can believe their moral grounds are objective. Religion is often given as the sort of thing which gives an objective ground to moral commitments, and different religions emphasize different values. — Moliere

If morality is objective, and different religions teach contradicting moral systems, then it follows that some moral systems taught by religions are wrong, as truth does not contradict truth.

Note however that nearly every religion uses the golden rule in their morality. Source

Yes he did it through his own will and no he didn’t harm anyone. And to answer your last question, yes he intends to do it again if no punishment is inflicted. Do you think jail time is deserved in this case? — SonJnana

I will also assume that anything lower than jail time would not be sufficient to deter him. Then yes, jail time is deserved (plus rehab afterwards). Laws and their enforcements are installed for the end of not only justice but also safety for the citizens. Yes, the addict did not commit injustice, but he nevertheless acted unsafely for himself and potentially others (e.g. he could be driving under the influence). Note that such punishment, while not for the end of justice, is also not unjust, for it can be applied to everyone.

And I claim that the judges wont necessarily agree on what punishment should be deserved via Golden rule becuase they can differ on what they think is a deserved punishment via Golden rule. — SonJnana

It seems that the golden rule is not the only criteria for determining a deserved punishment, because safety seems to be another criteria, as described above. Once again however, the deserved punishment cannot be unjust, and therefore the golden rule remains a necessary criteria, even if insufficient.

In the hypothetical scenario that all religion is proven to be made up[...] — SonJnana

"If God does not exist everything is permitted" - Dostoevsky :wink: The reason being that a true objective law is necessarily above the law abiding subjects; and this being would be what we call God. But this is entering metaphysics and goes beyond the scope of this discussion, so let's just ignore that.

One person does think premarital sex is okay via Golden rule. Another person is conditioned by parents and culture to believe premarital sex is wrong and unjust via Golden rule. [...] A collectivist thinks that if the father tells the son to become something, the son should do that. They think it is immoral to go against parents' word, and that the son has an obligation to his family that raised him. A more independent culture on the other hand thinks parents shouldn't impose on their kids to tell them what to become. They think that would be immoral. So which culture do you think is immoral and what criteria are you using to determine that? — SonJnana

For both cases, the criteria to determine morality is justice, and by extension, the golden rule. The person that breaks the golden rule is immoral, and the person that does not, is not. Even though the act and outcome are the same for both persons, the intention is not, because the first person is insincere where as the second person is not. This is the same rationale as the difference between intentional and accidental homicide. The act and outcome are the same, but the intent is not. This makes justice relative, but not subjective.

If some sect Christianity were to be true, all of its claims of morality would be right. This wouldn't make its moral claims an extra criteria for determining morality, this would make it the only criteria. Justice via Golden rule would be completely irrelevant. It wouldn't matter if everything thought that killing homosexuals is too cruel. [...] — SonJnana

In theory yes. But in reality, Christianity does not command to kill homosexuals; and in fact, makes the golden rule one of the two Greatest Commandments: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."

Do you think someone else might disagree with you on this? — Moliere

The disagreement is of no value if it is not backed up by an objective reason. :wink:

Do I not love myself because I forgo pressing for my friend to pay me back? — Moliere

Let's expand your example to the extreme for the sake of clarity. You forgo pressing your friends to pay you back for money they stole; all your friends, all the time. Would you agree that your act is not judged to be virtuous, but instead, either foolish or lacking self-respect?

That said, if this act of mercy is a means to the end of inciting your friend to penitence (e.g. see Les Miserables), then it may be morally good. But then it is also just, because in penitence, the friend would be willing to restore justice and avoid further acts of injustice.

Humans are basically sheep, and we like the comfort of conformity (conscience). — bloodninja

Conscience is not the inclination towards comfort nor conformity. It gives info on what we ought to do, even if it goes against comfort or conformity. During the Nazi regime, conscience may tell you to protect Jews, despite the risks it entails and the fact that it does not conform to the political regime of the time.

If you think ethics is grounded in our "nature" then you need to show how slavery was or was not grounded by or in our nature. I think you have the burden of proof here. — bloodninja

Conscience informs us on what we ought to do, which is not necessarily what we can do or what is easiest to do. People may choose against their conscience like choosing to own slaves, because they can (through power) and it makes their lives easier. But conscience tells us we ought to seek justice and avoid injustice; and no one can say that slavery is just, as justice is defined in the OP. Neither the slaves, nor even the masters.

Hello everyone,
I am going out of town and will be unresponsive for a couple of days. Back mid-next week.
Stay ethical!

I think that addiction doesn't work so cleanly as all that, or akrasia in general for that matter. Suppose both conditions are met the first time. What if he does it again? And so on? Or perhaps this is the first time he has done it to you, but he's done this elsewhere before.
We are prone to repeat mistakes. We can be sincerely penitent and yet fail. — Moliere

I don't know much about this akrasia condition, but if he relapses, it is either out of his own free will or it is not. If the former, then he was not sincere in the first place and is not to be trusted. If the latter, then his act is not immoral, but harmful nonetheless, and at which point the "punishment" would not be out of retribution but to "save him from himself" so to speak, like an intervention.

Mercy is to forgo punishment. You have a right to punish (a concept associated with justice), but you do not exercise said right. It may be morally correct to enact justice in some scenarios, and morally correct to enact mercy in others. Mercy is a value which flows from love -- the kind of general love for humankind. While you may have the right to punish, to enact just consequences, you forgo them out of compassion. — Moliere

I think that the case where mercy fails to meet justice and is yet morally good does not add up. Recall that justice is defined as equality in treatment among all men. As such, we can define injustice as mistreatment for some men. If justice is not met, even out of mercy, then it follows that somebody gets mistreated.

E.g. You are a judge. Person A is unjust to person B. You could give a just punishment to A but decide not to, out of mercy, which comes from love for A. The logical consequence is that justice is not restored for B. This unjust decision from love for A entails a lack of love for B.

Person A thinks the drug addict does not deserve to go to prison via Golden rule. Person B thinks the drug addict does deserve to go to prison via Golden rule. This is not a disagreement about facts about the event, or about the purpose of a punishment. It is a disagreement about what is just via Golden rule. — SonJnana

If there is no disagreement about facts, then there cannot be a disagreement via the golden rule either. What are the specific facts in your example? Did the drug addict become addicted through his own will? Did he harm anyone? Does he intend to do it again if no punishment is inflicted? If yes to all, then jail sounds just, and nobody could say it is undeserved; not even him with regards to justice. If no to all, then jail sounds unjust, and in which case, nobody would want that punishment.

That said, remember that the source of the golden rule is justice. As such, if we can judge straight from justice, then we don't need to rely on the golden rule; although they would not contradict. And a just punishment is one that restores justice and prevents injustice from occurring again. So if the judges agree about the facts, then they will necessarily agree on the just punishment.

I still don't understand how you can determine something to be not unjust yet immoral. If you are saying it is not unjust, what criteria are you using to determine that it is immoral? — SonJnana

Religious claims. E.g., if Christianity is true, then its claim that fornication is immoral is true, even if not unjust. But don't misunderstand; I am not here claiming that Christianity is true (that would far exceed the scope of this discussion); I am merely giving you a candidate criteria that goes beyond justice.

Hello.
My position is that morality is more than a mere social construct. It is discoverable through our moral sense called conscience, universal because all humans have the same human nature, and unchangeable because our nature does not change. Even though slavery was more socially accepted 2000 years ago, it was just as morally wrong then as it is today, because it always fails the golden rule of ethics.

I don't fully understand what you are saying, and so my response may not be adequate. Here it is anyways. We are physical beings (though maybe not only physical). As such, our bodies obey the laws of physics, and so we are not free from these. Our intentions can be influenced but not compelled by our surroundings. Even locked in jail, a saint can have saintly intentions.

how do you define the "our" in our morals? — Pollywalls

Not sure. How do you define it? Your answer might help me understand your question.

it would not violate justice to demand your friend leave and pay you back — Moliere

A just punishment is one that serves two goals. (1) restore justice, and (2) prevent injustice from occurring again. If the friend truly intends to pay you back when he can, then goal (1) is met. If in addition he is sincerely penitent, then goal (2) is met without further punishment; and in which case any additional punishment like kicking him out would be overboard and result in injustice the other way.

The problem in real life is that intentions of others are never fully known, and so the disagreement in punishment can come from disagreement in the perception of the defendant's intentions.

Mercy is much more in line with the Christian response, since mercy flows from love (which I would say is the central organizing value of Christian values, if we had to choose one). — Moliere

We would need to define the term 'mercy' to obtain a full understanding of it. If it means "Never over-respond so as to prevent injustice the other way, but enough to restore justice", then mercy is always in line with justice by definition. But if it means "Never over-respond so as to prevent injustice the other way, but also sometimes not fully restore justice", then mercy is not always just; and at which point, I would say that this kind of mercy is immoral.

[...] How can you say one is more objectively right than the other when people of both opposing views see their own view as just via Golden rule? — SonJnana

If the golden rule criteria is met, then the disagreement must be about facts about the event, or else about the purpose of a punishment. As previously stated, the goal of the punishment is to pay for the harm done, if any, and then to prevent the defendant from doing the crime again. The first goal restores justice, and the second goal prevents further injustice or harm to oneself. If the judges agree on the goals and the facts that meet those goals, then I see no other reasons for a disagreement.

Your viewpoint is that if it is unjust, then it must also be immoral. How can you say that it is not unjust but it is immoral? — SonJnana

For criteria other than justice in the case of sex. I can only think of religious reasons at the moment, like Christianity that commands against adultery.

[...] So how can premarital sex itself be just or unjust? It depends on the viewpoint of the person. [...] I agree justice is necessary and that it is not sufficient. That is because justice requires presupposed values. One's Golden rule is based off of their values. [...] As you've now acknowledged, people can have different values and therefore different different judgements about what is just via Golden rule. [...] And that is what I believe people mean when they say morality is subjective — SonJnana

Human justice and the golden rule are indeed relative to human values. But aside from subjective tastes, all men have the same values. E.g., we all want respect, honesty and health. The exception to this rule seems to be sex; which moral judgement seems to come from religion. But that is an exception rather than the rule. I honestly don't think we can find another exception.

I think it makes more sense to just say that an action is moral if it is just according to the criteria. — SonJnana

No, because this does not fit the case about sexual acts which may be deemed immoral even if the person committing it passes the golden rule.

When judging something, that is dependent on the criteria you are using. The criteria itself is constructed. And my point is that since people differ on the criteria they are using when they use the word morality - they have different values - that is why you can't just say something is objectively morally right. If everyone were to use the Golden rule in a situation, everyone wouldn't always come to the same judgements about what is just or unjust. — SonJnana

I still claim that the only objective value that creates a disagreement is about sex. All other objective values (i.e., not subjective tastes) are virtually universally agreed upon. So if the case is not about sex, then the disagreement in judgement must come from a disagreement of facts, not values.

The path of justice would have him pay you back. The path of mercy wouldn't. — Moliere

Something doesn't add. Being merciful sounds morally good only if he is penitent. And if he is sincerely penitent, then he would intend to pay you back when he can. If he can but refuses to pay, then there is no real penitence, and so mercy does not sound morally good here. Or else, declining to receive the money back sounds like irrational mercy, and thus also not morally good.

It seems the morally good mercy would be, after showing sincere penitence and intending to pay back when possible, you choose to keep sheltering him and retain the trust without further retribution. And this would not be unjust.

[...] But it would just be one contender among many for what counts as moral goodness -- one rule among many to follow. In what way could we select this kind of rule such that it is not merely a matter of taste, with a little more emotional "umph", just like sanctions against certain sexual acts appear to be? — Moliere

Since the moral judgements of sexual acts appear to go beyond the criteria of justice, I can only deduce it comes from religions, like Christianity, where the bible says that marriage is the union between a single man and woman (thus disapproving of homosexuality and polygamy), and commands against adultery (thus disapproving of premarital and extramarital sex).

If Christianity is true, then the moral commands posited in the bible would be true. But since not everyone has heard of or believes in Christianity or other religions positing these commands, not everyone will agree to follow these, even if they were true. So I think that, in practice, there may always be moral disagreements about sexual acts.

Free will does not mean we have freedom in every way. We seem to not be free to choose to abide to the laws of physics, and we are certainly not free from the laws of logic. Rather, free will means freedom of intentions, and acts that follow the intentions, insofar that the acts abide to the laws of logic and physics. As far as I can tell, we cannot prove that we do not have freedom of intentions.

I agree that what is objective is found either because the property is necessary, or because we observe it empirically. I also agree that we can find what is necessary from definitions, or essence of things; although we do not create essences, we discover them.

I disagree that all that is empirical is material. To observe an inner sense of moral duty is empirical, though the sense is not necessarily material. And if we all have the same inner moral sense of duty to seek justice and avoid injustice, then this justice-based morality is objective because justice is objective.

The original example was simply if someone has a drug addiction. [...] — SonJnana

I guess I was not very clear. My bad.

Do you think a person intentionally going out of their way to do drugs and become an addict - do you think jail exceeds that crime or not? — SonJnana

The correct answer is: it depends on the facts. First, is the defend truly at fault, that is, was the crime intentional and foreseeable? If not, then no punishment is deserved. If yes, then was someone else harmed, either physically, financially, etc? If yes, then the defendant must pay for the harm done. If not, then what punishment can be done with the end to prevent the defendant from doing the crime again? If it can be done with a mere warning, then so be it. If not, then the punishment would be raised so as to meet that end. At the extreme, if a criminal keeps escaping from prison and killing everyone, then the capital punishment may be adequate at that point.

I am not saying any of the above facts are easy to uncover; but they remain objective facts nonetheless.

Whether or not it is unjust depends on an individual's views. [...] My point this whole time has been to say that justice is dependent on presupposed values. — SonJnana

Not 'unjust'; 'immoral'. As defined in the OP, 'justice' is objective; and even when it comes to sex, justice is easy to determine by applying the golden rule. E.g., if I have premarital sex but am intolerant of my spouse having done it, then I am unjust.

[...] However, so many other variables like culture, parents, etc. can influence what people consider just in other situations, such as whether premarital sex is immoral or not. People may have the same presupposed values for extreme cases via Golden rule, but that doesn't mean it applies to every case. — SonJnana

Even in the case of sex, justice is a necessary criteria for morality, even though it is not a sufficient criteria. Note, this does not exclude the possibility that other criteria to determine morality are also objective. But I concede that justice alone is not sufficient in all cases. Can we agree to this: If just, then it is not necessarily moral, but if unjust, then it is necessarily immoral.

What is the criteria of whether or not a 15 y/o is old enough to make those decisions? You could look at the facts about brain development in 15 year olds. Some would argue that development is sufficient at 15 while others would say it is not - both views via Golden rule after looking at the same facts. — SonJnana

Whether or not the criteria is easily found, it does not make it less objective. Would anyone disagree that a 15 y/o is better suited to make this decision, than a 5 y/o? If no one, then the property of "being suited to make this decision" is objective.

Conventionally, objectivity means that the property described is part of the object of thought, independent of the subject of thought. Objective properties may be either necessary or contingent. To say "the Earth is flat" is an objective statement, because the Earth is either flat or not, independent of the subject saying it. It is also a contingent property because it could logically be not flat (like round if you can imagine). Speaking about morality, I use the term "objective" in the conventional sense (notwithstanding the possibility that it can be necessary too, but this is besides the point).

It is true that without free will, then there can be no moral acts. But why think there is no free will? Most people believe in free will, and it sure feels like we have free will upon self reflection. As such, the onus of proof is on the other side.

By "necessity" I just meant true or felt for all. So while "Do as you want" may lead to contradiction in desire as people compete over fulfilling desires which negate one another, the same would be said of the golden rule "Do unto others as you would have done unto you" -- so if you acted by said maxim you would still fall into conflict with the desires of others. — Moliere

Got it. This is what I have been calling "primary values": What all consider to be good or bad. But I don't think this it leads to competitions. Primary values such as honesty, respect, safety and health can be received as well as given without competition. Situations like the Trolley problem are more challenging, but as discussed a few times in this thread, it can be resolved.

[...] We can come up with other examples of mercy -- but mercy is the virtue I'm citing to give a clear delineation between moral goodness and justice. — Moliere

We should come up with another example, not so much because I disagree with your interpretation of the story of Jesus, but because it is about justice from God to man, which is not as clear as justice from man to man. I still think that mercy cannot be morally good if unjust, but we can test specific examples.

We may all have some needs. But we also want more than we need. [...] — Moliere

This is why I prefer the term "primary value" over "need". Need sounds more like what is necessary for survival. As such, values like honesty, respect, and equality do not fit the category of need; and yet are considered good, and their opposites bad, by all. I have not met you, but I would still bet you do not want to be lied to, disrespected, or discriminated against.

As for homosexuality, it is true that this does not fall under the criteria of justice or the golden rule, and I am not sure where I stand on this. I briefly talk here about sexual acts and show that it does not harm the claim that morality is objective, but this may not be what you are looking for.

hrm? I feel like this kind of came out of left field. Not that it's unrelated, only that I wasn't talking about duty -- only that agreeable moral maxims tend to say very little about what to actually do. — Moliere

You were talking about "proper conduct" and "what to do". Duty is defined as "what we ought to do", and so I think you are talking about duty even if you did not call it that. Since what is pleasurable and what is just is not always in agreement, this is where duty is needed: to have a sense to do what is just even when the act is not pleasurable.

The economy only has an instrumental value. If the economic net gain also resulted in net gain in the happiness of people, slavery would then be morally right, but I don't see how that could be possible. In the hypothetical world where slavery didn't cause any kind of suffering to the slaves, I'd have nothing against it. — BlueBanana

Your position still sounds like it is for justice, dressed in different words. One more try: Your spouse cheats on you but you never find out. Your spouse is happy; you are happy. I see no net loss other than in justice. Do you find this act immoral or not?

Why? This goes against that morality is based on equality. — BlueBanana

This is a misunderstanding of my position (which, granted, was not explicit in the OP). Morality is the intention for justice. Sometimes, justice is not easily achievable or straight up impossible. But the intent can remain, and in which case the person is not immoral.

People making different decisions in that situation proves that people disagree not only on the facts but moral sense as well. How is the decision to not pull the lever just? — BlueBanana

Why both the facts and moral sense? Why not just the facts? The decision to not pull the lever may come from the belief that all choices result in the same amount of gain/loss. This belief is of facts, not of moral sense.

How can a nihilist believe in morality based on equality if they don't believe in morality in the first place? If they believe there is no moral or immoral way to act in any situation, how can the actions they believe to be the moral ones be considered just? — BlueBanana

This depends on why they are nihilists in the first place. Are they nihilists because they perceive no moral sense, or do they perceive no moral sense because they are nihilists?

If the former, then it may be possible to have a reduced moral sense, inasmuch as blind people have a reduced sense of vision. This does not entail that the moral law is not real, inasmuch as the visible object is not unreal. Note also that if there is no moral sense, then there is no moral sense against justice either.

If the latter, then it could be they choose to ignore the moral sense on the grounds that it is a false perception, based on nihilism.

If those people are deemed immoral because morality is based on equality and their god is unjust, that's circular reasoning. — BlueBanana

:brow: I see nothing circular here. Only since the Abrahamic religions did people associate moral goodness with god. Before and outside these religions, one can speak of an immoral god. And if we judge a god to be immoral, the criteria for judgement must be separate from the will of god.

How so? Do not people do things out of duty because they believe it's morally right to do so? If not, why then? — BlueBanana

I should clarify. Duty just means obligation, and is not necessarily for moral reasons. One may have a sense of duty for its country, and not for the belief that the country is always morally right. It could be other reasons like mere tradition, or feeling of belonging, or simply "somebody said so".

Do you mean "to commit injustice" or "to do things that are unjust"? To the former, no, to the latter, yes. I think some unjust actions are morally right, but I don't think injustice in itself is morally right. — BlueBanana

The only difference I think I see between your first and second quote is about intentions. In which case, I agree. One's action may results in injustice without being immoral, if the intention was not unjust. Conversely, one may not intend injustice without being immoral.

[...] people don't always agree on a punishment for a crime. Where I'm losing you is that you are suggesting everyone agrees that for a crime, a certain punishment is acceptable via Golden rule because of natural inclinations. [...] Do you really believe that there are not differences between individuals and cultures of what they think fits a crime via Golden rule? — SonJnana

I don't believe the challenge in finding the fitting punishment lies in the difference in primary values. Rather, I believe the challenge lies in the facts surrounding the crime. Was the criminal's act intentional, was the outcome foreseeable, etc. See below for examples.

In the case of going out of your way to get drugs without coercion, then become addicted - many people would say that is immoral. While others disagree. — SonJnana

The example changed. The original example was about people who got addicted through not fault of theirs. In this new example, the people intentionally broke the law before becoming addicted. This deserves a punishment of some sort. Note, I am not saying it is easy to separate the sincere from the insincere addicts, but the acts should aim to achieve justice as best as we can.

I meant sex without getting married, like virgin till marriage — SonJnana

Sex outside marriage is not necessarily cheating. One could have an open relationship. — BlueBanana

Yep, you got me there. Sex seems to be a morally grey area. Some call premarital or extramarital sex immoral, others don't; and the act is not necessarily unjust. Notice however that if the act is unjust, e.g. nonconsensual, then virtually everybody would judge it to be immoral. My point is that, while justice may not be the only criteria for morality, it is nevertheless a necessary criteria. Morality may therefore be more than justice, but not less.

Some would say the 30 year old is being immoral because they're doing something with someone not old enough to make such important decisions. While others disagree and think they are old enough so the 30 year old is not immoral. This is the difference of values that I've speaking of. — SonJnana

Your example points to disagreement on facts: whether a 15 y/o can make such important decisions or not; not a difference of values. It seems if people were to agree on the fact, then they would agree on the moral judgement, as per your reasoning.

what do you mean by duty? — Pollywalls

Obligation; but we still have the freedom to go for or against it.

theoretically, morality does not even exist, because it is a concept. does your definition of objective define the laws of this universe as objective? — Pollywalls

Of course. Laws of physics are discovered, not man-made; and therefore objective. As it is for physical laws, so it could be with the moral law.

Depends on the case. Could be anything. Well-being, happiness, money, health, etc. etc. — BlueBanana

So anything like as stated above but not justice. So to clarify, if there is a net gain, say in the economy of a state, but for this slavery was introduced, you would find this good? Conversely, if justice was gained by abolishing slavery, but there was no net gain in anything else (also no net loss), then you would not find this to be good?

But the distribution of money isn't equal. I see how the outcome can be argued to be equal but that's merely a subjective interpretation of the situation.[...] — BlueBanana

Morality is intending for equality in treatment, but one still looks to reason on the foreseeable outcome to make the reasonable choice. If two persons had deadly allergic reactions and you had one EpiPen, and knowing that a whole shot is needed to be effective, it would be absurd to give half the shot to one and half the shot to the other, just to "preserve equality". The same goes for the money example. If the 1€ is expected to save lives, then that is the reasonable choice. But if the money is not critical and one of the poor can wait for the next donation, then that becomes the reasonable choice, and we can balance out the share next time.

Another extreme case is the Trolley problem, where equality in treatment is impossible, but that does not mean the person making the choice is immoral, because the intention for equal treatment remains.

What about nihilism? Or religious fundamentalists that believe the will of their deity is the absolute law? Or the trolley problem? — BlueBanana

I am not sure what you mean about nihilism. Could you expand on it? As for the will of a deity, you are here using the word 'duty' ambiguously. If the god is unjust, then a religious person may obey it "out of duty", but this "duty" is similar in meaning to how the nazis were carrying out their acts "out of duty", which has nothing to do with moral duty. In that case, we actually speak of an immoral god.

I wouldn't draw any generalizations out of 8 billion humans. — BlueBanana

8 billion already?! We're gonna fall off the edge soon.

Alright, we can remain skeptics on this. But then to be fair, neither can we assert that there exist people that commit injustice out of moral duty. The only data we can be certain of are from you and me. I have no sense of moral duty to commit an injustice. Do you?

Morality is subjective because it is a view taken by (a) person/s. It not only CAN be a view but it without exception has always been and will be a view. — Seastar

Your reasoning is circular. I would deny the premise that morality is only a view, and hence also the conclusion that it is subjective.

Hello.

Definitions a, b, and c: Notice how these definitions are circular because they contain the word 'justice' or 'just' in them.

Definition (2): It can indeed also mean "conforming to a principle or law", but this is not the meaning I am looking for here, because I would question whether these principles and laws are themselves just, that is, providing equal treatment to all.

Definition 3: "conforming to truth". Different meaning again.

Definition 2a: "Impartial". This is very close to my definition, because impartial is defined as "treating all rivals or disputants equally".

The dictionary is a good starting point to find the essence of concepts; although sometimes it is not perfect, as shown in definitions a, b, and c above. I like to use the good old socratic method of starting with real life examples where the concept is properly used, and arriving at the essential properties through induction.

What I meant is that yes, the law makers might change their minds when they are actually in that situation. But majority of them won't ever end up in that situation. So in their minds they may have no problem with truly believing that they should go to prison should they become drug addicts because they think the addicts are bad people and that they'll never end up as one. — SonJnana

But they still break the golden rule, even if they don't see it, from not thinking the treatment all the way through.

Also, it's even possible that if the law makers do become drug addicts, they may
may willingly go to jail out of a "change of heart" or sense of duty
— Samuel Lacrampe
while others want rehabilitation. — SonJnana

Hey! Don't quote me out of context :wink: . While it is possible out of duty to accept a punishment that fits the crime, no one would accept a punishment that exceeds the crime, even out of duty. Going to jail for stealing may fit the crime. Going to jail for a drug addiction, especially one that came through not fault of ours, clearly exceeds the "crime".

Person A thinks justice for drug addicts is rehabilitation. Person B truly thinks it is wrong and they should go to prison for sense of duty. Do you not think this is possible? — SonJnana

As described above, person B has not found true justice because that treatment breaks the golden rule.

Some people think having sex outside of marriage for everyone is immoral. Some people think it's okay to have as much consensual sex as you want. — SonJnana

By "sex outside of marriage", do you mean "extramarital sex"? I am fairly sure that nobody wants to be cheated on, and as such, this act clearly breaks the golden rule.

Some think it is immoral for a 30 year old to get involved with younger than 18 year old. Yet in other cultures, they truly think it's acceptable for a 15 year old to be with a 30 year old. — SonJnana

While I agree that this behaviour is frowned upon and illegal in some places, I think the reason is not really a moral one. Instead, I think it is either because it is thought that people younger than 18 are not old enough to make such important decisions, inasmuch as it is not permitted to quit school before a certain age, or it could be because of health concerns.

Hello.
Morality is the science of duty, not of facts; the science of 'what ought to be', not of 'what is'. If we are not treating each other equally, then it is our duty to change our behaviour to reach equality. If we already are treating each other equally, then it is no less our duty to preserve equality.

Criteria, evaluation, and value are subjective (i.e. occurring in minds only). — numberjohnny5

That doesn't sound right. Criteria is defined as: The factors that determine the validity of a judgement or proposition. These factors are not always chosen subjectively. E.g.: The criteria to determine if an object is a triangle is for it to be a 'flat surface' with '3 straight sides'. These factors are not chosen subjectively.

Same goes for some values, such as physical values. What is physically good or bad or us is not chosen subjectively. This is why medicine is a science.