Comments

  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    It's not as though the concept needs some inner thing to latch onto — Sam26

    This seems at odds with the rest of your post. If this is true, then I don't understand why you would also say:

    I would say that everything speaks in favor of common inner experiences, and generally nothing against it. Moreover, isn't this how "we know" that are inner subjective experiences are the same. If they weren't the same experiences, I believe the conceptual public use would break down. — Sam26

    If our concepts do not need "some inner thing to latch onto", then why would our "conceptual public use" break down without "some inner thing to latch onto"? It need not be that:

    Everything speaks in favor of people seeing the same colors, tasting the bitterness of dark chocolate, feeling the hardness of a table, etc. — Sam26

    Because it's not as though these concepts (i.e. the same colours, bitterness, hardness) need some inner thing to latch onto.

    I take Wittgenstein to be genuine in saying:

    272. The essential thing about private experience is really not that each
    person possesses his own specimen, but that nobody knows whether
    other people also have this or something else. The assumption would
    thus be possible — though unverifiable — that one section of mankind
    had one visual impression of red, and another section another.     — Philosophical Investigations
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    ↪Banno
    I thought it was an interesting question. Can we even talk about experiences or sensations in subjective terms? Or is doing so “running up against the limits of language”? But I understand it’s probably too far off the topic of this discussion.
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    Yeah, so drop the "in terms of private experience"... — Banno

    Who has a “public experience”? Wouldnt that imply that everyone has the same experience?
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    You and I both see the red Ferrari. You say you also have a "private subjective experience", and "No-one apart from myself will ever know what particular colour I am experiencing" - but that's not right. I know you are "experiencing red". You do not see a green Ferrari."...the actual colour that I experience in my mind, which could be green for me and yellow for you" is incoherent.

    Why not just say that seeing a red Ferrari is a public experience?     — Banno

    The phrase "public experience" strikes me as an incoherent concept, at least in terms of subjective experiences.

    Wittgenstein would probably say instead that the "private subjective experience" drops out of consideration as irrelevant; what is of grammatical relevance are only our appropriate/correct uses - or our behavioural responses to uses - of the word "red". If I order the Ferrari online, all that matters is that the one delivered to me is the same colour as the one shown in the picture you posted. It doesn't matter if the Ferrari seller and I (or anyone else) have a different "private subjective experience" wrt the colour in the picture; it only matters that we both have the same grammatical behaviour towards that colour and both call it "red". You do not know that I am "experiencing red" - at least not in the same way that you do. But our subjective experiences of seeing a colour needn't be the same in order to use colour words correctly anyway. Even a blind or colour-blind person can learn to use the word "red".
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    Atomic facts are not constituted from things — Banno

    This seems to contradict 2.01 and 2.011.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    Appearances are default evidence in support of what they represent to be the case.

    So, if event x appears to be present, that's default evidence that it is present.

    If a certain theory about the world implies that x is not present, but past, then we have default evidence that the theory in question is false.

    Surprise me - understand what I just said.     — Bartricks

    I don't believe that what appears to be the case is evidence that it is actually the case. Otherwise, it follows that the Earth is flat, that the Sun revolves around the Earth, that optical illusions are not illusions, and a host of other things that are known to be untrue, simply because that is how they appear to be. The "evidence" of appearances supports both an inaccurate theory (if the appearances are non-veridical) and an accurate theory (one which better accounts for those non-veridical appearances). Which of these is the "default evidence"?

    Would you allow for any alternative evidence to outweigh the "default evidence" of appearances?

    Anyway, how about addressing the argument in the OP? With which premise do you disagree?
    — Bartricks

    I’ve already told you. You’ve provided no argument that things are exactly how they appear to be. Saying that this is the “default justification” is not an argument. If it was, then you should agree that the world is flat, just as it appears to be.
    — Luke

    OP.

    I don't think you know an argument from your elbow given you think if someone says "if p, then q" they are defending p!     — Bartricks

    I was disagreeing with your second premise, not-q: that our impressions/sensations are not inaccurate and that things are exactly how they appear to be.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    You haven't answered my question - if there's a giant ball and you're tiny by comparison and are stood on a tiny bit of it, how would things look from there? Flat, yes? So there's no illusion. — Bartricks

    There’s no illusion that the world is flat? You have just accounted for the illusion that the world appears flat even though it’s a giant ball and isn’t flat.

    Added to which you're assuming materialism in assuming that there's an extended ball out there in space. — Bartricks

    And you don’t?

    But if - if - materialism is true and the earth appears flat when it is round (which it doesn't!), then that would be further evidence of materialism's falsity. — Bartricks

    So, basically, if science discovers that things are not as they appear, then that’s evidence of materialism’s falsity? According to what definition of materialism should things be as they appear?

    Anyway, how about addressing the argument in the OP? With which premise do you disagree? — Bartricks

    I’ve already told you. You’ve provided no argument that things are exactly how they appear to be. Saying that this is the “default justification” is not an argument. If it was, then you should agree that the world is flat, just as it appears to be.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    ↪Bartricks
    Doesn’t it appear that the Earth is flat, or that the sun goes around the Earth?
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    ↪Bartricks
    That “appearances enjoy default justification”? Then the world is flat, I suppose?
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    I am then arguing that not q. Not q here means I am arguing that our impressions of presentness are NOT systematically mistaken. — Bartricks

    Where can I find that argument?
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    if materialism is true, then our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate.

    So, if p, then q.

    The default is that our impressions are not systematically inaccurate.

    So: not q.

    Therefore not p.     — Bartricks

    I don't see how you conclude not-p when you are strongly arguing for q.

    For example:

    Nothing that I sense to be present is actually present. — Bartricks

    If p, then q. You are strongly arguing for q. Therefore, you are strongly arguing that materialism is true.
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    Ah, but one non-goat won't be sufficient if eating is ongoing. — Janus

    Goats shave eat all those, and only those, that do not eat themselves.

    I’m not sure that this is the same, but seems similar.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    ↪Bartricks

    Let’s go back to your argument:

    if materialism is true, then our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate.

    So, if p, then q.

    The default is that our impressions are not systematically inaccurate.

    So: not q.

    Therefore not p.     — Bartricks

    If materialism is true then our impressions of presentness are inaccurate. And if our impressions of presentness are accurate then:

    my sensations of the presentness of any event supports idealism, not materialism. — Bartricks

    So, if materialism is true (p) then our sensations are systematically inaccurate (q). However, our sensations are not systematically inaccurate (not-q). Therefore, materialism is false.

    This is your argument, correct?

    If materialism is false, then so is the fact that our sensations are systematically inaccurate (q). Time lag supports materialism, not idealism.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    No, as I said in the OP, appearances enjoy default justification. That is, if something appears to be the case, then that is default evidence that it 'is' the case.

    That's not idealism.

    […]

    One follows the evidence. That is, one follows the appearances.

    Now, if one does that where the appearance of presentness is concerned, one will arrive at idealism.     — Bartricks

    Yeah that’s making my point: accepting the appearances wrt presentness leads to idealism.

    Materialism does not accept the appearances, right?

    Therefore, if materialism is true we cannot always trust our senses, and if idealism is true we can always trust our senses. You are arguing that we cannot always trust our senses, so you are arguing for the truth of materialism, not idealism. — Luke

    Which one do you think you’ve been arguing for?

    if materialism is true, then our appearances of presentness are all - all - illusions of presentness. — Bartricks
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    q does NOT = “The default is that…”
    — Luke

    Yes, I know.     — Bartricks

    Then your modus tollens argument is faulty. Christ!
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    No, if materialism is true, then our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate.

    So, if p, then q.     — Bartricks

    Okay, q = “our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate”.

    The default is that our impressions are not systematically inaccurate.

    So: not q.

    Therefore not p.     — Bartricks

    q does NOT = “The default is that…”

    Is materialism the default? No. What our sensations tell us is the default. That’s the position of idealism. Therefore, if materialism is true we cannot always trust our senses, and if idealism is true we can always trust our senses. You are arguing that we cannot always trust our senses, so you are arguing for the truth of materialism, not idealism.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    If materialism is true, then none of our iimpressions of the presentness of events are accurate. That means they're evidence that materialism is false. — Bartricks

    So if materialism is true then materialism is false?
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    ↪Bartricks
    I’ll leave it for now. Maybe we can return to it after you realise you’ve been arguing for the truth of materialism this whole time.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    I take the lack of reply to mean that you now accept that the time lag argument - my version of it - goes through? — Bartricks

    No, I gave up because you refused to acknowledge what I was saying. I'll try once more.

    When an event occurs is when it is present and when it is present is when it occurs. — Bartricks

    I realise that is what you are presupposing. But is there a reason why the present (or "now") must coincide with the occurrence of an event? Can you provide a non-circular reason without merely presupposing that it does?

    Nothing that I sense to be present is actually present. — Bartricks

    In what way do you sense it to be present at t2?

    What makes the occurrence of the event "actually" present at t1? (And what event are we even talking about here?)

    If my sensation of d's presentness does not occur until time t2, then d appears present when it is not. That is, my sensation of d's presentness is false. If materialism is true, then all my impressions of presentness are false. Nothing that I sense to be present is actually present. The event of my sensation of d's presentness will occur after d is present, not simultaneous with it. And that's true of all of my sensations of presentness if materialism is true. So they're all false if materialism is true. — Bartricks

    If the above indicates that your sensations "are all false", wouldn't that make it an argument against idealism? "If materialism is true..." I thought you arguing for idealism being true?

    According to Wikipedia, idealism is the view "that reality is indistinguishable and inseparable from human perception and understanding; that reality is a mental construct closely connected to ideas".

    If all of our sensations are false, then that spells trouble for idealism.

    Thus, the falsity of all of our sensations of presentness if materialism is true is default evidence that materialism is false. — Bartricks

    If "materialism is true" implies that the present moment coincides with the occurrence of events, and that there is a time lag between the occurrence of an event and our sensation of that event, then that's what you have been arguing for. Therefore, you are arguing for the truth of materialism (according to the views on materialism you have presented here, at least).
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    4.01 A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it. — Tractatus
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    So, to be clear, you think that if an event occurs at time t1, it can be present later? — Bartricks

    I have said that the present moment needn't coincide with the occurrence of an event, but could instead coincide with our awareness of the event. If the event precedes our awareness of it, and our awareness of the event coincides with the present moment, then the event would be in our past at the present moment. That's not the same as saying "it can be present later". In fact, on your conception of time where the present moment coincides with an event, it would mean "it can be present earlier" - that is, the event would be "present" before we were aware of it. That's what the so-called time lag means, right?
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    Our sensations represent something to be the case - in this case the presentness of p is what they are representing to be the case.

    What could render that impression accurate? A past event? No. For it is an impression of presentness, not pastness.

    So only a present event can render an impression of presentness accurate.

    Hence why p needs to occur when the sensation of p's presentness occurs if the sensation of p's presentness is to be accurate.     — Bartricks

    Your conception of accuracy is entirely based on the presupposition that the present time is equated with the occurrence of the event at t1.

    Can you explain to me how your view - that an event can occur at t1 yet be present later than it occurs - makes any sense at all? — Bartricks

    If you'd stop presupposing that the present moment coincides with the occurrence of the event, and entertain the possibility that the present moment coincides with our awareness of the event, then the present moment can be later than the occurrence of the event.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    Because my sensation that event p is present will occur at t2, yet event p occurred at t1. — Bartricks

    That doesn't answer why t1 must be the present moment. Why must the present time be equated with the occurrence of event p instead of when I am aware of it or sense it?

    Because if an event occurs at time t1, then it is present at t1, not t2. — Bartricks

    Present to who?
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    1. If materialism is true, the present moment is not where our sensations say it is. — Bartricks

    Why not?

    If event p occurred at t1, then it was present at t1, not t2. — Bartricks

    Why?
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    Good, so we agree that in order for my sensation that p is present to be accurate, p needs actually to have presentness. — Bartricks

    No, that's not that same as what you said here:

    My view is that the present moment is when our sensations tell us it is. — Bartricks

    If the present moment is "when our sensations tell us it is", then p is present when our sensations tell us it is, not whenever p actually occurred.

    I'm not a materialist. I'm trying to refute it. So we both agree that my sensation that p is present is accurate. I think that's incompatible with materialism though. — Bartricks

    And I'm saying it doesn't have to be. A materialist can also agree that the present moment is when our sensations tell us it is, and not when event p actually occurs. It's just about defining when to situate the present moment.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    My view is that the present moment is when our sensations tell us it is. — Bartricks

    That's what I'm saying, too.

    What I mean is, if the event of p occurs at t1, would you admit that it is present at t1? It seems to me that you want to say that despite p occuring at time 1, it is present at a later time.....that, to my mind, makes no sense. — Bartricks

    I assume we have been using t1 and t2 as follows:

    t1 = the time that an event occurs
    t2 = the time that we become aware of, sense, or respond to that event.

    You've just said in the first quote above that the present moment is the time that we are aware of - "when our sensations tell us it is" - which means the present moment is at t2. However, you are also saying in the second quote here that situating the present moment anywhere but t1 makes no sense to you?
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    If event p occurs at t1, then it is present at t1, not t2. — Bartricks

    Only if you define presentness, or the present, in that way.

    I am not denying that an event occurs at t1 and that we are aware of it at a later time t2. I am only denying that we must situate the present at t1 instead of t2.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    My point was that if my sensation represents the event p to have presentness, then for that sensation to be accurate the event - not my sensation of it - would need to have presentness. But it wouldn't have if it was actually present at t1, not t2. — Bartricks

    To determine that your sensation falsely represents the event p as being in the present (at t2) presupposes that t1 is the present, not t2. My point is: don't presuppose this, since either t1 or t2 could be defined as the present. If t2 is defined as the present instead, then your sensation truly represents the event p to "have presentness".

    If you say that presentness is when the sensation of presentness occurs, then it is not 'of' presentness but is the presentness. — Bartricks

    If t2 is the present, then you could (possibly) say that your sensation is the present, or you could say that your sensations represent event p to be in the present. I would say it's the latter.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    That is, at time t2 I have a sensation. The sensation is of event p. And it has presentness - that is, it represents the event to be now. But if that event actually occurred at t1, then the presentness that I sensed it to have, it would not have. My sensation was present, but what it represented to be present was not. — Bartricks

    Have you heard that seeing stars (or starlight) is looking back in time? So when you look at the stars you might be seeing light that was reflected from a star millions or billions of years ago. Does that situate the (i.e. our) present moment at millions or billions of years ago? I don't think so.

    I don't think you're saying anything different to what I am. I acknowledge that an event can occur at t1 and that the earliest we can be aware of it is at t2. But you have ignored or misunderstood my point that we need not define the present moment as being at t1. It can also be defined as being at t2 - even by a materialist.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    ↪Bartricks
    Yes.
  • The time lag argument for idealism
    if materialism is true, then given what we know about how our brain responds to the world it inhabits, all our impressions of presentness are going to be false. For on the materialist view our sensations are caused by an external material world interacting with our brains. But although simultaneous causation is surely possible, the simple fact is that the events in the brain seem to lag behind the events they are responses to. — Bartricks

    I don't consider it to be an issue of materialism vs idealism, but an issue of how to define the present moment. Is the present moment defined as the time at which - as you say - we respond to events? Or, is the present moment the earliest time at which those events we respond to can be measured/recorded?

    I believe that one can be a materialist and still define the present moment as the time at which we respond to events; the time at/of which we find ourselves conscious.
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    W: “1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.”

    Q: What is meant by “facts”?     — Art48

    2 What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
    2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).     — Tractatus

    That is, the world is the totality of states of affairs, not of things. A state of affairs is a combination of things.

    "States of affairs" and "things" both refer to physical reality. Wittgenstein also states:

    2.063 The sum-total of reality is the world. — Tractatus

    W: “2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).”

    Q: Hm. “Objects” and “things” suggest material objects in the physical universe.     — Art48

    The Ogden translation uses "atomic facts" where the Pears and McGuinness translation uses "states of affairs". "Atomic facts" aka "states of affairs" refers to physical reality.
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    Goats eat everything,
    Eating is asymmetric. That is, if A eats B, then B does not eat A.
    Therefore,
    There is at least one non-goat     — Banno

    I don't see how the conclusion follows. It seems to follow only that nothing eats goats.

    EDIT: ah I see now.
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    In Fitch's case, the epistemic operator K is usually assumed to be factive and used in the future-tense in standing for "Eventually it will be known that ...", where K's arguments are general propositions p that can refer to any point in time. — sime

    knowledge changing over time is no big deal for the verificationist and simply means that one's beliefs are changing as the facts are changing. But this doesn't necessitate contradiction.

    For instance, if p is "Novak is Wimbledon Champion", then p today, and hence K p (assuming verificationism). Yet on Sunday it might be the case that ~p and hence K ~ p. But any perceived inconsistency here is merely due to the fact that the sign p is being used twice, namely to indicate both Friday 8th July and Sunday 10th July.     — sime

    Perhaps I'm just confused by: "K is...used in the future-tense in standing for "Eventually it will be known that ...".

    Do you mean anything different to the SEP's definition of K: "it is known by someone at some time that’?
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    The proposition "Joe Biden is President of the United States" was known to be false in 2016 and is known to be true now. — Michael

    I'm not saying you're wrong; I'm merely noting that what you have said appears to contradict what @sime has said. Does the Fitch proof use a non-standard meaning of "knowledge", perhaps?

    I note that the SEP article defines the epistemic operator "K" as:

    ‘it is known by someone at some time that.’ — SEP article

    This also appears to be different to sime's statement that:

    the epistemic operator K is usually assumed to be factive and used in the future-tense in standing for "Eventually it will be known that ...", where K's arguments are general propositions p that can refer to any point in time. — sime
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    In Fitch's case, the epistemic operator K is usually assumed to be factive and used in the future-tense in standing for "Eventually it is known that ...", where K's arguments are general propositions p that can refer to any point in time. — sime

    I’ll try and come back to the rest of your post, but if the above is correct, then this would seem to contradict @Michael’s claim that a proposition can be known to be true at one time and then known to be false at a later time. If K refers only to what is eventually known, then a proposition which is ultimately known to be false cannot earlier be known to be true.
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    Yes, very similar. Interestingly, from SEP: — Andrew M

    Oh cool, thanks.
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    B(p & ~Bp) - someone at some time has the belief that 'p is true and nobody believes that p is true'. Is this Moore's paradox? — Luke

    I was hoping someone would have responded to this point. Did anyone else note this connection between the two paradoxes? Does anyone agree or disagree that these are similar or the same type of paradox?
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    Is (2) both true and false?
    — Luke

    No. It was true before we knew 1 and false after.

    Is (3)?
    — Luke

    No. It was true before we knew 1 and false after.     — Michael

    I can see now that I was wrong about this, and I now accept that some truths are unknowable.

    Thanks to you and to @Andrew M for your patience and for correcting the errors of my thinking about this.
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    It's knowable because we can look for the cat and see it to be on the mat. In doing so, what was once an unknown truth (1) is now a known truth and what was once a known truth (2) is now a known falsehood. And what was once an unknown truth (3) is now a known falsehood.

    3 can never be a known truth.     — Michael

    Is (2) both true and false? Is (3)?
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