The Kantian case against procreation I see where you're coming from, and surmised you would respond something along those lines. I guess the problem I would have with that relates mainly to how you construe it.
I guess Im not necessarily ready to forego the "prior existence" condition.
On the following basis:
It seems to me that there needs to be a certain sort of temporal symmetry when you affect someone.
The two agents need to exist simultaneously, in the same temporal reality before we can talk about any party affecting the other one.
Were you to claim otherwise, would that not be falling into a category mistake?
For instance, in your thought experiment, I would have a somewhat different interpretation. Whereas it seems that you would conceive that Trudy is affecting her child, I would construe it as Trudy doing something that
will affect her child in the future.
It's a somewhat subtle distinction, but one nonetheless.