Comments

  • intersubjectivity
    ↪Banno
    You’re nonplussed and were expecting something else, but I’m making it about me? My argument stands if you ever want to try and counter it.

    Other people cannot literally feel my pain, and you cannot literally feel anyone else’s. The expression “I feel your pain” can only be figurative. In empathy one can only feel one’s own pain, even if it is expressed or felt for others.
  • intersubjectivity
    ↪Banno
    I'm not going to spoon feed you. — Banno

    How are mirror neurons relevant to each of us having our own individual pains? Do you want to argue that we don’t? Or that it’s not subjective? I mean, it’s fairly self-evident.
  • intersubjectivity
    I cannot experience anybody else's pain and nobody else can experience my pain.
    — Luke

    Is this pivotal for you?     — Banno

    In terms of subjectivity? Yes.

    Suppose a clever surgeon wired your arm to mine, so that if I stick a pin in my thumb, we both feel it. — Banno

    Suppose Banno had to invent a fanciful hypothesis to avoid my argument.

    Unless we were one and the same person in this scenario, then we would each be feeling our own individual pains, even if they both occurred at the same time, both occurred in the same locations in each of our bodies, and felt qualitatively the same to each of us. That’s what subjectivity is - it’s not our shared public (or “inter-subjective”) language.

    It seems that your contention has been falsified. — Banno

    Uhh how?
  • intersubjectivity
    Subjectivity is a social construct; subjectivity is intersubjective. — unenlightened

    Regardless of whether subjectivity is public or private, each of us has their own experiences. I cannot experience anybody else's pain and nobody else can experience my pain. Others can go through similar experiences and might be said to have felt the same types of pain as me, but not the same tokens of pain as me. This is what I understand "subjectivity" to mean in this context. The individuality of my body and my experiences is not a social construct, especially given that a society is a community of individuals, each with their own pains and viewpoints
  • intersubjectivity
    When you and I look tot he Newton's Cradle before us, do we see a type or a token? Is your claim that I see my token, you see yours, and together we make a type? — Banno

    I think it was fairly clear from my post that I was talking about types and tokens of experience, rather than types and tokens of objects. My point was that your experience of the cradle and my experience of the cradle are different tokens of experience. Whereas, you seem to want to reject talk about tokens of experience on the basis that we each have the same types of experience, e.g. seeing Newton's Cradle.

    How can we have a discussion about subjectivity (and how/whether subjectivity can be shared) if you reject all talk about different tokens of experience, i.e. if you reject subjective experience and subjectivity altogether?
  • intersubjectivity
    Even if we allow that everyone has the same type of experience - which is very much in question here - by virtue of being human, it is still obviously a fact that each of us (each human subject) has a different token of experience.

    Furthermore, there has been no support given for the apparent assumption of the OP that human experience is equivalent to, or can be completely defined by, language, or how the two are at all related.
  • intersubjectivity
    ...all indications are that we do see the same thing; and if we do not, we can talk about that, too; indeed, that is pivotal to progress.

    And any slightly different interpretations of what is said can be ironed out, as well; or ignored, if they make no difference.     — Banno

    I don’t deny that we can see the same thing or that we can discuss disagreements, but still I cannot perceive your perceptions or feel your pain. That’s what is not shared. “If they make no difference” to what?
  • intersubjectivity
    ↪Banno
    You asked what is not shared. I’ve answered the question.
  • intersubjectivity
    One’s subjective experience. My pain is not your pain.
    — Luke

    Again, talk to the example of Newton's cradle - what is not shared there?     — Banno

    Like pain, one’s perceptions are not shared - you have yours and I have mine.
  • intersubjectivity
    What is it that is not shared? — Banno

    One’s subjective experience. My pain is not your pain.
  • intersubjectivity
    ...because you already learned to use "sharp" and "stabbing"... — Banno

    I was responding to your question “why shouldn’t the sharing bring the aspect into being” which suggests a form of idealism, and in this case suggests that the pain is brought into existence by the use of the concept or coining of the word. I don’t believe that there was no pain felt (or no other sensory experiences to be had) prior to the concepts(s)/word(s) being coined. It seems like other animals have at least some of these experiences without language.
  • intersubjectivity
    Why shouldn't the sharing bring the aspect into being — Banno

    When the doctor asks me what the pain feels like, and I answer "sharp and stabbing", the pain doesn't become sharp and stabbing only after I say it aloud. It already felt that way before the doctor asked, and I was trying to provide my best description of how it felt.
  • intersubjectivity
    But how could we possibly know that we "share common understandings"? If there is a private subjective world, then by definition you cannot see into mine, nor I into yours. and it would not be possible to confirm any commonality.

    How can subjectivity be shared?     — Banno

    There has to be some degree of consensus or communication would be impossible.

    Seriously though, I think it's possible there could be both private and shareable aspects of subjectivity. We can use language to share some aspects, but other aspects cannot be shown or otherwise shared. (Looks like @Marchesk beat me to it.)
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    So, if the boundary of a convention is implicit instead of explicit, we cannot get beyond "I think I am following a rule", because the boundary is only thought of. — Metaphysician Undercover

    As though a convention is something that exists only as an idea.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    A rule consists of a stated principle of conformity, therefore defined boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Only according to your own self-imposed stipulation for how the word "rule" should be used.

    A convention has no boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

    If this is true, as you say, then the second premise of your deductive argument is false. People can't act outside the boundaries of conventions if there are none.

    i have no further interest in being mired in your bad arguments with you.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    No, because I don't think philosophy has a good track record as therapy either. — Snakes Alive

    To be fair, maybe philosophy as therapy hasn't been given much of a chance. I'm not sure that pronouncements can be made about what philosophy or philosophers ought to do, or who should make them, but you might be right that philosophy could go the way of alchemy.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    I asked you how do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule.
    — Luke

    If going outside the boundaries of a convention is the same thing as staying within the boundaries of a rule, then obviously a convention is not the same thing as a rule.
    — Metaphysician Undercover

    If staying within the boundaries of a convention is the same thing as staying within the boundaries of a rule, then obviously a convention is the same thing as a rule.
    — Luke

    Yes, we could make that judgement     — Metaphysician Undercover
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover
    FFS what does premise #1 have to do with conventions?
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover

    Because you've begged the question and presupposed it?
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover

    Then:

    Surely, it must be possible that either following or not following a convention, or acting in some way with regards to a convention, could fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundary of a rule? Or have you simply presupposed that either following or not following a convention does not fulfil the requirement? — Luke
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    Any understanding of the destructive portion of OLP has to start with the recognition that philosophy, objectively, doesn't work. That is, it is not what it claims to be – a form of effective inquiry. — Snakes Alive

    Do you agree with (at least some interpretations of) Wittgenstein that the role of philosophy then becomes a form of therapy for resolving conceptual confusion?
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    Where did you ever get that idea from? — Metaphysician Undercover

    From the preceding discussion, obviously.

    Or perhaps you'd like to try and answer this again:

    I asked you how do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule.

    I understand why going outside the boundaries of a rule would not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries of a rule, but I don't understand why going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries of a rule.

    Surely, it must be possible that either following or not following a convention, or acting in some way with regards to a convention, could fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundary of a rule? Or have you simply presupposed that either following or not following a convention does not fulfil the requirement?     — Luke
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover
    Oh, I see. It is only a requirement of your argument that a convention is the same as a rule. Okay then.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    You can simply define "rule" in a very ambiguous way, allowing all sorts of things to pass as rules without differentiating distinct types under the one name "rule". — Metaphysician Undercover

    This must be what you did in your argument, then? You know, since you ended up agreeing that a convention is the same thing as a rule.

    Despite the fact that we break rules, we can make a conscious effort to follow rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Breaking a convention is not the same as breaking a rule? I thought we just agreed that it was.

    Those other things, which you are inclined to call rules, such as customs, traditions, and habits of language use, do not exist in any form which we might consult in order to make a decisive determination of correct or incorrect. — Metaphysician Undercover

    We can never know whether "customs, traditions, and habits of language use" have been broken? Didn't Trump break with tradition by not attending Biden's inauguration? I guess we'll never know.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover
    Yes, but the real takeaway here is that conventions are no different to rules, so rules do not need to be explicitly stated. You could have saved me plenty of pages by not denying that.

    Now, let's get back to discussing whether one needs language before one can learn rules/conventions...
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover
    And the converse is also true?

    If staying within the boundaries of a convention is the same thing as staying within the boundaries of a rule, then obviously a convention is the same thing as a rule.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    How do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the terms of the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule? — Luke

    If this is true than it proves that a convention is something other than a rule.     — Metaphysician Undercover

    If what is true? I asked you how do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule.

    I understand why going outside the boundaries of a rule would not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries of a rule, but I don't understand why going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries of a rule.

    Surely, it must be possible that either following or not following a convention, or acting in some way with regards to a convention, could fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundary of a rule? Or have you simply presupposed that either following or not following a convention does not fulfil the requirement?
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    If a convention is proposed as a rule, then we must determine whether it fulfills the conditions of being a rule, to make that judgement of whether it qualifies as a rule or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Was it assumed in the argument that a convention is a rule? If so, this is the first I've heard about it.

    I asked you two posts ago whether this was the assumption, and you responded "No":

    Do we assume that conventions and unspoken rules are rules and, therefore, that people not following conventions and unspoken rules are not following rules?
    — Luke

    No     — Metaphysician Undercover


    We judge yes or no, as either fulfilling the terms of the criteria or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

    How do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the terms of the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule?
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    Obviously, going outside the boundaries contradicts staying within the boundaries, therefore going outside the boundaries does not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

    How does going outside the boundaries of a convention not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries of a rule?

    What is the common factor here? Is a convention a rule (prior to the conclusion)?

    If a convention is not a rule, then what does staying within the boundaries of a convention, or not staying within the boundaries of a convention, have to do with staying within the boundaries of a rule? If the answer is "nothing", then what is the common factor between the premises that enables you to derive the conclusion?
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    How many times do I have to repeat the same thing Luke? A is an action, the action of following a rule. The first premise defines this action. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Right, okay. Your argument demonstrates that a convention is not the act of following a rule. Or should that be: The act of following a convention is not the act of following a rule?

    Sorry to be a pain, but how do we infer this from the premises?

    I'll try and follow what you've said:

    When one is proving that B is not an A, then what is required to be an A is stated (definition), and the description of B is stated. If the description of B does not fulfil the stated requirement for being an A, then the conclusion follows that B is not an A. — Metaphysician Undercover

    I'm just a little unclear on how the description of B does not fulfil the stated requirement for being an A. That is, how does "often act[ing] in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules" not fulfil the stated requirement of "act[ing] within the confines of [a] rule"?

    Do we assume that conventions and unspoken rules are rules and, therefore, that people not following conventions and unspoken rules are not following rules? Otherwise, I don't understand how the stated requirement is not fulfilled by the second premise. If the second premise were instead that "People often act in ways within conventions and unspoken rules", would the conclusion then be that the act of following a convention is the act of following a rule?
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    When one is proving that B is not an A, then what is required to be an A is stated (definition), and the description of B is stated. — Metaphysician Undercover

    In your argument, you are attempting to prove your conclusion that a convention (B) is not a rule (A). Your argument does not state what is required to be a rule (A).

    Try again.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    Right, the argument concerns a type of action, what we were calling "rule-following". — Metaphysician Undercover

    What is described in P2, conventions and unspoken rules, do not concern the act of rule-following — Metaphysician Undercover

    Then how does the conclusion follow? Explain it to me like I'm a first-grader.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    Right, the argument concerns a type of action, what we were calling "rule-following". That's why P1 and P2 have "act" in common. — Metaphysician Undercover

    I can see that P1 concerns the act of rule-following. What I don't see from your argument is how P2 concerns the act of rule-following.

    The argument is basically:
    P1. Rules are followed
    P2. Conventions are (often) not followed
    C. Conventions are not rules

    P2 is about convention-following, not rule-following. What does (not) following conventions have to do with following rules? There must be some relationship between them in order to infer the conclusion from the premises. It can't be that there is no relationship between P1 and P2.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    P2 is related to P1 through the concept of what it means to follow a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

    The only possible connection between P1 and P2 that I can see are the words "act" and "outside of". The logic of your argument is no different to this:

    P1. To follow a rule is to not act outside of that rule
    P2. People often act outside of the theatre
    C. The theatre is not a rule

    P! is intended as a definition of "to follow a rule". P2 is intended to state that activities related to conventions ( call them conventional activities) are often outside that definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

    P1 defines following and breaking a rule. P2 tells us that people often break conventions. You know what that means:

    P1. To follow a rule is to not break that rule
    P2. People often break my heart
    C. My heart is not a rule

    The conclusion does not follow from the premises. You have begged the question with your argument and assumed what you set out to prove.

    That there are distinct referents for "rule" is taken for granted. — Metaphysician Undercover

    This leads to ambiguity and confusion, as has been demonstrated. Also, I'd hate for there to be any equivocation.

    The argument is meant to show that the activities described, or referred to by "rules", def#2, what you call unspoken rules, or conventions, do not qualify as activities called "following a rule", as dictated by def#1. — Metaphysician Undercover

    How so? You gave a definition for following a rule in premise 1 and in premise 2 you say that conventions are often not followed. What's the connection between them, the word "follow"?

    P1. To follow a rule is to not break that rule
    P2. People often do not follow a sports team
    C. A sports team is not a rule

    What I want from you is to accept that a custom or tradition def#2, is not a principle of conformity, i.e. not a rule being followed, nor a rule to be followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

    But, of course it is. Even the dictionary says customs and traditions are rules. And following a rule is one of the main things you can do with a rule.

    Maybe if you had a better argument I might be convinced otherwise.

    Just so that we have clarity, can you define "rules" for me? — Metaphysician Undercover

    Certainly. A rule is one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    I'm happy to adopt your terminology of "def#1" (or "#1") for explicit rules and "def#2" (or "#2") for non-explicit rules, but I'll remind you that your OED definitions #1 and #2 do not make the same distinction.
    — Luke

    However you continue acting as if there is no difference. That's hypocrisy. You say 'I'll play by that rule', but then your actions violate the rule. I will not play that game with you.     — Metaphysician Undercover

    This distinction was made very clear in my last post. Here it is again, simplified for you, ensuring to maintain a very clear distinction between explicit and non-explicit rules:

    P1. To follow an explicit rule means to not break that explicit rule
    P2. People often break non-explicit rules
    C. Non-explicit rules are not explicit rules

    This can be re-stated as:

    P1. To follow E means to not break E
    P2. People often break N
    C. N are not E

    The conclusion does not follow, since P2 has no relation to P1. The conclusion is not inferred from the premises; it's an assumption or definition that is required by the premises at the outset.

    Begging the question "occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it."

    I changed your P1 from "rules" to "explicit rules" because your position is that "rules" must be explicitly stated and non-explicit rules are not (true) rules. If you look at your original argument, you have equivocated in your use of "rule", as the abbreviated argument above clearly demonstrates.

    However you continue acting as if there is no difference. That's hypocrisy. You say 'I'll play by that rule', but then your actions violate the rule. I will not play that game with you. — Metaphysician Undercover

    That's not at all true. I have emphasised the distinction which was hidden in your argument. You required the equivocation in order to be able to draw a conclusion from your premises.

    Yes, I did need to go to that extent, because you continually refused to look at the difference between those two, assuming that customs and traditions (def#2) are "principles" of conformity (def#1).. — Metaphysician Undercover

    See my quote at the top of this post and my stipulation that I agree to your distinction between explicit and non-explicit, but that the OED definitions do not distinguish def#1 and def#2 along the same lines.

    I'm arguing (or just reading the dictionary, which tells us) that rules can either be explicitly stated or not. I have been maintaining this distinction and have been referring to them as explicit and non-explicit rules. However, I am confident you will urge that we collapse this distinction and demand to return to your original argument, despite its equivocation and question begging.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    Conventions, as you use the term, are not explicitly stated rules. So doing that switch, changes what the argument is about, while maintaining the structure. — Metaphysician Undercover

    What do you mean it "changes what the argument is about"? Let's remind ourselves of the original purpose of your argument:

    So if there are some different types of "rules" which are non-explicit, and therefore impossible to be followed, these types of rules are irrelevant to our discussion.
    — Metaphysician Undercover

    Conventions, unspoken rules, and the unwritten rules of baseball are not impossible to be followed. These are all relevant rules.
    — Luke

    Since you're having so much difficulty understanding this simple matter, I'll spell it out for you in the form of a simple deductive argument. First premise: to follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions. Second premise: people often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules. Conclusion: conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed.     — Metaphysician Undercover

    You produced your deductive argument as support/proof of your initial claim that conventions and other non-explicit rules are "impossible to be followed". Since you accept the conclusion of "my" argument (with its substitution of "explicitly-stated rules"), this implies you would agree that explicitly-stated rules are likewise "impossible to be followed".

    Later, you offered a different interpretation of the conclusion, suggesting a different purpose of the argument:

    The conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that conventions are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "conventions are rules". — Metaphysician Undercover

    Did you need to go to all the effort of a deductive argument simply to draw a distinction between explicit- and non-explicit rules?

    But that's clearly not your purpose here. You were desperately trying to make the case that conventions and other non-explicit rules do not qualify as "rules" - as you use the term - and that "true" rules can only be explicitly stated. Let's re-write your argument to make explicit your true intention:

    P1. To follow an explicitly stated ("true") rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions

    P2. People often act in ways outside of non-explicit rules, such as conventions and unspoken rules.

    C. Conventions and unspoken rules are not explicitly stated ("true") rules which are followed.

    The conclusion does not even follow from the premises, and your question begging is now made starkly obvious. P1 and P2 are each about completely different things. That's because you assumed that they were different, and that conventions could not be rules, before you ever derived the conclusion.

    But there's a further problem here. Even if your deductive argument does demonstrate that conventions are not explicitly-stated rules, it also demonstrates that explicitly-stated rules are not explicitly-stated rules:

    P1. To follow an explicitly stated rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions

    P2. People often act in ways outside of explicitly-stated rules.

    C. Explicitly stated rules are not explicitly stated rules which are followed.

    Oh shit, even with this explicit wording, "true" rules are not "true" rules. (I would add the "which are followed", but let's not forget your intention was to prove that conventions are not "true" rules, so that's the part of the conclusion we're concerned with here.)

    Explicit rules obviously are explicit rules, and they obviously are followed in some cases, which is what your second premise allows. But exactly the same can be said about non-explicit rules: that they are non-explicit rules and that they are followed in some cases. So, your argument fails to achieve what you intended.

    If you define "rule" such that it must be explicitly stated, then obviously a non-explicit rule won't qualify. But you've provided no good reason for restricting the definition of "rule" in this way, other than it's for the purpose of your "philosophical inquiry".
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    You changed the content, so that what you presented was not even similar to my argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

    How was it “not even similar”? It produces the same conclusion for conventions as it does for explicitly stated rules.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    You took mine, changed it to suit your purpose, and asked if I was OK with the conclusion. I'm ok with it, because I told you I would go along with your substitution just to humour you — Metaphysician Undercover

    So do you agree with the conclusion that “Explicitly stated rules are not rules which are followed” or were you only humouring me? In your last post you said “I have no problem with that conclusion” and went on to detail why you had no problem with it.

    I don't make a conclusion about all cases, — Metaphysician Undercover

    It’s taken you a while to admit it. Therefore, your conclusion should be stated as: “Conventions [and/or explicitly stated rules] are rules which are not followed in some cases, and which are followed in other cases.

    I don't make a conclusion about all cases, I make a conclusion which contradicts a general statement which is intended to apply to all cases — Metaphysician Undercover

    Which statement is that? I’ve never claimed that rules or conventions are followed in all cases.

    Isn't your position that one needs to learn language before one can learn and follow rules? How can inanimate matter do this, and how does it learn a language?
    — Luke

    We discussed this already, the difference between the prescriptive and descriptive sense of "following rules". We are now discussing whether human beings can be described as rule followers. This is the result of the changes you made to my argument, the difference caused by switching my use of "rule", (def#1), for yours, (def#2). Your obtuseness never ceases to amaze me Luke.     — Metaphysician Undercover

    I didn’t change the structure of your argument in any way. The same argument applies equally to both #1 and #2.

    Besides, what does any of that have to do with inanimate matter? The supposed “rules” that inanimate matter must follow (i.e. the laws of physics) are not the same type of rules we have been discussing here (e.g. the rules of a game). That’s equivocation.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    No, I have no problem with that conclusion, and I've already explained more than once why. Rules are broken, even explicitly stated rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

    You accused me of equivocation earlier because you thought your argument applied only to conventions and not to explicitly stated rules. It seems you've changed your mind. You also informed me in your last post that the original intention of your argument was to demonstrate that conventions are not rules. I've just used your argument to demonstrate that explicitly stated rules (def#1) are not rules - and you agree! Now you're back to arguing that rules are not followed.

    So if we are given the option for a general description of human activity as either rules are followed, or rules are not followed, we must conclude rules are not followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

    In all cases? Or are you just going to continue to ignore this question? You did not even engage the problem I pointed out with your argument: that you make a conclusion about all cases from a premise about some cases.

    You say we must conclude that rules are not followed, but we can equally conclude from the premises that rules are followed. Why isn't that your conclusion instead?

    That's the simple fact which observation gives us. — Metaphysician Undercover

    An observation, not a deduction?

    And this is the difference we can observe between human beings and inanimate matter, we do not necessarily follow rules, as does inanimate matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Isn't your position that one needs to learn language before one can learn and follow rules? How can inanimate matter do this, and how does it learn a language?

    Earlier you were arguing that we need to be conscious of rules in order to be able to follow them, and now you're arguing we don't follow rules at all? Gimme a break. Talking to you is an endless rabbit hole. You just keep changing your position.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy - Now: More Examples! Better Explanations! Worse Misconceptions!
    There's no hasty generalization, you're just refusing to accept the premises which are true and widely supported by the evidence we see all around us. — Metaphysician Undercover

    I don't refuse to accept the premises (depending on the definition of "often"); I refuse to accept the conclusion. The premises are no less true for the following argument:

    P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions

    P2. People often act in ways outside of explicitly stated rules.

    C. Explicitly stated rules are not rules which are followed.

    I have not altered your original argument in any way, other than by replacing "conventions and unspoken rules" with "explicitly stated rules". Do you not find this conclusion to be problematic?

    Bull shit Luke. I switched only at your insistence, that I make the substitution, and look at the argument from the perspective which the substitution provided. — Metaphysician Undercover

    So the original intention of your deductive argument was an attempt to demonstrate that conventions and unspoken rules are not rules. Thanks for clarifying.

    Making that substitution results in the conclusion that rules are not followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

    As I pointed out in my previous post, the wording of your conclusion leaves it ambiguous whether rules are not followed or whether rules are not rules. Maybe we can settle for 'rules are not (rules which are followed)'?

    The thing is, that when we make a generalization to describe a certain type of thing, it must apply to all of the things in that class, or else it is a faulty generalization. — Metaphysician Undercover

    You mean like how your P2 doesn't apply to all cases? Or how you derive a conclusion which applies to all cases from a premise which doesn't apply to all cases?

    You want to make "convention" equivalent to "rule", when the evidence is clear that many conventions are not being followed by many people. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Let's clear up this lingering false assumption of yours once and for all. Explicitly stated rules are not followed in all cases, either. You seem to think this somehow applies only to conventions and unspoken rules. A good example of explicitly stated rules is in sports. People cheat (i.e. break the rules) in sports all the time. For example, Lance Armstrong or doping at the Olympics. So, the evidence is equally clear that many explicitly stated rules "are not being followed by many people". For some reason, you seem to think that explicitly stated rules are different to conventions in this respect.

    That leaves us with the choice of either rejecting the generalization "human beings follow rules, or taking conventions outside the class of "rules". — Metaphysician Undercover

    Please decide what you are arguing for. Is it that conventions are not rules, or that conventions are not followed. And, if the latter, is it in all cases or only in some?

    Obviously, the choice is yours. Are you going to stick with your insistence that conventions are rules, in which case we must conclude that human beings do not follow the rules, or are you going to come over to my side, and allow that conventions are fundamentally not rules, thereby allowing that rules are a special sort of convention which human beings use conscious effort to follow. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Yes, I'm going to stick with my insistence that conventions are rules, because this is in accordance with Wittgenstein's philosophy, which I am trying in vain to convey to you. As @Antony Nickles has repeated several times, "we learn language and the world together". Language is a social activity, which is why it is closely associated with conventions. You have gone awry with this sort of thinking:

    The basic aspect of learning how to do something is fundamentally different from learning a rule. Do you recognize a difference between theory and practice? — Metaphysician Undercover

    Learning a rule is not a "theory", and neither is language. Language is a practice. Games, sports and other explicitly-stated-rule-bound activities are simply codified practices. You can refer to the rules if you are in doubt, but if you know how to a play a game or sport, you usually don't need to. Even if you don't know how to play, you can join in the practice until you break a rule, and then others can make you aware of it, and you learn it.
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