Just how the law will handle identity issues of the kind which seem to be arising, e.g., of "I have certain genitalia but identify as a person who normally doesn't have that genitalia" or "I am what is considered to be caucasian but identify as a non-causasian," will be interesting to observe. Definition is very important in the law. What constitutes "discrimination," what constitutes "guilt," what constitutes "eligibility" are examples of issues presented in legal forums everyday. What will it do regarding identity if a person's identity depends only on what the person thinks identity should be?

Regardless, though, the law is the law. Whether you feel it is wrong to identify you in a particular way makes little difference to its application. You either challenge it or change it or tolerate it.

Is the probe garbage? Why, I wonder. It would seem our computers, laptops, etc. would just as well be garbage. Stop using them and other such things if you find them offensive, lest you add to our violation of the universe.

Well, you at least understand what Power-mad Paul-Michel thought about it, in any case.

Why did he not outsmart Nero and take the Empire from his incapable hands?! :s Seneca sounds like he wasn't very savvy with regards to this... Instead he preferred to let the crazy one rule and terrorise his people. — Agustino

I can only speculate, but as his colleague Burris was praetorian prefect and so presumably was aware of what the only substantial military force in the area of Rome felt, it may be that Nero retained the loyalty of the praetorian guard at that time. Or it may be that there was no acceptable replacement handy. For about 80 years before Nero became emperor, the emperors were all members of the Julio-Claudian family--men related by blood, marriage or adoption to Julius Caesar's family, the Julii, and the Claudii. An ancestor of Caesar had married a member of the Claudii family. It may have been feared that chaos would result if Nero was removed.

And, in fact, there was chaos when Nero finally so infuriated the legions assigned to the provinces (or more importantly their generals) that some rebelled and he was declared a public enemy. He killed himself when cornered. He was the last of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. After his death came "the year of the four emperors" where the legions and their generals fought one another and Galba, Otho and Vitellius were emperor for a matter of weeks or months, and finally Vespasian became emperor and was able to restore order.

What I appreciate about the stoics is that their ethics and approach to living ones life can be applied independent of their metaphysics or religious context (of Roman paganism). Indeed they heavily influenced many later thinkers including St. Paul. For example, even though I do have faith in a world to come (i.e. some kind of Heaven) and I believe God is the source of morality, I still find the stoics call for action and virtue compelling. Hassidic Judaism rightly says we need to do as many good deeds as we can while in this life, that's our purpose in being in existence. Once we are Heaven it will be too late, earth was the place to follow the commandments. — MysticMonist

As far as Roman paganism is concerned (and it wasn't at all homogeneous in the first century CE), I think that the Stoics, along with most philosophers of antiquity, were skeptical or tolerant of it at best. They were not believers in the various pagan gods, that is to say. Most thought it appropriate to participate in traditional rituals, however, rather than criticize them. The Stoic Deity is pantheistic, sometimes called the "Divine Reason" which is a part of nature, though a vary rarified part of it. As rational beings we have a bit of the deity in us.

The ancient Stoics' view of the afterlife was that we dissolved or merged into the Deity, our individual being lasting but a short time if at all. Seneca and Epictetus seem to have believed in a more personal God, but as far as I know didn't concern themselves much with the afterlife.

Seneca wrote very well about Stoicism and other things. But his association with Nero, his cloying tributes to Claudius written while Seneca was exiled by that emperor to Corsica, and the power and wealth he accumulated during Nero's reign have led many to think he was a hypocrite rather than a Stoic.

I've thought along those lines as well. But to his credit Seneca along with Sextus Afranius Burrus generally ran the empire well during Nero's time as emperor, until Nero took full control after murdering his mother. Seneca seems to have made great efforts to control Nero and teach him morals. And, when he saw Nero no longer liked or trusted him, offered to retire from the imperial court and transfer all his assets to the emperor. He also by all accounts died very well when he was accused of conspiracy against Nero and Nero ordered him to take his own life or have it taken from him. He chose the first option.

Some books you might consider along with the works of the ancient Stoics, if interest in Stoicsim:

A New Stoicism by Lawrence Becker
Stoic Pragmatism by John Lachs
Stoicism and Emotion by Margaret Graver
The Inner Citadel by Pierre Hadot

Well, it's Lloyd. Lloyd the bartender, from Stanley Kubrick's The Shining (I won't say Stephen King's as it seems he thought the movie had little to do with the book, a fact which doesn't trouble me). Lloyd may or may not exist, but is a striking and intriguing, and somewhat eerie, figure with whom Jack Nicholson's Jack Torrance converses while knocking back Jack Daniels, though he's an alcoholic and knows he shouldn't be doing so. A perfectly groomed, polite, efficient, chillingly-friendly purveyor of what we want but what our reason tells us we can't have, played by the great Joe Turkel.

An ideal avatar for a philosophy forum, I think.

Silence is consent, you know. Qui tacet consentire videtur. So, the fact that the unborn silently accept their birth indicates they consent to their birth, if it indicates anything at all.

Now, some may reply that the unborn don't exist, and so could not give their consent. [Or, some may say that to speak of "the unborn" is silly, but let that pass--everyone seems to anyway]. That may be true, but if it is then so is the fact that they could not object to being born.

Why do some of us assume that they would not consent to being born? Or, if they don't make that assumption, why do they maintain that the fact consent can neither be give nor refused establishes that one should not give birth under any circumstances?

In either case, I think, consent is not an issue; it can't be. So, I suspect the idee fixe of the anti-birthers (so it seems they may be called) is merely that life is bad, or wrong, or undesirable, and so nobody should live. For that matter, we shouldn't have been born either, but alas we were (it is what it is).

Here's another thought. Let's say someone is born, and somehow becomes glad of it? He/she thus ratifies their birth, so to speak. Can consent not given (because impossible) be given when it is possible? Do the parents remain guilty--is the sin of having children unforgivable?

Nitpicking on the actual agent that caused the harm on localized life events is only useful if you intend to do something about the causal agent. In the case of inherent harms in life like old age, sickness, loneliness, boredom, and anxiety/sadness about death which can at best be mitigated, coped with, or postponed, I don't think much can be done to "address those issues in a sensible manner". The point is, there's little use in decoupling the mere fact of existing with causal agents causing each particular localized harms. — OglopTo

I think the "nitpicking" you refer to is essential to intelligent judgment in placing blame and in assessing harm. Those who delight in pontificating regarding the immorality of parents (which would include their own parents, of course) for having children, or maintaining that no one (else!) should be born, are indulging in an absolutism I can't accept, alas.

As I've said elsewhere, such a position strikes me as being analogous to the doctrine of Original Sin, so dear to so many absolutists throughout history. Sometime, somewhere in the course of evolution there were people or proto-people who coupled and produced children and through this sinful act thus began the vast parade of horror that has led to our own horrible lives, which should never have been.

I prefer to make judgments on a case by case basis, and avoid a post hoc ergo propter hoc approach by which parents are irrevocably subject to blame merely because they have a child, regardless of circumstances. Certainly there may be circumstances where people should not have children. However, the claim that nobody should have children because they will be harmed in some fashion which may or may not be serious--by e.g. stubbing a toe, or getting a cold, or being underappreciated, etc.--is one I find hard to respect.

I said you harm someone by creating them not be fore they exist. The act of creating them entails future harm. Creating someone is bringing them into existence
.
Some parents have been told that their child will inherit a genetic illness so they are actively creating a certainty of suffering. Are you claiming that the act of creating a person has no moral dimension even when you know full well what it will cause and what it entails. The law recognises intent to harm this way. — Andrew4Handel

Are you referring to a "wrongful birth" action? That's in the nature of medical malpractice; the duty breached is that of the physician to the parents. Or, perhaps you're referring to a "wrongful life" action, but that again is a negligence action against a doctor generally by the parents or guardians of a diseased child, and is a cause of action which isn't recognized by most jurisdictions by my understanding. In either case, though, the "harm" experienced occurs after existence begins.

So, there is no someone who is harmed by virtue of coming into existence in and of itself. Merely coming to exist isn't a harm. After coming into existence, a person is subject to harm for a number of reasons, virtually all of them identifiable as people, things, other causal agents, to which the responsibility for harm may be attributed.

Why is it unreasonable? — Andrew4Handel

It is unreasonable, at best, because there is no person, or people, who don't exist. There is no person whose consent should be obtained, nor is there a person who has certain rights which would be violated. There is no person who we would prevent from suffering harm, there is no person who would not live, there is no person who should not live.

I can harm someone more by creating them than by committing your average criminal offence that people get lynch mobby about. — Andrew4Handel

Consider what you're saying. How can you harm someone? There is no "someone."

A sleeping person and a person in a coma are, nonetheless, living people. We may say they should or should not be treated in a certain manner. We can't say such things regarding nothing.

Where consent isn't possible, it's unreasonable, to say the least, to insist that it must be given.

It is an interesting thing, but I doubt most people were great womanizers back in the day.
Agustino — Agustino

Who's speaking of womanizers? Nietzsche would make Ward Cleaver seem like Don Juan.

Frantic Freddie never had much luck with women. His sister in particular. Perhaps he was referring to self-flagellation.

Pragmatic Stoicism.

I think your position would be stronger if you abandoned the claim (which I think you make) that procreation (causing conception to take place) itself is wrong or causes harm. Nobody can be harmed until they're subject to harm; nobody can cause harm to somebody who can't be harmed. After we exist, we're potentially subject to harm of all kinds. Before we exist, we're not and can't be.

What takes place after we exist isn't something which takes place before we do. The harm we may experience after we exist has identifiable causes for the most part. People, animals, nature may cause harm to us once we live. We may ascribe fault to them for doing so. We're not harmed by coming into existence, but are subject to harm when we do.

So, I think one can intelligibly maintain that we shouldn't have children because they'll become subject to harm if we do. It's not a position I accept, but it's comprehensible at least.

We must return, then, to curious claim that we somehow do harm to "someone" who doesn't exist. In other words, that there is some class of "people" who are not people who are caused harm when they become people by some act which took place before they became people.

Becoming a person who exists (as opposed it seems to being a person who doesn't exist) is evidently bad in and of itself. That is the case because an existing person necessarily experiences pain of some kind in some manner at some time, which was not and could not be experienced by that person while in the blissful state of nonexistence..

So, for example, the parents of schopenhauer1 did wrong by causing him to exist, thus forcing him to do all the things existing people do and those fortunate people who don't exist do not do; work and for that matter I suppose eat, drink, speak, etc.

It's a view which has similarities to the doctrine of Original Sin. We humans exist because our ancestors procreated through the ages. There was no Adam and Eve, but sometime in the course of our evolution a pair or pairs of sinners reproduced and that reproduction caused the many harms we existing people now experience.

didn't think that Kuhn went that far out on a structuralist limb. But I have only read commentary from other people about his work rather than his actual work, so I don't really know.

I thought that the main, original observation he makes is that rather than seamlessly, cumulatively building on the knowledge it yields science is conducted within incommensurable paradigms each with their own language, problems, methods, theories, etc. and undergoes shifts in what paradigms are being worked within. Therefore, for example, quantum physics was not a continuation of Newtonian physics but a complete rupture from it. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Now that I've had to think about him again, I wonder whether Kuhn may have been speaking more as a historian of science in his Structure than as a philosopher of science or scientist. In other words, that he may have been concerned primarily if not solely to explain how, historically, scientific revolutions have taken place--what factors contributed to them, what was or was not significant in causing them. That wouldn't necessarily require any judgment regarding the value or usefulness of science. But it seems that his work has been construed to be just that.

Maybe that is what was meant when he would say "I am not a Kuhnian!". — WISDOMfromPO-MO

I think you're probably right.

It is my understanding that postmodern theorists have asserted that scientific texts are no different from other texts. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

That's sounds familiar, and is interesting. But I wonder how the techniques of literary critics in evaluating written works which are intended, and held to be,works of art serve to provide insight into written works which are not intended as art or thought to be art.

I fear that I'm incapable of determining what "anybody" may say or may have said on this point. As to Kuhn, though I doubt he ever used so few words in describing what he thought, how else characterize, briefly, what he said? I don't think he'd claim that my statement is incorrect, though he would I'm sure have thought it far too simple. The role of consensus, value, personality traits, history in paradigm shifts or perpetuation of a paradigm (and rejection of a new one) seem to tie them unavoidably to subjective (human) factors and characteristics. And his claims that science is not or does not result in a progress towards determining what is true seems, to me at least, to indicate that science is more properly understood as something different, something which has a different end or purpose, something nebulous and resistant of determination that necessarily, I believe, is subject to our own desires.

None of this strikes me as particularly surprising, or daunting or concerning.

But I understand that to his credit he rejected the position taken by others that only factors external to science are determinative of what science is or does. It seems he thought they misunderstood him.

By the way, I've always been puzzled by the reference to literary criticism in this context. When I think of literary criticism, I think of people like Edgar Allan Poe, William Dean Howells, Ezra Pound, Henry Hazlitt, Graham Greene; in short, those who critiqued the artistic merit of literature. I suppose that one could accept a very broad definition of "literature" so as to include in it any written work, and then claim that by analyzing it one is engaged in "literary criticism" but I have no idea if that is what's intended, nor am I certain why it would be thought appropriate or useful to do so.

Ah, Thomas "Paradigm" Kuhn. How well I remember being forced to read his Structure of Scientific Revolutions along with Plato's insufferable Republic and other gems I can't remember as part of something called Freshman Orientation when I transcended to college so long ago. Perhaps back then there were people who really thought that science or the work done by scientists or both to be completely unaffected by our humanity or history or society or culture and so were shocked to find someone thought differently. I confess to nostalgia.

But it seems a fairly trivial observation that what humans do in science will be impacted by what they do and are otherwise, nonetheless. Nor, I think, does it really matter that's the case, provided science--or perhaps more properly the scientific method--serves us well, and I think it does and is more likely to do good service than other methods in resolving certain significant problems we encounter.

God's teeth. What a story.

I've never been a fan of this most melancholy of the Danes. I wonder if he ever read Goethe and pondered whether the eternal feminine really draws us upward ("Das Ewig-Weibliche Zieht uns hinan.") If so, it seems he thought it does not. Given his statement about the need for a martyr, it seems he thought he would do so.

The reference to Abelard in the link Augustino provided is interesting. Poor Abelard was castrated for loving Heloise. Did K castrate himself, figuratively speaking, for refusing to love Regine, dying a celibate bachelor according to the link?

I think K's self-regard must have been monumental for him to treat another so shabbily on the ground that he is so important a figure with so much great to do that it's best (for Regine!) not to return love for love. As to the shabbiness, I don't refer merely to his breaking the engagement (which he saw fit to do twice), but to his subsequent haunting (stalking?) of his unfortunate victim, at least until she married, thereby reminding her that he would never be hers. A man of honor would have let her be after refusing her.

But perhaps those who think themselves martyrs have no honor. "There is no crime for those who have Christ" is what a fifth century Christian zealot said when accused of religious violence.

I chose not to venture down the legal profession because I see no glory in this Republic of yours or any country that values profit over human life. — TimeLine

I'm prone to irony. Regardless, I don't believe being a practicing lawyer requires appreciation of the glory of God's favorite country, these United States. Perhaps you should have become one after all.

For me, it has always been a dream of mine to study the classics, ancient history and languages, but the utility of a degree is to enable the prospect of working in the field you desire. Not sure what compelled you to become a lawyer. :-$ — TimeLine

I've always been fond of the classics and ancient history as well, and do what reading on them that I can. When it comes to ancient languages, I'm a fan of Latin. That might be due in part to my Catholic youth. But my knowledge of it is haphazard. It's no longer necessary to recite the Credo or Confiteor, and lawyer-Latin won't take you far at all. As to why I became a lawyer, I had no particular vocation. Continuing in the Academy, or going into journalism or the law were the options I presented to myself, and I chose the law.

Well, I'm a lawyer. I went to law school. Doing that is a condition precedent to being a lawyer where I practice, and in most jurisdictions in our Glorious Republic. In a sense, then, being a lawyer "utilizes" the education, such as it is, received in law school. Personally though, I think law school has little to do with being a practicing lawyer. There are those who get a law degree and don't practice law. They call themselves lawyers, but are not. I can't speak for them.

I was a philosophy major (why "major"?) in college, and at that place and time analytic philosophy was taught for the most part. I've found the emphasis on use and meaning of language and analysis of argument taught in those philosophy courses to be quite useful in practicing law.

You seem to mistake the refusal to be overwhelmed by reality for ignorance of reality. H.L. Mencken famously defined Puritanism as "the haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy." Are we to be tormented by the thought that someone, somewhere, is being harmed?

If I was truly deeply wounded every time someone or something suffered harm or was the victim of some evil I'd be incapacitated. A Stoic accepts that there are things beyond one's control, but as Epictetus said will do the best that can be done with what's in his/her control.

It would be wholly naive to believe that there is nothing wrong with this world and if you cared for Nature, the 'we', you would be wholly righteous, disgusted at injustice and at all things morally deplorable. This is where I have some trouble with the Stoics. — TimeLine

I don't think the Stoics believed there's nothing wrong with the world, or that the world is perfect, as that would require them to take the position that we can't improve ourselves. The Roman Stoics in particular were concerned with how we can do so. In fact, ethics and how to achieve happiness was their primary if not their only concern.

Spinoza, I believe, felt that the problem of evil is one that troubles us because we're finite beings. Not a satisfying point of view, but one which is understandable when the evil in consideration is, for example, the result of natural disasters (provided we don't assume ourselves to be God's favorites in all the universe). The Stoics certainly thought that certain conduct was wrong, and those professing to be Stoic have refused to do what they thought was wrong even when the result was their deaths at the hands of some of the more disagreeable Roman emperors. But I don't think they would think it desirable to be disgusted or outraged at the injustice of the world or deplorable conduct, because I think they would believe being disgusted and outraged wouldn't serve to prevent the wrong but would serve to unduly disturb and distract those opposing it.

The quote from Kant reminds me of what the devotees of the Orphic mystery cult were told to say when asked who they were by the guardians of the afterlife: "I am a child of the Earth and the starry heavens." It seems we can accurately be called such children. It strikes me as a wonderful thing to be.

It may be that some of us must go through what you describe in order to accept that we're a part of nature, but I hope it's not necessary that we do so, as I think this can occur to us simply by acknowledging what is the case. That should be easier now that it's been well established that there are billions of galaxies in the universe. The ancients can be forgiven for thinking we're the most important part of the universe, but I don't see how that can reasonably be maintained--or believed--now.

For me, there's nothing diminishing about being "a child of the Earth and the starry heavens." And while the Stoics and other ancient philosophers may have felt that humans were distinctive, and separate, as being endowed with reason, I don't think they suffered from the fear of death and of being alone as it seems many do now and have done for quite some time, but managed nonetheless to possess wisdom and formulate high standards of morality which I think remain unrivaled.

I think the fear of death and feeling of being alone is something that developed fairly late in our history and has its basis at least in part in the glorification of the self which found its most extreme expression in Romanticism, subsequent "isms" like Existentialism and Nihilism being something akin to symptoms of the resulting "hangover."

When one thinks of radical evil as being demonstrative of an innate condition, how does this reflect the interconnectedness of Nature? Whilst I appreciate your view particularly that humanity conceitedly have an unhealthy and even lunatic self-regard, self-righteousness (we're made in God's image) and I could not have said it better myself, this is not a dualism but rather a natural consequence of consciousness and free-will and thus Kant' categorical imperative is a moral alternative that sheds a more clear light than the stoics on overcoming radical evil. We stand in judgement of our nature to become one with Nature. — TimeLine

I don't think of it as "a natural consequence of consciousness and free-will" because I think it's decidedly unnatural. In living we're part of the world and as part of it we continually interact with other parts of the rest of the world; we wouldn't exist without it, we wouldn't think without it. I think we're aware of this and conduct ourselves in "ordinary day to day life" accordingly. Somehow, though, we've come to believe that there is some "us" distinct from the rest of the world, distinct even from our bodies some cases. I think it's as part of our unnatural tendency to make this distinction between "us" and the rest of the world, that we come to consider whether we're compelled to do what we do by the rest of the world or are able to do what we choose. But instead, I think, what we think and do is the result of a kind of transaction or interaction with other parts of the world of which we're a part. Because we have the capacity to reason (which the ancient Stoics thought to be characteristic of the divine aspect of the world) what we do can be the result of intelligent interaction.

The ancient Stoics tended towards determinism because (I think) they thought the Divine Reason permeates the world, and so all that takes place is in accordance with that reason, in which we share. So in living in accordance with nature we do what the Divine Reason as Providence or Fate "intends." At the end of the Enchiridion of Epictetus we find these quotes:

"Conduct me, Jove, and you, 0 Destiny,
Wherever your decrees have fixed my station."
Cleanthes

"I follow cheerfully; and, did I not,
Wicked and wretched, I must follow still
Whoever yields properly to Fate, is deemed
Wise among men, and knows the laws of heaven."
Euripides, Frag. 965

I tend to think this is more in the nature of advice on how to live than anything else, ancient philosophy being more concerned with that than philosophy is at this time.

I'm not certain what you mean by "radical evil" but would guess is it involves conduct resulting from the extreme or excessive desire or urge to harm or exercise power over other people, possess certain things, self-indulgence, etc. Stoicism teaches certain things are beyond our control, and only that which is in our control should be our concern--what's beyond our control should be a matter of "indifference." So, a Stoic would have no desire or need to accumulate things, harm or control others, steal, lie; no desire or need to do evil of any kind.

I appreciate the mutually interconnected and interdependent ontology vis-a-vis the virtue of existence and being a part of nature, but in the case of radical evil along with consciousness and free-will, I find myself drawn to the categorical imperative. How you live your life, your frame of mind and the decisions that you make reflect your overall clarity to become a part of this nature, but does it not also enable you to judge it? — TimeLine

I'm not sure I understand your point. But I think we've been ill-served by the belief we're apart from Nature rather than a part of it. I think that misapprehension or conceit has resulted in a great deal of harm. From it arises dualisms of all sorts, an unhealthy and even lunatic self-regard, self-righteousness (we're made in God's image), the view that nature exists for our benefit and use, etc. and, I suppose, the view that we stand in judgment of nature. For me, it's part of the attraction of Stoicism that it avoids these misunderstandings.

I think Stoicism is consistent with the more reasonable view that we're nothing more, or less, than inhabitants of a speck in an unimaginably large universe who are capable of thought and reason. The Stoic belief in God (I don't know that you have to believe in order to be a Stoic) also seems more reasonable. If a God of such a universe exists, it seems unreasonable to think God is particularly or peculiarly interested in us. If God is not of the universe, we can know nothing of God because we can know only the universe, or rather our small part of it. So if there be a God, God is immanent in the universe. I think Spinoza derived a great deal from the Stoics, though it seems he may not have thought so. In any case, I think they thought of God and what is good along the same lines.

The ancient Stoics accepted a kind of determinism. I personally think the question or "problem" of free will isn't worth much thought. It makes no difference to how we live; we'll continue to make choices and find that better choices result from being thoughtful. The problem of evil is, I think, is the result of our belief that the universe exists for us and should be responsive to our concerns. We came along long after the universe began, though, and we're rather responsive to it.

But I'm better off waiting for you to explain what you're point is. I do ramble on, once started.

Do you mind telling us the thumb-nail sketch of why you went from Catholic to Stoic? — Thorongil

The Church derived a good deal from Stoicism and ancient philosophy in general, so I think an appreciation for it has always been there. But I think it unreasonable to believe in a personal God, God becoming man through an "immaculate" conception, working miracles while on Earth, being crucified by Romans, coming back to life 3 days later, coming to judge the living and the dead, heaven and hell, and the rest of the doctrine I think a true Catholic must believe. It's too cluttered and too confining a conception of God for me. I find it hard to believe such a God created or abides in the universe. We're a very small part of the universe. The Stoic conception of an God immanent in nature is one I find appealing and doesn't require that I accept the various, and sometimes strange, views of divinity popular in the late Roman Empire which Christianity absorbed. The ethics of Stoicism is admirable. It provides an example of a way of living morally and tranquilly and doesn't demand a commitment to the supernatural.

nemo judex in sua causa (Y) — TimeLine

An interesting and legitimate caution. But although a Stoic partakes in Nature and the creative intelligence which permeates it, and so can be said to have an interest in it, a Stoic doesn't judge Nature in the sense referred to in this legal maxim. So, I think I'm okay.

When you phrase it like that, I don't know why you left, lol. — Thorongil

It's a rather daunting list, isn't it? One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic--these are the Four Marks, or Attributes, of the (true) Church. "One" because God is one, and the Church is the Body of God (Christ). "Holy" because the Church has a special mission, i.e. it is set apart for a special purpose by God. "Catholic" because it's universal. "Apostolic" because the Church carries on the tradition of the apostles, and the Pope is the successor of St. Peter, and the bishops the Pope appoints are thereby appointed by the authority of that apostle.

Do you consider yourself a religious person? — Thorongil

Not if being a religious person requires belief in a personal (and so bewilderingly human) God.

To what religion do you belong? — Thorongil

Formerly, a member of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. Now, Stoic.

get that I don't actually live on an island by myself, but I could well in the future. The only constant in my life is me, so I would like a robust philosophy that would work even when other people aren't around. — Kenshin

Solipsism is the philosophy for you, then. Or, perhaps, "Me-ism" (copyright Ciceronianus 2017), as you seem to acknowledge the existence of others, but would rather not bother with them. Me-ism is the philosophical view that "The only thing that is significant is me." You strike me as a Me-ist.

So here's the point Ciceronianus. There are laws, that's a fact. There are human actions, and that's a fact as well. These are two very distinct things, laws and human actions. In order that a person's actions may be criminal, a comparison between the actions and the laws must be made, with a judgement following that comparison. Do you agree with me here? If you do agree, then in cases where human beings do not pass that judgement, whom other than God could? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you're confusing judging and knowing. Accepting what I think is the common conception of God, God doesn't judge whether or not someone violated one of our laws. Knowing everything, though, he would know what our laws are and know if something took place, which would include what we define as a crime, though we do not. If that's your point, I agree.

It's a relevant inquiry, because you clearly desire to say that a criminal is a criminal without being named that, and that a tree is a tree without being named that. But this requires that someone, such as God attaches the name to the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think merely that one can have committed a crime without having been found to have done so. This assumes, of course, that there are laws, but we don't require God in order to establish that laws exist. A crime is by definition a violation of a law which is subject to punishment by the state. If there are no laws, there can be no crime.

But if there are laws, we know of them, and so know what a crime is as a result. Murder is a crime (whether God thinks so or not). We know that murder is a crime regardless of whether we know that a murder has been committed. We know that a person who has murdered someone has committed a crime regardless of whether we know the person has murdered someone. We may not know that a murder has been committed, but know that if one is committed a crime has been committed.

A criminal is someone who has committed a crime. We determine what constitutes a crime, as we adopt laws. A crime is "an action or omission that constitutes an offense that may be prosecuted by the state and is punishable by law." We may also refer to acts we consider bad or evil "crimes" even when they are not illegal, but we do so metaphorically--we say, in effect, "there outta be a law."

We know what a crime is by consulting the law, and determining whether the terms of the law have been violated, when prompted by circumstances to do so. We can refer to an "unsolved" crime as we can determine whether a law has been violated but may be unable to determine how it was committed or by whom. When we don't know a crime has been committed, though, then we don't think of or speak of a crime.

May laws have been violated, crimes committed, without our knowledge? Yes, as trees may have fallen without our knowledge. But I don't think this is a useful inquiry.

He apparently could be chilling, as well. And so we have Luke 14:25, where he's depicted as saying what modern cult leaders have been inclined to say, about leaving or hating all those you know and love and devoting yourself exclusively to the cult, and especially its leader.

Shakespeare wrote that the Devil can cite Scripture for his own purpose, and so have we. It makes a person (me, at least) wonder just how sacred Scripture can be, in that case. As for the core of his teaching? Well, we cite for our own purpose, I suspect. Which do we prefer, the Jesus who is said to have said "Love one another" or is said to have said "hate, leave those you love and follow me"? We chose one or the other and seek to explain why the one is the case and the other is not.

"Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a
sword." Matthew 10:34

How does introducing a counterfactual condition explain how the person is "in fact guilty"? The point of my example is that the person's actions have not been judged as criminal, so whether or not the person committed a crime is indeterminate. We know the person was active, but there is no description of the actions. How can you say that the person is "in fact guilty"? To introduce a counterfactual to explain your claim of what is "in fact" the case, is contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

We seem to have a problem communicating, or I do. The definition of "guilty" includes "responsible for" (in dictionaries I've seen, in any case). The definition of "responsible" includes "being the cause (or primary cause) of" something--again, according to dictionaries I've seen.

It seems to me that it follows that someone is guilty of a crime if he/she caused it, i.e. committed the crime, and so is responsible for it, having caused it. And, that a person is not guilty of a crime if he/she did not commit the crime, and so is not responsible for causing it.

That's not the case in the law, however.

A finding of "not guilty" by a jury is simply a finding that the defendant has not been shown to have committed the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt. A typical jury instruction given to a jury in a criminal case includes language like this (Pennsylvania):

"It is not the defendant’s burden to prove that [he] [she] is not guilty. Instead, it is the Commonwealth that always has the burden of proving each and every element of the crime charged and that the defendant is guilty of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The person accused of a crime is not required to present evidence or prove anything in his or her own defense [except with respect to the defense of [type of defense], which I will discuss later]. If the Commonwealth’s evidence fails to meet its burden, then your verdict must be not guilty. On the other hand, if the Commonwealth’s evidence does prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, then your verdict should be guilty."

So, outside the law, given the definitions of the pertinent words, it makes complete sense to say that someone is guilty of a crime if that someone caused it, committed it (is responsible for it), and not guilty of a crime if that someone did not cause it, did not commit it (is not responsible for it).

You seem to have some difficulty with the claim that a person may commit a crime and yet be found "not guilty" by a jury. I'm not sure why, though, since the fact that a jury found a defendant not guilty doesn't require a finding that person did not commit a crime.

What I'm asking is how is it possible that the person who was found not-guilty by the court is "in fact guilty"? By whose judgement is that person guilty? — Metaphysician Undercover

If a person commits a crime that person is responsible for the crime, and is therefore guilty of committing the crime. The person is responsible for the crime taking place. A person may think he has not committed the crime, in which case he has amnesia, or is insane (for example). A person may not think he's committed a crime--i.e. that what the person did should not be a crime, or is not crime, really, despite the fact that it is defined as a crime; but the person nonetheless has committed one, as whether a crime is a crime is not dependent on the person's beliefs.

OJ was found not guilty. Many believe that he nonetheless is guilty because they believe he is responsible for the crime having taken place--he committed the crime. This seems quite clear. The determination being made, or not being made, is whether a crime was committed, not whether it is "wrong" to commit the crime.

The described scenario is that many people are aware that a crime was committed, because of the evidence. So the deduction is that there is a person responsible for the crime. Therefore it is assumed that there is a person who is "in fact guilty". We do not know who committed the crime. The person who committed the crime does not believe it was a crime. How is that person "in fact" guilty? — Metaphysician Undercover

The point I've been trying to make is that what is the case in the law (e.g., whether a person is guilty or not guilty of a crime) isn't necessarily what people commonly believe is the case. As far as I know, that's the only claim I've been making. I think people commonly believe that a person is guilty of a crime if the person commits the crime and so is responsible for it. In the law, though it's entirely possible that a person may be found not guilty of a crime and yet have committed it.

I'm not sure what you're asking. Are you asking why people believe that someone who has committed a crime is guilty of committing a crime?