Again, my point is the idea of forcing pain on someone else for one's own benefit of alleviating pain is not a good one. — schopenhauer1

I’m not arguing with this, I’m interested to see what you think about harming X in order to reduce Y’s harm. Or, Harming X in order to prevent future harm for X.

Slightly changing your above quote illustrates my point:

The idea of forcing pain on someone else (by convincing them, or somehow preventing them from procreating) for one’s own (or someone else’s) benefit (the unborn child’s) of alleviating (or preventing) pain is not a good one.

Do you agree with that statement? Why, or why not?

Apart from this, I’m claiming that attempting in any way to alter someone else’s behavior for your benefit is treating them as a means to an end. Promoting antinatalism does this, and thereby violates your claim that it is wrong to treat people in such a way. Therefore, promoting antinatalism is immoral. As a hint, the out here is to concede that the statement “it is wrong to treat people as a means to an end” is not absolute; it’s relative.

Nah I don't think this follows. Just because someone is doing something bad does not mean I have any moral duty to get involved to stop them. I didn't ask to be here, and I hate cleaning up messes other people make. I have enough to worry about in my own life, so I mind my own business and let others do their thing. — darthbarracuda

Allowing bad acts to occur when you could have prevented it is morally judged as what in your opinion? Good, bad, or neutral? It seems to me that the point of morality is to either create “good” or reduce “bad,” or both whenever reasonably possible. It is good to do good actions, and bad to do bad ones. At the very least it is good to prevent bad actions from occurring. Since that act is good, and it is good to do good things, you should do it whenever reasonably possible.

But surely I am justified in trying to convince people that doing something is wrong, if I believe it is wrong? — darthbarracuda

Sure, but you have to admit that doing so is attempting to use them as a means to your end. You’re trying to get them to change their behavior so that it suits you and what you think is right or good.

Not having a child involves the certainty that the person will not suffer, and the uncertainty that...? — darthbarracuda

Not having a child involves the certainty that some will suffer as a result. The uncertainty is the amount of good the unborn person would have brought into the world. To be clear, I’m treating this as if it were a universal principle that could not be violated. If you personally don’t want children, that’s fine. I’m not going to convince you that you should. The issue is if you try to convince others they should not. Even worse would be acting in such a way that people were forced to not procreate, or punished for doing so. Which I don’t think anyone here has advocated for, but it seems a logical conclusion to me. If procreating is bad, then one should prevent it whenever possible. Just like if murder is bad, one should prevent it whenever possible.

Fine. But the unborn child’s “protection” from harm is also predicated on the harm of others. As a third party, you must at least allow the harm of others (those who desire children, grandchildren, siblings, etc.) to continue, and perhaps at times directly cause their harm so that the unborn child is protected at all costs. The point being that Antinatalism’s conclusion isn’t a “win-win” situation. New harm will be introduced in the world regardless. The only difference is who is experiencing it, and possibly the extent/severity of it.

And again, unnecessary suffering (for someone else). — schopenhauer1

What types of suffering are necessary?

Was it necessary for her to not get harmed further or are you causing the very harm in the first place because you enjoy it? — schopenhauer1

Explain what you mean by necessary. It was necessary to stop her in order to prevent her from being injured, and the harm I caused is less than what would have occurred. I suppose you could say that I enjoyed keeping her safe, but relieved would be a better term.

No it isn't. Straw man. This actually has only surface similarities at best. The trolley problem is picking between two bad alternatives to other people. This is about creating all instances of future suffering for someone else to alleviate one instance of suffering of oneself. — schopenhauer1

In my example, you are a third party whose action affects the suffering of other people. You can either treat the couple (which will enable them to give birth and reduce their suffering), or you can refuse to treat them and prevent the suffering of the unborn child.

Again, it's to alter their behavior to prevent other people's suffering. Just like the person who likes to blow up stuff in residential neighbhorhods who gets joy from it, should alter their behavior... — schopenhauer1

So in this case it’s ok to treat them as a means to your end?

If someone else is born already and was blatently going to get harmed, and you were trying to prevent this, thus causing slight harm... vaccines, pushing someone out of a moving train, educating one's offspring, not neglecting them, that sort of thing. — schopenhauer1

So necessary suffering is suffering that is caused in order to prevent or reduce greater suffering?

Don't understand this argument — schopenhauer1

The argument is that some suffering leads to pleasure, happiness, etc. Suffering can be a means to an end that is regarded as positive. So why focus on eliminating all suffering, and not just suffering that has strictly negative outcomes? You argue that it is best to not procreate because it prevents all suffering (not just unnecessary suffering) for the unborn person. So in this case, you judge allowing suffering of any kind to be impermissible. Yet in other cases, you seem to judge certain types of suffering (those you deem as necessary) as permissible.

That implied, the small harm to oneself to prevent others harm.. affecting others.. — schopenhauer1

This is where you’re misunderstanding me. Let’s say someone will continue to suffer if they do not receive a shot. The issue is if your position is that you should always prevent suffering if possible, you cannot give the person the shot, as it will cause suffering. You are intentionally harming another person, perhaps even against their will.

Again, other people's suffering is not a means to your end.. If someone likes blowing up stuff in residential neighborhoods but is prevented from doing so, and cries about it, tough shit. — schopenhauer1

This is inconsistent. You aren’t considering the bomber’s suffering, and are intentionally causing him to suffer to further your end of preventing the suffering of others. His suffering is a means to your end. What is the difference in causing his suffering and telling him to deal with it, and causing suffering by procreating and telling the child to deal with it? I would also add that it is very likely that at some point in the child’s life he will prevent the suffering of another human being. To what extent, however, is unknown.

You can’t experience pleasure if you’re dead. Suicide reduces suffering, but can’t increase pleasure.

If we continue to procreate, unethical behavior will continue. The inverse is not true and establishes its persuasive ability. — darthbarracuda

You’re right. I was looking at it from the wrong angle.

Presumably because the potential sufferings of an unborn person can and often does exceed (in great proportion) the potential sufferings of those who do not procreate (because they do not procreate). — darthbarracuda

Maybe, maybe not. Personally, I don’t like strict negative utilitarianism. I’m not so quick to discard pleasure as a factor. So for me, there’s more to consider than just potential suffering. The person being born will experience both (suffering and pleasure), and will cause both to occur in others. There are extreme examples of people who have largely caused others to suffer (Hitler), and those that have largely caused others pleasure or comfort (Mother Teresa). Exactly where the person falls on this scale is too difficult to predict, as is the amount of suffering/pleasure the person will endure throughout their life. The point being that everyone is connected. One unhappy couple can cause more people to be unhappy, etc., etc. At least in principle. So it’s too difficult to know, and I’d rather not base my decisions on such an uncertainty. Especially when the cost is so great.

If someone got pleasure from something that caused someone else known collateral damage (i.e. not intended but known to cause damage), that ain't good. — schopenhauer1

Always? If a nurse takes pleasure in vaccinating people it’s bad?

Forcing collateral harm on others, to alleviate one's own desires is not moral. — schopenhauer1

Forcing my daughter to not jump out the window because I desire her safety is immoral?

This is ridiculous reasoning. — schopenhauer1

Maybe...

Forcing suffering on others to alleviate one's own is not justified, because you don't know the quantity of suffering that will take place. — schopenhauer1

Neither is allowing the continued suffering of two people to spare the suffering of one. It’s just a different version of the trolley problem.

People are not means to your ends. — schopenhauer1

Nor are they means to your end. You desire extinction and are willing to persuade others to alter their behavior to bring about that end at the potential expense of their happiness.

I said unnecessary suffering. Don't straw man. — schopenhauer1

Wasn’t meaning too, but I don’t see the difference. In your view, what types of suffering are necessary?

One can argue, since already born, taking the vaccine is preventing oneself from harming others, besides preventing future harm for oneself. — schopenhauer1

Well then consider foul tasting medicine, or something else that illustrates the point that in certain cases harm/suffering is good, even if it only benefits the person involved.

But certainly, preventing birth, prevents all unnecessary harm from occurring for a future person with no negative consequence to that future person. — schopenhauer1

Right, but there are actual negative consequences for those already born.

Can you give me an example of an altruistic action or deferred gratification action, or any action at all for that matter that isn't predicated on the belief that it will give you pleasure? (Perhaps substitute "pleasure" with "happiness" or "wellbeing" as they mean the same thing here). — Bert Newton

Suicide.

So possible, or potential suffering is worse than actual suffering that is occurring?

Also, part of your critique of procreation is the expectation for the person being born to deal with whatever suffering it may occur. But, in this case at least, you’re doing the exact same thing; expecting those who suffer because they can’t have children to just deal with it.

Anyway, I’m not convinced that preventing potential suffering should take precedence over reducing actual suffering in cases where one has to choose one or the other. One reason being that you can’t assess whether or not the amount of suffering the person being born will experience will be greater than the amount of suffering experienced by the unhappy couple. It seems logical that you should reduce/prevent the greatest amount of suffering possible, and seeing how the unborn person isn’t even experiencing suffering, why not focus on reducing actual suffering that is being experienced?

I’m also not convinced that all suffering is bad and should be eliminated/prevented at all costs. The suffering experienced by receiving a vaccine, for example, pales in comparison to the potential reward. I don’t believe that if everyone lived in a way that they never inflicted harm on anyone else, no matter how great or small, the world would be a better place.

If one can prevent pain for another person when one is able to, that is the correct action. — schopenhauer1

So using fertilization treatment to relieve the suffering of being unable to have children is permissible in your view?

To be an antinatalism you don't have to say that life is mostly suffering, you just have to accept that suffering is all that can be considered, so if ANY is experienced, it would be better never to have been. — JacobPhilosophy

I get it. But if that is the case, how do you explain so many people that judge life to be enjoyable or pleasant? Or, in a word, worth living? I don’t see the logic of trading a life of mostly pleasure/happiness for no life at all.

This is because the absence of that pain is good, and the absence of all the pleasure you may have experienced is not bad, as it is not a deprivation to a potential being, only an existing one. — JacobPhilosophy

But there are existing human beings who are deprived of pleasure by not having a child. If tomorrow we woke up and everyone was sterile, happiness would decrease, and suffering would increase. I get it that the unborn cannot experience pleasure, so no suffering is experienced by them if they are not born. But why should my duty be to the unborn, rather than the living? Why should I be more concerned about the potential suffering an unborn person could experience by being born more than the potential suffering those already born could experience by not procreating? If a couple approaches me and is suffering because they are not able to have children, isn’t the ethical thing to do to try to help alleviate their suffering through some fertilization process if possible? If I am able to prevent suffering of those that are already born, shouldn’t I do so?

Well as I explained, just because a community truly believes they are doing what they believe to be in the best interests of human flourishing, doesn't mean they are right... — Thomas Quine

I would say just because a community truly believes they are doing what they believe to be in the best interests of human flourishing, doesn’t mean they are in fact pursuing human flourishing.

Just as in the natural world, diversity means some paths lead to the flourishing of the species, and some lead to extinction. — Thomas Quine

And it can be said that the paths that led to extinction were paths that did not pursue flourishing.

My next point is that we can actually determine what best serves human flourishing through science and reason. This means if we can agree on the common goal, we have an objective starting point for ethical considerations. — Thomas Quine

Only if you can pin down a more objective definition of flourishing. I’m fine with using population as a metric to assess this, as you suggested, but by doing so you have to agree that intentionally reducing one’s population is not pursuing flourishing. Otherwise, what would the opposite of flourishing consist of?

This would be the argument presented by saying giving birth (avoiding extinction) is the only way to guarantee ethical treatment. — JacobPhilosophy

I’m not really trying to present an argument. Antinatalism being good or bad seems to me to be a matter of opinion. It focuses on reducing harm, but there are other moralities that focus on increasing happiness, pleasure, etc. And as best as I can tell, the reason one chooses to emphasize one or the other is arbitrary, and depends on their own inherent biases and values. I’m just pointing out that the statement “If we continue to procreate ethical actions will also continue” is factually true, as is its inverse. Therefore, both fail to establish much persuasive ability.

We can, however, say that eliminating potential harm is good. — JacobPhilosophy

I’m not as quick to agree with this either, at least not in absolute terms. For example, is it permissible to eliminate harm for one person if doing so also reduces happiness for 10 people? Also, I typically think antinatalists exaggerate suffering/harm. I equate them with intolerable pain, either physical or mental. So I don’t consider being hungry as suffering, at least not until it reaches the person’s subjective threshold for pain.

Yeah, I think I agree, but I’m not sure what point your trying to make.

Well I'd say in regards to life evolving again, that would be beyond ones control. — JacobPhilosophy

Others acting unethically is also beyond one’s control.

Also, it doesn't make sense to say that procreation is the only way to guarantee ethical action, because that is only valuable when there is a being to receive said ethical action. — JacobPhilosophy

But the statement is still true nonetheless, right? If not, how would you answer the question of how to guarantee ethical actions?

I guess technically that’s true, but it seems very unlikely that someone would never exhibit an ethical act. Besides, even if my offspring doesn’t turn out, someone else’s will. If we as a species continue to procreate, we will continue to have ethical (and unethical) practices.

But isn’t it also true that you won’t be around after extinction to know that life will not appear and evolve again, and that those life forms will not act unethically? If you’re looking for 100% guarantees, you’re not going to find any almost 100% if the time. :razz:

Could it be argued that extinction isn't only not unethical, but the only way to guarantee the removal of unethical practices? — JacobPhilosophy

You could just as easily flip this and say that procreation is ethical because it’s the only way to guarantee ethical actions.

I am something other than my experiences? Fancy that. — Pantagruel

Are you still you after you die and cease to experience?

I think population metrics are a better yardstick by which to measure human flourishing, in the same way if we ask whether bison are flourishing in Yellowstone, we don't track the life history of an individual bison. — Thomas Quine

Using this metric, I fail to see how the Shakers flourished... Had they flourished, they would still be around. Instead, they intentionally did the opposite of that; hasten their demise.

Morals are grounded in intuition, and then whatever moral framework we’ve been inculcated with. — praxis

I agree, but could it then be said that our intuition is to flourish? Perhaps the post hoc justification that occurs is just a recognition of this fact?

The Shakers of course saw their truest flourishing to happen after death and their beliefs were meant to lead them to it... — Thomas Quine

Well, I wouldn’t consider simply spending eternity in heaven flourishing. To me flourishing implies advancing, or progressing in some way; not just experiencing pleasure. But regardless, I think using the term in a relative way results in it becoming a meaningless term. If “flourishing” just means whatever a particular person or group thinks it means, then there’s no way to distinguish groups that “flourished” from those that didn’t.

Am I wrong? Can anyone provide an example of a moral precept held by any community past or present who did not come to that position on the belief that it served human flourishing? — Thomas Quine

I think antinatalism fits this. For a particular community, consider the Shakers.

What are your reasons for wanting a philosophy degree? Are you wanting to start a career in the field? Pursuing a degree solely because of the reputation that comes with it seems odd to me. I switched from philosophy to psychology in college, but it was due to more practical reasons (pregnant girlfriend, no job, no “home,” etc.). I only have a B.A., but I can’t say I really regret my choice. I had plans of grad school and becoming a professor, but that wasn’t feasible at the time. I also think that I’ve been able to teach myself somewhat since I was able to take some beginners courses, I minored in philosophy. So personally I’m pretty satisfied that I’m able to both support myself and my family, as well as continue learning philosophy as a sort of hobby.

I don't follow your conclusion. If it's hopeless to try to universally justify our values, doesn't the nihilist escape tension by rejecting universal values? — Adam's Off Ox

I don’t think that the need or desire to justify our values, etc. diminishes simply by believing nihilism. Intellectually, the nihilist is aware of the fact of nihilism, but is utterly unable to make his desire for meaning go away. He will feel and experience meaning in his life regardless, and in contradiction, of his belief in nihilism. This is the cause of his tension. To alleviate it, he will largely ignore his nihilistic belief in practical, everyday life, and continue experiencing meaning and desiring to seek/find/create it.

So the nihilist experiences preferences, which you may call values, without falling back on some rational or logical meaning for those values. — Adam's Off Ox

Yes. I think the values would just be accepted as a sort of natural fact about himself.

You seem to be supporting the nihilist's position. — Adam's Off Ox

Yes. I humorously consider myself a non-practicing nihilist. Which oddly enough is justifiable. The truth of nihilism refutes the notion of truth itself. Therefore, I have no reason to live according to my nihilistic belief. Basically I pretend that all the meaning I experience in life is factual, even though I know it’s fictional. Life is just an elaborate ARG that I choose to participate in.

Largely for the sake of argument I took the position that it was possible to have the concept “me” without necessarily needing the concept “not me.” I gave reasons for taking this position. I have no evidence, so of course the starting place is an assumption, as are most starting places for most arguments.

Prior to this, I questioned the methods used to assess thoughts in the evidence you referenced. You sidestepped the question, and haven’t tried to answer it.

Prior to this, I asked about the necessity of language to have thought after it seemed you asserted that it was necessary. We both asked each other to define “thought” and neither of us complied.

To sum up, and try to get back on topic, I’m mainly interested in learning more about your claim that language is needed in order to have thoughts. I don’t claim to know enough to know whether this claim is accurate or not, but I need something more than just this assertion to figure out whether I agree or not. Maybe this isn’t even what you are claiming, as it seems to hinge on the so far undefined term “thought.” I’m happy to accept however you define the term. After all, it’s your argument.

The intellectually honest nihilist is constantly in tension because he still values things and often has strong attachments while at the same time he rejects the idea of objective value. — BitconnectCarlos

:100:

The outcome of this tension is a life of voluntary deception. It’s hopeless to try to universally logically justify our values, attachments, or actions with any consistency. Logic and emotion are apples and oranges.

Sure. Go ahead and avoid critiquing any arguments I present... :roll:

If you do not communicate with us, what grounds could there be for supposing that you even have thoughts? — Banno

I don’t know what the correct place to start would be. Assume I do because I’m a human, and humans have similar biology and experiences, or that I don’t because I’ve shown no evidence of thought? But my point is that either way all you can do is assume.

The issue here was if someone could have a concept of "me" without a concept of "not me". You've moved to someone with no concepts whatsoever. — Banno

I’ll tentatively say it’s possible. “Me” could represent a set containing parts (hands, heart, feelings, beliefs, etc.) that collectively make up the concept of “me.” I don’t need to know about or have access to anything external. I can simply identify with everything I do have access to.

That’s not what I mean. I mean that you cannot possibly know my thoughts, or lack thereof, unless I communicate them to you, and you cannot infer by my lack of communication that I also lack thought. So how can anyone say that locked-in people, or those not exposed to language, have thoughts or not?

Ok. How are “thoughts” assessed? Being entirely private, it seems that thoughts would be inaccessible to someone that lacks the ability to communicate.

They can debate the validity of assumptions. Nihilism is usually a consequence of debate, or discourse. It is the conclusion that is drawn from the inability to justify any assumptions.

What I don't like about philosophy is that you have to accept certain assumptions that cannot possibly be proven in any manner. — JacobPhilosophy

You don’t have to. Doesn’t Nihilism do precisely this; reject all assumptions?

...and you can do this only because you also have thoughts that are about other stuff. That's how you worked out the difference between "me" and "anything external"; without which, not. — Banno

I’m not sure. Suppose I had been born entirely senseless; without vision, hearing, taste, smelling, or sense of touch. I have no way to consciously experience the external world, but I would still be aware of what is internal; my feelings, needs, etc. and could form thoughts about them. Or could I? Perhaps without sensory experience I would have no feelings, needs, etc.? Am I essentially dead even though my body, or at least my organs, is functioning properly? For some reason I want to say that I could still experience things like fear or sadness, but like I said, I’m not sure.

Agree means sharing a certain belief with others. I would say that there are levels of acceptance. Consider the person who “accepts” a certain law, but nevertheless disagrees with it. On the surface this seems like a contradiction, but it’s not. The person is in agreement that the particular action is illegal, but disagrees that it should be illegal. The disagreement is over the fairness or justness of the law. So these types of examples could be one level of acceptance, whereas examples where there is no disagreement whatsoever would be a different level of acceptance.

Or, if you want to think about it in different terms, it’s possible to accept something cognitively, or intellectually, but not emotionally. I think the death of a loved one is a good example of this. You cognitively know that he or she is dead, and therefore accept that fact, but emotionally may be in denial.

Then you missed the point. Thought needs much more than just a thinker. Think on it a bit. — Banno

I assume you are referring to an external world or objects (things to think about). I was meaning that to be included in “somewhere,” but I’m not entirely convinced of that either. I can have thoughts that are strictly about me and have nothing to do with anything external. Something along the lines “I am me,” a statement about my sense of self, or self-awareness.

I agree that thought requires a subject (the thing thinking/experiencing) that exists, presumably somewhere, presumably physically, if that is what your getting at. I just don’t see where language is necessary for anything other than communicating your thoughts, and feelings, to others.

Actually, it depends on what you mean by thought. :razz:

One can only think because one is already embedded in a world and a language that interprets it. — Banno

Are you suggesting that without language thought is not possible?

Part 1 of the definition is more about agreeing to receive something, such as a gift or award. Part 2 means the same thing, but with ideas, such as accepting the truth of a statement or belief system.