So to a materialist view, that everything we know, we know by way of the mind (activities of neural networks) - including material or physical objects.
You're saying this is somehow inconsistent? — praxis
Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mind and consciousness, are results of material interactions.
In Idealism Mind and Consciousness are first-order realities to which Matter is subject and secondary. In philosophical materialism the converse is true. Here Mind and Consciousness are by-products or epiphenomena of material processes (the biochemistry of the human brain and nervous system, for example) without which they cannot exist. According to this doctrine the material creates and determines consciousness, not vice versa. Materialists believe that Matter and the physical laws that govern it constitute the most reliable guide to the nature of mind and consciousness.
How is this contrary to a materialist view, that everything we know, we know by way of the mind - including material or physical objects? — praxis
[Dennett maintains that] nothing whatever is revealed to the first-person point of view but a “version” of the neural machinery. In other words, when I look at the American flag, it may seem to me that there are red stripes in my subjective visual field, but that is an illusion: the only reality, of which this is “an interpreted, digested version,” is that a physical process I can’t describe is going on in my visual cortex.
I am reminded of the Marx Brothers line: “Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?” Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that in his view sets the outer bounds of reality. He is, in Aristotle’s words, “maintaining a thesis at all costs.”
Some of the problems posed by mental phenomena [e.g. 'the hard problem of consciousness'] Dennett simply dismisses without adequate reason; others he ignores. Most, however, he attempts to prove are mere “user-illusions” generated by evolutionary history, even though this sometimes involves claims so preposterous as to verge on the deranged.
MU, you really need to think a bit more before posting. It takes just a few seconds of thought to come up with real examples that show that what you say simply doesn't hold any water. We get at causes all the time by measuring the effects. Just think about what a police detective and prosecutor does.We cannot measure a physical thing by measuring its effects on another physical thing. That is, as it says, measuring the thing's effect, not measuring the thing itself. From that effect we can make some inferences about the physical thing which is causing the effect. Likewise, we cannot measure a non-physical thing by measuring its effect on a physical thing. But we can draw some inferences about the non-physical thing by measuring its effect on the physical thing — Metaphysician Undercover
What do subjective qualities mean in this instance if not the feeling of looking out from a particular location at a particular time? Stripped of those two qualities, it wouldn't be a view from nowhere, but a view from everywhere and every time.It's considered "nowhere" because it has been stripped of all subjective qualities. The world portrayed by science doesn't look, sound, taste, smell or feel like anything. And It's not from a particular vantage point. — Marchesk
No, the problem is that I understand it perfectly. It is you that simply fails to ask simple question of your own beliefs that you delude yourself into believing. I'm asking questions that everyone else, including you, should be asking of themselves, and their own understanding of what the distinction between physical and non-physical is. Doesn't the fact that so many people are having such a hard time getting at the distinction mean something? Go ahead and turn a blind eye, Wayfarer, and keep yourself in the dark light of ignorance.Not only ‘the last part’. Honestly, you don't seem to understand the issue - then you ask for clarification about it, then argue against the suggestions that are made, without understanding them. You really need to do some homework on the whole subject. — Wayfarer
I don't know. What does it mean to be physical? This is the whole point.I hear you. But do you yourself consider the first-person experience of heartbreak to be physical in the same way that an electron is physical? — ff0
Can we not get at someone's intent (non-physical) by observing their behavior (physical)? Can we not get at someone's ideas (non-physical) by reading their words (physical)?We cannot measure a physical thing by measuring its effects on another physical thing. That is, as it says, measuring the thing's effect, not measuring the thing itself. From that effect we can make some inferences about the physical thing which is causing the effect. Likewise, we cannot measure a non-physical thing by measuring its effect on a physical thing. But we can draw some inferences about the non-physical thing by measuring its effect on the physical thing
MU, you really need to think a bit more before posting. It takes just a few seconds of thought to come up with real examples that show that what you say simply doesn't hold any water. We get at causes all the time by measuring the effects. Just think about what a police detective and prosecutor does. — Harry Hindu
Are there things that exist right now that are physical that science hasn't yet explained? — Harry Hindu
How is this contrary to a materialist view, that everything we know, we know by way of the mind - including material or physical objects?
— praxis
mis-states the materialist view - actually gets it backwards. The materialist view (which I'm sure, incidentally, you don't hold) is something like: what we think we know of 'the mind' amounts to a 'folk psychology' which believes, fallaciously, that 'mind' is something real, when really it is simply an expression of the 'unconscious competence' (Dennett's term) of billions of neurons that have been shaped by evolution to perform in a certain way, creating the illusion of first-person consciousness. — Wayfarer
when really it is simply an expression of the 'unconscious competence' (Dennett's term) of billions of neurons that have been shaped by evolution to perform in a certain way, — Wayfarer
Discussing his new book, he seems to think that consciousness is not as mysterious as many people believe. I tend to agree.
I read Mind & Cosmos, by the way, and though most of it was wasted on me I appreciate the gist: that we haven't figured it all out yet and need to keep searching for answers. — praxis
No it doesn't; the very idea of searching for answers presupposes that consciousness is not mysterious. — Janus
New mysterianism—or commonly just mysterianism—is a philosophical position proposing that the hard problem of consciousness cannot be resolved by humans. The unresolvable problem is how to explain the existence of qualia (individual instances of subjective, conscious experience). In terms of the various schools of philosophy of mind, mysterianism is a form of nonreductive physicalism. Some "mysterians" state their case uncompromisingly (Colin McGinn has said that consciousness is "a mystery that human intelligence will never unravel"); others believe merely that consciousness is not within the grasp of present human understanding, but may be comprehensible to future advances of science and technology.
Although “the joy of knowing is not always as innocent as it seems”, the line separating culture from “barbarism” is crossed when science is transformed into scientist ideology, i.e., when the Galilean principle is made into an ontological claim according to which ultimate reality is given only through the objectively measurable and quantifiable.
It might be the case that it's forever mysterious. — Wayfarer
Alternatively, we might be obliged to understand that knowledge has intrinsic limits, even regarding the nature of something very near to us, namely, ourselves. When you look at the knots and tangles in current cosmology and philosophy-of-matter, then it's not necessarily surprising that this might be the case. — Wayfarer
In any case physicalism is nothing so much as a way of dodging the mystery - the kind of mystery that Dennett wants to dispose of. Put a bag over it, hose it down, throw it out the door, so we can all get back to the lab, where everything is safe and predictable, and we're not menaced by spooky ideas. — Wayfarer
SEP article on Michel Henry. — Wayfarer
So is it a real expression of "billions of neurons..."? What would an illusory expression of "billions of neurons.." look like? :s In any case wouldn't 'function' be more apt than "expression"? — Janus
It might be the case that [the nature of mind] is forever mysterious.
— Wayfarer
I already mentioned that possibility in the post you responded to. But if we assume it is then that would rule out the use of any inquiry. — Janus
You vowed a month or so ago that you would never mention Dennett again on forums, but it seems you just cannot help yourself. — Janus
"The knots and tangles in current cosmology and philosophy of matter" firstly may not be what you think they are, since you are by no means expert in those subjects (as I am not), and secondly they may be released and untangled in the future. You have no way of knowing whether they will be or not; but would you prefer to think that they will not? If so, why would you prefer to think that? Isn't the advancement of knowledge in itself a good thing; whatever we might think about its potential for abuse or its implications for our preferred metaphysics? — Janus
I think this is an absolutely egregious strawman. — Janus
What I think is needed as a corrective is the relinquishing of the very notion that science or materialistic thought in general is intrinsically a threat to attitudes that foster spirituality. — Janus
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