So the ambiguity is with respect to how that person, or anyone else for that matter, knows that this sensation which occurs at a later time is "the sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

How does the person know to write “S” every day for 10 years? Same problem.

Answer the question I put to you:

Should the diarist now [after one year] mark “S” in their diary as per Wittgenstein’s instructions, or does “S” refer only to a single token of the sensation?

You just asked why the person would mark “S” in their diary every day? Because that’s the scenario Wittgenstein describes at 258. What’s ambiguous about that?

I don't know, because as I say, what you call "Wittgenstein's instructions", are ambiguous. Why would the person mark a new "S" every day for ten years, if that time period is only one occurrence of "the sensation"? The person is not keeping track of the temporal duration of "the sensation", only how often "the sensation" occurs. Wouldn't that entire time period just qualify for one S, one occurrence of "the sensation? — Metaphysician Undercover

258. Let’s imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. — LW

Yes, it’s very ambiguous :roll:

You don’t even know what the scenario of 258 says yet you claim to understand it better than all of us. Pull your head in.

The issue is not strictly concerning the word "sensation". The issue is with the particular referent identified as "the sensation", at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover

Luke, my issue has always been with Wittgenstein's use of the word "sensation", in particular, his reference to "the sensation" at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover

Make up your mind.

Our disagreement as to what "the sensation" refers to in this context indicates very clearly that his use is ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me try one last time…

Let’s say that the diarist has a single token of the sensation which lasts for 10 years. The diarist recognises it as the same sensation every day and so they write “S” in their diary every day. After 10 years the diarist does not have any further experience of the sensation until exactly one year later when the diarist recognises the sensation again. Should the diarist now mark “S” in their diary as per Wittgenstein’s instructions, or does “S” refer only to a single token of the sensation?

The issue is not strictly concerning the word "sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

You recently made the issue about the meaning of the word “sensation”, with your claim that its meaning was not only ambiguous but that it could also mean “ambiguous” (as well as “token” and “type”). I’ll take the quote above as your retraction of this foolish claim.

The issue is with the particular referent identified as "the sensation", at 258. This is the thing which the diarist names with "S". — Metaphysician Undercover

I just provided you with a detailed response and reading of 258 here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/617672.

You declined to respond.

And, as you admit we spent two months discussing what was meant by "the sensation" with no agreement. Therefore I can conclude that there is ambiguity here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Our disagreement does not prove that there’s any ambiguity in the text. It only proves that you’re unreasonable and that you have no genuine interest in attempting to understand Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

I already justified my assertion, that the writing is ambiguous — Metaphysician Undercover

Your “justification” was that Wittgenstein uses “sensation” ambiguously to mean either “token”, “type” or “ambiguous”. I have pointed out several times now that it makes no sense for the word “sensation” to mean the same as any of these words, and you have not justified this claim at all. Furthermore, I have just told you again, and you have ignored it again, that the ambiguity lies not in the word “sensation” but in the word “certain”. What we discussed for two months was whether Wittgenstein means a certain type of sensation or a certain token of a sensation. What we did not discuss was the meaning of the word “sensation”. There is ample textual evidence that what Wittgenstein means by “sensation” throughout the text is an “inner experience” such as pain. All that your bare assertions to the contrary constitute are evidence of your profound misunderstanding.

And, I believe that we will never resolve that disagreement because what Wittgenstein wrote actually is ambiguous, as the evidence indicates. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only potential ambiguity here, which I identified from the beginning, was Wittgenstein’s use of the word “certain” in the phrase “a certain sensation”. This could possibly mean either a certain type of sensation or a certain token of a sensation. I have identified for you the textual evidence which proves that a certain type of sensation is the only logically possible meaning.

You erroneously mistook the ambiguity to be located in the word “sensation” instead.

Apparently, you don’t understand the meaning of the word “ambiguous”. You think that the names of colours are ambiguous, but you refuse to explain what you mean by this. Disagree all you want. Your utter failure to grasp the basics of Wittgenstein’s philosophy or to understand even the most basic English words is abundantly clear. I tried to give you guidance in reading the text but you’re arrogant and think you know better. Trust me, you don’t.

Sorry Luke, I will not go back to where we were two months ago — Metaphysician Undercover

You brought it up again. It looks like you've now recognised your mistake in claiming that Wittgenstein uses the word "sensation" ambiguously, too. Good.

Red is a colour. Pink is a colour, so are brown and blue, and many more. The definition is very ambiguous because there are many colours and it provides nothing to distinguish the colour green from the others. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what you mean by "ambiguous" here.

After discussing this issue for a month or two, with no consensus between us, I came to the conclusion that "a certain sensation" is ambiguous. Further, I gave some reasons why I believe that Wittgenstein practiced a technique of creative writing which employs the intentional use of ambiguity.

I thought we were making some progress. But obviously you just want to go back and argue the same thing, all over again, so that we can establish once again, that "sensation" is ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

The meaning of the word "sensation" is not ambiguous. It is the meaning of the word "certain" that is ambiguous. Does he mean a certain type of sensation or a certain instance of a sensation? If you also want to question what the word "sensation" means then that is a different matter.

Take another example: If we were questioning whether he meant a certain type of car or a certain instance of a car, then that is not questioning what the word "car" means. We must already know what the word "car" means in order to discuss whether he is talking about a certain type or a certain instance of a car.

You might have an argument for your interpretation of "type", if Wittgenstein hadn't used the definite article "the", four times at 258, when referring to "the sensation". Do you understand the grammar of this definite article? — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's take a look at what he says at PI 258 then:

To this end I associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. — PI 258

He uses the definite article ("the sensation") here twice, but he is also talking about writing "S" for "every day on which I have the sensation". Therefore, he clearly indicates that it is not a once-off instance of the sensation. If he writes "S" for every day that he has the sensation, then this implies that the diarist has the sensation and writes "S" on more than one occasion. Hence, "S" does not refer only to a once-off instance of the sensation.

But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation — and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. — PI 258

Well, that is done precisely by concentrating my attention; for in this way I commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation. — PI 258

These third and fourth times that Wittgenstein uses the definite article is to discuss how the diarist is supposed to define the sign "S", or to link the sign with the sensation. We can imagine that the definition of "S" is established on the first occasion of having the sensation and committed to memory, so that on the next day that the sensation occurs, the diarist recognises it as such and writes "S" again. Again, this suggests that the diarising occurs on more than one occasion. Otherwise, there would be no point in committing to memory the link between the sign and the sensation.

But “I commit it to memory” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. — PI 258

I said very early on in the discussion that the diarist ultimately fails to define the sign "S" in this manner. Nonetheless, it is supposed from the outset that "S" refers to a certain type of sensation that is had on more than one occasion.

And what reason do we have here for calling “S” the name of a sensation? Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game. — And why a “particular sensation”: that is, the same one every time? Well, we’re supposing, aren’t we, that we write “S” every time. — PI 270

There is no question that defining "sensation" as "an inner experience" is extremely ambiguous, just like defining "green" as "a colour" is extremely ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

How is it ambiguous to define green as a colour? Green is a colour.

The issue concerns what Wittgenstein refers to with "the sensation", at 258, what he has called "a certain sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

Then the issue is not with the meaning of the word "sensation". That is not in question.

What is in question is whether the phrase "a certain sensation" refers to a one-off particular instance of a sensation or to a recurrent particular type of sensation. I have given you all the quotes about "recurrent" and "every time" to support that he means the latter.

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person
could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings,
moods, and so on — for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our
ordinary language? — But that is not what I mean. The words of
this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his
immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the
language. (PI 243)

244. How do words refer to sensations? — There doesn’t seem to
be any problem here; don’t we talk about sensations every day, and
name them? But how is the connection between the name and the thing
named set up? This question is the same as: How does a human being
learn the meaning of names of sensations? For example, of the word
“pain”.

246. In what sense are my sensations private? — Well, only I can know
whether I am really in pain;

250. Why can’t a dog simulate pain? Is it too honest?

251. What does it mean when we say, “I can’t imagine the opposite of
this” or “What would it be like if it were otherwise?” — For example,
when someone has said that my mental images are private; or that only
I myself can know whether I am feeling pain; and so forth.

253. “Another person can’t have my pains.” — My pains — what pains
are they?

256. Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences
and which only I myself can understand? How do I use words
to signify my sensations? — As we ordinarily do? Then are my words
for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensation?

258. Let’s imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the
recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign
“S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the
sensation.

261. What reason have we for calling “S” the sign for a sensation?

263. “Surely I can (inwardly) resolve to call this ‘pain’ in the future.” — LW

Wittgenstein uses the word "sensation" to refer to an "inner experience" such as pain. There is no ambiguity about it and none has coherently been pointed out.

Alright, so imagine I claim I can play the tuba, but there's not one handy to *prove* it. (Have to come back to this.) Suppose someone else says, "No really, I've heard him play the tuba." I think it's reasonable to take that as a claim to *know* that I can play the tuba, because they have experience that put them in a position to know. At this point, you can choose to trust them, to take their word for it, or demand further evidence. But that's the same choice you faced with my initial claim that I know how to play the tuba, and the presumption that I'm in a position to know whether I can. I'm not guessing. — Srap Tasmaner

You should theoretically be able to demonstrate (at some time) that you know how to play the tuba, whether one is handy or whether you can play one right now or not.

How much do I have to play? How much knowledge do I have to demonstrate? — Srap Tasmaner

I don't know. At what point do we say someone can play an instrument? Regardless of "at what point", we often do say these things about people. Can Eric Clapton play the guitar? Of course.

At some point, I think it comes back to trust that I possess still more knowledge and capability than I've actually demonstrated. — Srap Tasmaner

It's most likely that you do possess more knowledge and capability than you've demonstrated, but not necessarily with regards to playing the tuba. We might find that you struggle to make any sound at all with a tuba in your hands.

This is why at least most reports about my current condition or my mental states, past and present, can readily be treated as matters of knowledge. — Srap Tasmaner

But you cannot ever demonstrate that you know you have a headache - not even to yourself. You cannot theoretically, at some time, prove to anyone - including yourself - your knowledge of your headache. As Wittgenstein says at PI 246:

It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean — except perhaps that I am in pain? — LW

It's not that people cannot be confused or uncertain about this sort of thing, of course not. It's not even that when they make a claim about their mental state, they must be right. It's that we by and large accept each other as authorities on our own mental states, because, as the saying goes, "If you don't know, who should I ask?" We are the only ones in the position to know a great many things about ourselves. — Srap Tasmaner

That may be true, but Wittgenstein shows us that all language is essentially behavioural, social and public, so the grammar of the word "know" is based on behavioural verifications, not on inner objects. You might think that you know all the words to Eleanor Rigby until you try to sing it and find out you really don't.

This is what Wittgenstein does throughout the PI, and especially at the passage I quoted from, at 261. What he is saying at 261 is that "sensation" has no referent (or, we cannot say what it refers to), and this is very consistent with intentional ambiguity, as I've described. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does he say at 261 that "sensation" has no referent or that we cannot say what it refers to?

In saying that the word could mean either of the two, you are admitting to intentional ambiguity, and you are saying that neither one is the correct one, because if there was a correct one you would have to say which one is the one which is meant, thereby negating the possibility of either. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's say that what I meant by the statement "I am going to the bank" is "I am going to the financial establishment". How does my intention remove the ambiguity from the statement? It could still mean either the financial establishment or the side of the river.

See, if a person intentionally uses a word ambiguously, the appearance is that the word has numerous possibilities for meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

This can also occur when a person unintentionally uses a word ambiguously. Again, having more than one possible meaning is what "ambiguous" means. Do you understand that?

However, since the use of ambiguity is intentional, we can conclude that the author cannot possibly mean any single one of these possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have a lot of work to do to demonstrate that Wittgenstein intentionally uses the word "sensation" ambiguously (or at all ambiguously). And I know you're wrong about it, but you cannot be reasoned with, so I'm out.

"I don't know I have a headache" seems to entail, if not itself to be, a contradiction. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure that I understand in what sense it's a contradiction.

The question I am focused on is whether, in denying that a sentence is useful in some circumstance, do we deny that it is meaningful? Do we deny that it could carry a truth-value? — Srap Tasmaner

It's not an easy question, but I think we could start by noting that claims to knowledge can typically be checked by others and ourselves. You might claim to be able to play the tuba or how to speak Russian, and we could test your knowledge by asking you to demonstrate. But how can we similarly discover or learn whether or not I have a headache? How could my knowledge be tested in order to demonstrate to myself and to others that I really do (or don't) know whether I have a headache?

When you say "Surely, if you had a headache, you'd know it", you appear to be using "know" in the sense of "be aware of". I could be wrong, but I think Wittgenstein might object to the notion of pain as an inner object that one is aware of and can check to confirm whether or not they are in pain, instead of pain as something which one simply has or expresses.

In a chapter of Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty, author Thomas Morawetz puts it this way:

An inner experience cannot show that I know p because knowing p is
something that others will conclude about me, and that conclusion will
be a judgement that I am qualified to do certain things, to give grounds
or evidence for my knowing p. I may not have to perform if others are
willing to concede the qualification to me, and in that sense knowing is
a state rather than an activity. The connection between knowing and
acting is logical and not causal. My knowing p is not an inner state of
being that causes me to act in certain ways, for example to give grounds,
but rather it is manifested when I act in such ways. My inability to give
adequate grounds is not simply evidence that I do not know p; it can be
tantamount to my not knowing p. Inability and failure to give grounds
are not the same because in the latter case I may be devious and try to
lead others to believe that I do not know p when in fact I do. — Thomas Morawetz

Now do you see that if the author intends multiple interpretations, there is no such thing as the correct interpretation of the word? — Metaphysician Undercover

What reason do you have for thinking that Wittgenstein intends multiple interpretations of the word "sensation"? This might seem like a silly question, but what makes you think Wittgenstein is not using the word "sensation" to mean a sensation such as pain?

Didn't I already give you three possible meanings for the word "sensation" in that context? — Metaphysician Undercover

I gave you arguments two posts ago for why your examples were not possible meanings of the word "sensation". You have not addressed them.

As I said, the third is not really "no meaning". — Metaphysician Undercover

That "ambiguous" really means that the word has no meaning is precisely what you said here:

In the latter case there is no such thing as what the word means (or we can simply say as I did, its meaning is ambiguous). — Metaphysician Undercover

You have still failed to explain how having more than one possible meaning implies having less than one possible meaning. Or, that is, how either implies neither.

It's just your refusal to acknowledge the reality of this sort of meaning, and your insistence that meaning is given by following a rule, which creates the appearance that ambiguous meaning is no meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't just spout this rubbish; tell me how it follows.

You've just finished stating "there is no such thing as what the word means" and equated this with saying "its meaning is ambiguous", but now you're trying to blame me for your dual claims that the word has multiple possible meanings and (at the same time) no meaning? Please. I'm not the one saying these silly things.

You do not seem to be recognizing the difference between using a word with a specific intended meaning, but which could be wrongly interpreted because it is ambiguous, and intentionally using a word to create ambiguity. In the latter case there is no such thing as what the word means (or we can simply say as I did, its meaning is ambiguous). — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether intentional or not, “ambiguous” means that a word has more than one possible meaning, not - as you claim - that a word has no possible meaning or is meaningless. Any reasonable English speaker or dictionary could correct you on this, but so does your own quote on poetry:

Poetry uses forms and conventions to suggest differential interpretations of words… — Wikipedia: Poetry

Note that it says differential/different (i.e. more than one) interpretations.

You may claim that W uses the word “sensation” to be ambiguous (not to mean ambiguous), but then you will need to say what (more than one) meanings the word “sensation” could possibly have in the text.

You can’t have it both ways by saying that the word has more than one possible meaning but also no meaning.

Otherwise, simply stop using the word “ambiguous” incorrectly.

You said:

Right. If you can sensibly say one, you ought to be able sensibly to say the other. Negation also comes up here: if you can sensibly say you know you have a headache, you ought to be able sensibly to say that you don't know you have a headache. — Srap Tasmaner

Can you sensibly say that you don’t know you have a headache?

If you agree that the statement is nonsense, then wouldn’t you agree that it’s not truth apt? I don’t want to say that the statement is always nonsense. Perhaps there might be occasions where it would make sense to say. But I can’t think of any and I’d imagine they would be exceptional circumstances.

Hi Srap. I think W’s position would be that if it doesn’t make sense to doubt it (e.g having a pain), then it doesn’t make sense to say you know it, either.

Meh.

That’s a funny way to answer a question. Okay, never mind.

Edit: in case you missed it, how can one follow the rules (in what one does) if there are no rules (if language games are not rules based). In other words, how can conventions be broken if there are no conventions?

And I think this puts the lie to the notion that language games are rules-based. That one is following a rule is not dependent on one being able to state that rule, but is found in what one does. — Banno

How does it follow that language games are not rule based? Is it that there are no rules or that following the rules is found in what one does?

It would be brave indeed to claim that any use is determinate. — Banno

I’m fairly sure I know what you mean by this: that it would be brave to claim that any meaning is determinate, or that we can be certain to understand any use of language. But isn’t that just what we do everyday? I think the bar is set too high here on knowledge/certainty; a philosophical use of these terms.

That is, to say that we can never be certain what someone means with their use of language, then I think you have gone too far or set too high a standard.

You say "I am going to the bank". You also say "the word 'bank' which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment". Since you are the one making both these statements we can see the two as inconsistent with each other. — Metaphysician Undercover

There aren't two statements; there is only one. That the one statement has more than one possible meaning is what "ambiguous" means.

If you meant that you are going to a financial establishment then it is not possible that you meant that you are going to the side of a river, — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how I could prevent the ambiguity using that statement alone. I could proceed to clarify what I meant if questioned.

Do you understand this so far? By saying that "bank" could mean either one, you are implying that it means neither one. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't see how that follows. How does either imply neither?

This is because if it meant the former, it could not mean the latter, and if it meant the latter it could not mean the former. — Metaphysician Undercover

It could mean either. That's what makes it ambiguous.

So by saying that it could mean either, you are saying that it does not mean the former, and you are saying that it does not mean the latter. — Metaphysician Undercover

By saying It could mean either, then I am saying it does not mean either? Is that your argument?

Therefore, you are giving "bank" a third and very distinct meaning. You are saying that "bank" in this context does not mean a financial establishment, nor does it mean the side of a river. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it could mean either. That's what it means for the word "bank" to be ambiguous.

To know what "bank" means we have to look and see what purpose the word serves in this context, what you are doing with it. — Metaphysician Undercover

We could imagine a context in which I often frequent both the financial establishment and the side of a river, and it is unclear from the statement which one I mean.

All that "bank" is doing for you is allowing you to make a statement of indeterminate meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

The word "bank" does that itself by having more than one common meaning/synonym.

And since you are not telling us where you are going at all, as you are creating ambiguity with the word instead, we wouldn't say that you have said "I am going to the ambiguity", the word "bank" simply makes the entire statement an expression of ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover

You either don't understand my argument or you are purposefully ignoring it. It was your claim that the word "sensation" is ambiguous (having a "multitude of possible meanings") and that "ambiguous" is one of its possible meanings. It is the latter half of this conjunction that I find ridiculous.

It is one thing to describe the meaning of the word "sensation" as ambiguous, which is to say that the word "sensation" has more than one possible meaning. It is quite another thing to say that the word "sensation" itself has the possible meaning of, or is possibly synonymous with, the word "ambiguous". Can you not see the difference between a description about the meaning of the word and the meaning of the word? The former tells us that the word has more than one possible meaning, the latter tells us what those possible meanings are. You somehow make the leap from describing the use/meaning of the word “sensation”as ambiguous to giving the word “sensation” a use/meaning which is synonymous with "ambiguous". That's ridiculous.

What makes you think that Wittgenstein is using the word "sensation" to mean "ambiguous"? Please do not repeat your spurious reasoning that if the word "sensation" has an ambiguous (more than one) meaning, then the word "sensation" means "ambiguous". Look up the word "sensation" in the dictionary if you want to know its common meanings/synonyms.

Similarly with type and token: these are not readily apparent as possible meanings of the word "sensation". Types name a class of objects, and tokens are the instances of that class of objects. The type/token distinction can be applied to many words/nouns, but you would rarely consider most words to have the same meaning as, or to be synonymous with, the words "type" and "token". You are making some sort of category error here. Wittgenstein does not use the word "sensation" to mean "type" nor "token" nor "ambiguous", and it's absurd to think so.

The meaning of a word is only ambiguous when it is used in an ambiguous way. I agree that any word can be used in an ambiguous way, and therefore have "ambiguous" as its meaning. But do you not understand that the meaning of a word is dependent on how it is used? Often words are not used ambiguously, so in those situations we cannot say that their meaning is ambiguous. You seem to be especially thick on the subject of ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't believe you're persisting with this crap. To use an example off the top of my head, if I say "I am going to the bank", then there is potential ambiguity in the word "bank" which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment. What the word "bank" does not mean here is "ambiguous" because "I am going to the ambiguous" makes no apparent sense. Although the meaning of the word "bank" may be ambiguous - because it has more than one possible interpretation - it does not seem that the word "bank" could possibly mean "ambiguous" or could be one of the possible interpretations.

As I explained, the example of 258 is not supposed to be an example of a private language as described at 243. So this is not relevant to our discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've already demonstrated that you don't understand what Wittgenstein means by a private language, so I won't bother addressing your unsupported assertions.

A word's meaning is a function of the way the word is used. If it is used in a way so as to be ambiguous, then its meaning is ambiguous. Therefore the third option, "ambiguous", is a possible meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since any word could be used in an ambiguous way, then all words mean "ambiguous". Right? You're an idiot.

How would that work? Or are you unable to tell me? If you can't justify the possibility of a private language, or provide anything more than a mere assertion that it is possible, then why should I believe you?
— Luke

I could tell you how it would work, just like Wittgenstein does at 243. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein tells us what he means by a private language at 243; he doesn't tell us how a private language works.

If the person meets up later with other people speaking public language, the person's private language would need to be altered to become consistent with the others', to understand them, and would no longer be a "private language", even though it was a "private language" prior to this alteration. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein's private language is private in principle: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." (PI 243) That is, it's not possible for others to ever come to understand a private language, or for a private language to ever be translated into a public language (or vice versa).

The natives there speak a public language, and the stranger arrives with what is in relation to their language, a private language. — Metaphysician Undercover

The natives' language is not private if they all use it.

The private language, as the context for understanding, must be altered to become consistent with the native language, in order for the person to learn the language. This alteration to the private language renders it as something other than a "private language", it's been affected by the public. But the fact that the new language, produced by the alteration is not a private language, does not mean that it wasn't a private language prior to alteration. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not what Wittgenstein means by a private language.

As for a private sign, one could think of many reasons for that. It could be used as a memory aid. You write something down, so that you do not forget it, and if it's a secret, you don't want anyone else to be able to understand it. And of course private meaning plays a big role in deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are suggesting a translation from a public language into a private language. This is not what Wittgenstein means by a private language. Try and find another reason to use a private language.

What examples? Where? Quote them.
— Luke

So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

The third is not a possible meaning of "sensation". Additionally, you later said:

I never said it means both a type and a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

As such, you have yet to provide any examples of your so-called "multitude of possible meanings" of the word "sensation" in Wittgenstein's scenario.

There is nothing mentioned about "private meaning", or "private word". — Metaphysician Undercover

See PI 243:

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? — But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243

What were you saying about the inability to read?

But if we assume that "S' starts out as a private sign, then to be understood, even by the private person using the sign, it must be placed into the context of a language (justified). — Metaphysician Undercover

Hence "the private language argument".

So a private language will always be unintelligible from the perspective of a person who understands through the means of a public language, because the private sign will always need to exist within that context, making it a part of a language which is not private. — Metaphysician Undercover

If a person speaks a public language, why would their private language be unintelligible to them? Why does the private sign "always need to exist within" the context of a public language?

However, there is no reason why there cannot be a private sign, and other private signs, and even a private language, which has no part of any public language. — Metaphysician Undercover

How would that work? Or are you unable to tell me? If you can't justify the possibility of a private language, or provide anything more than a mere assertion that it is possible, then why should I believe you?

Furthermore, what role does the private sign play? Does it signify a type of sensation - or a type of whatever - or does each instance of a private thing get its own sign? How is this language used and what is it used for? You say there is no reason that there cannot be a private sign or private language, but there also seems to be no reason that there can be a private sign or private language.

I'm really sorry that your inability to read English has left you incapable of understanding the examples I presented. — Metaphysician Undercover

What examples? Where? Quote them.

There is no specific criterion which tells us when to say that two things are exactly the same, that's the point Wittgenstein makes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Prove it. Where does he say this?

The issue I've been talking about is Wittgenstein's use of the word "sensation". I thought we were both talking about that, because you asked me why I thought the word's meaning was intentionally made ambiguous. He even explicitly states at 261 "the use of this word stand in need of a justification which everyone understands" ,indicating that his use has not been in a conventional way. — Metaphysician Undercover

261. What reason have we for calling “S” the sign for a sensation? For “sensation” is a word of our common language, which is not a language intelligible only to me. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands. — And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes “S” he has Something — and that is all that can be said. But “has” and “something” also belong to our common language. — So in the end, when one is doing philosophy, one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound. — But such a sound is an expression only in a particular language-game, which now has to be described. — LW

He refers to "S" here twice, which undermines your assertion that he is not talking about "S" here. Furthermore, you are misreading this. He is not using the word "sensation" in any unconventional way. The point is that the use of the word "sensation" stands in need of a justification which everybody understands because it is a word of our common language. If the word "sensation" has a public use then how can we be talking about a private language? "S" is meant to be a private word with a private meaning, but this cannot be if it refers to a sensation, where the word "sensation" has a public meaning. For the same reason, "S" cannot refer to "Something" which is also a word of our public language. In the end, the private language advocate has no recourse but to emit an inarticulate sound in defence of their claims. But that won't do either.

Because the interpretation of Wittgenstein's example which you gave me was based in the type/token distinction, and I've been trying to tell you, to no avail, that the type/token distinction is not applicable here — Metaphysician Undercover

So you still have no examples to support your claim that the word "sensation" in Wittgenstein's scenario has a "multitude of possible meanings"?

Right. Now notice that whether or not they are the same, or "exactly the same" is not at question. We say that they are "two exactly the same", or in my example, "that hat is the same as mine", meaning "exactly the same", but whether or not they actually are, doesn't matter. As Banno pointed to at 148, it doesn't matter so long as misunderstanding is avoided. — Metaphysician Undercover

At 253, Wittgenstein asks us to "consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”. So what makes it possible? When might we say that two physical objects are "exactly the same"?

But you seem to think that all word use must be "rule abiding" to be meaningful. — Metaphysician Undercover

If word use is not rule abiding, then you must be using all of your words in a non-conventional manner. Therefore, you will need to explain how you are using all of your words. But then you will also be using all of the words in your subsequent explanation non-conventionally, and so you will then have to explain how you are using all of those words. And so on.

Yes, but this does not imply what you said earlier: "that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible." At best, 261 implies this about the word/sign "S", not about the sensation(s) had by the diarist. Sensations don't have referents or meanings; sensations are not words.
— Luke

Wow, your misreading never ceases to amaze me. Wittgenstein is explicitly talking about the use of the word "sensation" here, not the use of "S". " — Metaphysician Undercover

If you're correct, then address my argument that sensations don't have referents or meanings.

No, I never said it means both a type and a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

You claimed that the word "sensation" has a "multitude of possible meanings" in Wittgenstein's scenario. When I asked you to name some of this "multitude", you could only name "type" and "token" as two possible meanings. In your previous post, you attempted to include "no determinate meaning" as a third possible option. Now you claim to have never said that the word "sensation" means both a type and a token. So where is this "multitude of possible meanings"? You cannot even name one.

The type/token distinction is inapplicable in this scenario because it makes a false dichotomy, rendering "neither" as impossible by the nature of a "dichotomy", and the law of excluded middle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you want to argue that "S" denotes neither a type of sensation nor a token of that type?

But I find it obvious that neither is what is intended by Wittgenstein. — Metaphysician Undercover

So do I. I never said that this is what Wittgenstein meant. Once again, I introduced it to clarify two possible meanings of "the same". I did this because it seemed to me from other discussions that, for you, "the same" can only mean the same token, as per the law of identity. That is, that you allowed only for the same token, but not the same type (nor of two things that looked the same, for that matter).

I am quite surprised to hear you recently stating that two distinct but similar things can be the same. You were previously adamant that they were not the same, only similar.

But I find it obvious that neither is what is intended by Wittgenstein. That's why I keep requoting 261 "he has something—and that is all that can be said". At this point he makes it very clear that we cannot say whether it is a type or a token. I suggest you reread this passage very carefully. He even states that what the diarist has, need not even be "a sensation", according to our use of "sensation" in our public language. He says: " And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; ". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but this does not imply what you said earlier: "that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible." At best, 261 implies this about the word/sign "S", not about the sensation(s) had by the diarist. Sensations don't have referents or meanings; sensations are not words.

This is false. What is said, is that the two things are the same. "His hat is the same as mine". That is how we speak. But you have a very bad habit of thinking that if it doesn't make sense to me, then the person cannot mean what they say. So, in your mind you change what the person has said, into something which makes sense to you, so that you now think that what the person said is "the two things look the same", when the person actually said "are the same". — Metaphysician Undercover

Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”: for example, to say, “This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it”. — PI 253

Wittgenstein says at 253 that what makes it possible (although not necessary) to speak of "two exactly the same" is that it is the same (type of?) chair as the one you saw yesterday. The implication seems to be that it looks no different to the one you saw yesterday.

Now, you said earlier: "That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same." I replied, by the same logic, that two things look the same does not make the two things the same. Wittgenstein never says that if two things look the same then they necessarily are the same. He only talks about what makes it possible that we might speak of "two exactly the same"; and he appears to be saying that what makes it possible for us to say this is if they look or seem the same.

There is no hiding behind the type/token distinction here, you have made it front and centre, as the standard for interpretation. So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". — Metaphysician Undercover

For the last 10 pages or more, we have been discussing whether Wittgenstein's diarist is naming a type or a token of the sensation. Note that these are not the same question:

(i) "Does the diarist name a type or a token of the sensation?"
(ii) "What is the meaning of "sensation"?"

I don't see how you can answer question (i) without knowing the meaning of "sensation". Either you have greatly misunderstood this whole time, or else you are now pretending that we have been discussing question (ii) instead of question (i).

I've mentioned several times that I introduced the type-token distinction to distinguish two different meanings of "the same", viz. the same type and the same token. I have also explained that the type-token distinction is used to distinguish between a class and its concrete instances. Moreover, I recently said that you should firstly establish the sense of the word and then subsequently apply the type-token distinction.

You have insisted this entire time that you understand the type-token distinction, yet you now claim that the word "sensation" is being used by Wittgenstein at PI 258 to mean "a type" and "a token"? I find this difficult to believe.

These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

There you have three now — Metaphysician Undercover

The third possible meaning of "sensation" is that it has no determinate meaning? You cannot count "no determinate meaning" as one of its possible meanings; it isn't one.

So your "multitude of possible meanings" consists only of "type", "token" and "no determinate meaning". None of these are the obvious meaning of the word "sensation" at PI 258. Did you ever wonder why Wittgenstein talks a lot about "pain" in the surrounding passages as well as "sensation"?

That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same. It is the type which is the same, not the two things. Can't you see that? You are saying the type which they are is the same, they are of the same type. You are not saying that the two things are the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

By the same logic, you are saying that the two things look the same, you are not saying that the two things are the same.

Two things can be the same type without looking the same, and two things can look the same without being the same type. But things don't have the same name only because they look the same. Consider two dogs, for example.

I'll ask you a third time: name the "multitude of possible meanings" that you think the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario.
— Luke

We've been through this for weeks with your type/token distinction. You argued "the sensation" refers to a type, I argued it refers to a token. You simply refuse to accept that it could possibly refer to anything other than a type, so you do not see the ambiguity — Metaphysician Undercover

You hid behind the type/token distinction when I originally asked you this question, and now you're doing it again. Let me get this straight: the "multitude of possible meanings" that the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario are that "sensation" means "type" or "sensation" means "token"?

Surely you are not referring to types and tokens when you say that the word "sensation" has a "multitude of possible meanings" in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario.

Again: what are the multitude of meanings that the word "sensation" has in the scenario? Name two possible meanings, at least.

I think that I look at two things and see that they appear to be the same, so I say that they are the same. Likewise with "similar". I look at two things and see that they appear similar, so I say that they are similar. This is clearly not a matter of classing things by type. But if you were to ask me why I think they are "similar", or "the same", I could find reasons for you, to justify my judgement. But I don't look for, nor find those reasons, before you ask me. I just make the judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you would prefer to talk about "similar" instead of "the same" (or attempt to conflate the two) because you have no reason to judge two things as being the same except that they are of they same type. It's much easier to argue that you don't need a reason or principle to judge two things as being similar than it is to judge them as being the same. There must be a reason why you judge two things as the same and not merely similar.

Conversely, if you show me two things of the same type, and I know that they are of the same type, two dogs for example, then even if I see them as very different, I would judge then as similar, because of that principle, I know they are of the same type. — Metaphysician Undercover

There you go again. They're not similar; they're the same. What makes them the same is that they are both of the same type; they're both dogs.

What I am claiming is ambiguity, and therefore that there is a multitude of possible meanings. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll ask you a third time: name the "multitude of possible meanings" that you think the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario.

I didn't say "it has no possible meaning", I said "there is no such thing as what the word means". — Metaphysician Undercover

There is "no such thing as what the word means" in Wittgenstein's scenario, even though the word ["sensation"] has a "multitude of possible meanings" in Wittgenstein's scenario? Make up your mind.

Or do you think that art can only be meaningful if it depicts or represents something? — Metaphysician Undercover

If I think that it depicts or represents more than one thing, then I don't think that it depicts or represents nothing. But that's just me.

You just don't seem to get this, insisting that each word must have a specific meaning — Metaphysician Undercover

Not always, but in Wittgenstein's scenario, yes, obviously the word "sensation" has a specific meaning there. You are just being disingenuous, as usual.

Right, but your example, of the same type of hat, demonstrates that you just don't get it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since you have a thing for principles, perhaps you could explain by what principle you judge two things to be the same?

I told you, I believe it is used in an ambiguous way. Do you understand that? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it's why I asked you this:

What different possible meanings do you think "sensation" has in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario? — Luke

You still haven't answered the question.

It is a common tool in creative writing to leave the meaning of a word unclear so that it may be interpreted in numerous different ways. Therefore I think there is no such thing as what the word means in that context, because the meaning is intentionally ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are claiming both that the meaning of "sensation" is ambiguous and "may be interpreted in numerous different ways", but also that "there is no such thing as what the word means in that context".

It cannot be both that "sensation" has more than one possible meaning in context and that it has no possible meaning in context.

When I saw the guy wearing the same hat as mine, I saw it, and judge it as "the same". I didn't make any judgement of type. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you have a fedora and I have a fedora, then we both have the same hat, right? These are the same type of hat. Otherwise, how are they the same?

I make judgements of "similar" in the same way, without even thinking about types. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are not discussing "similar"; we are discussing "the same".

To use your type/token distinction, It could refer to what you call a type, or it could refer to what you call a token of a type, as we've discussed. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not asking about "the same" sensation or types and tokens here. I asked you what you think "sensation" means in Wittgenstein's scenario. How do you think the word "sensation" is being used there?

Easily, he means to create ambiguity with the use of the word. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is only to repeat that you don't know how he is using the word. If you don't know how he is using the word, then how can you understand the scenario? You claim to understand the point of the scenario yet you don't understand his use of words?

You have given me no principle by which we can determine whether two instances, such as what Wittgenstein is talking about at 258, are of two different tokens, or of one and the same token. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't need to give you a principle. An instance of X is a token of X by definition. And I've told you this about 30 times.

But of course you are wrong, as Wittgenstein demonstrates with the example of a chair, the same token of a chair can occur as two distinct instances of sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

A chair is not a sensation, and an instance of a chair is not an instance of a sensation.

In this case, "same" refers to two distinct things which have been judged to be identical, they appear to be exactly the same as each other. They are not judged as being the same token, nor are they judged as being of the same type, they are judged as being the same — Metaphysician Undercover

The same in what respect?

We do not "learn the names of types, and we learn what tokens( typically) belong to those types". — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you realise that I'm applying the concept of the type-token distinction here as a conceptual tool in an attempt to clarify different meanings of "the same"? I'm not claiming that when we learn a language we are explicitly taught about types and tokens.

We learn the names of particular things, and we judge others as being "the same" in the sense described above, and so we call them by the same name. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is the type-token distinction in other words.

Do you understand that we can, and commonly do, judge two things to be similar, and even "the same as each other", without judging them to be the same type? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that's exactly what I don't understand: how two distinct things can be classed as "the same" without being the same type.

That they are "the same type" is a logical conclusion drawn from the judgement that they are the same, or similar, along with another premise stating that having the same, or similar features constitutes a type. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not always about resemblance. It's about the use of the word that names the type.

"The sensation" which is referred to at 258 is not meant to be a token nor is it meant to be a type, — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you know, when you claim not to know what the word "sensation" means here?

At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say".
— Luke

Another example of your misreading.
— Metaphysician Undercover

It’s a direct quote. Explain how it’s a misreading.
— Luke

My translation gives what you present as the statement: "What is true or false is what human beings say", as a question: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"' There's a big difference between a question and a statement.
— Metaphysician Undercover

According to your translation, what comes after the question?
— Luke

The answer to the question is negative. "That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life." — Metaphysician Undercover

241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and
what is false?” — What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life. — Wittgenstein

Evidently I'm being played for a fool.

I don't need any help with the meaning of "sensation". I see it very clearly as ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

What different possible meanings do you think "sensation" has in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario? How can you possibly understand the scenario if you don't know what he means by "sensation"?

I asked whether two distinct instances of the same word are the same token. You answered they are not the same token. However, they are clearly not the same type, because as I said, one might be a noun, and one might be a verb. You continue to insist that they are "the same word", but you haven't explained by what principle you use "same". — Metaphysician Undercover

I use the type/token distinction. You have offered only synonyms of "same", which explains nothing. No two tokens are the same token, but they can be considered as (tokens of) the same type/class. The principle is one of conventional language use. We learn the names of types and we learn what tokens (typically) belong to those types by means of examples and repetition. I would recommend you to read PI 208, but I'm quite sure that you would intentionally misread it.

The issue is very clear to me. There is a use of "same" which refers to neither a type nor a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

What does it refer to then?

There is a use of "same" which we commonly call "identical". Wittgenstein calls it "exactly the same as". It does not mean the same token because it clearly refers to two distinct things. It does not mean the same type, because there is no classing the things within a type, just a judgement of "same". There is no type mentioned, only the very strong assertion that they are "exactly the same". — Metaphysician Undercover

You keep telling me what "same" does not mean, without telling me what it does mean.

If it's not by type, then how else can two distinct tokens be the same? Try to answer without simply repeating that they're the same (or some other synonym).

We don't learn how to employ tokens, or use words (I don't teach you all the things to say). — Antony Nickles

You may not have taught me all the things to say, but some person or people did. “It takes a village.” Or, at least, they taught me up to the point where “Now I know how to go on”.

My translation gives what you present as the statement: "What is true or false is what human beings say", as a question: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"' There's a big difference between a question and a statement. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to your translation, what comes after the question?

OK, so let's say that there are two distinct instance of what we commonly call "the same word". In one instance the word is used as a noun, and in the other instance, the word is used as a verb. They are two distinct tokens, as you say here. By what principle do we call these two tokens "the same"? They are not tokens of the same type, because one is a token of the type of word called "noun", and the other is a token of the type of word called "verb". — Metaphysician Undercover

My explanation obviously didn't take. Try this: First, establish the particular sense/use/meaning of the word. Second, apply the type/token distinction.

In this case, we are talking about a "sensation". Do you need any help with the meaning of that word?

What do you mean by “the very same thing”?

You don’t allow that two instances of “word” can be the same but you allow that two instances of a sensation can be the same?

What do you think “recurrence” means?
— Luke

It's not me who said that two instances of the same word are not the same word. I asked you that question, and you gave me that answer. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not me, either. Where did I ever say "two instances of the same word are not the same word"?

I have introduced the type/token distinction to try and create clarity about the meaning of "the same". You have done nothing but try to maintain opacity.

I would say that if we adhere to the principle stated by Wittgenstein at 253, it is "the same word". — Metaphysician Undercover

You have not answered my question: What do you mean by "the same"?

In so much as the two instances are "exactly the same as" each other, we can say that it is "the same word". — Metaphysician Undercover

You realise that two instances is two tokens, right? How can two tokens be the same? You have refused to accept this until now.

So, "recurrence", in the context of 258, means a repeated instance of the very same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by "the very same"?

Likewise, a person might have a repeated instance of the very same word, within one's mind. Don't you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover

Until you can clarify what you mean by "the same", then I don't understand what this means.

At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say".
— Luke

Another example of your misreading. — Metaphysician Undercover

It’s a direct quote. Explain how it’s a misreading.

A multitude of things is not a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Almost every thing is a multitude of things. The English language is no exception.

Do you think that the "word" written here is the same thing as the "word" written here? — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends what you mean by “the same thing” (this has been my point all along).

Are the two of these, two distinct instances of the same token? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. An instance is a token, so they are two distinct instances or two distinct tokens.

Or would you say that each is a different token of the same type, the type being a type of word expressed by "word"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes.

What we call "the same word", could be either a noun or a verb depending on the instance of use. — Metaphysician Undercover

I said to consider a type as a word, noun, concept or class in the quote you responded to, so I don’t need to clarify if i mean a verb or a noun. I already have.

Then each instance of use must be a different token. And therefore it is incorrect to say the "word" written here is the same word as the "word" written here. — Metaphysician Undercover

It’s not incorrect. Same type, different tokens.

Each instance of use must be a different word — Metaphysician Undercover

Same type, different tokens.

So, let's start, as you suggest with Wittgenstein's use of "the recurrence of a certain sensation". If we put that in context, we see that he is talking about naming a particular sensation, which occurs on numerous occasions (recurrence of the very same thing), which is referred to as "the sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by “the very same thing”?

You don’t allow that two instances of “word” can be the same but you allow that two instances of a sensation can be the same?

What do you think “recurrence” means?