Is this a relevant consideration though? Does the source of the error matter? And if yes, 1) why does it matter; and 2) what evidence do you have that this is indeed always the case?

My point is: any code replicated long enough WILL at some point get wrongly copied, whatever the cause of the error. In practice, there is no such thing as a perfect information replication system that can always get it right. — Olivier5

To say that an "error" occurred, or that some information replication system got something "wrong", is saying that this system had intent to do it one way and it worked out a different way. Does DNA possess intent?

It seems to me that any system does something based on the design of that system. Nature doesn't do anything wrong or right. It just does whatever prior conditions dictate.

I again find your thinking incomprehensible. — Banno

The only time you find my thinking incomprehensible is when I apply YOUR theory to other uses of language, like plagiarism. If integrating your theory with other uses of language makes it incomprehensible then that means your theory is incomprehensible.

If not, then you are the only one here that seems to find my posts incomprehensible. How convenient for you.

Creating new theories...

Novelty.

That's what's left sorely unaccounted for. The attribution of meaning to that which is not already meaningful. — creativesoul

Indeed. I propose that malapropisms are the random mutations of human languages. DNA too is a language, though a chemical one, and what I find interesting is how replication error (mutations) can be a strength in that they introduce novelty. — Olivier5

But there are still causes that result in mutations and malapropisms. They aren't random. They only appear that way because of our ignorance. If they were ultimately random, then there would be no way for someone to understand what was meant.

Novel intentions, or goals, are what create novel uses of some tool. Unique experiences can lead to novel intentions.

Conscious processes would be those we experience the stages of, sub-conscious processes would be those we experience only the results of, and infer the stages from experimental investigation (such as lesion studies, fMRI scanning in various forms of aphasia, etc). That's how I'd separate them, anyway. — Isaac

Where, or what, is the "we" in this explanation? Is it a human body, a human brain, a human mind or what?

If conscious processes are stages that we experience and sub-conscious process results are what we experience, then are you saying that the stages are the results that "we" experience? What is the relationship between the stages and the results that we experience? How does the sub-consciousness interact with the consciousness to create results that "we" experience? And then what is an "experience"?

So we can use the word. It does not follow that it is the name of a thing. — Banno

Saying that you're using a word is only getting at a fraction of what is going on. How are you using it - to what end - if not to name your ideas?

That they point to things, yes. Davidson is pointing to HIS idea and his intent to communicate it, not yours, creativesoul or Janus ideas or else we'd be getting at what you meant, not Davidson.

Think about it, Banno. If I copy what you said, word for word, you might cry, "plagiarism!" But if words meant different things then my word for word duplication could mean something else, so what place does plagiarism take in your theory?

Not getting this at all I'm afraid. Not sure it's relevant to the discussion though so unless it is you can leave off answering my query, but - how can you use what you're consciously aware of to judge what does or does not happen in your sub-conscious? I really don't understand this "you can only compare what appears in consciousness". Why? What prevents neuronal networks from comparing things without your conscious awareness but allows then to when they involve conscious awareness? — Isaac

Yes. I thought the same when Srap Tasmaner mentioned "awareness". We'd need to nail down what we mean by "awareness" and conscious vs subconscious.

This looks like the same transcendental argument you have used before: There is a thing called "what was actually meant", that is shared by multiple individuals; the only way this could occur is if we were all doing the same thing - following the same rules; hence interpretation is algorithmic.

But of course there is not one thing that is what was actually meant, and which is shared by multiple folk. — Banno

Strange, considering that this thread seems to be dedicated to what Davidson meant. If Davidson didn't mean one thing with his use of words, then it appears that he didn't mean anything, or at least it would be impossible for you to ever get at what he meant.

Rhyming or similarity of sound are kinds of association and association of ideas is another. That's obvious to anyone who thinks about it for a few moments. — Janus

Exactly, so now I'm confused as to why my analogy didn't work for you if you're now admitting that similarity of sound and shape are the associations that are used to solve the problem of what is actually meant to be said but wasn't? How would you solve the problem of interpreting someone's improper use of a hammer as a meat tenderizer? How would you interpret what they intend if not by the similar shape if the tool that they are using and the similar action in using it? How do you interpret what was meant when someone utters an unintentional word that sounds like the intended word if not by comparing the similarity of sound and use with the intended word?

The question is can you come up with anything more interesting or enlightening to say about it than that? Does the paper we are supposed to be critiquing manage to come up with any such thing? Not as far as I can tell. — Janus

Finding something interesting isn't the goal here. Finding the truth is. Philosophy is in the habit of questioning the trivial things that we might be taking for granted. Its just that some, like Banno, keep questioning trivial things - like the idea that brains are algorithmic and perform computations to solve problems, like malapropisms.

According to Harry a malapropism must sound like or rhyme with the word it has replaced. — Janus

It's not just me. Look it up in a dictionary or Google it.

Processing information is an algorithmic process.
— Harry Hindu

What should one understand by this?

An algorithmic process is one that follows explicit rules; I'm suggesting that the rules must be explicit, since in order to recognise that he process one is following is algorithmic, one must recognise the rules one is following.

What's the rule one follows in recognising the joke ‘We need a few laughs to break up the monogamy’? Is it the very same rule we follow when we laugh at ‘We’re all cremated equal’?

Or are we to say that in recognising the joke, one is not processing information?

Experience is information, I'm told; processing information is algorithmic; an algorithm is a method for solving a malapropism.

So what, exactly, is the algorithm being used?

Or is Harry's use of "algorithm" itself a malapropism? — Banno

You're simply describing the same problem, but with different variables.
A calculator, for instance, can solve addition problems no matter what numbers you are adding. Brains solve grammar and vocabulary problems no matter what words are being used.

Computer programs run the same algorithm on different data, thanks to the use of variables in the program. The algorithm uses the variables and the variables can contain different data, but the same rule is being run and used to solve the same problem.

The algorithm to put out a fire is to smother it. You might use water and I might use dirt. We are using the same algorithm, but with different variables, and accomplishing the same thing - putting out the fire - thanks to using the same algorithm, not thanks to the different variables, because if neither of us used the dirt or water to smother the fire, the problem doesn't get solved.

Words not only point to things, and what they point to is compared in the mind, but words are seen and heard and their shapes and sounds are compared in the mind as well. Those associations are created and stored in long-term memory over time and are recalled when some word is read or heard. The associations might be different because each person will have unique experiences with the rules and vocabulary of some language, but overall the associations are fairly consistent or else there would be a great deal less accuracy in communicating. This is why children would have trouble getting your jokes, where adults would have less trouble.

The difference in how different individuals might solve the problem or not is related to what information different individuals have access to - like that there is a dance called the Flamenco in the first place. A person that has never heard of the Flamenco will come to a different conclusion (probably not the correct one) of what the speaker meant than one that has heard of the dance. Because they aren't aware that there is a dance called the Flamenco, they would not interpret it as an error in speech but would believe that there is an actual dance called the Flamingo. For them, there would be no problem to solve.

If we weren't using the same algorithm to solve the same problem, then you have your work cut out for you in explaining how we can come to the same conclusion of what was actually meant. How is it that you and I understand not only why those are errors, but what was actually meant, if we aren't following the same rules?

To better understand what someone is getting at when they use language is to ask that person what they meant. You'd have to go to Davidson.

Part of the process of understanding what others are getting at when they use language is to paraphrase what they said, or what you think they meant in the case of a malapropism, and they either agree or rephrase, but that would have to come from from the original user of the words. Anything else could only be second-hand guessing as to what they were getting at.

Threads such as this tend to squabbling minutia towards their demise. We might all agree on the resilience of language in the face of apparent error and misuse, and the impossibility of an algorithmic account of how one understands what has been said. — Banno

It was minutia from the get-go considering the assumptions built into the OP.

If not an algorithmic account, then what reasons would you have for interpreting some sound our scribble in some way? It seems like you can only go by experience, which is information. Processing information is an algorithmic process. You use past experiences (information) to interpret (process) present information - the meaning of some scribble or sound seen or heard at that moment.

An algorithm is a method for solving a problem. When each of us hears the use of a specific malapropism, do we not use the same method to solve the problem of interpreting what was meant?

You may have something here. We regularly produce speech errors (I haven't found a solid source on the frequency). Why? Why isn't our speech production better at its job?

I would guess the answer is it's too slow and too expensive. Perfect is the enemy of good. — Srap Tasmaner

About 1 in every 1,000 words for adults - according to Garnham A, Shillcock R, Brown GDA, Mill AID, Cutler A. Slips of the tongue in the London–Lund corpus of spontaneous speech. Linguistics. 1981. — Isaac

I'm not sure about this stat or how it interprets "speech errors", and what impact speech impairments have here, but it if this is correct it seems to indicate that our speech production is 99.999% accurate, so I think that qualifies as good, but not perfect. It seems like it might actually be better than the accuracy of computers communicating with each other and they follow strict protocols.

Why do we process in parallel and not series? Possibly efficiency, as you say, but the high necessity of working memory involvement rather negates that theory, it's possibly even less efficient. Possibly it points to the fact that word selection and grammar are secondary to general communication and have been 'tacked on' in evolutionary terms. — Isaac

The high necessity of working memory indicates that learning how people use words is very useful for survival, so extra energy that is used to extrapolate what is communicated from sounds and scribbles is necessary for survival. Even though if what is actually said isn't important, how certain scribbles and sounds were used to communicate is. Every use is knowledge acquired about how to use scribbles and sounds to communicate.

The comparison of sounds, and their similarities and differences, happens within consciousness.
— Harry Hindu

According to whom? — Isaac

According to conscious beings, like myself. It is not only observable in my mind that sounds are compared, but logical in that you can only compare what appears in consciousness.

Scientists say that there are no colors out in the world. Colors only exist in the mind. That means that the only place that colors can be compared is in the mind. The same goes with shape and sound. Seems obvious to me, unless you're a p-zombie.

Not only do colors, shapes and sounds exist only in the mind, but the process of comparing is a mental process and therefore only happens in the mind.

While I agree that that is the usual meaning of the term, the substituted words need not rhyme or sound similar. The etymology of malapropism renders it close to 'misappropriate'. And in relation to this discussion concerning how we are able to understand what is meant when a misappropriate word is substituted for an appropriate one, rhyming or not seems pretty much irrelevant. — Janus

Trivial nonsense. Trying to solve the problem of interpreting what is meant by an unintended word that sounds like the word that was intended is done differently that interpreting what is meant by an unintended word that doesn't sound like what was intended. You're talking about two different processes for solving the problem of interpreting what was meant because of the relationship, or association between the word that wasn't intended and the one that was (the unintended word sounds like the intended word vs not sounding like the intended word).

This is why I asked earlier: If I told you to dance the Flamenco and you danced the Macarena, then is that an error in language-use or dance-use? If I told you to dance the Flamenco and you stood on one leg like a flamingo, is that an error in language-use or dance-use? What is being misunderstood - language, or dances?

So, I was right. We are talking past each other. I'm talking about one problem and you're talking about another as if it can be solved by the same process that solves the other. One process involves comparing sounds, the other involves comparing what the words point to.

In fact there's plenty of evidence, near as I can tell, that top-down constraints play a huge role here -- the phrasal, sentence, and conversational context. We take a speaker to have uttered a word that would make sense in the context as we understand it, rather than whatever mispronunciation they actually produced. All of that "correction" happens below the level of our awareness. — Srap Tasmaner

I think that you are muddying the waters bringing awareness into this. If it happened "below our level of awareness" (whatever that means) then how are you able report it? And what does "our" entail, as in "below the level of our awareness"?

The comparison of sounds, and their similarities and differences, happens within consciousness. Sounds only appear in consciousness and so how they are compared can only be done in consciousness. Consciousness is working memory and computers have both working and long-term memory, just like we do.

Your virtual keyboard on your smart phone detects similarly typed words that you might have intended to type instead of what you actually did type and displays them for you to choose rather than having to retype the word. I think "efficiency" is a key term that is missing here, as in efficiently using words to communicate, and that includes being able to interpret similarly sounding, shaped, and typed words in the improper context, as meaning the words that the they sound like in the proper context, so that they don't have to be repeated.

You are playing chess, — Banno

The thing about chess and language is that you have to have someone else to play with, and the rules have to be established before the game, or else someone could be cheating, or lying, depending on the game. If that is how you can move a pawn, then I need to know that before the game starts. If "flamenco" is what you mean when you say "flamingo", I need to know that before communication starts.

The correct analogy to use in chess to simulate a malapropism would include misusing a similarly shaped object, like moving the king as if it were a queen. Because the shape of the object is similar to the object's whose use you are simulating, the intent can be determined. The king is not a queen, just as the flamingo is not the flamenco, but they are similarly sounding and shaped. Their use might get mistaken because of this.

I don't think your mixture of metaphors here is helping. Well, I guess I should only speak for myself: it's not helping me. — Janus

Then we must be talking past each other. A malapropism is the mistaken use of a similarly shaped, or sounding word.

Words are objects in the sense that they are seen and or heard, just like a hammer and meat tenderizer.

Some words are similarly shaped and sound similar, just like some objects like a meat tenderizer and hammer.

Words are objects that are designed, just like meat tenderizers and hammers.

Use is dependent upon intent and design, and if the design is similar then the tasks it can be used for will be similar. So even though you can have a mistaken or improper use, there is enough similarity in the design, or shape/sound by which an observer can still understand how it was intended to be used.

Agreed pretty much all around, except I'd be more inclined to say "following the rules", or if I wanted to be really careful, "acting in accordance with the rules", rather than "knowing the rules". An awful lot of the linguistic machinery we operate is below our level of awareness -- some of it might always be, but at least in use it is: we don't consciously work out what the appropriate rule is and then consciously refer to it as we apply it and check that we've applied it properly. We can do a lot of that sort of thing, and will when there's trouble, but mostly the rules take care of themselves without us paying them any attention. Not once we've learned them, at any rate, and though learning requires a lot of conscious effort, it eventually results in reliable habits that require no awareness. — Srap Tasmaner

Just because some rules have been memorized (stored in long term memory rather than working memory) does not mean that you no longer know how to use the rules. It doesn't make much sense to say that you can follow rules without knowing them. Did you know that 2+2=4 even before I just mentioned it? In other words, does knowing mean that the information is only present in working memory rather than in long-term memory that can be recalled to working memory when it is needed? If you didn't know something, then how can you recall it to use it in your working memory? Knowing entails recalling information, not having to learn it.

How would the T sentence method work for translating meaningful sentences that are not truth apt?

For example...

"Don't be scared of the virus." "Don't let the virus dominate your life."

Are these out of reach, so to speak, beyond the 'domain' of application? — creativesoul

Is it true that you believe that we shouldn't be scared of the virus and that it shouldn't dominate our lives?

But a malapropism is more like a game of chess in which one player moves a pawn backwards... despite the rule saying they must move forwards! — Banno

No they aren't. The substituted word is almost always the same part of speech, even the same number of syllables with the same prosody, and the resulting expression is grammatical.

The analogy in chess would be a move that, while legal, "doesn't make sense" according to some view of chess, but works for some specific reason. — Srap Tasmaner

Exactly. That is why the example of using a meat tenderizer to hammer a nail works here. The sound and shape of the word is similar to the sound and shape of the word that is meant, just as a hammer and meat tenderizer are shaped similarly and used similarly, but not exactly - hence the distinction. While you can accomplish your goal by using a similarly shaped word, it doesn't accomplish it in the most efficient means possible. The mistake and it's subsequent understanding by others is something that should be predicted to happen in pattern-recognizing systems like your brain.

If someone said, "dance the Macarena" but they actually meant, "dance the flamenco", then is their error in language-use or dance-use?

When someone says something and believes that they meant what they said, but it turns out that they didn't mean what they said, then what is meaning, and what does it mean to "mean to say something"? This can only be the case if meaning of a word is seperate from, or more than, its use.

That seems fair, and an interesting point, that communication is not just the delivery of a semantic payload but confirmation of that delivery. But absent specific cues, we often just assume we've communicated successfully, don't we? — Srap Tasmaner

Assuming that we've communicated successfully comes with an understanding that you know the rules and also knowing that others use the same rules, or else what is the point of knowing the rules?

You wouldn't assume that you successfully communicated with a person in China if you used only your very limited/non-existent knowledge of the rules of Mandarin. You also wouldn't assume that you successfully communicated with a person in China if you used English, rather than Mandarin.

That is, as the audience, I'm not sure; to a third party, until the audience is sure, there's at most incomplete or partial communication; but the speaker is still entitled their presumption of success. — Srap Tasmaner

Sometimes we have to dumb down our language use for others to understand what we intend to communicate. Think about how you would communicate the idea of democracy to an adult vs a child. Presuming you have succeeded in communicating entails not just knowing the rules of the language you are using, but knowing the limits of other's understanding of the rules too. Each person is different and may require different uses to get the same idea across, just as you may have certain phrases, or inside jokes, that only close friends that have experience with how you use words, can understand.

No, that's clearly not right. I might wonder whether you've misused a word if I understood what you said but am very surprised to hear you say it, especially if a substitution would yield a sentence I think you more likely to say.

Should we say communication has or hasn't occurred here? Evidently, as the audience, I'm not sure. — Srap Tasmaner

Until we clear up whether the use was intended or not, no communication has happened. After all, there just might be a new dance called the Flamingo.

We only question the proper use of some words when words were used but communication didn't occur.

That's true, but there is nothing in chess analogous to malapropistic expressions. I think my response to the earlier "soup tureen" example shows that there are no rules, and that it is mostly a matter of association. — Janus

I think an excellent example would be using a meat tenderize to hammer a nail, or a hammer to tenderize your meat.

Both tools are similarly shaped, just as words are shaped and sound similarly, but do not have the same use. Observers will understand the use, even though its not the conventional use of a meat tenderizer, because of the similar shape and action in using it.

IT's not a thing at all, unless you want to call acts "things"!
— Banno

Is that a problem? — creativesoul

Malapropism is a noun.

It seems you read Davidson as saying that conventions play no role in understanding what someone says.
— Banno

I haven't figured out how to read him. — Srap Tasmaner

Same here. So is Davidson using language in a new way that hasn't been imitated or simply not using language correctly, or is it you and I that are not using language correctly by not figuring out how to read him?

It leads to Harry Hindu -ism. — Banno

Oh, Banno :heart:

If others don't imitate, then it won't become established, and if enough do imitate then it will. — Janus

Sounds like rules for language use to me.

It's by imitation that conventions become established, not by people consciously seeing them as sets of rules to be followed, but by people's natural tendency to imitate. This means language is an open-ended, often improvisational, practice, not a hidebound practice involving adherence to sets of rules. — Janus

If language use is open-ended then there can be no wrong way to use a word (no such thing as malapropisms), only a new way to use a word that is either imitated or not - which is another rule.

BTW, how are new words used if everything is imitated?

How is imitation just more rules? — Janus

Imitation isn't a rule. It is a behavior. Your explanation is a set of rules that describe what language use is or isn't.

Does imitating any noise or scribble made by someone else make that noise or scribble a word?

Voting third party is entirely about sending a message to the main two parties. — Pfhorrest

Ultimately, the solution I'd ike to see is the abolishment of all political parties (group-think).

SWING STATE — 180 Proof

Terms used by ppl who've been indoctrinated to think in black and white, right and left, etc., as if there are only two directions/positions to swing.

My prediction is not caused by some condition in the future, but it is about some condition in the future, which is why the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of that condition determines the truth of my prediction.

Therefore it's false to say that "referencing is a causal relationship between the referencer and what is referenced." We can refer to things that have no causal relationship with us. — Michael

If your prediction is false then it isnt about the future. This means that predictions aren't about the future, but are about memories of similar conditions. Like i said, memories are required to make predictions and predictions are based on what you know, not what you don't. So the causal relationship is between your prediction and your memories. It is false that you are ever referencing the future with predictions. You are referencing your memories, which are about the past.

But there is no such separate instruction set that the neurons follow, not atleast for learning chinese. — debd

Neural networks weren't born knowing Chinese, English or any other language. The neural network had to learn those instructions, which means that the instructions were initially external to the neural network. How does a neural network acquire instructions for learning a language, and where do the instructions go when they are learned, understood, or known?

How did a neural network learn to do what it does? It doesn't perform the same function as other cells in the body. What allowed it to do what it does and not some other job that some other type of cell does?

Self-reference appears to create an infinite regress, of the self referencing itself, referencing itself, referencing itself, etc., just like when a visual or audio feedback loop is created by the camera or microphone looking at itself, looking at itself, looking at itself, etc., or listening to itself, listening to itself, listening to itself etc.

Otherwise how can counterfactuals, predictions, and descriptions of far away things ever be false? — Michael

What does it even mean for the future to be false unless you aren't really talking about the future, but a representation of the future? The fact that these things can be false is evidence that they are not necessarily about, or causally connected with, counterfactuals, predictions, and descriptions of far away things. That was the point of distinguishing the actual from the potential.

If I predict something about the future then my prediction is true iff the future happens as I predict. Therefore my prediction is about the future, not a particular idea in my head. — Michael

Exactly. The future and your prediction are two separate things. Isn't a property of a prediction is that it occurs before the future? Predicting something after it happened isn't a prediction of the future. It would be a memory of the past.

Predictions are actually related to memories of the past. It seems to me that you need memories of the past in order to make predictions. So predictions are not caused by some condition in the future, but some present state of the mind in recalling past conditions.

Now that it's clear Georgia (where I live) is in play, I'll vote for Joe Biden this fall (and both Dems for the US Senate). Swing state "lesser evil" voting it is. — 180 Proof

Wouldn't the lesser evil be a third party?

I don't know about you, but that "debate" on Tuesday night was just more evidence of why alternative choices are necessary.

"Wasting your vote" entails voting for someone that doesn't properly represent you because you've been manipulated into thinking (like most ppl) that there are only two possible choices.

That's because we are replacing the chinese room with the brain and the person inside the room is being replaced by a nerual network. — debd

Your missing an important component - the instructions. The instructions are in the room, along with the man, but are two separate entities inside the room. What "physical" role does the instructions play inside the brain if the human is the entire neural network? And isn't the entire neural network really the brain anyway? So you haven't coherently explained all the parts and their relationship with each other.

Define what it is to be the post, and then define what it is referencing the post. You might find that part of the post is referencing the whole. So a thing cannot reference it self, but can use part of itself to reference itself, like using your fingerprint. — Harry Hindu

Actually, your comment is referring to the post, not the comment. The post is more than the comment and when I click the link, it refers me to the whole post. Therefore, some thing can never refer to itself. It must use something that isn't its whole self to refer to its whole self.

It makes no sense for something to use itself to point to itself. Its always just itself, and any pointing to the self is done by utilizing other things, like scribbles and sounds.

Referencing is a causal relationship between the referencer and what is referenced.
— Harry Hindu

Can one talk about the future? Or things happening far away? Or counterfactuals? — Michael

Absolutely, because these things are ideas in which scribbles and sounds can be about. You never talk about your actual future. You can only talk about your potential future, which is an idea in the present, spoken or written about after the fact of you thinking of it. You can only talk about things after they have happened - either out in the world or in your head. And then the talking isn't the thing being talked about, but something else. We have language and then we have what language is about. Interestingly, we can use language to talk about language, but then some instance of language use cannot refer to all the rules of a language and how its used.

How would you know if I am self-aware or not? You can only do that by looking to a comparator, yourself. — debd

Seems to me that I have to first know that I am self-aware. What does that mean? What is it like to be self-aware? Is self-awareness a behaviour, feeling, information...?

Define what it is to be the post, and then define what it is referencing the post. You might find that part of the post is referencing the whole. So a thing cannot reference it self, but can use part of itself to reference itself, like using your fingerprint.

I dont think so. Referencing is a causal relationship between the referencer and what is referenced. Something having a relationship with itself is incoherent. Something can only be what it is. Referring to that something entails using something else to point to it.

I can say my name, but the sound of my name does not exhaust what it is to be me. The sound of my voice speaking my name is only part of what it means to be me and the sound of my name points to more than me just saying my name.

Games have a finite number of rules. Once you know all the rules you know how to play the game. Change the rules and then you change the game you're playing.

Does knowing a language entail making scribbles and noises myself, or simply understanding what others mean when they make particular scribbles and noises? Say there's a person without the ability to speak or write, but has the ability to see, hear and think. Given time to observe others using sounds and scribbles, would they know the language that is being used?

If I had lived amongst the Neanderthals, I could looked around me and named every object I saw - rock, water, gazelle, etc. This would be my language, albeit simple. — RussellA

But why would you do such a thing? What purpose would naming objects only for yourself, that you already know, be? Do you have to name a rock to know about rocks?

To be useful, the names would have to be known by others. Are you using words when you say them and no one is around to hear you say them?