There is no "lack of motion" in eternalism, so yes I ignore fictitious problems. — Inis

In the article I linked to in my last post, it states that "60 physicists, along with a handful of philosophers" attended a conference to discuss this issue. Are they all incorrect?

Why do you think there is no motion under eternalism, particularly if that were the case, no one would advocate it? — Inis

I think that there is "no motion under eternalism" from everything I've read about it. It also states the same in the article I linked to in my previous post. Eternalism is synonymous with the block universe.

Alternatively, presentism may dispense with an observer independent objective reality. — Inis

Have you worked out yet how to account for eternalism's lack of motion, or are you still ignoring that eternalism has this problem?

Many physicists argue that Einstein’s position is implied by the two pillars of modern physics: Einstein’s masterpiece, the general theory of relativity, and the Standard Model of particle physics. The laws that underlie these theories are time-symmetric — that is, the physics they describe is the same, regardless of whether the variable called “time” increases or decreases. Moreover, they say nothing at all about the point we call “now” — a special moment (or so it appears) for us, but seemingly undefined when we talk about the universe at large. The resulting timeless cosmos is sometimes called a “block universe” — a static block of space-time in which any flow of time, or passage through it, must presumably be a mental construct or other illusion.

https://www.quantamagazine.org/a-debate-over-the-physics-of-time-20160719/

§76. Bounded and unbounded concepts differ conceptually but share a family resemblance. Their resemblance is like that of two "similarly shaped and distributed" colour patches, one with a sharp boundary and the other a blurred boundary.

§77. The degree of resemblance between the sharp and blurred colour patches (at §76) "depends on the degree to which the latter lacks sharpness". W asks us to imagine drawing a sharp rectangle which 'corresponds' to a blurred one, before noting that this is a "hopeless task".

Won’t you then have to say: “Here I might just as well draw a circle as a rectangle or a heart, for all the colours merge. Anything - and nothing - is right.”

W indicates that the concepts of ethics and aesthetics contain a high degree of blurriness, and that (e.g.) philosophers have a similarly hopeless task of trying to find "definitions that correspond to our concepts".

He's saying, that if his knowledge of what a game is, is equivalent to an unformulated definition, then he ought to be able to formulate that definition, and this description, or explanation, which he ought to be able to produce, if his knowledge is like that, would completely express his knowledge of what a game is. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then why does he ask whether his knowledge is not completely expressed in the explanations that he could give? Your account is inconsistent with the preceding passages:

When I give the description “The ground was quite covered with plants”, do you want to say that I don’t know what I’m talking about until I can give a definition of a plant?
An explanation of what I meant would be, say, a drawing and the words “The ground looked roughly like this”. — PI §70

And this is just how one might explain what a game is. One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. - I do not mean by this expression, however, that he is supposed to see in those examples that common feature which I - for some reason - was unable to formulate, but that he is now to employ those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples is not an indirect way of explaining - in default of a better one. — PI §71

Though this comparison may mislead in various ways. - [e.g.] One is now inclined to extend the comparison: to have understood the explanation means to have in one’s mind an idea of the thing explained, and that is a sample or picture. — PI §73

Isn’t my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations that I could give? That is, in my describing examples of various kinds of game, showing how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of these, saying that I would hardly call this or that a game, and so on. — PI §75

An "unformulated definition" suggests that there is something of my knowledge (i.e. something mental) which is left unexpressed in the "mere" giving of explanations (e.g. by providing a list of typical examples). If this missing something were able to be formulated, then maybe "I’d be able to recognize it as the expression of my knowledge". But this picture is inaccurate. Instead: "my knowledge...[is] completely expressed in the explanations that I could give".

§75. "What does it mean to know what a game is...and not be able to say it?"

Wittgenstein answers in the form of a question that could be rewritten as: "my knowledge, my concept of a game, [is] completely expressed in the explanations that I could give".

§73. Explaining the names of colours by pointing to samples is comparable to giving someone a colour chart. "Though this comparison may mislead in various ways." One of the various ways it could mislead is by incorrectly assuming that to have an understanding of the explanation means "to have in one's mind an idea of the thing explained, and that is a sample or picture." What does this paradigmatic picture of what is common to all samples - e.g. "the sample of what is common to all shades of green" - look like?

W then asks: "Might there not be such 'general' samples?" - i.e. physical instances of the paradigmatic picture? "Certainly!" he says, but whether this 'general' sample is to be understood as a paradigmatic type or instead as a particular token depends on how the sample is used, or "the way the samples are applied".

What shape should a sample of "pure green" be? If it were, e.g., a rectangular or an irregular shape, then we might mistake it for a sample of shape instead of colour. This demonstrates that it depends on how the samples are used, and that we cannot just assume that it will play the role of a colour sample regardless of any context of use.

§74. W raises the idea that someone who views a leaf as a sample of a paradigmatic type sees it differently from someone who views the same leaf as a sample of a particular token. He quickly dismisses this idea insofar as seeing it differently amounts only to using it differently. He does not deny that people can see things differently, but this is exhibited by their use of those things, and by their use of language in relation to those things.

One clock runs slower than the other. Neither of them tracks the pace of the advancement of the present. If there was a device that could do that, you'd have your empirical evidence for the view. — noAxioms

I'm not sure how this relates to what I've said. Perhaps you're just noting another problem with presentism in relation to the rate at which time flows? Again, I think we need to assume presentism (or that "the A theory of time is correct") for the purposes of the topic of this discussion. However, if you all just want to discuss the failings of presentism then have at it.

The question that bothers me is why are there no instances of time travel? Why is it difficult? We see travel in 3D space - it's so commonplace that no one even notices it. What is so special about the 4th dimension? — TheMadFool

Time travel may not be possible, or we may not have discovered how to do it yet, but I think we can entertain the possibility for this discussion at least.

How about doing a simple time dilation experiment? Synchronise atomic clocks, and take one on a flight around the world. When the clocks are reunited, they no longer agree on the time. How is that possible under presentism? — Inis

I am aware of at least some of the problems of presentism (including this one), but it seems to me that presentism needs to be assumed in order to address the topic of this discussion.

In response to your question, the clocks are reunited and measured from a preferred frame of reference, so can't we also talk about presentism and eternalism from a preferred (e.g. Earthly) frame of reference, at least for the purpose of this discussion?

No times but the present exist, and wherever the present is, that is what exists. Yesterday the present was thataway, and now the present is thisaway. Nothing about presentism says that the present has to stay in one place — SophistiCat

Right, I've never denied that either.

I think it's important to remember that the motivation, the main selling point of presentism is this inescapable subjective perception of being in time - and that includes both the instantaneous now and its temporal progress. However we choose to formalize and articulate presentism, we shouldn't lose track of those basic intuitions, else this turns into a sterile formal exercise. — SophistiCat

I agree, and I've never said otherwise. What I've said is that, according to my view of presentism, no other times but the present time exist, and time travel can only be viewed from an eternalist or B theory perspective of time.

If I were to hazard a guess at what the statement could possibly mean, I might say: 'More people than I have been to Russia', or maybe just 'Other people have been to Russia'. For those keeping score, I think Baden did a good job of it above.

It could be code for "There are doughnuts in the conference room." — frank

Shut it down people, he's onto us.

Love the 8yr old daughter's response. And his 'Cool. Thank You'.
How perfectly simple, civilised and charming. — Amity

Yes, I thought so too. :up:

According to you, time doesn't pass at all, according to presentism. That can't be right. And I don't mean that in the sense that presentism can't be right, but in the sense that your construal of presentism can't be right. — SophistiCat

You may be right.

To offer some explanation and defence of my view, I consider there to be a perfect symmetry between the motion of Presentism and the motionlessness of Eternalism. Presentism, with its present moment ever flowing into the future is how we experience time, whereas Eternalism with its motionless ontological equality is how we represent or model time. Both are required for our understanding of time. Without the eternalist picture, there is no model or representation of time and we cannot even talk about time. Without the presentist picture, there is no motion and thus no time at all. They need each other. Anyway, that's my probably ill-conceived view in a nutshell. I would consider naming it 'Dumb Presentism', but too many might agree.

In my previous post I argued that only the present time exists according to presentism and that no other times exist. I expect an easy rebuttal to this would be, e.g., that future times don't exist now but that they will exist (or may exist) when they come into existence. Likewise for past times: that they did exist even though they no longer do. Fair enough, but I still like the symmetry of my view. Donning my pure presentist hat for a moment, I might even respond: what other times are you referring to?

One consequence of my view would be that even if the presentist did time travel (to some abnormal temporal destination), then they could be oblivious to having done so because it would always remain the present time for them anyway.

I don't see why presentism as such should be inimical to other kinds of time travel, proceeding at different rates than the normal forward rate. — SophistiCat

Time travel is not possible according to presentism because those other times (or travel destinations) do not exist (according to presentism). I did not get into it in my previous post, but the caveat I spoke of there (that the present is always moving into the future) can only be viewed in terms of the B theory. According to presentism, no future or past times exist nor any other time except for the present time, and therefore time travel is not possible by presentism's own lights. Any time travel, including time travel at the "normal forward rate", can only be viewed in B theory terms. That is, unless you mix or disregard the tenets of the A and the B theories, because obviously we can and do talk about other times and probably nobody is a true presentist.

Hi Walter

Firstly, it depends what you mean by the A theory and the B theory of time. Presumably you are using these as synonyms for Presentism and Eternalism (respectively), in which case you are talking about the ontology or existence of time(s).

There is also the [McTaggart's] A-series and B-series of time, which refer to a temporal ordering of events, but that's not important right now.

I will use 'A theory' as a synonym for Presentism and 'B theory' as a synonym for Eternalism below.

The B theory holds that all times (and everything at those times) exist...equally. Therefore, those times are available travel destinations, if we are to assume that time travel is possible.

The A theory holds that only the present time (and everything at that time) exists. Therefore any time other than the present time is not an available travel destination. This appears to rule out the possibility of time travel according to the A theory.

However, there is one caveat, which is that the present time is always moving into the future.

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.

5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?
You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye.
And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.

These are concepts that Wittgenstein doesn't explicitly talk about in the Tractatus... — Wallows

Sorry to interrupt but yes, he does. According to the index:

free will, 5.1362
soul, 5.5421, 5.641, 6.4312

I disagree. I think that whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. That we cannot talk about the "metaphysical subject" doesn't mean it doesn't exist in the world. — Wallows

Then you disagree with Wittgenstein. As quoted by Fooloso4 above:

The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it. — Tractatus 5.641

I think I see your point, but isn't it kind of an inverted version. In the one case, "teach the children a game" is wide open, unbounded, referring to anything which could be construed as a game, until it's restricted by "anything except gambling". — Metaphysician Undercover

Likewise, "stand roughly there" is wide open, unbounded, referring to anything which could be construed as (roughly) "there", until it gets restricted by (a more specific) there.

Returning to your question at the top of the page, there is no contradiction in giving the order "stand roughly there"; this does not signify both a bounded and unbounded area. As I stated earlier, it has some definition even though it is not "everywhere" defined. The use of the word "there" in this example is not completely without definition. Maybe think of it as a comparison between a loosely bounded and a more definitely bounded area, or perhaps an area of "blurred edges" vs. an area of "sharp edges".

If I add "roughly", to say "stand roughly there", it does not change the meaning of "stand there" such that I am now telling you to stand at an area rather than at a spot, it just means that I am not fussy about the particular spot where you stand, and therefore I have not bothered to properly determine the precise spot where I want you to stand. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is similar to the person who gives the order to Wittgenstein to teach the children a game - they do not "properly determine" or draw a boundary around what type of game to teach the children at first (i.e. they do not tell him to exclude gambilng games), but this does not change the meaning of "game". In your words, it just means they are "not fussy about the particular" game. The further instruction not to teach them a gambling game acts as a rigid boundary, or a more specific definition, for this special purpose.

Not agreeing with it and wanting it to change are two entirely different things. — Isaac

So you don't want it to change?

I only made a couple of posts because Sam and StreetlightX made a couple of comments I found interesting. If they go nowhere, I'll duck out again and you can get back to your work of saying what Wittgenstein said but in slightly different words. — Isaac

Personally, I find that attempting to summarise what I think Wittgenstein is saying in each section gives me a better understanding of the text. I could probably do that on my own, but I doubt that I would have the same motivation to do so if I wasn't reading/summarising the work along with others. I'm also interested in finding points of disagreement, and discovering other's views on things that I might not have thought about myself.

I'm not denying that's my opinion. I'm questioning why that would make you feel obliged to stop posting (or that I should start another thread for that matter). — Isaac

Because what I and several others have happily been doing on this thread for the past 28 pages is what you want to change. I take it that you want me to stop posting because I've mainly been doing the type of explication that you want to end.

On the other hand, a new discussion would give you the chance to discuss exactly what you'd like to discuss, and we could continue this one without you trying to dictate a change.

Not at all, why would you think that? — Isaac

I got that impression from your expressed dissatisfaction with the point of this discussion on several occasions throughout the thread, including when you referred to it as "onanistic scholasticism" and told us it wasn't for you. Then, in your previous post, you singled me out as an example of how, in your opinion, this type of section-by-section exegesis we've been doing is not worthwhile. You know, you could always just start another discussion...

Should I stop posting? I thought the point of this discussion was in the title.

Try this. "Stand roughly there" does not signify an area at all. It signifies a point, which has not been properly determined. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by "properly determined"?

§72. The section is headed 'Seeing what is in common', and reintroduces similar themes to those raised in the discussion of pointing (at the shape, colour, etc.) at §33-36. Wittgenstein provides three examples of "explaining" to another person how to find a common colour.

The first example contains various multicoloured pictures in which one of the colours is yellow ochre. Wittgenstein tells the student that the common colour in all of these examples is 'yellow ochre'. Note that Wittgenstein gives an account of the odd type of "explanation" he will provide here: "an explanation that another person will come to understand by looking for, and seeing, what is common to the pictures. Then he can look at, can point to, the common feature."

The second example contains figures of different shapes which are all painted the same colour. Wittgenstein again tells the student that the common colour in all of these examples is 'yellow ochre'.

The third example contains samples of different shades of blue. Wittgenstein tells the student that the common colour in all of these examples is ("what I call") 'blue'.

I take it that the student does not know in advance the names of the colours, and that he is being taught to identify them via Wittgenstein's "explanation" of seeing what is in common. I use scare quotes here because Wittgenstein "explains" only that there is a common colour and then assumes the other person will find it themselves without any further instruction. Note that in the 'blue' example, there are no two identical colour samples - therefore, what commonality is the student supposed to find by sight alone?

§70. W's interlocutor expresses concern that "if the concept 'game' is without boundaries in this way, you don't really know what you mean by a 'game'." W responds that he can use the description "The ground was quite covered with plants" without having to provide a definition of 'plant' in order to demonstrate his understanding. W states that a satisfactory explanation (i.e. demonstration of his understanding) of this statement could be a drawing, together with an explanation that "The ground looked roughly like this". Wittgenstein says that he could even explain that "It looked exactly like this," but he advises that his use of "exactly" here is not and need not be precisely exact. This level of precision is not required in order to explain what one means, or demonstrate one's understanding.

W gives a scenario in which he is asked to "Show the children a game" and he teaches them a gambling game. The person giving the order complains that they didn't mean that sort of game. W asks whether the person must have had the exclusion of the gambling game in mind when they gave the order. This again demonstrates that there is no boundary to the concept prior to setting one for a special purpose, in which case the concept gets more specifically defined via its agreed upon use. It also touches on Wittgenstein's rejection of the notion that meaning is determined by the mind.

§71. Wittgenstein dismisses the idea that a concept "with blurred edges" is not useful (or not a concept), stating that it is often more useful than a concept with "sharp" edges.

But is it senseless to say “Stay roughly here”? Imagine that I were standing with someone in a city square and said that. As I say it, I do not bother drawing any boundary, but just make a pointing gesture - as if I were indicating a particular spot. And this is just how one might explain what a game is. One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way.

W advises that he is not intending the person receiving the explanation to find the features common to all of the examples; commonalities that W was somehow unable to express. "Here giving examples is not an indirect way of explaining - in default of a better one." Giving a different type of explanation, such as a dictionary definition, could equally be misunderstood. But the giving of examples in this way is how we do commonly explain the meaning of words, including "game".

What you call my "error" was based in your unwarranted introduction of the concept of "conventional use". Remove that assumption (that there is such a thing as "conventional use") because it is unsupported by the text, and the appearance of error disappears. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is clearly not what I was referring to as your "error". Your error was your repeated claim that a) use creates a boundary; and that b) instances of use are for a special purpose.

It may be helpful to think of the boundary as the limits of the concept; as those borderline cases where it is difficult to decide whether something falls under the concept or not, e.g. whether a hot dog is a sandwich. Wittgenstein says that we do not need to decide this boundary once and for all in order to use the concept. However, we can decide to draw a limit to the concept, if we choose to, for a special purpose. It is not an instance of use that draws this boundary, but our agreement in a particular instance or for a particular purpose to use the word in this special (more specific) way. Otherwise, there is no boundary to the concept and it will just have it's usual unbounded meaning.

B-theorists tend to speak in the tenseless terms of earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than, instead of the tensed terms of past, present and future.

So he never introduced the notion of "conventional use", as you are claiming. You are adding that, and it distorts what Wittgenstein has actually said. He has distinguished between having a boundary and not having a boundary. The boundary is produced when the word is used. Each instance of use being for a particular, or "special" (besondern) purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

You claim that my talk of conventional use distorts the matter, but you fail to mention how. You say here that W distinguishes having and not having a boundary, that the "boundary is produced when the word is used" and that each instance of use is for a special purpose. Furthermore, in your previous post you read Wittgenstein as posing a paradox and to be saying that: "the concept "game" has no boundary unless someone gives it a boundary by using it for a specific purpose. However, whenever the word "game" appears, it's an instance of someone using the concept for a specific purpose."

Now, after I pointed out your error, you pretend that none of this was your position.

Can you point to the bit that denies the reality of motion? I don't see it, but then I am chronically averse to the absurd. — Inis

The B-theory of time is the name given to one of two positions regarding philosophy of time. B-theorists argue that the flow of time is an illusion, that the past, present and future are equally real, and that time is tenseless. This would mean that temporal becoming is not an objective feature of reality. [...]

The terms A and B theory are sometimes used as synonyms to the terms presentism and eternalism, [...]

The debate between A-theorists and B-theorists is a continuation of a metaphysical dispute reaching back to the ancient Greek philosophers Heraclitus and Parmenides. Parmenides thought that reality is timeless and unchanging [B-theory]. Heraclitus, in contrast, believed that the world is a process of ceaseless change or flux [A-theory]. [...]

The difference between A-theorists and B-theorists is often described as a dispute about temporal passage or 'becoming' and 'progressing'. B-theorists argue that this notion is purely psychological [read: illusory]. [...]

It is therefore common (though not universal), for B-theorists to be four-dimensionalists, that is, to believe that objects are extended in time as well as in space and therefore have temporal as well as spatial parts.

Yet it seems unavoidable according to your claim: "The boundary is produced when the word is used."

What? You said that the use produces a boundary. Wittgenstein says it can be used without a boundary, so you're wrong. Also, W says it's the boundary which can be drawn for a special purpose, not an instance of use.

The boundary is produced when the word is used. Each instance of use being for a particular, or "special" (besondern) purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

For I can give the concept of number rigid boundaries in this way, that is, use the word “number” for a rigidly bounded concept; but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by a boundary. — PI 68

I don't think our understanding relies on the flow of time though. This flow didn't even appear in Newton's theories, despite the fact that he claimed that time "flows equably". — Inis

Im not sure whether Newton had much to say about how the human body functions.

Also, B-theory doesn't imply that motion doesn't exist. I hope not anyway. — Inis

It does, at least according to some definitions.

If the flow of time were an illusion, wouldn't we at least experience it? — Inis

It would seem to run counter to our understanding of how the body (including our experiences) functions, which relies on actual motion.

I'm not asking you to read a 42-page article. I was talking about the brief Wikipedia article I linked to: the block universe theory.

I'm not sure whether you didn't read the link or didn't understand it, or whether you think that pretending not to understand it constitutes an argument against the view. Nevertheless, I've done as much as I'm willing to to help you understand it.