An odd argument I came across recently:

1. if the universe was temporally infinite, then there would be no 1st moment
2. if there was no 1st moment, then there was no 2nd moment
3. if there was no 2nd moment, then there was no 3rd moment
4. ... and so on and so forth ...
5. ... then there would be no now
6. since now exists, we started out wrong, i.e. the universe is not temporally infinite

EDIT: Post 17 or thereabouts below has an extended rendition of the argument

Sound argument? — jorndoe

It's not sound because if there is no beginning then it would be illogical to count moments. The only thing you could do is start with an arbitrary moment and count from that. There would still be moments.

Appealing to the majority, Mongrel? How... illogical.

The universe itself functions along certain lines - causal and consistent. Our brains (and computers) are simply part of this process. When the same causes lead to the same effects (causal) - always (consistent), then there is no surprise that our minds work the same way as the rest of the universe. Water has a tendency to boil when it reaches a certain temperature. You might say that boiling is a relationship between water and heat. Thinking is a relationship between senses and brains.

What is it that thinks along certain lines? Which comes first, the mind/brain, or the ability to think along certain lines?

The "rules" by which the universe works isn't a priori to the universe itself. It is simply part of what the universe is and trying to sever the action from the thing is the result of the tendency of human minds to compartmentalize everything.

You asked me what form "logic takes." Earnestly, that question was meaningless to me. Weren't you really asking what form my experience takes when I note that I'm being logical?

Surely you aren't proposing that a logical principle is identical to any one experience of its application. One can only accept that at the cost of defying logic. — Mongrel

A "logical principle" is an idea. There are no logical principles outside of our heads. There are processes that are lawful in that they are consistent and causal and it is our minds that categorize these processes under "logical principles". I find that humans are often not logical. They have trouble integrating their beliefs from different domains of knowledge into a consistent whole. Remember what I said about our brains being modular?

What form does your logic take in order for you to know that you are being logical - for you to be able to observe your own mental processes as being logical? — Harry Hindu

I would describe it as processional like a parade or constructive like a building project. Being logical has the character of walking one step after another. Or it's like mortaring bricks where each one is sturdily stacked on the last (which is why I would describe a really solid logical argument as a brick house.) — Mongrel

Notice how you described a logical process visually. Thanks.

I don't understand the question, Harry. Could you explain it to me? — Mongrel

I think you're being purposely obtuse, but I'll ask it a different way.

How do you know when you performing logic? Don't you have to have an experience of performing logically to know you are being logical?

You know you are observing an apple when your experience takes a certain form (visual, olfactory, tactile, gustatory). What form does your logic take in order for you to know that you are being logical - for you to be able to observe your own mental processes as being logical?

Principles are expressed by utterances of sentences. One is free to take it on faith that a particular expression is understood in the same way by two different people. Question is: can you prove it? — Mongrel

Well, I guess you disproved it here, when you didn't understand what I was talking about:

Sorry, can't help you Harry. I don't know what the hell you're talking about. — Mongrel

What form does logic take?

If you and others in this thread weren't denying this then what were we even at odds with as my point was that thoughts and reasoning take the form of sights, sounds, etc.?

It seems logical to conclude that natural selection would favor organisms that can change their behaviors on the fly because the environment is dynamic. Some aspects of the environment are stable, which natural selection would then favor instinctive behaviors for these situations. When most, if not all, the edible things in your environment are colored red, then it would become instinctive to eat red things. But in a more dynamic environment then it would be logical to be able to adapt to changing conditions.

One way of ensuring that instincts don't get you into trouble in a changing environment would be to learn what behaviors are better in certain situations. This is what experience is. It would be best to start of with a blank slate and then learn what the current conditions are in your environment, and what you learn about the environment becomes the norm for you.

We see how humans can be born into virtually any environment or culture and adopt that environment or culture as the norm. The norm for every human born is that every environment can be different for each one.

To be highly adaptable to any environment would provide a benefit to that organism, but to be highly adaptable means that you shouldn't have any, or have a very limited, number of assumptions, or built-in knowledge, in order for you to learn the conditions as they are now and as they change. Innate knowledge in these circumstances would include instinctive behaviors like how to breath, which works in a stable oxygen-rich environment that doesn't change. Human newborns don't even seem to know that they have limbs and how to use them but discover this knowledge through experience. So it would seem to me that acquiring knowledge through experience trumps innate knowledge because the environment is inherently dynamic.

Again, I ask: What form does your reasoning take? You simply can't omit the fact that symbols are required for logic. How would you even know that you are reasoning if you aren't processing sensory symbols?

It's like saying you can boil water without any water. It's like saying the process of boiling exists a priori to some thing with the capacity to be boiled. It makes no sense. One cannot exist without the other. To even say you are being rational or logical is to say that you are processing information in some way. To separate the process from what is being processed makes no sense.

Point is that you must have had confidence in basic principles of reasoning in order to accept evolution. Therefore it doesn't make sense to say that observation of the ways of evolution provides you with that confidence. — Mongrel

And my point is that you must have had some sensory experience in order to reason. If you didn't then what form does your reasoning take? What is it that you would reason about?

As I have said before (I find myself repeating myself here to both you and Wayfarer), both sensory symbols and the process that manipulates them are both inherent in the mind. You cannot have one without the other and still have a mind.

I took issue with intitial statement 'every idea is composed of some sensory impression'. I gave mathematics as an example but there are many others - see this. — Wayfarer

We've already been over this, Wayfarer. Several others mentioned mathematics also which I already showed that you need a visual experience of symbols, like numbers, to do math. Try doing math without having seen any numbers, or a number of things, to then add, subtract, multiply, and divide. How would you know to perform these operations without seeing symbols like +, -, *, and /?

If there are many more examples then why don' you provide them. People have already tried to use math as a means of debunking my explanation and they failed.

Right! 'Darwin says', so it must be true! Alfred Russel Wallace, co-discoverer of the principle of natural selection, never accepted that h. sapiens intellectual abilities could be explained by Darwinian principles. — Wayfarer

I could say the same thing about what you said about Plato. - "Right, 'Plato says', so it must be true.

The difference between Darwin and Plato is that Darwin's theories are falsifiable (remember what I was talking about in regards to Occam's Razor?) and have been tested and still hold true. The field of genetics reinforces the theories of Darwin.

The difference between Darwin and Wallace is that Darwin put more work into his theories. We also have this modern field of science called evolutionary psychology which has provided more insight into how our minds evolved and why they are structured the way they are presently. It seems obvious to me that natural selection shapes my mind presently as I learn new things - adopting new ideas that seem to hold true and allows me to make accurate predictions, and those that I drop when I learn that they don't - kind of like how genetic information is either kept as part of the gene pool or dies out as a result of not being compatible with the environment.

Because evolution by natural selection isn't inconsistent, biased "selection". It is simply a process that engineers organisms to master changing environments, like cockroaches and human beings. The most successful organisms are the ones that have spread to virtually every corner of the globe - to every diverse environment. You owe your existence and your ability to think abstractly and about the future, which are all ideas composed of sensory symbols, to this natural process.

Our justice system seems to have confidence in our senses and minds as eye-witnesses to crimes are often the deciding factor in determining the innocence and guilt of others.

If your only argument is that my explanation is to simple then I take that as a compliment. — Harry Hindu


OK then, I meant 'simplistic'. — Wayfarer

Ok then point out what my explanation doesn't explain. What is missing? Isn't it simply the fact that most people have an emotional investment in their own experiences and minds - as if they are all-important, eternal, etc. and that is why they make this so needlessly complex - in order to evade any emotionless explanation that doesn't put their mind up on some pedestal? Like I said, "For every explanation of some phenomenon, there could be a large number of possible and more complex alternatives because one can always burden failing explanations with ad hoc hypotheses to prevent them from being falsified."

I'm not familiar with modularity in brains. — Mongrel

Then you're not familiar with modern theories in neuro science and psychology.

We can tell that math isn't straightforwardly innate because there wouldn't be any such thing as a math class if that was true. That's one prong of Locke's attack. The other prong is to say that if Leibniz (and others) are saying that humans have a potential to acquire knowledge, then the thesis is trivially true.

Leibniz says it's something else. He uses the tabula rasa image, but says we should imagine it as marble with streaks running through it. Any statue can be cut from plain marble, but the streaky kind will reduce the number of possible outcomes... in like manner, the mind has an innate tendency to think along certain lines.

But do the streaks lean us toward the truth? Descartes says we can rely on that because of God's benevolence. For Leibniz, it's more that the human mind is a reflection of the divine mind. — Mongrel

Exactly - just as the number and kinds of sensory devices you have reduce the number of possible outcomes in your mind and create an innate tendency to think in sensory impressions (symbols). Do the symbols lean us toward the truth? Darwin says we an rely on that because of natural selection also fine-tuning the mind to interpret these symbols in ways that allow the organism to survive and procreate in a dynamic environment.

So it is the case that we are born as individuals who are raised and shaped by society/culture/linguistic input (that itself originates from historical development/established norms and institutions). Humans, for the most part, need society to thrive. Let us say there are two main responses to this:

1.) The responsibility to work with the established group norms, institutions, and settings are foisted upon the individual, and thus, one has been forced into the situation. Though one may feel a personal obligation out of enculturated habits and personal preferences it is not anything more than an individual preference or habit of thinking.

2.) The responsibility to work with the established group norms, institutions, and settings are foisted upon the individual, and thus, even if one is forced into the situation, since the group shaped/shapes the individual, and the group, by-and-large, is also part of the reason the individual can survive and thrive, the person should feel a sense of duty to the established group.

Which is closer to the more accurate view? — schopenhauer1

Well, we know that there are hermits which distance themselves from society. They take no part in it and seem to be able to take care of themselves and survive for a long time. But does the hermit live a happier, healthier life than a non-hermit? I would say that the hermit is probably happier not interacting with others or else he wouldn't be a hermit. In order to be healthier would mean that the hermit would need access to medical care when needed. No human body stays healthy and life in the wild is more harsh than life in the concrete jungle. Humans who live in a society live longer than those that don't. So, the hermit would probably be healthier if they were part of a society.

The final problem is that people need other people in order to procreate and continue the existence of the species. Hermits can't pass down their genetic information to subsequent generations, so in the long run, the hermit ceases to exist within the gene pool, or the hermit ceases to be represented in society over the long term if during it's life it never made copies of it's genes. All animals must be social to the extent that they procreate, which is a social interaction. You need two to tango.

Philosophically speaking, what do bear attacks, anatomy, chemistry, physics, office work, aliens, foraging societies, and technology have in common? — schopenhauer1

They are all strings of symbols that refer to (mean) something other than the symbols themselves. What they refer to is some external process to the mind. The organization of the symbols and the establishment of the correlation of the symbols to their external process is a process of the mind.

Why should I be honest? Everybody lies, and people who lie are usually better at getting what they want. Wouldn't it be more logical from an evolutionary standpoint to be a liar? — MonfortS26

That all depends on the social environment one finds oneself in. People who lie and don't get caught can usually get what they want, but it's that part about getting caught that can throw a wrench into things.

In a small group of social beings with long memories and with minds that provide enough detail of others to be able to distinguish them apart, being caught means you run the risk of retaliation of some sort. And when the victim can share their experience with others, others will distrust you and refuse to interact with you in any meaningful way thereby thwarting any easy chance to find a new victim and running the chance of being cut off by the group.

In large groups of social beings, where a victim will probably never see the cheat again, or doesn't recognize them, cheats have a higher chance of not getting caught and not be on the receiving end of any retaliation. When the victim has no way of retaliating or doesn't rat out the cheat, then others will fall victim to the same cheat. The saying, "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." seems to be appropriate.

Consciousness is always of something. It isn't clear that all thought and ideation are necessarily conscious. I think nativism is counting on the existence of unconscious ideas. If such a thing exists, how does that work? — Mongrel

How do we know that these other ideas are "unconscious"? Our brains are modular and we could have several different parts forming different concepts with different data.

It doesn't matter what form thoughts and ideas take - only that they have form. What matters is what they represent (the of) and we can have different forms represent the same thing. 2 + 2 = 4 AND two plus two equals four are written in different symbols but mean the same thing. I experience a 475 wavelength of EM energy as the color blue. Some other system could represent it differently, but we are both representing the same thing and can therefore talk about the same thing and have ideas about the same thing even though our thoughts would take a different form. In order for information to be processed you need the information to take some form.

Just as sensations and the ability to organize them are inherent features of the mind, so is attention. The attention is what directs the organizing of sensations and does so for some purpose, or goal, which also seems inherent in the mind. It's not the different forms information takes that distinguishes one process being conscious and another as unconscious, it is the presence of goals and a focus of attention - or the amplification of certain signals over others - that distinguishes one system as conscious and another as not conscious. The presence of attention is what seems to create this cartesian theater, as the attention "observes" this information architecture made up of sensory symbols, which is better than looking at the information that just one sense provides at a time. This information architecture provides real-time information from all the senses at once, which provides more detail and allows the organism to fine-tune their behaviors. Human consciousness seems to allow us to fine-tune our instinctive behaviors which can often lead to to trouble in complex social environments.

Basically your post says 'hey, all we need to do is define 'ideas' and 'knowledge'! - and then you proceed to do that, as if you can compose a forum post, and basically wrap up the entire curriculum of philosophy. They're deep issues - Plato's dialogue on the nature of knowledge presents various definitions but ultimately leaves it an open question. — Wayfarer

No. That's not all my post says. Defining these terms would certainly be a starting point and would build a good foundation for what we are talking about. If you have better definitions then by all means, provide them instead of just putting words in my mouth.

If your only argument is that my explanation is to simple then I take that as a compliment. For every explanation of some phenomenon, there could be a large number of possible and more complex alternatives because one can always burden failing explanations with ad hoc hypotheses to prevent them from being falsified (Occam's Razor). Plato didn't have access to the information we have today. We've come a long way since Plato.

I'm not 'conflating' anything. Without the ability to organise sensations, then what kind of ideas could you form of anything? It's not simply a question of 'recieving sensations' and 'learning by experience' - the mind has innate abilities and capacities of many kinds, which constitute ideas. Now, whether that means that we're born with ideas, is another question, but what I am arguing is that we are not born 'tabula rasa', as Locke says, and we don't accumulate knowledge solely through experience or sensory impressions. — Wayfarer

I'm not disagreeing that the ability to organize sensations isn't less inherent in the nature of the mind than the sensations themselves. Without either there would be no mind. It would be like saying you could boil water without any water.

We really need to nail down a consistent definition for ideas and knowledge. I define knowledge as instructions for interpreting symbols. I know how to tie my shoes and speak English. I follow specific instructions stored in my long term memory to tie my shoes and speak English. The instructions are composed of sensory impressions (symbols) in a certain order that I try to repeat. I acquired these sets of instructions through numerous previous experiences, with each one adding new instructions to improve efficiency. My mind instinctively organizes these experiences for a purpose - to improve my efficiency in functioning in the environment.

Ideas are simply manipulated sensory symbols for some purpose - usually to improve my efficiency in functioning in the environment. I could say that the organization of sensations itself is an experience. I can reflect upon my own mental activity, which is one of the distinctions between humans and most other animals. Acquiring new knowledge through the organization of sensations itself is an experience because of this self-reflective perspective we have. We seem to be able to observe our mental activity, which is just the manipulation of sensory symbols, and form ideas and derive new knowledge from that.

You're conflating the process of organizing sensations with the sensations themselves. You must have something to organize - sensory symbols. You must have some form to your thoughts an ideas that is different than the process itself of thinking - of manipulating those symbols for some purpose.

I don't believe the mind to be a mirror of the world. Our minds are limited and skewed representations of the world.

But God is not visible to the eyes, and the thought of God is not a composite of elements taken from the visible world, so your assertion seems to contradict itself. — John

But the "effects" of God are visible to the eyes. The effect (like your existence) is what needs to be explained and your mind seeks explanations for virtually every thing experienced. Declaring God not to be visible to the eyes is just and assertion made by believers to make their God unassailable by science. I don't understand how anything that you know or think of isn't a composite of elements taken from the senses. If God isn't a composite of elements taken from the senses, then what is it and how do you know it even exists?

There have been notable blind mathematicians. In fact last time this came up, I think I discovered some notable deaf-mute mathematicians. But regardless, your depiction of what constitutes knowledge is so simplistic, that it is barely worth debating. — Wayfarer

Are you saying that these blind and deaf mathematicians were born knowing mathematics, or were they taught it? If the latter then how did they learn it - if not by using their available senses? Braille and sign-language are just different forms of language using different symbols for different senses.

Isn't making things more simple to goal rather than making it more complicated?

That is a good example, but then you could have picked just about any concept in science or mathematics. — tom

Try doing either without any senses.

Where did the idea of God come from then? — John

Primarily from our sense of vision. Our sense of vision provides us with the most information about the environment than any of our other senses. We are visual creatures and mostly visual thinkers. How could you ever arrive at the idea of God if you haven't first experienced a world for God to create to then declare that God exists? How does one transmit the idea of God if not through speech or pictures?

And what sensory experience leads you to posit the square root of -1, pray tell! — Barry Etheridge

My sense of vision. Could you do math without visual symbols - like numbers? Math is just another form of language. Notice how you had to put up visual symbols just to declare a math problem. Try solving that problem without ever having seen these symbols, or taught how to solve it.

Do you believe in such a thing as an innate idea? Or are ideas always built up from experience?

Leibniz believed that principles of math are a clue. Though he granted that knowledge starts with the senses, he didn't believe that's enough. He pointed to the expectation one has that a principle is universally true. Instances of sensory experience can't account for that kind of expectation. — Mongrel

What is an idea?

Every idea is composed of some sensory impression. We think in colors, shapes, sounds (language is just colored shapes and sounds), smells, tastes and tactile sensations. In order to have an idea, you must first had a sensory impression to compose that idea with.

Does it make sense to assign a (universal, not personal) "meaning" to "life"? Or has the question always been a category error? — hypericin

Well, that depends on how you define, "meaning". Some have already claimed that "meaning" refers to some end goal. The problem with this is that one can fail at achieving a goal, so the end goal can't be the cause of life as it exists. If it were, then all goals would be achieved. Also, there is no end goal for the universe, or life in it. Goals only exist in minds which places value on everything in how it helps or hinders achieving one's goals. Values are derived from the present goal. Does the universe have a value system based on some goal?

"Meaning" is related to causation. When we ask what something means, we are asking how it came to be, or what the causes of the effect (life) are, or how words relate to the concepts in someone's mind that they are trying to communicate (what someone means by what they say or write).

Evolution by natural selection has showed us that the meaning of life is simply to procreate genes - to exist through time by passing genetic information to subsequent generations. The meaning of organisms isn't to reproduce other organisms, but to reproduce genes and organisms are just temporary carriers of this genetic information.

The curious case of the robot and the scientist.

Consider a faulty scientist and a faulty robot. The scientist is an expert in light, but was born with a rare condition affecting her optic nerve, that makes it unable to transmit blue light signals. The robot has a loose wire, so it too is unable to transmit blue light signals from its camera. The scientist is fixed by a doctor, and the robot is fixed by an engineer.

So, what has changed? Both the robot and the scientist can now recognise blue and are able to use that recognition to perform certain tasks. Both the robot and scientist experience blue.

But, only the scientist now *knows* what it is like to experience blue, the robot does not. There are also a couple of curious aspects of this experience that she notices - she, despite her extensive knowledge, could not predict what the experience was going to be like, and she can't describe it either.

Only the scientist possesses the quale of blue.

It seems a bit easy just to deny qualia exist, rather than recognise there is a potentially deep philosophical problem to solve. — tom

Why would the robot need to experience blue in order to know what blue represents? Why couldn't it represent a 475nm wavelength of EM energy with some other symbol in it's memory and still "know" what the scientists "knows"?

We don't have qualia just to have qualia. Qualia inform us of some state-of-affairs outside of our minds. If a banana is yellow, it is ripe and ready to eat. If it is black it is rotten and not good to eat. When you say "The banana is yellow", aren't you really meaning that the banana is ripe? If the robot were to bypass it's qualia and just say, "the banana is ripe". How is that any different? Both the scientist and robot know the banana is ripe. Why would the robot need to experience yellow to know the banana is ripe? Knowledge needs to be redefined to take into account the fact that information is stored (long term memory like a hard drive) and can be accessed when similar information arrives in working memory (short term memory like RAM) in order to interpret the information in working memory. Knowing is simply the ability to interpret some bit of information using stored memory. This why I can say that "I know how to tie my shoes" even when I'm not tying my shoes, nor accessing memory with instructions on how to tie my shoes. I know how to tie my shoes even when I'm sleeping because the instructions are stored in my long term memory.

But where is the "terminus"? Both robot and scientist are being affected by blue light - i.e. some atoms are being affected.

We know, via computational universality, that consciousness *cannot* be a peculiarity of an exact state of matter.

Also, depending on how you define consciousness, there exist conscious entities that don't possess qualia - e.g. all non-human animals.

The fact remains that qualia are unpredictable and indescribable - very odd indeed! — tom

I think it is anthropomorphic to claim that all non-human animals don't possess consciousness to some degree. When we share nearly 99% of our genes with chimps, what is it about that 1% that prevents the chimp from having consciousness? How do you explain how a chimp can know that when another chimp is staring in another direction, then they look in that direction too. This must mean that they can model other chimps' mental activity - that they know that other chimps have access to information that they might not until they look in the same direction.

To me, all animals with central nervous systems have consciousness to some degree. The brain is the central location where all sensory input coalesces into a whole experience of visuals, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations at once. This provides a benefit to organisms who have this system because it allows you to compare the information from one sense to another in real time. You can discern more detail about things, and make less mistakes, with more senses accessing it. When you see someone from behind and you mistake them for someone you know until you hear them speak, is an example. The key difference between humans and other animals is that humans seem to have acquired this mental ability to turn their mental processing back on itself - of thinking about thinking - of thinking about themselves doing the thinking - to reflect on the process itself rather than just be the process.

Uhh? Duh! — tom

Exactly.

So, in order to single out one of those (philosophical) theories from all the rest and make it valid, you'd need to perform testing and falsifying that it passes. Philosophy goes nowhere without science.

Really? So how would you set about testing and falsifying a philosophical theory? — tom

Uhh. By using science. Duh!

Which philosophical theory that hasn't been tested is better than any that also hasn't been tested? Which one would you say is more valid?

Ironic. Trump claims the elections are rigged (against him) but it is the fact that they are rigged (to sustain a two party system) that has allowed someone so despised as he to have any chance at all of winning the presidency. As many of his voters will be voting against the other (also widely despised) candidate as for his candidacy. It's doubly ironic that most of the rigging is on the conservative side in working to deny likely Democrat voters their suffrage. But this is like Trump's complaints against the media - what he rails against is very often what has got him where he is. — Baden

The Democrats have done more to deny their own voters a voice by what they did to Bernie.

I agree that the elections are rigged to sustain a two party system. Obama has said that America needs a Republican, or opposition party, but this is only so that they can blame the opposition party for everything and anything - to divert blame and attention from one to the other. The whole point is to divide us and make us fight and blame each other instead of the whole system. People will still go and vote for Trump or Hillary - as if they are the only choices.

If you have a good idea as to how to make sure voters are authenticated so that they can't vote more than once, then I'm all ears. I don't see what the big fuss is about in making people identify themselves before voting. Why participate at all if there is no faith in the system?

Philosophy is a science. The conclusions of one branch of investigation of reality must not contradict those of another. All knowledge must be integrated.

Both science and philosophy identify and integrate sensory evidence. Both have a need to "make sense of all those facts". They are both based on observation and logic. The act of looking under a rock or into a telescope are scientific acts. So is the act of observing and thinking about your own mental processes.

They are both the same in that they both gather knowledge through observation and then classify this knowledge, and through classification, elaborate general principles or ideas. Science is simply organized knowledge.

No, in your first post you said "To me, the world is all that is" and "If someone claims that the world isn't all there is, I would make the claim that they are misusing terms."

You're saying that it's wrong for someone to use the word "world" to refer to something other than "everything that exists". I'm asking you to defend this assertion. — Michael

...and in my next post, I admitted that people can use the term, "world" to mean/refer to different things. When are you going to get over something I said before and then corrected myself in my next post and start defining what you mean when you use the term, "meaning", so we can then get on with the discussion?

As I have tried to show you before "meaning" is what words refer to.

"The President of the United States" and "the husband of Michelle Obama" mean different things even though they refer to the same person.

And to bring up an earlier example, "human" and "intelligent species" mean different things even though they refer to the same things (assuming no extraterrestrial life for the sake of argument).

Although I don't see how this is relevant to this discussion. — Michael

You keep bringing it up. I'm trying to get you to understand the point I was making in the actual thing that people refer to when they use some term to refer the entirety of what exists. Who cares what symbols people use to refer to it?

If there is a causal relationship between some "world" and another "world" then logically, "world" doesn't refer to the entirety of existence. They must use some other string of symbols to refer to the entirety of existence.

↪Harry Hindu
science is in no way related to religion. They are different methods of seeking truth. One is based on authority and tradition, while the other is based on experiment and observation by your peers.

I know all of that. However, science is now normative, with respect to what ought to be believed, in the way that religion once was. It takes itself as the 'arbiter of reality'. — Wayfarer

Religion is subjective which includes seeking truth through faith and revelation. Science is objective, making use of methods of investigation and proof that are impartial and exacting. Theories are constructed and then tested by experiment. If the results are repeatable and cannot be falsified in any way, they survive. If not, they are discarded. The rules are rigidly applied. The standards by which science judges its work are universal. There can be no special pleading in the search for the truth: the aim is simply to discover how nature works and to use that information to enhance our intellectual and physical lives. The logic that directs the search is rational and ineluctable at all times and in all circumstances. This quality of science transcends the differences which in other fields of endeavor make one period incommensurate with another, or one cultural expression untranslatable in another context. Science knows no contextual limitations. It merely seeks the truth. Combustion works in every part of the world, in every culture, in every time. The same cannot be said about the "discoveries" of religious revelation.

Try having several of your peers test the "truths" you find through revelation and question you on how you arrived at your conclusion. You'd be offended because your experience of revelation isn't to be questioned and it's subjective - not prone to be tested by others. It is taken at face value based on your already preconceived notion that spirits and a spirit world exists.

Science can't be normative for most people are religious which makes religion the norm, not science. When I was religious and questioned the validity of my beliefs - that wasn't being normal. I was going against the grain.

Are you seriously suggesting that there is as clear a dichotomy as that? There is no part of science based on authority and tradition? No part of religion based on experiment and observation by peers? I'm sure it is very comforting to live in this black and white world of yours but it is clearly a delusion. — Barry Etheridge

To make such claims about science without any examples severely dilutes your argument.

And the point I was making is that some people don't use the word "world" to refer to all there is. Plato distinguished between the world of substance and the world of Forms. The religious distinguish between the world and heaven.

The thing I took issue with was your claim that "If someone claims that the world isn't all there is, I would make the claim that they are misusing terms". You're saying that it's wrong to not use the word "world" to refer to all this is. This assertion needs to be defended. — Michael

Re-read my post. I acknowledged that people may use different terms for "everything that exists". As I have tried to show you before "meaning" is what words refer to. You refused to define, "meaning". The OP was particular about the word, "world", and the way it was used - "of the world" - which I took to mean "everything". In my first post I pointed out the inconsistency of someone who means/refers to "everything that exists" when they say, "world". If that isn't what they mean/refer to, then there isn't an inconsistency, but they would still need a term that means/refers to "everything that exists". We could use universe, multi-verse, reality, etc. Take your pick. It's not the word you use, it's what you are referring to when you use the word.

To me, the world is all that is — Harry Hindu


Carl Sagan's well-known saying is 'cosmos is all there is, or ever will be'.

I think this type of philosophical naturalism has transposed the Cosmos into the place formerly assigned to God, and assigns science the role previously assigned to religion. Of course that's a lot to say in a short sentence, but there are numerous historical studies which make the case in detail; a notable example being M A Gillespie's The Theological Origins of Modernity. — Wayfarer

Sigh...

No, Wayfarer, science is in no way related to religion. They are different methods of seeking truth. One is based on authority and tradition, while the other is based on experiment and observation by your peers.

People sometimes use the word "world" in a restricted sense. Plato distinguished between the world of substance and the world of the Forms. The religious distinguish the world from heaven (and other afterlives).

To make a case that they're misusing the word "world" you'd first have to justify your claim that what you mean by it is the correct meaning.

And, you know, the word is also used to refer to just the Earth (and everything on it), but I guess we're ignoring that meaning? — Michael

Yes, Earth is another meaning of "world" and many people can mean/refer to different things with a word that has a fluid meaning. But then fluid meanings of words just makes it harder to understand what someone is talking about or specifically referring to.

My point in my post that you are responding to is that whatever term you want to use to refer to everything, must include these other domains that have a causal relationship with each other. If they can affect each other, then there is no difference between that domain vs. this domain, and our solar system (a domain) and another solar system (another domain). They all exist within the same whole and can affect each other given enough time.

To claim that there are separate worlds, realities, or whatever, yet claim that these "separate" things have a cause and effect relationship is to be inconsistent in your use of terms, if by what you refer to when you say "reality" or "world" is "all there is".

Thanks, Harry. This word domain can sometimes stand for a subsidiary zone and might be useful to me. I don't claim that the world isn't all there is, myself. I just allege we don't even need to ask and answer that sort of question to get on with our scientific enquiries, our art and our lives. — mcdoodle

But we do need to ask the question because if other domains have a causal relationship with our domain, then there are effects here in this domain caused by changes in the other domain(s). If there are any causal relationships between domains, then they are all integrated into one whole and it is the whole that science seeks to explain.

Here's an innocuous phrase I'm suddenly having tremendous difficulty with. 'Of the world'. Why do we use it so much? What are its bounds? — mcdoodle

To me, the world is all that is - the objective reality, which includes subjective perspectives of it. It is everything. So for someone to say the phrase, "Of the world" I take to mean that some thing is part of the world. This would also imply, to me, that they believe in things NOT of this world. For what would be the purpose of claiming that something is of the world IF the world is all there is because it would be logically deductive that all things are of this world, and therefore redundant to say this.

If someone claims that the world isn't all there is, I would make the claim that they are misusing terms. The world is all there is, which includes their area of time and space that they claim isn't part of the world, especially if this other domain, not some other world, has a causal effect on the "world".