Our language is made up of many kinds of beliefs that can be called foundational or even bedrock, but not all foundational beliefs have the same structural significance...
What is the structure? — Sam26

I think that:

1) Language is a code (specific and structured data) consisting of a set of symbols having paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, hence; semantic content.

2) Codes have a vocabulary (sign set common to and/or understood by both message source and destination) and syntax (laws of structure).

3) Language components are:
a) Morphemes
b) Words
c) Phrases
d) Clauses
e) Sentences
f) Phonemes
g) Graphemes

4) Structure is component (element) arrangement.

In other words: since beliefs are propositional attitudes, I consider them to be a component of mind, not language.

Here we are 'brains in vat' endlessly discussing how to get a grip on reality with ever more sophisticated language.

If you were familiar with Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions in his notes called On Certainty, you would know that I'm not asking the question that you are answering. This is not a linguistics class, at least not a typical linguistics class.

The structure rests on bedrock. What is the structure? — Sam26

Can you guarantee uniqueness of the structure? It seems to me "Here is one hand" is a bedrock for philosophy. But not for examining the self reports of a delusional phantom limb patient waving their hand about.

↪Galuchat Here we are 'brains in vat' endlessly discussing how to get a grip on reality with ever more sophisticated language.

Our language is made up of many kinds of beliefs that can be called foundational or even bedrock, but not all foundational beliefs have the same structural significance...
What is the structure? — Sam26

In other words: since beliefs are propositional attitudes, I consider them to be a component of mind, not language. — Galuchat

I thought the same thing when I read that. Language is made up of many kinds of letters and words, not beliefs. Minds are made of beliefs, but beliefs aren't the foundation of minds. There are the brute sensory experiences that are the structure of our beliefs and the root cause of changing (restructuring) our beliefs.

Our beliefs are composed of shapes, colors, sounds, feelings, etc. The words and letters of any language are themselves composed of these things. You need to see and hear (or feel in the case of using braille) to learn and then use a language. So the structure of language and the beliefs it symbolizes are composed of sensory impressions.

It seems to me that a more fundamental belief in the kind that Sam26 is trying to get at would be the belief that there is an external world. You need that as the foundation before you can build a structural understanding of what language even is. The idea of language is built on the idea that there is an external world with other minds, and that my mind is a representation of that world including how human being communicate. Language would have no foundation to stand on if there wasn't the foundational idea of an external world, for what purpose would language serve to a solipsist? How would the idea even come about in a solipsist mind?

You might say that our senses, with all of their brute sensory impressions informing the mind of how the world is, are using the language of sensory impressions to communicate the state of the world to our bodies. The mind's interpreter tries to make sense of those impressions, which the shapes and sounds of language are a part of. Learning a language entails interpreting the correlation between the shape, color and sound and what it represents, just as learning that the redness of an apple means it is ripe.

↪fdrake
↪Galuchat
Here we are 'brains in vat' endlessly discussing how to get a grip on reality with ever more sophisticated language.

"Brains in a vat" is an external world scenario, thereby language would still have it's uses in such a world.

"Brains in a vat" is an external world scenario, thereby language would still have it's uses in such a world. — Harry Hindu

Describing the shadows on the wall of a cave will never give you a satisfactory understanding of your surroundings no matter how sophisticated you are able to formulate your description of them.

If you were familiar with Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions in his notes called On Certainty, you would know that I'm not asking the question that you are answering. This is not a linguistics class, at least not a typical linguistics class. — Sam26

Fair enough.
Then being familiar with On Certainty, perhaps you could explain in what sense beliefs are elements (or foundational parts) of language?

Describing the shadows on the wall of a cave will never give you a satisfactory understanding of your surroundings no matter how sophisticated you are able to formulate your description of them. — ovdtogt

I don't see shadows. What I see is much more detailed than shadows. Not only that but I have other senses that give me even an even greater resolution on reality by way of providing more information that can confirm what one other sense is telling me. Notice how the location of objects in your visual field match up with the location you can feel and hear those objects in your tactile and auditory fields of consciousness. If we only had shadows to go by in how we understand the world, we wouldn't be as adaptable as we are, and survive as long as we do.

What is the structure? — Sam26

See R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, also many references online His argument is to something he calls absolute presuppositions (APs), these being the beliefs we all have all the time that undergird our notions of what is true and what is not true. The significance of APs is that their function is to be believed - absolutely presupposed: questions as to the truth of APs being irrelevant, and according to the author, metaphysical error.

It happens (he argues and demonstrates) that APs tend to endure but are subject to "strain" and can change, usually with very significant consequences. An example is the change in the understanding of nature as being imprecise to being precise. But APs exist at every level and all the time. It is useful, indeed is the business of metaphysics, to study and learn what they are for given people at given times - that is, metaphysics is the historical science of determining exactly that.

Hello fdrake. My next post is going to talk more about the structure, and what the structure is. It's not unique, in fact, it's quite familiar to us. The problem, as usual, is how we talk about it, and therein lies the problem that's difficult to explain.

As to your second question or comment, the problem is epistemological, and as you say philosophical, and since philosophy has something important to tell us across all subjects, it even has something to say about phantom limb pain. Especially Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, which I believe is important to understand.

Hello fdrake. My next post is going to talk more about the structure, and what the structure is. It's not unique, in fact, it's quite familiar to us — Sam26

Very interested in your continued exegesis, then!

Guys and gals, I'm a little slow with my typing due to 'essential tremors,' so please don't take offense if I don't answer all of the questions/comments. Sorry my age is slowing me down. :yikes:

I don't see shadows. What I see is much more detailed than shadows. — Harry Hindu

You are living in Plato's Cave, you can only see shadows.

Some of this is going to be difficult to understand, especially if you have not studied Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, or especially if you haven't studied On Certainty. Although much of what I'm writing is an extrapolation of what I believe follows from Wittgenstein's On Certainty. These are my own thoughts, which I believe follow from some of Wittgenstein's remarks.

The structure as I see it, consists of the world, minds, and language; and the relationship between these three. The world is the backdrop, and we find ourselves existing in it. Our mind helps us to interpret the world (it's in the relationship between our minds and the world that bedrock or basic beliefs form); so in a sense our mind is the center between the world and language. However, before we get to the language of beliefs, I want to say a few things about prelinguistic beliefs.

Without language we have the most basic of all beliefs. These beliefs are formed (I believe) causally between the mind (sensory experiences) and the world. More importantly these most basic of beliefs (states-of-mind) are not revealed linguistically, but are revealed in our actions (remember I'm talking prelinguistic beliefs). They are mostly seen in animals and children (and prehistoric man - OC 284). This is not to say that you don't see these kinds of beliefs in the language of modern man, it's only to say that they are most clearly seen in the actions of animals and very young children.

What is the relationship between my mind and the world? The initial relationship seems to be between our sensory experiences and the world. We come into direct contact with the world through sensory experience. We observe this initial contact (between the world and sensory experience) in animals and in young children. However, I'm not saying that adults don't exhibit these kinds of beliefs, only that they're most clearly seen in the actions of animals and young children who only have a rudimentary language.

One of the problems in seeing prelinguistic beliefs is language itself. It's difficult to look past the beliefs we express in language in order to see the beliefs I'm referring to. The key to doing this is in our actions. Actions express beliefs. In some ways actions tell us more about what we believe than statements (written or verbal).

Try to keep your responses limited to two or three paragraphs, or about the length of this post. It's difficult to read anything longer.

Hey Sam! Good to see you. Hope this finds you well.

As you may remember, pre-linguistic beliefs are pivotal to my own position. It seems that we agree regarding the problems 'seeing' these beliefs. I also agree that non linguistic beliefs are causal in the sense that one acts upon them.

I think that the largest hurdle we have in front of us is overcoming the limits that conventional notions of belief impose upon us. It is common, perhaps most common, to hold that beliefs are propositional attitudes. Of course, that notion has significant difficulty straddling the divide between prelinguistic belief and linguistic. I mean, it doesn't make much sense to say that a language less creature has an attitude towards a proposition, or has belief that consists of such a thing.

The content of belief is important here, it seems to me. If belief is prior to language, then it exists in it's entirety before our awareness of it. Keeping this in mind as a guiding principle will better serve us to help discriminate between the sorts of things that such foundational belief can consist of, and that which is just simply cannot.

What do you think of this approach?

It seems to me that a more fundamental belief in the kind that Sam26 is trying to get at would be the belief that there is an external world. You need that as the foundation before you can build a structural understanding of what language even is. The idea of language is built on the idea that there is an external world with other minds, and that my mind is a representation of that world including how human being communicate. Language would have no foundation to stand on if there wasn't the foundational idea of an external world, for what purpose would language serve to a solipsist? How would the idea even come about in a solipsist mind? — Harry Hindu

Actually Harry this is a pretty good summary of some of my thoughts. I've been trying to work on a theory of epistemology based on some of these ideas.

It seems to me that a more fundamental belief in the kind that Sam26 is trying to get at would be the belief that there is an external world. — Harry Hindu

I would also concur.

If belief is prior to language, than it exists in it's entirety before our awareness of it. — creativesoul

That's probably the case. However, others become aware of these kinds of prelinguistic beliefs by observation, but only if they have the concept of belief. In other words, it's backward looking, it only happens, that I can say there are prelinguistic beliefs, from the perspective of language. It's only in language that we can talk about such beliefs. This causes confusion.

That's probably the case. However, others become aware of these kinds of prelinguistic beliefs by observation, but only if they have the concept of belief. In other words, it's backward looking, it only happens, that I can say there are prelinguistic beliefs, from the perspective of language. It's only in language that we can talk about such beliefs. This causes confusion — Sam26

Yes, but perhaps it's a confusion that can be easily resolved by realizing that knowledge of prelinguistic belief requires language, talking about prelinguistic belief requires language, but prelinguistic belief does not... cannot. What we're taking account of is not equivalent to our accounting practices. Prelinguistic belief is akin to Mt. Everest in this way.

I'll continue tomorrow.

Hi Sam, Long time no see, I hope you are well. I have been infirm and studying philosophy. I think Wittgenstein addresses this question in para 208 of the P.I. (A philosopher called Meredith Williams has constructed a Wittgensteinian view of how the infant acquires language from this insight which I recommend if you can get at it).

...if a person has not yet got the concepts, I'll teach him to use the words by means of examples and by exercises - And when I do this, I do not communicate less to him that I know myself. In the course of this teaching, I'll show him the same colours, the same lengths, the same shapes...For example I'll teach him to continue an ornamental patter 'uniformly' when told to do so. - And also to continue progressions. — Witt P.I. 208

We learn conceptual norms by trust, initially, through language, and we subsequently develop our own, which we in turn pass on.

these most basic of beliefs (states-of-mind) are not revealed linguistically, but are revealed in our actions (remember I'm talking prelinguistic beliefs) — Sam26

For myself I think 'prelinguistic' is a red herring, though I know many are wedded to it. Instead I feel that it's a mistake to distinguish the linguistic from action. To use or interpret language is to act, it's not an alternative to action. It may be that this will eventually amount to a similar argument to the one from the 'prelinguistic', but for me it has different foundations: all our engagement in language games is a way of acting, as the form of life we are.

For myself I think 'prelinguistic' is a red herring, though I know many are wedded to it. Instead I feel that it's a mistake to distinguish the linguistic from action. To use or interpret language is to act, it's not an alternative to action. — mcdoodle

Hello Mcdoodle.

Prelinguistic is just a way of talking about particular kinds of beliefs "wedded" to actions apart from linguistic actions. I agree that to use language is an act, but I also believe that all beliefs are actions of a sort. If someone walks into the woods with an axe, walks up to a particular tree and start chopping it down, it would be weird to say that the person doesn't believe there is a tree in front of them, or that they don't have an axe in their hand. Our actions, linguistic or not, show that we believe certain things apart from the linguistic act of saying (verbal or nonverbal) "I believe..." There are all kinds of things we do on a daily basis (opening doors, starting our cars, brushing our teeth, etc) that reveal that we believe certain thiings, all of which are acts of a kind.

I think we must see the Moore-Wittgenstein debate about 'hands' differently. To me Wittgenstein's point is that these just are my hands: 'knowledge' or 'belief' don't come into it. If I chop down a tree with an axe, they are a tree and an axe. To 'believe' in what they are in some intermediary way is redundant. Bedrock just is bedrock. The test-case which I have heard people argue over is hallucination. If Kripke hacks down a tree that turns out to be a person, what was happening, from Kripke's point of view? The visiting psychologist may well say that this Kripke believes this and that, but for Kripke, there was just a tree that unexpectedly bled, and an axe. On my version, at any rate.

That's probably the case. However, others become aware of these kinds of prelinguistic beliefs by observation, but only if they have the concept of belief. In other words, it's backward looking, it only happens, that I can say there are prelinguistic beliefs, from the perspective of language. It's only in language that we can talk about such beliefs. This causes confusion. — Sam26

It seems to me that people can display knowledge without saying so. I know that you know how to tie your shoes by me observing you tie your shoes. No words need to be spoken. From this observation I can see that you have a belief about shoes and their laces being tied. Only if I never observed you tying your shoes would it be relevant to say so. Observing you tying your shoes and you saying that you know how to tie your shoes would be redundant information.

Knowing how to tie your shoes is knowing that there are shoes to be tied and that if you don't tie them they will fall off. You telling me that you know how to tie your shoes isn't a truth about your tying your shoes. It is a truth that you know how to say, "I know how to tie my shoes", not a truth that you actually know how to tie your shoes. Tying your shoes displays to both you and I that you do know how to tie your shoes, not saying it, and doing entails knowing that there are shoes to be tied or else they will fall off.

Learning that your shoes fall off when they aren't tied can be learned without language use. It can be learned without someone telling you so. So your belief that your shoes will fall off when they aren't tied can be learned by the experience of someone telling you or by you experiencing your shoes falling off more easily when they aren't tied. The experience can lead one to inform others that are new to wearing shoes why it is important to tie them.

One of the fundamental beliefs that we have is communication. Organisms communicate. One might even say that a more fundamental belief would be "aboutness" - that there are things that are about other things. Symbolization and representation seem to be an integral part of any belief as beliefs are about things.

In order to be able to learn a language, one must be able to symbolize, or understand that things can be about other things, and those other things can be outside of our own immediate experience (object permanence) of having a belief about that thing. Language is only useful to communicate things that aren't known by the other party. It would be redundant, and a waste of energy, telling someone something they already know.

People can communicate their ideas and knowledge to others without language. Body language and sounds babies make communicate their needs to their parents. Think about how you'd communicate with someone who speaks a different language. Pre-linguistic societies had many ways to communicate their ideas. Language is just a more sophisticated tool for communicating those ideas and knowledge.

In these types of discussions I often bring up Ildefonso, who is a man that didn't learn what a language was until he was in his late 20s.



IIdefonso had beliefs and he communicated them to others. The problem was that he wasn't using a shared language where others used the same means to communicate. In learning a language, one isn't learning new beliefs other than what scribble and sound symbolizes some other belief or idea that isn't a use of language.

One of the things that Susan says in the video is how it was difficult to teach someone what a word is by using words. We do this all the time when we teach babies how to talk and write. So it seems to me that, at least humans, already have this built-in feature of their minds to interpret symbols, or to assume that things can mean other things - that things are about other things.

She also says that he could obviously think and that she wanted to meet him and the only way to meet him was to teach him a language he could use to express himself - what was already there before language.

It seems to me that people can display knowledge without saying so — Harry Hindu

There is knowledge as a belief, and there is knowledge as a skill. We can observe knowledge as a skill, for example, tying your shoes, but there are many other examples. Riding a bike and counting to ten are skills. Knowing that bikes have wheels and that 2+2=4 are beliefs.

There have been times in the past where I stated that prelinguistic man doesn't have knowledge, but I was mainly thinking of the language of knowledge in terms of propositions/statements. It's clear though, if you want to be precise, that prelinguistic man and even young children display certain kinds of skills, which is another aspect of knowledge. You don't necessarily need language to demonstrate a skill, but you do need a language to demonstrate knowledge as a belief. Knowledge as a belief is necessarily linguistic.

So, I agree that you can show that you have knowledge (knowledge as a skill) without the use of language. Your example of tying your shoe is just that.

Beliefs are much more basic than knowledge, so the act of tying your shoe or skinning an animal shows that you have certain beliefs about the shoe and the animal. In both these cases we see very basic (bedrock) beliefs and knowledge as a skill.

There is knowledge as a belief, and there is knowledge as a skill. — Sam26

Knowledge as a skill is simply applied knowledge as a belief. You can't apply beliefs that you don't have.

Knowledge as a skill is simply applied knowledge as a belief. — Harry Hindu

Skill has nothing to do with belief.