In this way, I am suggesting that a fuller critique of the Christian worldview is important in philosophy, especially as the perspective shaped so much Western thinking, including the foundations of science, especially the ideas of Kant and Descartes. Any thoughts? — Jack Cummins

Christianity is a remarkable hodgepodge of preexisting religious, philosophical, social and cultural beliefs popular in the ancient Mediterranean world, but unusual for its intolerance and exclusivity, which came to thrive after it was absorbed into the Roman imperial state. I doubt there is anything original or unique about it; even its exclusive nature may be said to be derived from Judaism.

To the extent it's worldview made any contribution to Western thinking and science, it did so by way of ancient pagan thought which it borrowed so much from (the fact that pagan thought wasn't a very good fit with Christian doctrine was largely ignored, which is to say that the claim Jesus was God was ignored when convenient). The Renaissance and the Enlightenment owed much more to pre-Christian Greece and Rome that they did to Christ, Scripture or the Church Fathers.

Is it a good thing that "prostitution" (under any name) is stigmatized?
Do you feel obligated to use the euphemism "sex worker" rather than prostitute or whore?
Is sex "work"?
Is sex "an industry"?
Is selling or buying sexual access a legitimate commercial activity?
If selling sexual access is a legitimate commercial activity, should it be officially recognized, regulated, and commercially encouraged, like any other trade?
Is buying sex a legitimate, normal, moral act?
Do you think "sex workers" (as opposed to "prostitutes") freely choose to sell sex?
Do you think adverse circumstances is the likely cause of people becoming prostitutes?
Does promiscuous sexual activity reduce the need for people to buy sex?
Is "unable to obtain sex any other way" a legitimate reason to use pr
2 days ago — BC

No.
No.
It can be.
Oh yes.
It can be.
Yes. Taxed too.
It can be.
Don't know.
Don't know.
Don't know.
As legitimate as any other reason, I suppose.

He's an interesting man and significant figure in U.S. History (he brought the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius along with him on his trip along the Amazon, by the way, which I think impressive). But I find his daughter Alice even more interesting.

Christianity is kind of odd in that the central figure doesn't really demonstrate characteristics we'd think of a masculine. — frank

I agree, but consider the "muscular christianity" movement in Victorian England and beyond. Thomas Hughes, the author of Tom Brown's School Days, is credited with popularizing it. Muscular Christianity is characterized by "manliness" and "masculinity of character." Team sports figure in its development; scouting (as in boy scouts) with its emphasis on vigor and health became popular around the same time. God made men to be manly, as that is necessary to subdue the earth and protect women and the weak, you see. TR was a big fan of it, in fact.

Tom Brown's School Days at least served to inspire the marvelous Flashman series of novels by George MacDonald Frasier (Flashman was the villainous cheater and bully who was the chief opponent of the heroic Tom Brown).

It's amazing what purposes Christianity can be made to serve.

There's a book of hers I have but haven't yet begun reading: Putting Philosophy to Work: Inquiry and its Place in Culture. It looks good. It may include some of the essays you mention.

For me, the word "arena" refers to the arena where the Roman ludi took place. Combat by gladiators or the killing of wild beasts for the entertainment of the public. The "man in the arena" is properly a slave engaging in blood sports to amuse others, not the romantic hero portrayed by Roosevelt. TR certainly killed his share of wild beasts for his own amusement, of course, but if he thought of himself as "the man in the arena" I wonder if he understood what it implied.

What are your thoughts regarding the suggestion that 'pragmatists and feminists are necessary partners'? (see my underline below) — Amity

I'm not sure what it means, exactly. I'm not sure what a feminist-pragmatist or a pragmatist-feminist might be. I know of a pragmatist I admire who is a woman. She's Susan Haack, a valiant defender of pragmatism from the vagaries of such as Rorty, who thinks Dewey was a postmodernist before postmodernism became popular. I don't know if she qualifies as a feminist.

Dewey felt that philosophy, and specifically the process of inquiry as he described it, should be applied to social problems. If that's what feminists do, I suppose that has an association with pragmatism.

I'm unable to make the distinction you seem to make along with the majority, which you describe as follows:

According to the Supreme Court, being black in and of itself does not CAUSE you to have certain qualities, but it CAN cause you to experience circumstances that (by means of your response to those circumstances) creates those certain qualities. — Voyeur

So, being black can cause you to have certain experiences. You have them because you're black. You wouldn't have them, then, if you weren't black.

The experiences you have which are caused by the fact you're black can cause you to have certain qualities, but you don't have them because you're black. Yes?

But if they're caused by experiences resulting from the fact you're black, must it not be the case that you have them because you're black? You wouldn't have had those experiences but for the fact you're black. You wouldn't have had them if you were white, for example.

As a non-lawyer I suspect that if this lawsuit rises to the level of SCOTUS review, the Supremes will vote 6-3 in favor of pro-"legacy preference", etc. — 180 Proof

I thought this decision would spawn litigation, but this is pretty fast work on the part of plaintiffs' lawyers. Of course, the decision will also have the result that those involved in admissions decisions will be bombarded with essays of the kind the majority so blithely referenced at the conclusion of their opinion. But I think the decision will create all sorts of legal advocacy.

A court which held, previously, that spending money is speech in Citizens United and is now composed of even more justices with a similar mindset isn't likely to find any problem with a "legacy preference" or with preference being given to the children of large donors to an institution of higher education.

Still, it will be interesting, and revealing, how this litigation proceeds.

Legacy preferences should certainly be prohibited. So, I believe, should so-called "development cases" where preference is given to the children of wealthy donors. Or perhaps they could write essays describing how being legacies or the children of rich parents has resulted in the development of the individual qualities the majority admires which would contribute to the institution in question, in which case....

To dismiss those dissents (as well as concurring opinions), because they have little current use in the courtroom is to miss the point of the dissents/concurrences altogether. They are not written for the courtroom, they are written on and for the issue. Otherwise why write them, if they have no value? — Voyeur

I suspect they may be written for a number of reasons. Perhaps they'll turn out to be useful, sometime. In the here and now, in which a lawyer practices--in which decisions are made, people are impacted, lives are led--the majority opinion determines the law. What the law may be or could be in other circumstances, or should be, is a matter of speculation, and sometimes wishful thinking.

Do you treat all black people the same? Because all black people are black? Or do you treat them differently based on their personal characteristics, many of which are directly derived from their racial/cultural experiences of being black in a world of systemic racism? — Voyeur

Do you treat all people the same? Or do you acknowledge that some of them should be treated differently "based on their personal characteristics, many of which are directly derived from their racial/cultural experience of being black in a world of systemic racism?"

I think the majority contends that the Equal Protection Clause provides that all applicants must be treated the same. At the same time, however, they state that the Equal Protection Clause allows some of them to be treated differently due to "their racial/cultural experience of being black (for example) in a world of systemic racism." It would seem to me essential that one must be black to have the "racial/cultural experience of being black in a world of systemic racism."

It DOES mean the fact that the applicant is black figured into the decision. — Voyeur

Yes. Race is necessarily a factor, as those having the qualities the majority thinks merit consideration will have them because they're black. Now, though, it's necessary that in order for the race of an applicant to be considered, the applicant must establish that they have those qualities due to their race.

Affirmative Action may have presumed that discrimination takes place, and for that reason those discriminated against should be favored. The majority aren't brazen enough to claim that it has ceased entirely, though they seem to take the position it no longer creates a problem to be remedied and so no longer may be presumed. I think the majority tries to allow race to be considered while maintaining it can't be considered. It simply has made it more difficult for race to be considered, placing the burden on those who've been discriminated against to establish that the discrimination they suffered due to their race has rendered them worthy of consideration despite their race.







.

What Justice Gorsuch concludes regarding Title VI, in this case, is no more binding on a court (and of no more importance to me) than is the ass of a rattus rattus.
— Ciceronianus

Of course it's not binding, nowhere did I say it was. — Voyeur

Well, try to understand I've never before been asked to render a legal opinion on what a court didn't say in deciding a case, or about a holding it didn't make. It's not something that's come up in my practice. I assumed you were trying to address the actual decision in question.

And yes, concurring opinions and dissents are generally unimportant in the actual practice of law. I don't advise clients they have a good chance of success based on a dissent or a concurring opinion which differs from the rationale of the majority.

Many universities have for too long done just the opposite. And in doing so, they have concluded, wrongly, that the touchstone of an individual’s identity is not challenges bested, skills built, or lessons learned but the color of their skin. Our constitutional history does not tolerate that choice. (majority decision)

I suspect that the musings made in the closing paragraphs of the majority opinion will come to be reqarded as dicta, depending on the spin it's desired to make.

Regardless, consider. An applicant may submit an essay regarding the wrongs experienced due to racial discrimination. So, the applicants race may be mentioned in the application process. A person reading the essay will, without much effort, rightly infer the applicant to be a member of the race discriminated against. So, the applicant's race will be known by those making the admission decision.

According to the majority, those making the admission decision may consider the impacts of discrimination against the applicant because of race (e.g. because the applicant is black) in coming to a decision. But, the admission decision cannot be made because the applicant is black, despite the fact that there would have been no discrimination, the impacts of which may be considered, had the applicant not been black.

Where does the black go? Applicant X should be admitted because of characteristics and abilities arising from discrimination against the applicant because the applicant is black (characteristics and abilities which presumably would not have arisen but for the racial discrimination), but that doesn't mean the fact the applicant is black figured in the decision to admit? It doesn't work, I'm afraid.

From a lawyer's perspective, concurring opinions are insignificant. It's the decision of the majority that's important. A concurring opinion joins in the holding of the majority, for reasons that are not stated in the majority decision. As a result, they state a rationale or argument that isn't supported by the majority. So, a concurring opinion doesn't constitute precedent. What Justice Gorsuch concludes regarding Title VI, in this case, is no more binding on a court (and of no more importance to me) than is the ass of a rattus rattus. Nonetheless, concurring opinions are cited sometimes in the hope that courts might find them persuasive on particular points, and particularly when a lawyer can't find any good authority on which to rely.

Also, I think you misunderstand the majority's decision if you think it doesn't rule out consideration of race as a factor in admissions. Let's look at that small portion of the decision you seem to latch onto:

At the same time, as all parties agree, nothing in this opinion should be construed as prohibiting universities from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected his or her life, be it through discrimination, inspiration, or otherwise. (citation omitted). But, despite the dissent’s assertion to the contrary, universities may not simply establish through application essays or other means the regime we hold unlawful today. (A dissenting opinion is generally not the best source of legal advice on how to comply with the majority opinion.) “[W]hat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows,” and the prohibition against racial discrimination is “levelled at the thing, not the name.” (citation omitted). A benefit to a student who overcame racial discrimination, for example, must be tied to that student’s courage and determination. Or a benefit to a student whose heritage or culture motivated him or her to assume a leadership role or attain a particular goal must be tied to that student’s unique ability to contribute to the university. In other words, the student must be treated based on his or her experiences as an individual—not on the basis of race.

The majority seems to be conjuring up a kind of being, or creature, whose race and or cultural heritage subjected him or her (or they, I don't know) to discriminated against in some fashion, but who was able to overcome this as an individual (in ways somehow not arising from the individual's race or which are apart from the individual's race) and contribute to the university. I have no idea how such a determination may be made But the statement that a person must not be treated on the basis of race seems rather clear.

What the majority prohibits is consideration of race as a factor in admissions, clearly enough. That consideration was allowed in the past under other case law which it was thought met the "strict scrutiny" standards which have to be met for governmental action to sanctioned though it is constitutionally questionable.

↪Ciceronianus MAGA Supremes are pulling the plug on stare decisis in judicial review? And yet Biden still opposes 'packing the court'. :shade: — 180 Proof

Yes, I see they're at it again. I haven't read the latest opinions from On High, yet. I suspect they'll be additional examples of what I would call "Legal Scholasticism." Reasoning, sometimes intricate, based on fixed dogma which transcends precedent. I wonder how many of them were taught by Jesuits or Dominicans. Most of them are Catholics.

In fact, there are exceptions to the rule of stare decisis. There was a time when the Supremes were condemned as being activists, ignoring the rule with impunity. Now, they're reactionaries, doing just that as well.

It's such a chore reading these decisions. Particularly when one isn't paid to do so.

The Equal Protection Clause came into being after the Civil War and, when it isn't being ignored, has inspired an amount of litigation which easily rivals that inspired by the older dictates of our Constitution, which seems sometimes to have been drafted with that purpose in mind. There's a good argument, given the timing of its adoption, that it was adopted specifically to end racial discrimination, particularly against blacks. For a long time, though, it was ignored.

Then it wasn't. The Supremes began generating opinions which sanctioned legal measures which favored certain races and minorities in an effort to remediate the disfavor of them which continued regardless of the Clause. The policy behind those decisions was, I think, one which had its basis in the belief that in order to attain a society in which all would have equal protection it was necessary that the inequality which characterized the law and its enforcement be reduced by according an additional benefit to those victimized by that inequality.

The fact that the Equal Protection Law was adopted in an effort to end racial discrimination makes it rather difficult to contend that policies intended to limit or even eliminate such discrimination are in violation of it. But now the Supreme Court has revealed that racial discrimination no longer exists. So, if there ever was a basis on which desegregate schools, for example, or protect voting rights, or provide for greater access to higher education for some, there no longer is a need to do so. It follows that affirmative action instead of being supported by the Equal Protection Clause now violates it.

In fact, affirmative action has always been treated rather gingerly by the courts in light of the language of the Equal Protection Clause. The language of the Clause seems to admit of no exceptions. I think it's mistake to treat the Constitution as Holy Writ and believe we regularly find reasonable grounds on which exceptions to it may be and are made, myself. But ultimately I think that what this decision comes down to is the fact that a majority of the Supremes think, in effect, that everything's okay now; there's no discrimination anymore, or at least that discrimination is no longer a serious concern except in increasingly limited circumstances. The playing field has been leveled, saith the Supremes.

Yet, when confronted with a woman of high intelligence, social position, and education --- daughters of the Ptolemaic rulers of Egypt were educated in Alexandria along with sons --- both of those manly men were inclined to "cooperate" with her --- at least in private. Even to the point of reluctantly accepting wise military strategy. But their own Roman leaders and military compatriots kept urging them to get rid of that "gypo" witch, who had beguiled them. — Gnomon

Caesar was quite randy, it seems. He was called "every woman's man and every man's woman."
\
It's interesting that women in ancient Rome could do much more than women in ancient Greece could, and in that sense may be said to have been "more free." For example, Roman women could buy property, run businesses, make wills and inherit wealth, get divorced and obtain a paying job. The women of ancient Greece couldn't do any of those things.

The relationship between Caesar and Cleopatra was perceived differently by the Romans than that between Anthony and Cleopatra. Caesar's relations with Cleopatra took place after Pompey had been defeated and killed. Caesar had many enemies in Rome, but there was no civil war taking place. There may have been fears of Cleopatra having too much influence over him, and concerns regarding whether their child would take on the powers granted his father as dictator, but Cleopatra was actually well received by the rich and powerful of Rome when she stayed there in Caesar's villa, and was visited there even by Cicero. Egypt was considered an ally of Rome.

After Caesar's assassination, Rome was occupied with civil war again. Anthony was allied with Caesar's adopted son, Octavian, while the assassins were disposed of, and then formed an alliance with him and Lepidus and more or less agreed to each of them having authority over certain portions of Rome's dominions. Anthony's relations with Cleopatra began at this time, Octavian and Anthony then fell out and a new civil war began, in which Anthony's association with Cleopatra despite his marriage to Octavian's sister, and his alliance with her in the war, was thought to represent a choice of a foreigner and a foreign kingdom in opposition to Rome. I think it was the fact she represented a foreign power in alliance with Anthony that made her an object and fear and contempt in Rome more than the fact that she was a woman although it seems clear that Octavian's propaganda portrayed her as having seduced Anthony to do her bidding.

The Romans seems to have respected Cleopatra, in a sense, after her fleet and that of Anthony was defeated at the battle of Actium. Horace wrote of her in one of his odes on how she refused to surrender to Octavian and be displayed in his triumph:

But she, intending to perish more nobly,
showed no sign of womanish fear at the sword,
nor did she even attempt to win
with her speedy ships to some hidden shore.

And she dared to gaze at her fallen kingdom
with a calm face, and touch the poisonous asps
with courage, so that she might drink down
their dark venom, to the depths of her heart,

growing fiercer still, and resolving to die:
scorning to be taken by hostile galleys,
and, no ordinary woman, yet queen
no longer, be led along in proud triumph.

I don’t know, ask that dude in the quote — Darkneos

That dude in the quote isn't interested in questions, or answers. That dude in the quote is content to be discontented.

So the opening question: What is a man? — Moliere

Well, don't ask Rudyard Kipling. It seems he thought a man to be a kind of demi-god, judging from his poem If, and told his (fictional) son in that poem he had to meet the impossibly high standards described in it in order to be one. He managed to arrange for his real son John to have a commission in the army in WWI, despite the fact that John had been rejected because of his eyesight was terrible. John was killed in battle, aged 18.

I doubt it's possible to define "a man" in any non-trivial sense, and think it's not worth the trouble.

Well, to be honest, I don't give a rat's ass for the Juneteenth celebration -- it just isn't part of my heritage. — BC

I confess that I don't celebrate Juneteenth. Nor do I celebrate MLK's birthday, or Washington's birthday, or Labor Day, or Memorial Day, or any other national holiday with the possible exception of Thanksgiving and Christmas, if by "celebrate" we mean anything more than taking the day off from work if we're allowed to do so. The notion that we must or should celebrate any holiday--or anything, for that matter-seems peculiar, if we refer to engaging in any enjoyable or happy activity. If we celebrate a holiday by taking the day off from work, however, I'll celebrate them all, regardless of who or what the holiday is claimed to note.

What makes a holiday deserving of being a holiday? — TiredThinker

This thread should be transferred to the "Philosophy of Holidays" section.

It's not quite as simple as you seem to think. The Armstrong cases dealt with the application of several federal records laws, and specifically the distinction between records governed by FOIA and those addressed by the Presidential Records Act. FOIA address federal agencies; part of the executive branch. They discussed the civil remedies available to those who seek records under both laws. They're not exactly on point.

As this Memorandum Decision itself notes, however, what it refers to as Armstrong I was subsequently interpreted by the D.C. Circuit (the federal appellate court for the D.C. District Court) in what it refers to as Armstrong II. In that subsequent decision (at 1 F.3d 127) the D.C. Circuit noted that Armstrong I ""the Armstrong I court was not addressing the initial classification of existing materials." Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, Office of Admin., 1 F.3d 1274, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1993) In other words, Armstrong I didn't address the initial classification of materials as presidential or personal records. Presidential and Personal Records and he difference between them are defined in the PRA. That classification is not at the sole discretion of a president, but is subject to court review:

"Thus, although the PRA impliedly precludes judicial review of the President's decisions concerning the creation, management, and disposal of presidential records during his term of office, Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 291, the courts may review guidelines outlining what is, and what is not, a "presidential record" to ensure that materials that are not subject to the PRA are not treated as presidential records. We remand to the district court to conduct this inquiry."

Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, Office of Admin., 1 F.3d 1274, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Regardless, though, the indictment isn't limited to the PRA or civil remedies available under it. It involves violation of the Espionage Act, obstruction, and other criminal matters.

Yes. In addition to Biden and his family, Hillary Clinton is brought up. But selective prosecution is hard to establish, and in this case given the circumstances and the stupidly incriminating statements of the man himself and his conduct during the investigation, I don't know how any competent, self-respecting lawyer could refrain from prosecuting given the grand jury's direction.

That is why we have the law and courts. At the end of the day, if the courts conclude guilt, the opinion of the public does not matter. America in general might complain about rulings, but we abide by them. Trump will go to jail, many people will insist they don't believe it, but he will suffer the consequences under the law if found guilty. The court of opinion is always a biased rabble of logically inconsistent feelings and emotions struggling for power. Its irrelevant in the face of a country that solidly favors and enforces the law. — Philosophim

Well, I hope you're right. But I think we face a situation where a significant portion of the populace doesn't favor the law, and believes it shouldn't be enforced, in this case as to this individual. That anyone could accept him as credible or honorable mystifies me; he seems a kind of paragon of brazen deceit and selfishness. But there are those who do.

I think representing Trump would be a nightmare for a lawyer. He has no discipline, is scatter-brained, tends not to take advice, and has a reputation for stiffing his lawyers. I hope those representing him now will demand a very large retainer, and do nothing until they know the money is in the bank.

Yes, again. — T Clark

You are our resident censor, our Cato (the Elder), our Anthony Comstock. Te saluto!

Again?
— Ciceronianus

Again? — T Clark

Again?

Again?

As William James says, "The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is the conduct it dictates or inspires."

This I would apply to the moral more than the mundane. I realize a bridge can be built only a certain way.

So even should a belief in God be entirely delusional, if it should lead to greater happiness, and should its disbelief lead to misery, you'd be hard pressed to explain why we should accept the cold hard scientific misery unless you hold that adherence to empirically motivated beliefs is always righteous. Such would be a basic tenant of your dogma. — Hanover

Note that James refers to "what a truth means..." That isn't a statement regarding how we determine what is or is not true. It sounds to me like a Jamesian effort to express Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim (how to determine what we mean by a concept or idea).

So, what a belief in God or what a particular belief in God means may be determined by "the conduct it dictates or inspires" (regardless of its truth).

It's not clear to me that "happiness" is a kind of conduct; nor is it clear to me that we can ascribe any particular kind of conduct as being dictated or inspired by a general, undefined "belief in God." So, I doubt that James' statement can be of much use to you in the point I think you're trying to make.

If we add a bit of context, and explanation, we may be able to determine the type of conduct a belief in God dictates or inspires. A belief that "X is the one, true God" for example might result in conduct of a certain kind.

Regardless, though, if your point is that what makes us happy should be preferred to what makes us miserable, the truth or meaning of that claim would also seem to call for some context in order for it to be determined.

The more context is significant in making a judgment, the less it is a matter of dogma, I think.

While it's strikingly easy to believe that the personal gods many worship are out to get one or the other of us, it isn't nearly as easy to believe that of the universe. The universe is enormous, and it's exceedingly unlikely that, if it is aware of us and has the capacity to form intent, it has any concern with what we think, say or do. That being the case, it makes no sense to think that it bears us any ill will, or that the kind of person we are disturbs it in any way.

. It is my contention that though the great and the good might agree amongst themselves a definitive canon and ritual and so on, and enforce that upon the great unwashed, a religion founded on inerrancy and literalism cannot become a popular religion until the masses can read the text in a language they can understand. — unenlightened

OK. And "the masses" probably didn't read until the 19th-20th centuries. I see your point.

I would prefer to believe that Christ was speaking from a universalist perspective, rather than proclaiming the requirements of a sectarian religious affiliation ("Yo! Christians! Form a queue to the right! Others - outer darkness!'). — Wayfarer

Well, I'd prefer to believe he never said such things. But we know what the Gospel says he said. Either he said it, or he didn't. In the latter case, the author(s) of the Gospel thinks he said it or would like us to believe he did. In either case, I think, there's no ambiguity in what's said.

Maybe you have this mixed up though. Jesus was anti-religion. He rebelled against the Jews. You must recognize that there was no Christianity at that time, so he was not promoting a religion called Christianity, he was simply rebelling against religion. So when, if, he said "I am the truth", then it was in an anti-religious context. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know that he was anti-religion. Perhaps he was. All we have to judge him by are writings made decades after his death. As to those, they were written at a time Christianity was developing. John's Gospel was the last to be written, by my understanding--at least the last of the four Gospels which have been accepted (though it's possible this particular excerpt was made later; Christians were known to edit writings to suit their purposes, as they did to those of Flavius Josephus, or indeed fabricate them, as in the case of the supposed correspondence between Seneca and St. Paul).

In John's Gospel we see the seeds of what Christianity the religion was becoming and became. More sophisticated by the rather clumsy insertion of the ancient pagan concept of Logos into Christian discourse (this was followed by the wholesale assimilation of the works of pagan philosophers, most notably Plato and the Neo-Platonists, Aristotle and the Stoics). More exclusive in its claims to be the one true faith.

The most difficult thing about understanding the New Testament is to discern what Jesus actually said, and did, when all that is provided is hearsay. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure if this can be done, though. Unfortunately. We can interpret what it's claimed he said to suit our preferences, we can point out inconsistencies in the Gospels and seek to resolve them or argue in favor of one version over another, but we can't do more than that.

Yes. I just have fond memories of the '60s and the pre-disco '70s, though I was too young to be an actual hippie.

We spend a lot of time talking about radical priests - Thomas Merton, Richard Rohr — Tom Storm

They're not radical priests. The Berrigan Brothers were, and the one that got the guy who sang "Me and Julio Down by the Schoolyard" out of jail and on the cover of Newsweek. Even Father Groppi.

Oh no. This comment probably isn't pertinent, is it?

But what I want to talk about is the phenomenon of literalism in particularly Christianity and Islam, but also Hinduism and even Buddhism, that seems to have begun in the 18th Century — unenlightened

Ah. As opposed to the literalism which resulted when the early Church through Councils and otherwise tossed out what's been called the Apocrypha, or which resulted through the Protestant Reformation, or the division of the Church into western and eastern Christianity, for example. Well, that at least makes the claim regarding literalism as a reaction to peevish scientists and atheists somewhat more credible, as they haven't been all that much around until fairly recently. But I think modern fundamentalism is more a function of the Protestant evangelical tradition, which began during the Reformation. The stranger of the evangelicals, like the Puritans, took ship to God's Favorite Country as they didn't like and were shunned by the Church of England, a kind of quasi-Catholic Church established to satisfy the vanity and cupidity of Henry VIII. And here the tradition flourished, sometimes clashing with science, as in Tennessee and other states. But again, literalism even of this variety isn't merely a reaction to atheism or science.

. "I am the way, the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me."
— Ciceronianus

Notice here that "truth" is represented as a way of life, a way of being, instead of as fact . — Metaphysician Undercover

If that's so, there would be no need to make reference to "the way" or "the life." They become mere surplusage as we lawyers would say; irrelevant and unnecessary. It would seem kinder to the author to assume he wasn't claiming that Jesus said "I am the truth, the truth and the truth" but drew a distinction between "the truth" and "the way" and "the life." Regardless, though, it's clear that Jesus is portrayed as claiming he alone is the way, the truth and the life. I don't think it's possible to reasonably construe these statements otherwise, so I don't believe this is the result of a literal, fundamentalist interpretation which can be considered a reaction to "atheist dogma." It isn't necessary to be an atheist to maintain that such statements are the foundation for the intolerance which has characterized Christianity during the 20 centuries of its existence (which is also characteristic of other religions which make claim to being the one true faith).

It's interesting you choose to quote from John. "I am the way, the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me." 14.6. It strikes me there isn't much in the way of love to be focused on here, and it sounds very much like those who don't accept Jesus--who are not saved thereby--are condemned.

Like the Devil, we all can quote scripture for our own purposes. If that's the case, are we to focus only on the "good" parts, for fear of provoking fundamentalism?

I think religious fundamentalism has been around a very long time. I doubt atheism, however virulent, has been a significant cause of it. I think the exclusive nature of Christianity (as expressed in the quote from John above) and the resulting intolerance is the primary cause. What Scripture says, and its interpretation--the correct interpretation--has been the subject of dispute and violence for centuries, and not because atheists ridicule it, but rather because there were, and are, people who don't accept it or fail to accept it's "true" meaning.

I don't consider myself an atheist, virulent or otherwise, but if we focus on the love expressed in the Gospels or elsewhere, what I would find most offensive is the remarkable lack of it in those who profess to be Christians in the present and in the past.

Concludes that the linguistic turn might have had its day.
— Wayfarer

If so, then only because it is by now ubiquitous. — Banno

Well, not entirely so, I fear.

I think the methods of analytic philosophy and OLP are useful and will remain with us as long as efforts are made to speak, write and think carefully and critically in an effort to curb, or perhaps discipline, the results of our efforts to obtain special insight merely by a kind of deep, intuitive consideration of things, ideas and concepts in abstract and without context, i.e. thinking about something really hard (contemplation).

Pretty cool, eh?

Unlike many here on the forum I don't have any antipathy toward religion. I suspect you can't separate it from other social factors when considering social history. — T Clark

I agree, but admit to antipathy towards particular religions, especially the Abrahamic versions, which I think are especially exclusive and intolerant; often violently so, and similar religions which claim to be the only way.

Yes, I understand, and in retrospect think you're correct. It was an expression of surprise, frankly; one better made in casual conversation than here.