I think what you're wanting to say is that hinge propositions aren't truth apt? — frank
His thinking is developing as he writes. — Sam26
(PI 122)A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. - Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.
The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)
(217)Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do."
(OC 166)The difficulty is to realise the groundlessness of our believing.
I think there is a causal or correlatory relationship between the world and our sensory experiences that produce these beliefs and/or mind states. I haven't thought much of it beyond this. — Sam26
In terms of behavior, we aren't blank slates. Biology would suggest that some hinge propositions are genetic in origin. — frank
But at this point, we turn and notice that all I've just said rests upon untestable hinge propositions. Part of the connotation of "true" is that it's something solid I can push off from. To the extent that I'm confidently pushing off from hinges as I speak, I can say they qualify as true. — frank
I don't think it is a matter of development but of looking at things in different ways, giving different examples, reminders of what we say and do, so as to obtain an overview, an übersichtlichen darstellung, a surveyable or perspicuous representation or overview: — Fooloso4
Hinges should be viewed in the larger context of the problem of knowledge, doubt, and certainty, which, in turn, are viewed in the context of a form of life, as a matter of practice rather than theory.
Our actions occur along a continuum from the prelinguistic to the linguistic. Hinges do not function exclusively linguistically or prelingistically.
I have not been able to find anywhere where Wittgenstein talks about bedrock beliefs. — Fooloso4
Does your picture of "very basic beliefs" correspond to what prelinguistic humans believed and practiced? How do you know? Did they believe certain objects and animals possess powers? Did totems exist in prelinguistic groups? Were there prelinguistic ritual dances, such as those before the hunt? Burial practices? In each case such beliefs are foundational, but not beliefs we accept. — Fooloso4
When primitive man or modern man interacts within his environment, they show their basic beliefs by what they do, or the way they act. So, if a primitive man picks up a stone, that shows that he or she believes something about his or her environment, something fundamental, something very basic. For example, it shows that they believe there is a stone there, that they have hands, that they are a body distinct from other bodies or objects. These kinds of hinges, for the most part don't change. On the other hand, there are other kinds of hinges that we accept as certain (not epistemologically certain, but a certainty that's reflected in our actions), and they are expressed in other ways, maybe ritual dances, praying, that the Earth is flat, etc. These kinds of hinges change over time, and they are culturally dependent, and also dependent on our current fund of knowledge. — Sam26
Then you typing and submitting your post is evidence of your underlying uncertainty? You seem certain of what you say, but if your admitting that your certainty of what you are saying is an illusion and that you know its an illusion I would have expected a lot less of telling others what they fail to realize (as if they are wrong and you are right) and more humility on your part. Are you certain that certainty is just an illusion?What you, many others in this thread, and Wittgenstein himself, fail to recognize, is that doubt and uncertainty is what underlies human actions, as inherent within them, essential to them, and impossible to remove. — Metaphysician Undercover
Then you typing and submitting your post is evidence of your underlying uncertainty? — Harry Hindu
You seem certain of what you say, but if your admitting that your certainty of what you are saying is an illusion and that you know its an illusion I would have expected a lot less of telling others what they fail to realize (as if they are wrong and you are right) and more humility on your part. Are you certain that certainty is just an illusion? — Harry Hindu
My point is that W. never finished developing his ideas in OC. — Sam26
So, if a primitive man picks up a stone, that shows that he or she believes something about his or her environment, something fundamental, something very basic. — Sam26
For example, it shows that they believe there is a stone there, that they have hands, that they are a body distinct from other bodies or objects. — Sam26
I agree, but my point is that more generally we should not read the later Wittgenstein in the same way we read someone whose work leads from premise to conclusion. — Fooloso4
We disagree about the nature of a belief. — Sam26
478. Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a mouse exists?
90. "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre") ... "I know" is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition (like "I believe") but between me and a fact. So that the fact is taken into my consciousness.
424 ... One says too, "I don't believe it, I know it". And one might also put it like this (for example): "That is a tree. And that's not just surmise."
482. It is as if "I know" did not tolerate a metaphysical emphasis.
Clearly Wittgenstein is connecting beliefs and propositions here. Does he distinguish between propositional beliefs and non-propositional beliefs elsewhere? — Fooloso4
4: A thought is a proposition with a sense.
4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.
The proposition is a model of the reality as we think (denken) it is.
4.1: Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
This is about as clear as it gets. These kinds of beliefs are not tied to propositions and/or statements, they are primitive, animal if you will. They are belief states revealed in a non-propositional way. We show these beliefs in innumerable ways. They are non-linguistic beliefs.
All beliefs are expressed in acts of one kind or another, i.e., either in linguistic and/or nonlinguistic acts. — Sam26
If one limits propositions to spoken statements then the belief that we will find the parts of animals is not propositional if it is not expressed. But is this what Wittgenstein means by a proposition? — Fooloso4
... the definition of a proposition shouldn't be seen as some one essence that governs what we mean by all propositions. — Sam26
They are belief states revealed in a non-propositional way ... They are non-linguistic beliefs — Sam26
Finally, there is not going to be some final correct interpretation of W. which we can all agree is what W. meant by this or that. — Sam26
Wittgenstein's writing style, in particular, doesn't lend itself to easy interpretations. — Sam26
(CV p. 16)Work on philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more work on oneself. On one's own interpretation/conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them).
I get what you're saying but I think that it can be argued that habitual behavior has also been selected as a trait conductive to surviving. For me, it is one of those yin/yang relationships. Certainty has no meaning without doubt.Here's an example of what I am saying. We can represent the certainty as the basis for the habitual activity. I know that the act X will have the outcome of Y, so act X for the purpose of Y becomes habituated, and I tend to proceed with very little doubt. The light turns green, I walk across the street, for instance.
However, before I cross the street I glance around to see if anyone is running the red. This is "the check", which is a manifestation of the fundamental uncertainty. The check has to be more fundamental than the certainty, in order that it might at any time overrule the certainty. The habit can be broken. If the check is allowed to be overruled by the certainty, then eventually I will step in front of an errant vehicle.
One might model the certainty as more fundamental than the uncertainty, as is the case when hinge propositions are modeled as free from the tendency to doubt, but this is a false model. It is proven false, because those who do not perform the check get the Darwin award, and this trait of relinquishing the check, is not maintained. So the uncertainty of the check is supported by evolution, and its overruling the certainty of habit, as a more fundamental aspect of living beings is verified in this way. And the check as an uncertainty based activity cannot be modeled as a habit because it is different (habit being similar) in every field of activity yet common to them all. — Metaphysician Undercover
Right, the reason for posting here is to submit my ideas to the criticisms of others. My ideas are forever evolving, because of my uncertainty, and the role that others play in changing my mind.
— Metaphysician Undercover
Right. So here on a philosophy forum, discussing topics that are on the fringes of human knowledge, there would be a higher degree of playing devil's advocate - in proposing ideas that you don't necessarily believe but would like to see if there are any rebuttals to. The forum does have it's fair share of fundamentalists that you find in the religious and political discussions where what people say, they really mean, or "know" is true. And then there is the every-day-talk where most of what people say, they believe because we talk about each other, the events of the day, the world, etc.To state something as a proposition, is to make a proposal. It does not imply 'I am certain of what I wrote'. This is your misinterpretation, derived from, (and a very good demonstration of), that faulty notion that actions are based in certainty. That you interpret my proposal as an indication that I am certain of the truth of what I write, shows that you are committed to this faulty way of understanding. I write in my habitual way, but this does not mean that I am not ready, willing, and actively looking for reasons, to break the habit if necessary. I walk across the street right after the light turns green, and it appears like I am certain in that act, if you do not notice the more subtle act of me looking around before crossing. In the case of writing, the more subtle act occurs within my mind, as thinking, so it's even more difficult to notice. — Metaphysician Undercover
I get what you're saying but I think that it can be argued that habitual behavior has also been selected as a trait conductive to surviving. For me, it is one of those yin/yang relationships. Certainty has no meaning without doubt. — Harry Hindu
Right. So here on a philosophy forum, discussing topics that are on the fringes of human knowledge, there would be a higher degree of playing devil's advocate - in proposing ideas that you don't necessarily believe but would like to see if there are any rebuttals to. The forum does have it's fair share of fundamentalists that you find in the religious and political discussions where what people say, they really mean, or "know" is true. And then there is the every-day-talk where most of what people say, they believe because we talk about each other, the events of the day, the world, etc. — Harry Hindu
I seem to remember a whole section where he is criticising the way a picture is entailed by a proposition or something like that. — Apustimelogist
If meaning is determined by use, then something is used to accomplish some goal. What is being used if not our representation (knowledge) of reality, and what is the goal? In using propositions we are using scribbles and sounds, or pictures, to communicate (represent) some state-of-affairs that isn't the use of scribbles and sounds, or pictures to others that we believe do not possess the same knowledge (representation) of reality that we do.Can you find the section you are referring to? He rejects the idea that meaning is a picture or representation of reality, in favor of the idea that meaning is determined by use. But the issue here is about the relationship between beliefs and propositions. Sam's contention is that non-verbal beliefs are not propositional, on the assumption that propositions are are verbal statements, and so pre-verbal beliefs are not propositions. — Fooloso4
I disagree. If doubt were fundamental then what would you be doubting if not some certainty? It seems that in order to doubt you must have some certainty to doubt prior to doubting it.I am not dismissing the importance of habitual behaviour, or the role of certainty. What I am saying is that it must be the case that uncertainty, doubt, is necessarily more basic or fundamental than certainty. This is due to the fallibility of certainty. Since a living being can still be wrong, even in instances when that individual has the attitude of certainty, then there must be a mechanism whereby we doubt even the most basic certitudes, or else we'd all die from our mistakes. Some of us do not doubt our fundamental certitudes, and some of us die from our mistakes. Some of us do doubt our fundamental habits and certitudes, and since this trait often saves us, it is selected for in evolution.
The conclusion therefore, is that the beliefs are fundamentally not certainties, because the living being who holds a belief is conditioned through instinct and genetics, to naturally doubt the belief. This is an evolutionarily beneficial trait which has been selected for. So positing something like hinge propositions, as fundamental beliefs which are somehow beyond doubt, is simply an incorrect representation. The evolutionary process has ensured that beliefs do not actually exist in this way. The propensity to doubt, is fundamental to, and inherent within all belief. The condition of certainty, I suggest, is added to the belief afterward, therefore not fundamental to belief. It is layered on, as an attitude toward belief, not actually part of the belief. — Metaphysician Undercover
I disagree. If doubt were fundamental then what would you be doubting if not some certainty? It seems that in order to doubt you must have some certainty to doubt prior to doubting it. — Harry Hindu
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