Comments

  • Hypostatization
    In my adventures, I occasionally encounter a discussion going back to Plato (at least).
    Let me just try a different angle.

    8zqp0hvrke0ql5tq.jpg

    Most can easily identify that as a cow.
    Not a "real" cow, just a drawing, but there are many cows in the world, that just go about their business on their own.
    By a semi-idealist reasoning, there's an "abstract cow" that somehow exists "objectively" and independently of all else, sort of in it's own ("timeless") realm of reified abstracts.
    (I'm just using the term "semi-idealist" a bit broadly here; you get the gist.)

    Of course this hypothesis spurs a few questions.
    How exactly is this abstract cow supposedly related to the cows in the world?
    Why should anyone take this hypothesis serious, and ontologize such an abstract cow, anyway...?
    jorndoe
    The objective existence is possessed by the actual computer screen with black and white dots on it that forms the shape of a 2-D cow. In this instance, the objective existence of the "abstract cow" has taken the physical form of a monitor emitting white light. This is why many different minds can now see the "abstract cow" in this shared forum.

    If the "abstract cow" was drawn on a sheet of paper it would take on the objective existence of a physical piece of paper with ink on it in the shape of a 2-D cow.

    I'd live to hear a "semi-idealist" (whatever that is) explain the relationship between a cow and this photograph of that cow,https://goo.gl/images/xDbG4C, and how that differs from the "abstract cow".
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    For starters, the usage of the terms, "nature", and "supernatural" seem to imply that nature existed first, or is the primary aspect of reality, and the supernatural is on top, above, or beyond the natural - implying that the supernatural is dependent upon the existence of the natural. But the descriptions of these things implies the complete opposite - that the supernatural existed first, or prior to the natural world being created by a "supernatural" entity. Is the supernatural realm the primary realm in which the natural world stems from, or does the supernatural stem from the natural?

    If the terms, "natural" vs. "supernatural" are only related to things that are explained vs. things that aren't, then (1) why is the idea of "divinity" associated with "supernatural"? and (2) is any supernatural explanation really an explanation, because by explaining something it becomes natural?
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    It has implications on what is being discussed. Everything is interconnected. You can't talk about one thing without it implying other things and ignore those implications as "off topic".

    A great example is the idea of "God" or "supernatural". Those ideas have so many implications that most people ignore that they end up having an inconsistent world view, and if your world view is inconsistent, and you don't give a damn that it's inconsistent, then what is the point of discussing anything with you?
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    There are no reasons so far as I know to think that the nature of the mundane world is physical to begin with, in any substantive ontological sense (that is, if by 'physical' you don't just mean something banal, like things that take up empirical space) – this would need to be established prior to the further position that physical sort of stuff is 'all' there is.

    It's generally taken for granted that physical things exist and everything else has to prove its existence. But this is a prejudice and so far as I can tell nothing supports it.
    The Great Whatever

    Why does it matter what term we use to label the fundamental substance of reality? It seems to me that it is the term that you don't like, as reality has some kind of substance and things that are made of the same substance can interact, or causally influence each other. Would it matter if called it "mental" instead of "physical"? Wouldn't that be based on a plethora of baseless assumptions as well?

    If we can agree that what we call "mental" has a causal influence on the "physical" and vice versa, then why are we arguing over the terms used to refer to the fundamental substance? Why would that even matter? Using different terms to refer to different fundamental substances is what creates the problem in the first place. By referring to them as different substances contradicts our own observations of both "substances" being a causal influence on one another. If it is the terms, "physical" and "mental" that set idealists and materialists off, then dispense with both of these terms altogether and let's all use a new word for the fundamental substance of reality. How about, "information"?
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    Let's suppose a dummy universe, with only a few laws (say, 3), which are discoverable by its inhabitants. They discover the first law, and call this the law of nature. And they refer to the events under the influence of the other 2 laws by the word, "supernatural".

    In such a universe, once the other two laws are discovered, yes, the word "supernatural" would become obsolete (in talking about physics -- not in talking about history).

    Whether or not our universe is analogous to this dummy universe, of course, is a metaphysical (not a scientific) question. Even in the dummy universe, people would never be sure that there weren't new laws waiting to be discovered (the number of laws is not apparent to them). Even if we define supernatural as "whatever has not been explained so far", it seems that there will always be scope for speculating about it.

    Worthy of note is that these definitions of natural and supernatural (both referring to explainability) are surely not how the word is used, nor how it was etymologically derived.
    Mariner
    Sure. People have a tendency to keep asking "Why...?", but this isn't evidence that there is more to be discovered. It is simply evidence that we seek explanations for everything. Either the explanations stop somewhere, or there is infinite causation. What would be the term for explanations that underlie the supernatural explanations? What would be the cause of the supernatural? Would we call those laws, "meta-natural?" and then what about the laws that underlie those meta-natural laws? Where do we stop?

    If "supernatural" only carried the meaning of being "unexplained", then I could probably come to some agreement with you. But "supernatural" also carries with it the connotation of "divine", or "holy", and of being the domain of gods. Remember, the ideas that religion are based on are preliminary. Religion was our preliminary explanation of the world and humans' place in it. They were explanations based on our very first assumptions - that humans are the most important aspect of creation, and the reason for creation. Humans have a tendency to focus on themselves - of seeing themselves as the important aspect of creation - of seeing nature as created and designed specifically for them. Religions are anthropomorphic in the sense that it places humans as the central focus of nature. All of these baseless assumptions are where the term, "supernatural", was etymologically derived.
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    Ok, then the point made way back when, that "natural" would lose its usefulness (in metaphysical discourse) if the word "supernatural" were discarded is still cogent.Mariner
    I don't remember anyone making that particular point. I made the point that "supernatural" would lose it's meaning in the absence of the natural because the word "supernatural" refers to things (of a manifestation or event) attributed to some force beyond scientific understanding or the laws of nature. So when these other parts are explained scientifically, and the causal relationship between the supernatural and the natural is explained, then "supernatural" won't refer to anything. That is why it will become useless.

    If nature is defined as what has been scientifically explained, then once everything is explained, everything would be natural, and then what use would the word, "supernatural" have? Weather is a great example of this. Do we still refer to the weather as a "supernatural" phenomenon?
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    This means that whenever knowing my intent is not enough, context is necessary to communicate. Which is what I'm claiming.

    Our differences seem to be more of emphasis than of content.
    Mariner

    I rolled this answer around in my mind a bit more and it seems that we are agreeing for the most part. Because we are cut off from direct contact with each other's minds, we use context as a tool for getting at the intent of the speaker/writer. So we are always still trying to get at the speaker/writer's intent. Context is an indirect means of doing that. This is why we say things like, "I misunderstood you", not "I misunderstood the context" because as every proficient language user knows, deep down, that it is the intent that we are trying to get at, not the context itself.
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    This means that whenever knowing my intent is not enough, context is necessary to communicate. Which is what I'm claiming.Mariner
    This doesn't address my answer. Again, if you are using a word in a way that is unfamiliar to me, then even the context isn't going to help me. I did say this in the post you just replied to. Miscommunication occurs as a result of the listener or reader not understanding the speaker or writer's intent, not as a result of them misunderstanding the context. When I misunderstand your words, I'm misunderstanding you, not the context. The speaker or writer's intent precedes even the knowledge of the context. As I said before, even the speaker/writer can get the context wrong, but they still have the intent to communicate a specific idea.

    In any case, we can [begin to] go back to the theme of the thread. Would you say that the word "artificial" should not be used, whatever the context, and whatever the intent of the speaker? This seemed to be your claim, let me know if it stands as formulated.Mariner

    Because there are a lot of people that still believe that humans are separate from nature, "artificial" still has it's uses to communicate with those people. If I wanted to steer away from the use of the word because of the outdated idea that it refers to, then I could use the word, "man-made" instead to distinguish between the things man has made and what other animals have made without separating them from nature.
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    So, Trump is not merely the person or the card, it is also the idea of tripping someone up -- assuming you interpreted my intent correctly.

    Curious.

    Words can refer to things that are not in their dictionary definitions ("Trump" just did that), depending on the context. Which means the context (here, a philosophical discussion) has a role. That's all I'm pointing out here.
    Mariner

    I'm not sure if I'm understanding you here. In every dictionary I've looked at, the word "trump" doesn't have the definition you are ascribing to it. Does this mean that you are using "trump" as an example of your statement that words can refer to things that are not in their dictionary definitions? If this is the case, then again, it is your intent to do so. And the reason I didn't understand your use is because you are using it in a way that we haven't agreed on.

    A dictionary is a list of words and their definitions that we all agree on. When you start using rules that we haven't established or agreed on, then even knowing the context isn't going to help me. I'd need to get in your head to see the relationship between some idea and the word your using to refer to that idea that you are intending. Anyone can use any words however they want, but if they intend to communicate, then they would need to use the established rules that everyone has agreed on and learned in grade school.

    Yes. I don't disagree with that (not with what Srap Tasmaner said. But it doesn't go far enough when it dismisses any relevance of context.

    Perhaps I'm misinterpreting you :D. But you did say that meaning is "not derived at all" from context, and this seems to contradict the experience of any proficient language user.

    I'm sure we can reach a formulation that gives the proper weight to the speaker's intent and to context without dismissing one or the other.

    After we reach that formulation, we can examine once again whether discarding any word (be it "Trump", a quite ambiguous word, or "artificial", a much less ambiguous one) can be justified on account of it being useless in a given context, even though it is useful in another.
    Mariner

    It doesn't contradict my experience of using my native language. Before I speak, I have the experience of intending to communicate an idea in my head. I then have the experience of converting those ideas into words that I then write down or use noise to transmit to other minds. There is always the intent to communicate a particular idea.

    Answer me this: If I could get into your mind, why would I ever need to know the context in which we are communicating? If I simply understood your intent, then why would I ever need to know the context in which we are communicating? If knowing your intent is enough, then context isn't necessary to communicate.
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    Meaning is not derived at all from context? Not even a little bit?

    Let's test this theory.

    Trump.

    What do I mean by that word?
    Mariner

    Do you realize what you just asked? You asked, "What do I mean...." In other words, the meaning is related to your intent. What is it that you intended when you typed that word on the screen? Didn't you intend to try and trip me up with an example of a word that has at least two meanings (one is the last name of the President of the United States while the other is a decisive, overriding factor (aka a trump card))? Isn't that the idea you had in your mind just prior to you typing the word on the screen?

    It's not that I'm left with trying to figure out the context in which you are using the word. The context is this particular discussion on a internet philosophical forum. I'm left with trying to discover your intent which I believe was simply trying to show me that you need context in order for words to mean things. But I just showed how that is incorrect. Even the speaker can get the context wrong. It is what they intend to say, but don't get it out right, or when the listener doesn't interpret the intent properly, that results in miscommunication.
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    Any description of the supernatural would have to include it's causal relationship with the natural. When that is done, we will no longer use the term, "supernatural". Everything would simply be "natural". — Harry Hindu

    And then a perfectly useful word like "nature" and its related concepts would have become useless.
    Mariner
    How so? "Nature" would then be synonymous with "reality", or "multiverse". So even if "nature" did lose it's meaning (and I don't think it would), we'd still have other words to use.

    Since the term, "artificial" is a term created when man thought of himself as separate from nature, and we find out that we aren't, then the term itself loses its meaning... — Harry Hindu

    That's the point. It loses its meaning in some contexts (when we are discussing metaphysics) but not in others (when we are discussing, say, environmentalism). "Artificial" is a useful word when it is properly used. When it is not properly used, of course it is less than useful.

    Note that "properly" here does not refer to rules of grammar, etiquette, or something like that -- it refers to the transmission of meaning. If a word is useful to transmit some meaning in a given context, then it cannot "lose its meaning" because it is useless in another context.
    Mariner
    Meaning isn't derived at all from context, but from the intent of the speaker or writer. It is up to the listener and reader to discover the intent, not the context, being used. When we misunderstand some use of a word, it is because we misunderstood the intent, not the context.

    The word, "artificial" would only still be used by those that still hold on to the belief that we are separate from nature. If they don't believe this, then the are unwittingly misusing the word, or using it in a way to communicate something in a way the listener (who still believes that man is separate from nature) can understand. They wouldn't be consistent in their world-view and their use of some term. This happens a lot because most people don't seem to take the time to integrate their varying views on certain subjects together, much less their terms they use with their views.
  • The Epistemology of Mental Illness Diagnosis
    You're hovering near a stoic viewpoint. Note that you don't actually have to provide anything logically satisfying.

    Just point to the way people use the words and drop the mike.

    True it now becomes impossible to have an intelligent discussion about the concepts on the table... but look at your interlocutor objectively. Was there ever any chance of an intelligent discussion? If not then you have lost nothing.
    Mongrel
    Shouldn't the way people use words be logical? Aren't I pointing to the illogical ways people are using words? From my perspective, it is those people that are using words improperly, or conflating words like "asocial" and "antisocial", that aren't participating intelligently in this discussion.
  • The Epistemology of Mental Illness Diagnosis
    That is completely ridiculous. If everyone was a full time writer, or a woman, or for that matter, a metal worker, the species would die out. But these are not illnesses.

    If all the bees were queens, the species would die out, and if all the bees were workers, the species would die out, and if all the bees were drones, the species would die out. Therefore all bees are ill.
    unenlightened
    Uhh... yeah. If everyone was a "full-time" writer or metal-worker - meaning that is all they did, 24-7, and never possessed an inclination to eat or procreate, then I would say that they are ill, sure. Do you know anyone like this? I doubt it. So you examples are preposterous.

    If everyone was suddenly being born a female and there were no males being born, yes the species would die out and would probably be the result of some disease, or damage to our DNA.

    The same goes for all bees being drones, or queens, etc. Something would be wrong and Natural selection would filter out the problem. It is a fundamental feature of life to procreate and if that doesn't happen, then one would argue that life isn't happening.

    You seem to just like to be contrarian for the sake of it.unenlightened
    You seem to just like to be obtuse for the sake of it.
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    And then a perfectly useful word like "nature" and its related concepts would have become useless.Mariner
    What is the meaning of "supernatural" in the absence of the "natural"?

    To see the point from another angle. "Natural" is often opposed to "artificial". Obviously, everything which is "artificial" is also "natural" (if we are looking at "natural" as a distinction from "supernatural"). But that does not mean that we can discard the notion of artificiality.

    Perhaps the notion of "naturality-as-distinguished-from-supernaturality" is useful in a similar way.
    Mariner
    "Artificial" is often used to define man-made things, but since man is a natural outcome of a natural process, then everything it makes is also natural. "Artificial" is a term used to distinguish between the "natural" and "man-made". Since the term, "artificial" is a term created when man thought of himself as separate from nature, and we recently find out that we aren't, then the term itself loses its meaning and is relegated to the trash heap of other terms that we have used but found to be useless in the light of new knowledge.
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    Also, there's a debate going on at the moment about what 'natural laws' are, and if you drill down, it's actually quite hard to account for them, in scientific terms. I think the general gist is that 'natural laws' are assumed by naturalism - after all, it could hardly get out of bed without them - but in itself it doesn't account for them. Not that it really needs to - but again, assuming that naturalism accounts for the order which allows it to work, is perhaps a little like 'the rooster taking credit for the sunrise'.Wayfarer
    A supernatural law would have the same problem.

    There is a way the world is and then there are the patterns we find in the way the world is, and we call those patterns, "laws".

    Any description of the supernatural would have to include it's causal relationship with the natural. When that is done, we will no longer use the term, "supernatural". Everything would simply be "natural".
  • The Epistemology of Mental Illness Diagnosis
    So if you are 1. averse to the company of others, be a lighthouse keeper, and if you are 2. hostile to society, be a revolutionary.

    How does an agent of change and progress get others to agree with them and follow them if they are hostile to everyone they interact with? — Harry Hindu


    Smack them briskly about the head until they comply. Or possibly crucify a few of them to encourage the others. Are these mental illnesses?
    unenlightened
    You still don't seem to understand the very terms you are using. Being a lighthouse keeper still requires you to be sociable to the captains and sailors out off the coast. An anti-social lightkeeper would turn the light out just to see a ship full of people crash on the rocks. You keep referring to an asocial lighthouse keeper.

    If one is 2., hostile to society, and would then be a revolutionary, then they would only be a revolutionary against any social order. This all goes back to my first post about how the majority of humans behave, and that being the norm for humans - being social, just as we define the normal behavior of all living things based on the commonality of the behavior among the species. Being antisocial is simply abnormal and we usually define abnormalities as an illness or something to fix in someone.

    If someone possesses a trait that, if all members of the species possessed would mean the demise of the species - like being hostile to other members, then that would be sufficient to call that trait an illness.
  • The Epistemology of Mental Illness Diagnosis
    Not at all. An anti-social person is ideally suited to being a night-watchman or a lighthouse keeper, or a mountain shepherd. No reason at all to call such people ill.unenlightened
    You're confusing asocial behavior with anti-social behavior.

    Or do you mean by 'antisocial' one who opposes the society they are in, in some way? Such people are agents of change and progress.unenlightened
    What I mean is the definition of antisocial. Here, let me help you:

    Definition of antisocial

    1
    : averse to the society of others : unsociable

    2
    : hostile or harmful to organized society;

    In other words, being asocial just means that you avoid social interaction. Antisocial means that you are antagonistic towards other people - regardless of the culture you find yourself in.

    How does an agent of change and progress get others to agree with them and follow them if they are hostile to everyone they interact with?
  • The Epistemology of Mental Illness Diagnosis
    What I conclude is that the whole notion of mental illness is flawed. As you say, anyone can find themselves in an environment they cannot cope with, and the details of what they cannot cope with will vary with the individual. But one becomes dysfunctional in relation to a social environment, and that is what we call 'mental illness'. The same mentality that functions stably in one environment breaks down in another. Whereas another mentality might respond in the opposite way.unenlightened
    It doesn't have to do with the society itself defining what is sane vs. insane behavior. It has to do with the common features we all share vs. rare features that occur within our population.

    One of the defining properties of a human being is that they are highly social. If a person is anti-social, in any social environment, that person is defined as mentally unstable in every social environment, even in the social environment of ISIS.
  • The Epistemology of Mental Illness Diagnosis
    If the one doing it was named,"Joe" then he would be 1 joe tall, while everyone else would be 0.8, 1.2, etc joes tall. Measurements are relative. It's just we have agreed on the use of particular measurements (inches, yards, metres, etc.).
  • The Epistemology of Mental Illness Diagnosis
    Thats why you need to share your observations with others in order be more objective. Even in observing external phenomenon requires you to share those observations with others in order to be objective. If you were their only person in existence and had no one to bounce your ideas about the extenal world off of, then could you really say you're being objective?

    Isnt that why you go to the psychologists - to ask the person in which many others go to and shares their internal states with in order to compare them and apply similar solutions to similar problems?
  • The Epistemology of Mental Illness Diagnosis
    Thus it turns out that the scientific mindset not only does not work psychologically, but is in fact a mental illness in its own right.unenlightened
    So it is a mental illness to make observations and then categorize those observations? If that is the case, then every human being is mentally ill.

    It would seem to me that several philosophical stances are equivalent to a mental illness - like believing that no one but yourself exists, believing that some unseen entity loves you and that makes you important, believing that you will live forever, a gross misuse of the English language, etc.

    ...can psychology really be called a science?rickyk95
    Of course it can. It is based on observations, categorizing those observations, and sharing those observations with other psychologists in order to apply them to the masses. Psychology has been around for about 150 years and since then it has several other fields branching out from, or overlapping psychology and neuroscience - like cognitive neuroscience and physiological psychology.

    Observing your own mental states and categorizing those mental states, and then sharing those observations with others is a scientific act.
  • Why We Never Think We Are Wrong (Confirmation Bias)
    The problem is that too many people have made an emotional investment in what they believe. They have connected their emotional state with their beliefs. It's not so much that they need to be right to be happy, it's that the belief itself makes them content, or that they are "disposed" towards a particular belief because other beliefs simply put them off and they can't mount a proper argument against it. It's just how they feel about it. Most people think if they just ignore the response, or the pointed question, then that makes it go away as if it never existed.

    Everything is evidence of something. You just can't ignore certain facts. You have to account for them in some way and that way has to be consistent with your other beliefs. For instance, some ignore the existence of religion and some ignore the existence of consciousness. Whether it's just a delusion or an illusion, it still needs to be explained why it is so, and your explanation needs to fit with the rest of your puzzle pieces of your overall worldview. Too many people don't integrate their ideas into a consistent whole and end up being inconsistent.
  • A Wittgenstein Commentary
    I'm not sure what you mean by "...a set of instructions for interpreting some sensory impression..." When we talk about knowledge, we are talking about how it is that we come to say that we have knowledge. Not all knowledge is about sensory impressions, as I've mentioned before. For example, how is it that we come to say "I know algebra," isn't it because I've studied algebra and have taken the appropriate tests that verify my knowledge of algebra. Thus, I'm justified in saying that I know algebra, because there is an objective way of measuring my knowledge. It's not a matter of just saying one knows, it's a matter of justifying the belief, i.e., I have good reasons for making the claim. Hence, the definition of knowledge is justified true belief. The key word is justified.Sam26
    You aren't taking the time to read my posts. I already explained in my first post what a "set of instructions for interpreting sensory impressions" is.

    You answered your own question yourself. "Learning algebra" is learning a set of instructions for interpreting sensory impressions. How did you learn algebra without seeing the formulas - without seeing the numbers and symbols? You learned rules for interpreting what you see.
  • Persuasion - Rand and Bernays
    Let me rephrase your question for clarity's sake: If someone is unaware that their emotional complexes and habits-of-thought have been created or reconfigured by a self-serving manipulative agent, should we consider these complexes and habits---and all resulting physical and psychical activity---voluntary?ZzzoneiroCosm
    You didn't clarify it. You made it more complex. My question was quite simple.

    The answer is no. (If you want to pivot to a dusty discussion of free will, count me out.)ZzzoneiroCosm
    Finally. Thank you for agreeing that your argument in the OP isn't an argument against your Rand quote because if it's not voluntary, then it doesn't fall under the point Rand was making. So you're essentially creating a straw man. This what most of you socialists do when it comes to Libertarians.

    Here "propagandic phenomena" is defined as "that phenomena by which a self-serving manipulative agent creates or configures the emotional complexes and habits-of-thought of a given subject."ZzzoneiroCosm
    So, how does a self-server become a self-server? How is it that they are able to manipulate others without being manipulated themselves? Maybe we each make a choice to give up some of our individual liberty in order to interact with others, or in order to take part in manipulating others.
  • A Wittgenstein Commentary
    To define language as a game means that language must be a game, no? In other words, you can never escape using words to refer to some state-of-affairs, like language being a game.
  • A Wittgenstein Commentary
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K5ljEBkCeMQ

    Pinker makes two great points in this video:

    1) the fact that there can be two ideas underlying one word like "stud", or "tires", shows that words and thoughts (what the words refer to) can't be the same thing.

    2) the fact that you can translate at all shows that there has to be something other that words because what would it mean for two sentences in different languages to be translations of each other if not for the fact that both of them have the same meaning?
  • A Wittgenstein Commentary
    No, I'm not saying that we never possess knowledge. I'm simply pointing out that there is a difference between the definition of knowledge (justified true belief), and one's claim to knowledge. Just because one claims to have knowledge it doesn't follow that they do. By definition knowledge is a true belief, but knowledge claims are not by definition true. You seem to be conflating the two.Sam26
    Sure, one can claim that they have a set of instructions for interpreting some sensory impression, and then there is the true interpretation of that sensory impression. But how do you, or anyone else, know when your claim represents true knowledge, or the accurate interpretation?
  • A Wittgenstein Commentary
    Yeah, so that's the tinge of solipsism in the Tractatus. It's no big deal if one acknowledges that the world represents logical space, with every person being some point on the origin, perceiving reality relativistically. Wittgenstein doesn't go into detail; but, I assume he would say that some external world exists apart from the one perceived by an observer.Question

    It would be no big deal if he didn't use the qualifier, "my". By using this term he seems to imply that there are other worlds. If there are other worlds, then I would apply the same argument I have made before in regards to there being "other" minds, and that is that there must be some medium that separates these other things, and that medium must be the objective world.

    If solipsism is the case then there is no "my" world. There is simply a world, or the world, that, if there was an external world to this one, then it would be called a "mind". But if there is nothing external to the mind, then there is no mind, only a world.
  • A Wittgenstein Commentary
    What about older insights, scientific or philosophical, that have *not* been rendered obsolete by modern knowledge? Do ideas all come labeled with a expiration date? I would be hard pressed, myself, to think of a single Wittgensteinian insight that has been rendered obsolete by a recent scientific discovery. On the other hand, reading some philosophical musings produced by philosophically illiterate modern scientists, it often seems to me that what they are saying had already been rendered obsolete by Aristotle more than twenty-three centuries ago!Pierre-Normand
    I never said ideas come with an expiration date. That would be committing a genetic fallacy. My point was that old ideas without the new is only telling half the story. We can find what Steven Pinker thinks about W., but we will never know what W. thinks about Pinker. Studying W. without studying Pinker is limiting yourself and prevents you from seeing the bigger picture.

    Since philosophy and science are the same - they are both methods of seeking knowledge AND the conclusions in domain of investigation cannot contradict those found in another - so by sticking to just one means you aren't really seeking truth, you're simply cherry-picking.

    I'd be interested in your examples of "philosophically illiterate modern scientists" whose ideas have been rendered obsolete by Aristotle.
  • Persuasion - Rand and Bernays

    You didn't answer my question.
  • A Wittgenstein Commentary
    "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world."
    -W.

    There is no "my" world. There is the world and the limits of my language mean the limits of me being able to communicate my knowledge and understanding of the world. I can still experience the world without language. The world is still there even if I never learned a language.
  • A Wittgenstein Commentary
    Reading philosophy by dead philosophers that didn't have access to the findings of modern science is like reading a science book written by some dead scientist who didn't have access to the findings of modern science. It's nice if you are interested in a history lesson, but not if you are interested in modern ideas involving modern knowledge.
  • Persuasion - Rand and Bernays
    This and the OP implies that in order to be truly free then we shouldnt interact with anyone ever for fear of being manipulated by others. It would seem to me that you both are unwittingly agreeing with Rand that individual liberty (libertarianism) is more favorable to being a socialist.
  • Persuasion - Rand and Bernays
    The Argument: Persuasion can be a kind of physical force in the Randian sense. Bernays, through persuasion---the manipulation of neurons (unconscious desires)---gets his way, alters the behavior, emotional and ideative patterns of his subjects.

    The manipulation of neurons constitutes a surreptitious use of physical force.
    ZzzoneiroCosm
    This isn't an argument. This is what I call nitpicking. Are we really that bored on this forum?

    It would seem to me that the correlation your are trying to establish falls on it's face when you read the part at the end of your Rand quote:
    ...establishing the principle that if men wish to deal with one another, they may do so only by means of reason: by discussion, persuasion and voluntary, uncoerced agreement.ZzzoneiroCosm
    If someone is unaware of some intent to control them by some other group, does that make their choices voluntary?
  • A Wittgenstein Commentary
    When we talk about knowledge we are talking about language, and how we go about making a claim that we know something. If I say that "I know X," then presumably I have the evidence, or I have good reasons for making the claim to knowledge. However, knowledge by definition is true, as opposed to someone making a claim to knowledge. One's claim can always turn out false, i.e., saying one knows is different from how we define knowledge. We have all experienced making a claim to knowledge, but later we find out that the claim was false.Sam26
    What you seem to be saying is that we never possess knowledge. We only possess claims of knowledge. Does that make any sense? If we don't possess knowledge, then how is it that we are claiming it? If we don't possess knowledge, and never can, then we are misusing the word knowledge when we claim we have it, as knowledge is something unattainable, or imaginary. So, if we don't have knowledge, then what do we have? What is it that makes us claim that we have "knowledge"?

    This is the problem that philosophers have created in defining "knowledge" in such a way that creates these paradoxes. Using your definition, one eventually arrives at the claim, "We can never know anything." As I already stated, this is a contradiction. If we can never know anything, how is it that we know that we can never know anything? and doesn't that contradict the phrase itself?

    I surely know some things. I know that something exists, rather than nothing. I also know that I know this. I also have the experience of knowing something and then realizing that my knowledge was inaccurate. This is easier and less contradictory than defining knowledge as something unattainable or imaginary. It's not that we think we possess knowledge and then find out we don't which ends up relegating "knowledge" into meaninglessness, or nothingness. It is that knowledge is an interpretation, which means that it can be accurate, or inaccurate depending on the relationship between some state-of-affairs and your interpretation of your sensory model of that state-of-affairs.

    There are rules for saying that one "knows," and Wittgenstein shows us in On Certainty how we can unlock the rules by examining the many uses of the word know. Knowing though goes beyond simply sensory information, however, it also includes sensory information. For example, I can know the orange juice is sweet by tasting it, but knowing that triangles have three sides, is something that can be known apart from sensory experience. By definition triangles have three sides. This is not to say that I can't have a sensory experience of a triangle, but that my knowledge of what a triangle is not limited to sensory experience.Sam26
    But I can know the orange juice is sweet by looking at the sugar content on the label of the orange juice carton, or know that orange juice is sweet simply by referring to my memory of tasting it, not by experiencing the sweetness by tasting it now.

    As for triangles, are you saying that you know what a triangle is simply by reading a definition of a triangle and not having ever looked at one? When reading the definition, what are "sides", and what is "three"? You can keep using words to define things, but eventually you have to get at the root sensory experience of seeing a triangle. Words themselves have shape and an audio quality and you must be able to see and hear in order to learn and use language. You must have had some prior experience with words, or triangles, in order to know what they are, and how to use them.
  • Language games
    Easy. To what does "Hello" refer?Banno

    If not all words refer, then meaning cannot be the very same thing as reference. Yes?

    Unless not all words have meaning...


    Which way would you go?
    Banno

    I received many hellos from my co-workers when arriving at work this morning. "Hello" refers to something here. It refers to the act of greeting. So, "Hello" is also a noun that refers to itself - the act of greeting someone.

    Would you consider, "Hello" informative? Are you informed of something when someone says, "Hello"? If you are, then what is it that you are informed of? What does it refer to?

    When saying, "Hello" to someone, the listener understands your intent to greet, so "Hello" refers to your intent as it caused you to say "Hello". Meaning is related to causation.

    It is a fact is that we can misinterpret the meaning of words when spoken or written by someone. This is because we are misinterpreting their intent, not some context the words are spoken or written in. After all, the speaker can get the context wrong too, or may not be a native English speaker. It is what they mean, or intend, that matters. Some are simply better at communicating their intent than others.
  • A Wittgenstein Commentary
    Language games are merely artful ways of using words, but it is also a logical use of words. When we learn things, we establish connections between many concepts that are related. For instance, when we learn about dinosaurs, we learn about how big they were, how they are extinct, and how long ago they lived. So when someone says, "Your computer is a dinosaur.", they are really saying "Your computer is outdated." This is because there is a property of the computer (it's age) that coincides with a concept connected to "dinosaur" in the mind - "ancient". This is why the phrase, "Your computer is a tree.", or "Your computer is water." doesn't make any sense. These phrases aren't any kind of language game. It's just nonsense because there is no property of the computer that is related to some concept connected to the concepts of trees or water - at least not any that are easily observable and understandable by others. Language games are artful ways of using words, but they also mean something about some state-of-affairs independent of the knowledge of these things.

    "Knowledge" is simply some set of instructions for interpreting sensory information. We have all had the experience of believing that we know something and then realize that we didn't know it at all, or were mistaken. "Knowledge" can be wrong. This is because we were using the wrong set of instructions for interpreting some sensory experience. Any explanation of knowledge needs to include how it can be wrong, or inaccurate. It needs to explain how it is that we think we possess knowledge, but sometimes don't. It also needs to explain how every use of our knowledge is what determines whether or not our knowledge is sufficient, and how subsequent uses of our knowledge that allow us to make accurate predictions lends more weight to the accuracy of our knowledge.

    When we acquire knowledge, we are learning. Learning is simply acquiring some set of instructions for interpreting sensory information. When I say that I know how to speak English, I am saying that I have learned the set of instructions for interpreting the visual and audio impressions in a particular way. I don't know how to speak Chinese because I don't have the instructions for interpreting the visual and audio impressions when I see or hear Chinese written or spoken.

    Would W. say that I'm misusing the term, "know"? Why, or why not?
  • A Wittgenstein Commentary
    Are you reading your own thread? I'm responding to the conversation that was happening in this thread, not your constant posting of W.'s writings and your interpretation of them.
  • A Wittgenstein Commentary
    If language doesn't refer to things that are real, or accurate, then how is it that any one can talk about language itself? What does it mean to talk about, or communicate things about, language, like it's rules and symbols? What was W. doing when he talked on and on about language? What was he referring to? What was he getting at?

    It seems that no matter how hard we try, when we use language, we are making some claim about some objective state of affairs in the world. Even saying things like, "We can never know anything." is a claim of some objective state-of-affairs. Even though it contradicts itself and becomes meaningless once you parse it correctly, it is still a claim of some state-of-affairs. It is meaningless because it is a claim of knowledge while claiming at the same time that one has no knowledge.

    Things like this and metaphors are only possible because we have so many different words that share the same meaning, or have some arbitrarily loaded meaning that is created via communicating something other than what is being said. When someone says, "the computer is a dinosaur." Why is it that most adults know what they mean? Would a child know what they mean? If not, then doesn't that mean that the child needs to learn how language is used, and by learning how something is used is learning about how something is. They would be learning something - language - the thing that all the scribbles in this entire thread are referring to - that and some dude with a silly name that begins with the letter W. If not, then who are we referring to, and what did he actually say about what?
  • RIP Hubert Dreyfus
    If representation, or symbolism, isn't the case, then how is it that I have different ways of experiencing the same thing. For instance, I can see that the cookies in the oven are done. I can also smell that they are done and even taste that they are done. Which impression is the right one? They are distinctly different impressions and if they all mean the same thing - that the cookies are done - then how is representation, or symbolism, not taking place?

    How about our own language? How is it that we use symbols to represent other things and there are some that even say we think in our language? If language uses symbols and we think in our language, then we think in symbols.