I think what you're wanting to say is that hinge propositions aren't truth apt? — frank

Actually I did say that. First, I don't think hinge-propositions are propositions, so they aren't truth apt. You have to read OC as Wittgenstein working through these ideas. So, it may appear that Wittgenstein is saying one thing, but later he may change it a bit. His thinking is developing as he writes.

I think of these hinges as bedrock beliefs. In the past I've talked about them as pre-linguistic, which I think fits with Moyal-Sharrock's animal beliefs. If you think of them as pre-linguistic, especially in terms of epistemology, then, I believe, it removes them from the concepts of knowing, justification, and truth. I'm thinking of beliefs in this context, not as propositions, but as acts apart from language, or more specifically, as acts apart from the language-games of epistemology. All of our accounts of epistemology are language dependent, but animal beliefs have no such dependency. Moreover, we are not free of these animal or bedrock beliefs. They are fixed as part of the background of reality, and the way we interact with reality.
So, much of this has to do with the way you think of beliefs, and only later, truth.

By the way, I've actually talked with one of the philosophers (Prichard). I sent him a paper I wrote just to get some feedback on some of my thoughts. Nothing I was proposing was out of the ordinary, i.e., it was in line with what other philosophers were saying. This doesn't mean that I'm right, but it does go to what some are saying in here, that my proposals are absurd, or that they don't follow.

First, I don't think hinge-propositions are propositions — Sam26

Yes. So you see language use as secondary to actions that are the real hinges. :up:

Yes, language is in some sense is a function of these very basic beliefs; and it's these very basic beliefs that are the hinges that W. is referring to. The concepts of knowing, and therefore, justification and truth, are later in our development or evolution. You can think of these bedrock beliefs as non-linguistic, and that removes them from the concepts of knowing, justification, and truth. It's when they are incorporated into language that the confusion starts, because we fail to see where and how they originate. They are foundational or bedrock to all the language-games of ratiocination, which is why Moore fails when using the concept of know.

I see. Yes, at base, the nervous system doesn't deal with truth because there's no falsehood at the level of reflex.

Falsehood is a resident of passive reflection, and so is secondary.

I think there is a causal or correlatory relationship between the world and our sensory experiences that produce these beliefs and/or mind states. I haven't thought much of it beyond this.

His thinking is developing as he writes. — Sam26

I don't think it is a matter of development but of looking at things in different ways, giving different examples, reminders of what we say and do, so as to obtain an overview, an übersichtlichen darstellung, a surveyable or perspicuous representation or overview:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. - Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.
The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)

(PI 122)

Hinges should be viewed in the larger context of the problem of knowledge, doubt, and certainty, which, in turn, are viewed in the context of a form of life, as a matter of practice rather than theory.
Our actions occur along a continuum from the prelinguistic to the linguistic. Hinges do not function exclusively linguistically or prelingistically.

I have not been able to find anywhere where Wittgenstein talks about bedrock beliefs.
In PI he says:

Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do."

(217)

This was in regard to following rules.

What this means is simply that we can dig no further to uncover some underlying principle or foundation or stable unshakable ground

The difficulty is to realise the groundlessness of our believing.

(OC 166)

Hinges are not timeless or immutable. It is not that they stand free of doubt, but that we need to look at all that hangs on and revolves around them. We cannot call one into doubt without calling a great deal more into doubt. Hinges have their place within a system.

Does your picture of "very basic beliefs" correspond to what prelinguistic humans believed and practiced? How do you know? Did they believe certain objects and animals possess powers? Did totems exist in prelinguistic groups? Were there prelinguistic ritual dances, such as those before the hunt? Burial practices? In each case such beliefs are foundational, but not beliefs we accept.

I think there is a causal or correlatory relationship between the world and our sensory experiences that produce these beliefs and/or mind states. I haven't thought much of it beyond this. — Sam26

In terms of behavior, we aren't blank slates. Biology would suggest that some hinge propositions are genetic in origin.

But we can't reasonably say that sense data arranges itself into ideas. Neuroscience suggests that there is some sort of ideation ROM that we bootstrap up from as we leave infancy and begin to think rationally. From there, truth becomes significant because we know what falsehood is. We hypothesized and we were wrong. We were told there's a Santa and that was wrong. It's out of this that truth means something, although logic says that truth is very primal, too basic to even define.

But at this point, we turn and notice that all I've just said rests upon untestable hinge propositions. Part of the connotation of "true" is that it's something solid I can push off from. To the extent that I'm confidently pushing off from hinges as I speak, I can say they qualify as true.

I guess my answer would be: yes and no. Depends on how you look at it.

In terms of behavior, we aren't blank slates. Biology would suggest that some hinge propositions are genetic in origin. — frank

No doubt we aren't blank slates, but I don't see how hinge beliefs (I don't see them as propositions. However, since OC starts out addressing Moore, and Moore's claim that they are propositions, that's how W. talks about them.) could be genetic, but genetics sure influences many of these basic or bedrock beliefs. In other words, my position is that hinge's come into existence as beliefs, based on our sensory interactions with the world around us. So, at the very least, there is some correlation between genetics and such beliefs. However, if you are saying that the belief itself is genetic, that seems very problematic.

But at this point, we turn and notice that all I've just said rests upon untestable hinge propositions. Part of the connotation of "true" is that it's something solid I can push off from. To the extent that I'm confidently pushing off from hinges as I speak, I can say they qualify as true. — frank

I think of hinges, when put into statement form, (as opposed to non-linguistic hinge beliefs) as contingent rules of reality, like a rule of chess. As such, there is no need for testability, they give testability it's very grounding. And, this grounding supports the very concepts of epistemological language (knowing, justification, and truth). The rule in chess that bishops move diagonally, gives the grounding for us to say, in some contexts, that it's true that bishops move diagonally.

What we push off of is what allows for the concept of truth to take root.

I see what you're saying.

I don't think it is a matter of development but of looking at things in different ways, giving different examples, reminders of what we say and do, so as to obtain an overview, an übersichtlichen darstellung, a surveyable or perspicuous representation or overview: — Fooloso4

My point is that W. never finished developing his ideas in OC. In one passage (I forget the number), he expresses some frustration that he won't have time to finish his thoughts in OC.

Hinges should be viewed in the larger context of the problem of knowledge, doubt, and certainty, which, in turn, are viewed in the context of a form of life, as a matter of practice rather than theory.
Our actions occur along a continuum from the prelinguistic to the linguistic. Hinges do not function exclusively linguistically or prelingistically.

I have not been able to find anywhere where Wittgenstein talks about bedrock beliefs. — Fooloso4

I agree with all of this. And, you're right he doesn't specifically talk about bedrock beliefs, but I think it's one way of expressing what hinges are, from the prelinguistic to the linguistic. They are just very basic kinds of beliefs within our forms of life.

Does your picture of "very basic beliefs" correspond to what prelinguistic humans believed and practiced? How do you know? Did they believe certain objects and animals possess powers? Did totems exist in prelinguistic groups? Were there prelinguistic ritual dances, such as those before the hunt? Burial practices? In each case such beliefs are foundational, but not beliefs we accept. — Fooloso4

There are many different kinds of hinges or basic beliefs, but there are those that are common to all of us, prelinguistic as well as linguistic. When primitive man or modern man interacts within his environment, they show their basic beliefs by what they do, or the way they act. So, if a primitive man picks up a stone, that shows that he or she believes something about his or her environment, something fundamental, something very basic. For example, it shows that they believe there is a stone there, that they have hands, that they are a body distinct from other bodies or objects. These kinds of hinges, for the most part don't change. On the other hand, there are other kinds of hinges that we accept as certain (not epistemologically certain, but a certainty that's reflected in our actions), and they are expressed in other ways, maybe ritual dances, praying, that the Earth is flat, etc. These kinds of hinges change over time, and they are culturally dependent, and also dependent on our current fund of knowledge.

So, yes, there are hinges that some people accept as basic, but others do not. Religious people act as though belief in God is a hinge, but others reject this idea, so it's not a hinge for them. What we can ask, is, does it make sense to doubt what others take to be a hinge? And if it makes sense to doubt what's normally considered a hinge, then that belief is no longer a hinge (e.g. the Earth is flat).

There is obviously much more to this, and I'm sure I left some important ideas out, but this is basically how I think of hinges.

When primitive man or modern man interacts within his environment, they show their basic beliefs by what they do, or the way they act. So, if a primitive man picks up a stone, that shows that he or she believes something about his or her environment, something fundamental, something very basic. For example, it shows that they believe there is a stone there, that they have hands, that they are a body distinct from other bodies or objects. These kinds of hinges, for the most part don't change. On the other hand, there are other kinds of hinges that we accept as certain (not epistemologically certain, but a certainty that's reflected in our actions), and they are expressed in other ways, maybe ritual dances, praying, that the Earth is flat, etc. These kinds of hinges change over time, and they are culturally dependent, and also dependent on our current fund of knowledge. — Sam26

What you, many others in this thread, and Wittgenstein himself, fail to recognize, is that doubt and uncertainty is what underlies human actions, as inherent within them, essential to them, and impossible to remove. Certainty is just an illusion we create when we're asked to justify our actions. But as Wittgenstein demonstrates, such justification cannot be applied to the foundation. Therefore, uncertainty, the possibility of mistake, and the consequent risk management, is what truly shapes and forms our actions, at the most fundamental level. You might say that we have a very deeply seated fear of failure, because it manifests as pain.

This is simply a feature of the reality of the human being's presence in a temporal reality. The future is indeterminate, and the human being is inadequate in its capacity to bend the future, to suit its will. This manifests as the fallibility of human knowledge. To represent human actions as based in some underlying certainty about the future, rather than as based in an underlying uncertainty, produces a false attitude of certitude, by those who represent actions in this way, and this is conducive to grave mistake, and the consequent suffering.

What you, many others in this thread, and Wittgenstein himself, fail to recognize, is that doubt and uncertainty is what underlies human actions, as inherent within them, essential to them, and impossible to remove. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you typing and submitting your post is evidence of your underlying uncertainty? You seem certain of what you say, but if your admitting that your certainty of what you are saying is an illusion and that you know its an illusion I would have expected a lot less of telling others what they fail to realize (as if they are wrong and you are right) and more humility on your part. Are you certain that certainty is just an illusion?

Here's an example of what I am saying. We can represent the certainty as the basis for the habitual activity. I know that the act X will have the outcome of Y, so act X for the purpose of Y becomes habituated, and I tend to proceed with very little doubt. The light turns green, I walk across the street, for instance.

However, before I cross the street I glance around to see if anyone is running the red. This is "the check", which is a manifestation of the fundamental uncertainty. The check has to be more fundamental than the certainty, in order that it might at any time overrule the certainty. The habit can be broken. If the check is allowed to be overruled by the certainty, then eventually I will step in front of an errant vehicle.

One might model the certainty as more fundamental than the uncertainty, as is the case when hinge propositions are modeled as free from the tendency to doubt, but this is a false model. It is proven false, because those who do not perform the check get the Darwin award, and this trait of relinquishing the check, is not maintained. So the uncertainty of the check is supported by evolution, and its overruling the certainty of habit, as a more fundamental aspect of living beings is verified in this way. And the check as an uncertainty based activity cannot be modeled as a habit because it is different (habit being similar) in every field of activity yet common to them all.

Then you typing and submitting your post is evidence of your underlying uncertainty? — Harry Hindu

Right, the reason for posting here is to submit my ideas to the criticisms of others. My ideas are forever evolving, because of my uncertainty, and the role that others play in changing my mind.

You seem certain of what you say, but if your admitting that your certainty of what you are saying is an illusion and that you know its an illusion I would have expected a lot less of telling others what they fail to realize (as if they are wrong and you are right) and more humility on your part. Are you certain that certainty is just an illusion? — Harry Hindu

To state something as a proposition, is to make a proposal. It does not imply 'I am certain of what I wrote'. This is your misinterpretation, derived from, (and a very good demonstration of), that faulty notion that actions are based in certainty. That you interpret my proposal as an indication that I am certain of the truth of what I write, shows that you are committed to this faulty way of understanding. I write in my habitual way, but this does not mean that I am not ready, willing, and actively looking for reasons, to break the habit if necessary. I walk across the street right after the light turns green, and it appears like I am certain in that act, if you do not notice the more subtle act of me looking around before crossing. In the case of writing, the more subtle act occurs within my mind, as thinking, so it's even more difficult to notice.

My point is that W. never finished developing his ideas in OC. — Sam26

I agree, but my point is that more generally we should not read the later Wittgenstein in the same way we read someone whose work leads from premise to conclusion.

So, if a primitive man picks up a stone, that shows that he or she believes something about his or her environment, something fundamental, something very basic. — Sam26

This is something that we should not assume. We should not impose the way we look at things on him. We do not know how he might see the world on him. He might regard all things as animistic. The way he sees a stone at a basic, fundamental level may be very different than your own.

For example, it shows that they believe there is a stone there, that they have hands, that they are a body distinct from other bodies or objects. — Sam26

I don't want to get into the quagmire that is the concept of 'belief'. I would say he sees a stone there, not that he believes there is a stone there or that he believes he sees a stone there. He does not believe he has hands, he uses them. Neither certainty or doubt play a part. Lack of doubt does not mean certainty, but rather that to doubt in such cases does not make sense. There is here no basis for doubt.

I agree, but my point is that more generally we should not read the later Wittgenstein in the same way we read someone whose work leads from premise to conclusion. — Fooloso4

I agree, but that doesn't mean you can't formulate an argument based on some of his ideas. Although doing that may distort his ideas.

We disagree about the nature of a belief. And ya, I'm not going to go over this ground again, at least not right now.

We disagree about the nature of a belief. — Sam26

A few remarks from OC:

478. Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a mouse exists?

Some, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, for example, take this to mean we should consider these things to be a matter of belief rather than knowledge. But:

90. "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre") ... "I know" is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition (like "I believe") but between me and a fact. So that the fact is taken into my consciousness.

Wittgenstein's point here is not simply etymological. The relationship is between the child and the milk It sees the milk and reaches for it. The cat sees the mouse and chases it.

Clearly Wittgenstein is connecting beliefs and propositions here. Does he distinguish between propositional beliefs and non-propositional beliefs elsewhere?

424 ... One says too, "I don't believe it, I know it". And one might also put it like this (for example): "That is a tree. And that's not just surmise."

But much of this is bound to be misunderstood unless we keep the following in mind:

482. It is as if "I know" did not tolerate a metaphysical emphasis.

Clearly Wittgenstein is connecting beliefs and propositions here. Does he distinguish between propositional beliefs and non-propositional beliefs elsewhere? — Fooloso4

"People have killed animals since the earliest times, used the fur, bone etc. etc. for various purposes; they have counted definitely on finding similar parts in any similar beast.

"They have always learnt from experience; and we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express their belief or not [my emphasis] (OC 284)."

This is about as clear as it gets. These kinds of beliefs are not tied to propositions and/or statements, they are primitive, animal if you will. They are belief states revealed in a non-propositional way. We show these beliefs in innumerable ways. They are non-linguistic beliefs.

All beliefs are expressed in acts of one kind or another, i.e., either in linguistic and/or nonlinguistic acts.

Wittgenstein continues this thinking, viz., that beliefs are shown in our actions (OC 285). I interpret this to mean that our actions reflect what we believe apart from statements/propositions.

<nvm>

If one limits propositions to spoken statements then the belief that we will find the parts of animals is not propositional if it is not expressed. But is this what Wittgenstein means by a proposition?

In the Tractatus he says:

4: A thought is a proposition with a sense.

4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.
The proposition is a model of the reality as we think (denken) it is.

4.1: Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

Although Wittgenstein later rejected the idea that propositions are built from simple elements,
he not reject the idea that propositions are pictures of reality that need not be expressed in words.

This is about as clear as it gets. These kinds of beliefs are not tied to propositions and/or statements, they are primitive, animal if you will. They are belief states revealed in a non-propositional way. We show these beliefs in innumerable ways. They are non-linguistic beliefs.

All beliefs are expressed in acts of one kind or another, i.e., either in linguistic and/or nonlinguistic acts. — Sam26

I think you misunderstand the nature of "belief". There is always some degree of doubt, insecurity, uncertainty, underlying all belief, inherent within belief, and this feature allows us to adapt to the unknown aspects of an ever changing environment. The more primitive the belief, the greater the degree of uncertainty, as is evident by the capacity of base instincts such as 'fight or flight', and superstitions, to overpower fundamental rational beliefs.

To represent "belief" as a sort of foundational certainty which excludes an individual's inclination to assess the possibility of mistake, is simply a false representation of belief. In reality, the possibility that I am wrong, therefore uncertainty, is the foundational aspect of belief, which we attempt to overcome through training. Certainty is acquired, while uncertainty is instinctual, and the acquired will never completely suppress the instinctual, as it is structured on top of that foundation.

If one limits propositions to spoken statements then the belief that we will find the parts of animals is not propositional if it is not expressed. But is this what Wittgenstein means by a proposition? — Fooloso4

In W. later philosophy propositions are functions of use, rule following, and forms of life; and, the definition of a proposition shouldn't be seen as some one essence that governs what we mean by all propositions. The definition of a proposition should be seen under the rubric of family resemblance. To demonstrate this it would take a separate thread, and an in depth analysis of the nature of a proposition in the T., and W.'s criticisms of how a proposition functions in the PI and in OC. And, not only how his view changed, but specifically, what remains of his early thinking, and, of course, what was discarded.

Finally, there is not going to be some final correct interpretation of W. which we can all agree is what W. meant by this or that. Wittgenstein's writing style, in particular, doesn't lend itself to easy interpretations. This doesn't mean that we can't agree on W. general themes (although, even here there is disagreement, to some extent), it just means that some of these difficulties will never be resolved.

... the definition of a proposition shouldn't be seen as some one essence that governs what we mean by all propositions. — Sam26

But you seem to be doing exactly what you council against doing. You restrict the term to what is expressed in words. You say, for example:

They are belief states revealed in a non-propositional way ... They are non-linguistic beliefs — Sam26

Unless you can show that Wittgenstein limited propositions to verbal statements, your distinction between beliefs and propositions does not hold.

In any case, what I was pointing to in OC 90 was the distinction he makes between a primitive meaning of knowing (related to "I see" "wissen", "videre") and believing. The difference between knowing as a relationship between me an a fact and believing as a relationship between me and the sense of a proposition. If I understand it correctly, the difference between seeing something and representing something.

Finally, there is not going to be some final correct interpretation of W. which we can all agree is what W. meant by this or that. — Sam26

This is true of philosophers in general. Each year there are hundreds of books and articles on Plato, for example.

Wittgenstein's writing style, in particular, doesn't lend itself to easy interpretations. — Sam26

This is what attracted me to him. Everyone is reading the same book and coming up with very different interpretations. It is not, in my opinion, a matter of a final correct interpretation, but rather, on the one hand, of improving my understanding of what he is saying and showing us, and, on the other, of working on my own way of thinking, seeing, and interpreting things.

As he put it:

Work on philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more work on oneself. On one's own interpretation/conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them).

(CV p. 16)

Here's an example of what I am saying. We can represent the certainty as the basis for the habitual activity. I know that the act X will have the outcome of Y, so act X for the purpose of Y becomes habituated, and I tend to proceed with very little doubt. The light turns green, I walk across the street, for instance.

However, before I cross the street I glance around to see if anyone is running the red. This is "the check", which is a manifestation of the fundamental uncertainty. The check has to be more fundamental than the certainty, in order that it might at any time overrule the certainty. The habit can be broken. If the check is allowed to be overruled by the certainty, then eventually I will step in front of an errant vehicle.

One might model the certainty as more fundamental than the uncertainty, as is the case when hinge propositions are modeled as free from the tendency to doubt, but this is a false model. It is proven false, because those who do not perform the check get the Darwin award, and this trait of relinquishing the check, is not maintained. So the uncertainty of the check is supported by evolution, and its overruling the certainty of habit, as a more fundamental aspect of living beings is verified in this way. And the check as an uncertainty based activity cannot be modeled as a habit because it is different (habit being similar) in every field of activity yet common to them all. — Metaphysician Undercover

I get what you're saying but I think that it can be argued that habitual behavior has also been selected as a trait conductive to surviving. For me, it is one of those yin/yang relationships. Certainty has no meaning without doubt.

Right, the reason for posting here is to submit my ideas to the criticisms of others. My ideas are forever evolving, because of my uncertainty, and the role that others play in changing my mind.
— Metaphysician Undercover

To state something as a proposition, is to make a proposal. It does not imply 'I am certain of what I wrote'. This is your misinterpretation, derived from, (and a very good demonstration of), that faulty notion that actions are based in certainty. That you interpret my proposal as an indication that I am certain of the truth of what I write, shows that you are committed to this faulty way of understanding. I write in my habitual way, but this does not mean that I am not ready, willing, and actively looking for reasons, to break the habit if necessary. I walk across the street right after the light turns green, and it appears like I am certain in that act, if you do not notice the more subtle act of me looking around before crossing. In the case of writing, the more subtle act occurs within my mind, as thinking, so it's even more difficult to notice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. So here on a philosophy forum, discussing topics that are on the fringes of human knowledge, there would be a higher degree of playing devil's advocate - in proposing ideas that you don't necessarily believe but would like to see if there are any rebuttals to. The forum does have it's fair share of fundamentalists that you find in the religious and political discussions where what people say, they really mean, or "know" is true. And then there is the every-day-talk where most of what people say, they believe because we talk about each other, the events of the day, the world, etc.

I get what you're saying but I think that it can be argued that habitual behavior has also been selected as a trait conductive to surviving. For me, it is one of those yin/yang relationships. Certainty has no meaning without doubt. — Harry Hindu

I am not dismissing the importance of habitual behaviour, or the role of certainty. What I am saying is that it must be the case that uncertainty, doubt, is necessarily more basic or fundamental than certainty. This is due to the fallibility of certainty. Since a living being can still be wrong, even in instances when that individual has the attitude of certainty, then there must be a mechanism whereby we doubt even the most basic certitudes, or else we'd all die from our mistakes. Some of us do not doubt our fundamental certitudes, and some of us die from our mistakes. Some of us do doubt our fundamental habits and certitudes, and since this trait often saves us, it is selected for in evolution.

The conclusion therefore, is that the beliefs are fundamentally not certainties, because the living being who holds a belief is conditioned through instinct and genetics, to naturally doubt the belief. This is an evolutionarily beneficial trait which has been selected for. So positing something like hinge propositions, as fundamental beliefs which are somehow beyond doubt, is simply an incorrect representation. The evolutionary process has ensured that beliefs do not actually exist in this way. The propensity to doubt, is fundamental to, and inherent within all belief. The condition of certainty, I suggest, is added to the belief afterward, therefore not fundamental to belief. It is layered on, as an attitude toward belief, not actually part of the belief.

Right. So here on a philosophy forum, discussing topics that are on the fringes of human knowledge, there would be a higher degree of playing devil's advocate - in proposing ideas that you don't necessarily believe but would like to see if there are any rebuttals to. The forum does have it's fair share of fundamentalists that you find in the religious and political discussions where what people say, they really mean, or "know" is true. And then there is the every-day-talk where most of what people say, they believe because we talk about each other, the events of the day, the world, etc. — Harry Hindu

I think you misrepresent "believe" here. That a person believes something does not imply that the person is certain of that. So I can propose ideas, which I believe in, but not certain of, with the intent of allowing rebuttals from others. Then I might be inclined to change my mind. The fact that I change my mind does not mean that I actually did not believe what I claimed to have believed. It simply means that I allow the uncertainty which is inherent within belief, and more fundamental than certainty, to rule within my mind, such that I am always capable of changing my mind, no matter what the particular belief might be. I do not allow myself to develop the attitude called certitude. This is what is called having an open mind, and it is the trait of an honest human being who is true to one's own nature as an evolved life form. Professing certainty as fundamental to one's beliefs, to justify one's attitude of certitude, is the self-deception of closing one's mind to the reality of belief.

I feel like he does reject that idea about propositions. I seem to remember a whole section where he is criticising the way a picture is entailed by a proposition or something like that.

I seem to remember a whole section where he is criticising the way a picture is entailed by a proposition or something like that. — Apustimelogist

Can you find the section you are referring to? He rejects the idea that meaning is a picture or representation of reality, in favor of the idea that meaning is determined by use. But the issue here is about the relationship between beliefs and propositions. Sam's contention is that non-verbal beliefs are not propositional, on the assumption that propositions are are verbal statements, and so pre-verbal beliefs are not propositions.

See above: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/662920

Can you find the section you are referring to? He rejects the idea that meaning is a picture or representation of reality, in favor of the idea that meaning is determined by use. But the issue here is about the relationship between beliefs and propositions. Sam's contention is that non-verbal beliefs are not propositional, on the assumption that propositions are are verbal statements, and so pre-verbal beliefs are not propositions. — Fooloso4

If meaning is determined by use, then something is used to accomplish some goal. What is being used if not our representation (knowledge) of reality, and what is the goal? In using propositions we are using scribbles and sounds, or pictures, to communicate (represent) some state-of-affairs that isn't the use of scribbles and sounds, or pictures to others that we believe do not possess the same knowledge (representation) of reality that we do.

In telling someone it is raining, we only do so because we believe the person we are using a proposition with isn't aware that it is raining. If we believed they already knew it was raining, then what use would it be in telling them?

I am not dismissing the importance of habitual behaviour, or the role of certainty. What I am saying is that it must be the case that uncertainty, doubt, is necessarily more basic or fundamental than certainty. This is due to the fallibility of certainty. Since a living being can still be wrong, even in instances when that individual has the attitude of certainty, then there must be a mechanism whereby we doubt even the most basic certitudes, or else we'd all die from our mistakes. Some of us do not doubt our fundamental certitudes, and some of us die from our mistakes. Some of us do doubt our fundamental habits and certitudes, and since this trait often saves us, it is selected for in evolution.

The conclusion therefore, is that the beliefs are fundamentally not certainties, because the living being who holds a belief is conditioned through instinct and genetics, to naturally doubt the belief. This is an evolutionarily beneficial trait which has been selected for. So positing something like hinge propositions, as fundamental beliefs which are somehow beyond doubt, is simply an incorrect representation. The evolutionary process has ensured that beliefs do not actually exist in this way. The propensity to doubt, is fundamental to, and inherent within all belief. The condition of certainty, I suggest, is added to the belief afterward, therefore not fundamental to belief. It is layered on, as an attitude toward belief, not actually part of the belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. If doubt were fundamental then what would you be doubting if not some certainty? It seems that in order to doubt you must have some certainty to doubt prior to doubting it.

Personally, it don't like the terms being used to explain what you are trying to explain. I think of certainty and knowledge as the same thing. And I think of knowledge as a set of instructions that we go by. These instructions are dynamic - capable of being updated with new (sensory) information. In other words, knowledge can change with new information.

The instructions we use aren't much different than instructions in a computer language. Given some goal, reference the instructions we have for attaining that goal. If we don't have instructions then acquire them through learning (observe someone with the same goal and how they do it or trying instructions that we already have that are used for similar tasks and observe the results and then modify as needed and try again).

Doubt stems from our knowledge (certainty) that the world is complex and changes constantly and that we acquire new information by the use of our senses, and that any set of instructions may need to be updated, given new information.

We must understand how a term or symbol is being used in order to understand how it is being used to represent a state of affairs. The same term can be used in the representation of different states of affairs.

The proposition: 'it is raining' is not used only to convey meteorological information. It can be an expression of exasperation or pleasure or surprise.

I disagree. If doubt were fundamental then what would you be doubting if not some certainty? It seems that in order to doubt you must have some certainty to doubt prior to doubting it. — Harry Hindu

You're not making sense Harry. To doubt a certainty is contradiction. The fact that you are doubting it means that it is not a certainty. To doubt is to be uncertain. To be certain of something is to be free of doubt concerning it.

I don't see why you believe that it is required to have certainty prior to having uncertainty (doubt). Obviously human beings are evolving creatures, and human knowledge has come into existence as have human beings. Therefore, if certainty is knowledge, as you propose, uncertainty is prior to certainty, as the form of animalistic belief prior to knowledge. It makes no sense to say that uncertainty (doubt) requires an underlying certainty, or else knowledge would have to come into existence from some form of certainty which is prior to knowledge. But this undermines your proposition that knowledge and certainty are the same thing.