Of course, but if you want to determine which claims are more useful than others, and therefore more accurate, then they need to be testable and falsifiable, or else every claim has just as much validity as every other claim, which includes contradictory claims. When two claims contradict each other, how do you go about getting at which one is more accurate?Not everything we are interested in is falsifiable or testable. — tom
I gave you an answer. It's not my problem if you don't like it.I asked you for a yes or no answer. Are you incapable of following directions? I want a yes or no answer — Agustino
You suffer from delusions. You asked me to show you that you are delusional. I did.Yes, that's the problem. You never made that distinction, but you gave me a list used to diagnose a medical condition. Is your claim that I suffer of the medical condition known as delusions? Yes or no? — Agustino
Those are not delusions in a medical sense. — Agustino
The delusions do not interfere with general logical reasoning (although within the delusional system the logic is perverted) and there is usually no general disturbance of behavior. If disturbed behavior does occur, it is directly related to the delusional beliefs.Yeah, you do have to look at ALL the symptoms, and in addition, you have to understand what they mean. Delusions are usually part of psychiatric disorders. Psychiatric disorders are manifestations which halt someone's ability to function in society, that's one key characteristic. So unless my "delusions" harm my ability to function in society, they can't be medically qualified as delusions. — Agustino
I think you really do have problems in understanding the meaning of what you read. — Agustino
An attempt to contradict the belief is likely to arouse an inappropriately strong emotional reaction, often with irritability and hostility. — Harry Hindu
Of course it now remains for you to show that they were delusional. — Agustino
Delusional people have risked their lives in order to maintain their delusions. They are even willing experience ridicule because the risk of losing the delusion is greater (be ridiculed or lose one's eternal status in heaven?).No, I wasn't referring to that sort of scenario. I was referring to the sort of scenario where, say, someone saw a murder, but the murderer later threatened to kill all witnesses, and this person nevertheless comes forward to testify. In that light, his testimony, because he is willing to risk his life, has greater weight. — Agustino
Methodological materialism is neither a belief nor an assumption but a restriction on method. Briefly stated, it holds that a non-material assumption is not to be made. Science, for example, is necessarily methodologically materialist. Science aims to describe and explain nature. Diversion into the "supernatural" or into the preternatural begins to address matters that are not natural and to obfuscate the natural. — WISDOMfromPO-MO
I couldn't care less about the millions like you. If you are the one that stole from me, prepare for some dire consequences. People like you tend to not recognize that one day you're going to wrong someone that you wished you hadn't.To steal the property of another person could consequently lead to retaliation; do you want to take that risk? —
Are you going to stop me? There's millions of people just like me. — antinatalautist
I could say the same thing about murder. What about when you steal from someone who has no quarrel about killing thieves?My explanation is simply that people can universalize their moral standards of behavior all they like. But there's nothing at all irrational in me personally opting out of this. Prove that moral standards for behavior should be universalized. Why should I not hold others to a population wide standard of moral behavior, while personally opting out of it. I get the best of best worlds. People choose not to steal from me, and yet I choose to steal from them. — antinatalautist
Read The Selfish Gene by Dawkins. He shows that cheaters don't make out as well as the non-cheaters in any human society. Humans have a longer memory and are better at making distinctions between individuals allowing them to hold those cheaters responsible and naming them for others so that the rest of us can avoid you or keep an eye on you.Is there some sort of mind-independent moral fact that must behavior ought correspond to? No. — antinatalautist
You're the second person to talk about philosophical conversations being "deeper" than scientific ones.Nevertheless, the way good friends talk about 'life' around a campfire as they share a bottle bourbon seems 'deeper' than science to me. They talk about the total situation of life. Love, career, death, religion, art, etc. And they do it in a shared language that as far as I know has never been formulated or processed by philosophy or science. I think the wise-man fantasy involves getting behind life and language with a formula that sums the total situation up once and for all. In my experience the most believable philosophers are those who point at the gap between systems and what they'd like to conquer --being alive as a particular human in all of its complexity. (Unfortunately, even some of these 'existential' philosophers tend to impose some lingo and get themselves talked about formulaically. ) — tEd
Simple. The intent lies within the cause of the equation themselves - Schrödinger. Why else would you call it the Schrödinger equation if not for the intent of Schrödinger himself when coming up with the equation. Wherever you find a statement, or law, you will find intent, for as far as I know, only people write statements and laws. Did Schrödinger design the universe to behave a certain way, or did he just write some equation that represents the way the universe behaves in a certain way?OK, what or where is the intent in the Schrödinger equation, the law of motion for
all particles? — tom
Okay, so you mean something else with the second use of the term, "law", than you mean with the first use. Like I said, I dislike the use of the term, "law" when referring to the way things are. There is no underlying code, or rules for the way things are. There is simply the way things are and our representation of the way things are with language and math (laws).No idea what you are on about. The Principles of Physics are laws about laws, or if you prefer Meta-Laws. There is absolutely nothing circular in that. — tom
Of course it does. Look it up in a dictionary. Laws are statements about things and statements are intentional.Meh. The word "law" implies no such thing. — tom
This is circular and therefore meaningless. You're basically saying, "The Principles of physics are a statement of an order or relation of phenomena that so far as is known is invariable under the given conditions about a statement of an order or relation of phenomena that so far as is known is invariable under the given conditions."The Principles of physics are laws about laws. — tom
Meaning, like information, is related to the relationship between cause and effect. Meaning is the same as information.In short: Thoughts and ideas possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and ideas cannot be identified with brain processes, as they are of a different order to the physical. — Wayfarer
Personally, I don't like the term, "law", applied to how things are. It implies that there is some intent in the way things are, which would then require an explanation I don't think we can get to without contradicting current "laws".I think a line in the sand has to be drawn. Physicalists can't constantly retreat into yet to be discovered physics. Of course, new physics has to be admitted, but the line says that all new things will adhere to the fundamental principles of physics.
We have a set of principles, which are laws about laws. A physicalist seems compelled to draw the line there. There may be new principles, but the old ones must survive.
So, according to physicalism, mental activity obeys the laws of thermodynamics; it requires energy and increases entropy. — tom
I believe that the true nature of the relationship between mind and world will be answered via the investigation of natural processes using a different vantage point than what we are using now. Like I said, most of the great discoveries that provide great predictive explanations of new experiences are the ones we acquired by taking a different look at the data.Fair enough. Can we agree on this, though: You hold a trust/faith/belief that things such as the true nature of experienced/enactive aesthetics will be answered via investigation of objects while I hold the trust/faith/belief that such things can never so be discovered?
(I say "trust/faith/belief" because they in at least one sense all signify the same thing.) — javra
When you say, "laws of physics", do you mean the explanations science currently provides, which even science admits could be wrong, or do you mean the way things are?Physical things are those things that obey the laws of physics.
Which laws? Certainly the conservation laws and principles. — tom
Thank you for this. I'm not sure if you noticed, but I put "physical" (and "non-physical") in quotes because the whole basis of this thread is questioning the validity of the distinction between the two. I keep asking for a explanation of the distinction, but thankfully I haven't been holding my breath.You’re concluding rhetorical question relies on a circular argument, as far as I can currently see.
Just as can be the case with any other stance regarding, basically, philosophy of mind—idealisms (in plural since these can take many forms), Cartesian substance dualism, pluralism, and (my now personal favorite) dual-aspect neutral monism—so too can physicalism be a circular argument in search of some justification for not merely being a “because I say/believe/will so” argument.
Hence: P1) because I/we/they so assert, everything discoverable by science is physical (even though science might have no clue as to what it is; e.g. dark matter and dark energy (maybe over 90% of the known universe and of what we ourselves consist of as physical beings, this in the colloquial sense of physical); P2) because I/we/they so assert, everything shall be discovered by science at some future point in time (including all aspects of being and its becoming involved in consciousness); C) therefore, everything is physical (this due to the cause of me/us/them so saying it is—as explicitly affirmed in the two former premises).
This, as presented, is then a circular argument (where the conclusion is implicitly upheld in the premises) that does not demonstrate any stance to be true at expense of any other stance being erroneous. — javra
He might have said that, but that doesn't mean the explanation is going to be what we now understand as a scientific one, for reasons that I won't begin to try to explain to you. — Wayfarer
Are there things that exist right now that are physical that science hasn't yet explained? — Harry Hindu
Of course. For example, maybe the most notable and dramatic instance these days is the acceleration of the recession-rate of the more distant galaxies. But a lot of other things too, of course, such as the observed system of particles, etc.
...because physics isn't completed, and probably never will be.
For that matter, ball-lightning hasn't been given an explanation satisfactory to all who study it.
Michael Ossiopff — Michael Ossipoff
Mysteries are evidence of our ignorance.Yes the possibility of consciousness being mysterious does disturb a lot of people. — Wayfarer
Can we make the way a word functions in the world totally explicit? I don't think so. At best you can sharpen the meaning as much as possible for a particular purpose within a local conversation, it seems to me.
In general, knowing what 'physical' means is (IMV) a dimly understood knowing-how to get along with others in the world. Perhaps every use of 'physical' is unique, albeit with a family resemblance. Just because we have this fixed sequence of letters from a fixed alphabet P H Y S I C A L doesn't, in my view, indicate that the 'meaning' has the same kind of quasi-mathematical static, definite presence as the mark. The foundation of our making sense of things seems to lie mostly in darkness. — ff0
Perfect, then you finally agree with me for what I've been saying for months now - that effects inform us of the cause.Sure, we make inferences about the cause by examining the effect, that's exactly what I said. — Metaphysician Undercover
So we aren't measuring someone's guilt or innocence (the cause) based on the evidence left behind (the effect)? Just like how scientists use other scientists to check their results in order to minimize subjective mistakes, prosecutors take the evidence to multiple people (the judge and jury) and show the causal connection between the evidence and someone's guilt or innocence.What I said is that we cannot "measure" the cause by examining the effect. The detective and prosecutor make a judgement which is not based on measurement of the cause. If it were a measurement of the cause, we wouldn't need a trial, a judge, nor jury, we could just refer to the measurement to see if the person measured up as guilty or not guilty. — Metaphysician Undercover
Another way of saying this is that science doesn't try to answer questions that don't make sense, or aren't falsifiable. What makes any answer to any question that isn't falsifiable better than any other answer that isn't falsifiable?I don't think 'science' even tries to answer the most profound questions. — ff0
What is an eternal, universal truth as opposed to just the truth? What is the 'deepest' kind of talk, as opposed to just talking about the way things are?Moreover, I don't see how science can provide its own foundation. Engineering and medicine earn our trust more or less by giving us what we want. But the idea of eternal, universal truth sounds pretty theological to me. In short, its foundation looks to be largely pragmatic or 'irrational.' We keep doing what scratches the itch. By putting philosopher in quotes, you are (as I see it) linking the heroic 'payload' of the words science and philosophy in an ideological way --as if the 'deepest' kind of talk humans are capable of is the defense/worship of science. — ff0
Can we not get at someone's intent (non-physical) by observing their behavior (physical)? Can we not get at someone's ideas (non-physical) by reading their words (physical)?We cannot measure a physical thing by measuring its effects on another physical thing. That is, as it says, measuring the thing's effect, not measuring the thing itself. From that effect we can make some inferences about the physical thing which is causing the effect. Likewise, we cannot measure a non-physical thing by measuring its effect on a physical thing. But we can draw some inferences about the non-physical thing by measuring its effect on the physical thing
I don't know. What does it mean to be physical? This is the whole point.I hear you. But do you yourself consider the first-person experience of heartbreak to be physical in the same way that an electron is physical? — ff0
No, the problem is that I understand it perfectly. It is you that simply fails to ask simple question of your own beliefs that you delude yourself into believing. I'm asking questions that everyone else, including you, should be asking of themselves, and their own understanding of what the distinction between physical and non-physical is. Doesn't the fact that so many people are having such a hard time getting at the distinction mean something? Go ahead and turn a blind eye, Wayfarer, and keep yourself in the dark light of ignorance.Not only ‘the last part’. Honestly, you don't seem to understand the issue - then you ask for clarification about it, then argue against the suggestions that are made, without understanding them. You really need to do some homework on the whole subject. — Wayfarer
What do subjective qualities mean in this instance if not the feeling of looking out from a particular location at a particular time? Stripped of those two qualities, it wouldn't be a view from nowhere, but a view from everywhere and every time.It's considered "nowhere" because it has been stripped of all subjective qualities. The world portrayed by science doesn't look, sound, taste, smell or feel like anything. And It's not from a particular vantage point. — Marchesk
MU, you really need to think a bit more before posting. It takes just a few seconds of thought to come up with real examples that show that what you say simply doesn't hold any water. We get at causes all the time by measuring the effects. Just think about what a police detective and prosecutor does.We cannot measure a physical thing by measuring its effects on another physical thing. That is, as it says, measuring the thing's effect, not measuring the thing itself. From that effect we can make some inferences about the physical thing which is causing the effect. Likewise, we cannot measure a non-physical thing by measuring its effect on a physical thing. But we can draw some inferences about the non-physical thing by measuring its effect on the physical thing — Metaphysician Undercover
I asked several questions in that post that can't be answered by simply repeating what it is I'm questioning.Yes, it is a feeling. There are no instruments that can measure feelings or the nature of any experience for that matter. Feelings are an internal experiences which often confound the experiencers themselves. — Rich
Do they mean that the non-physical is forever and always unmeasureable? Are there things that are physical that haven't been measured?There are several ways to think about the distinction.
I think Locke's primary/secondary qualities captures it nicely.
One can also think of it in terms of the difficulty in reducing qualia, intentionality and indexicality to physical terms, while at the same time finding the idealist explanation for space, time, particles, etc to be unbelievable.
Or one can just say that the physical is mathemitizeable, while the mental is not. Meillassoux's version of speculative realism might fall into this, although he talks in terms of transcending Kant's correlationism to get at the mathematical reality.
On a more meta level, there is Nagel's subjective/objective split, with science being the view from nowhere, which is objective, and subjectivity being a view from somewhere. — Marchesk
