Perfidious Albion, the Holocaust, European guilt, the bizarre and deadly belief in a divinely bestowed homeland which hasn't been a homeland since Hadrian's legions crushed the Bar Kokhba revolt in 135 C.E. at the latest, Christian fundamentalism, not to forget fanaticism and political expediency, all combined to create this bloody, running sore which shows no sign of healing. Makes one believe it Nemesis (the Greek goddess, I mean).

I am not even saying it's a horribly bad system. ALL I AM SAYING is that the justice system is not in the service of justice. It is in the service of law. — god must be atheist

The law isn't quite the wacky, unprincipled, standardless, unpredictable, haphazard, amoral or incoherent system you may think it to be, intent on finding people guilty on any basis, and festooned with madcap juries running amuck without thought or guidance.

But as I've noted before, the law is simply the law. "Justice" to some isn't justice to others, and that makes the service of justice speculative and uncertain. But the law is always the law no matter what anyone believes. Think what you like of it and be damned.

As Justice Holmes noted to some poor lawyer appearing before him: "This is a court of law, young man, not a court of justice." I think he was saying something along these lines..."Know something about the law before you slink into my courtroom, you buffoon, and waste time prattling about what you think is just or unjust."

I've been in front of many judges. The terrible truth is that they're just lawyers who get to wear black robes and sit on chairs placed higher that those of the other lawyers in the room. There's no reason to think they'll be any more or less qualified in the law than any other lawyer, regardless of who or what they are. If you're lucky, they've read the pleadings, listened to the evidence and argument, perhaps done some research or had someone do it for them, take the job seriously and try to make an honest judgment. That's the best you can expect from any of them.

Yes it can, but this assertion as a kind of motto is not worth anything. It has to provide that ground in practice. The USA in her time nominally supported freedom but there were many social groups disenfranchized even more so than now — Tobias

Yes, that's true. And as for the French Revolution, the Terror followed it, and eventually Napoleon. This suggests a community is incapable of promoting individual freedom or inclined against it by its nature, absent law--which I suppose may be deemed communal. We can't give up the law, though. But retirement beckons, so perhaps soon. Regardless, the law's certainly an expression of sovereignty, so that won't work.

Maybe Stoic "freedom" truly is what she means. There is no sovereignty for the Stoic Sage. Nobody is sovereign over the Sage; the Sage is sovereign over nobody, and this constitutes Stoic freedom.

She could have just said so.

She asks how a free community is thinkable, in which you ar efree with others. We think of a free community in terms of isolated individuals free from interference by others. — Tobias

I think a community can, as a community, as a nation, assert its commitment to the freedom of all its members/citizens. The U.S. does that and has done that since its foundation; so have other nations (France, most notably, since the Revolution). So that in itself is quite "thinkable." It's apparent, in fact, so I assume that's not what she refers to, and this of course raises the question--what does she mean?

A nation of course may go beyond mere assertion and adopt laws which restrict the power of government and guarantee certain freedoms. That would be the exercise of sovereignty in favor of freedom, at least to an extent. How renounce that and achieve the wished for freedom? Or does she speak of individuals renouncing any claim to sovereignty of some kind over others, e.g. someone claiming his/her individual freedom.rights have priority over the freedom/rights of others? The conflict of rights, if not freedoms, is something we certainly know of and of course is something the law must address wherever legal rights exist. It's likely inevitable and in many cases has to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps she's recommending we refrain from engaging in such conflicts? Is that what she's touting, using Epictetus as an example?

you win a bottle of Laphroaig, — Banno

Mmmmm. Laphroaig. It's so smokey.

Reading Arendt is not like being led through an argument so much as inundated by it. — Banno

That's well put. I wish I had thought of it.

I think Arendt would agree that the Stoics emphasised virtue rather than freedom, and that she would add that private virtue was brought together with the will by Augustine to give us the fraught notion of freedom. Central to Christian concerns is the freedom to choose to go with or against the will of the Lord, who sees into one's soul and judges us on our private thoughts as much as our public actions. — Banno

Augustine, having conceived (a nice way to put it, I believe) Original Sin, had to find a less obviously unjust way by which we could be condemned to the flames of hell. Christ's sacrifice wouldn't do the trick, not entirely. If it in itself removed the stain of Original Sin, did that mean that those who lived before the sacrifice no longer writhed, so justly, in agony for all eternity? Did that mean that those born after it were clean of stain? Of course not. So, Original Sin had to be a proclivity to sin, but not an overwhelming one. We had to choose to sin, or at least appear to do so, and presto! Free Will was born.

I don't need to read this shit. — frank

Indeed you don't. Yet it seems you do.

What I think Arendt wants to do is reconceptualize freedom in a non individualized manner. how exactly I do not know but she is making the point that freedom can only exist within a community that fosters it, that gives you something to be free with. — Tobias

Perhaps a community which fosters a desire for it, instead. Free from, would make more sense than free with, I think. I find it hard to conceive of a community which fosters freedom as we think of it now--or at least as I think of it. Perhaps those damn Romantics, with their emphasis on individuality, bear some responsibility for this perspectives. I like to poke at them now and again, as well.

For me though I have the same problem with the analytic tradition, the logic chopping is abhorrent and when they explain it to me in lay terms I think "óhh but could you not have said that clearly?" — Tobias

Fair enough.

He was a despicable little man, wasn't he? Still, hardly the first 35 year old eager to jump on an 18 year old, and perhaps her being Jewish made the affair more naughtily thrilling to him. The bit about "being worthy to meet" the relationship of teacher and pupil notwithstanding is certainly banal, and of course self-serving.

:rofl: I do know he is a national socialist and that is, of course, uncomely. However, I do wonder why you always react so strongly to him. He is also a very interesting thinker. He really is, despite his unwelcome affiliation with some of the most heinous villains in history. — Tobias

Well, perhaps something more than uncomely.

I don't find him interesting, I'm afraid. I confess I find it very hard to read his work--his student, the young woman he seduced while her teacher, who wrote the essay being discussed in this thread, was a model of clarity in comparison to him. I find him, to the extent I can understand him, to be romantic, mystical, muddled; inclined to obfuscate if it suits his purposes, inclined to pontificate, a "self-infatuated blowhard" as it seems Don Idhe called him in reviewing his rhapsodic musings on the Parthenon while ranting about modern technology (Heidegger was apparently not content with merely likening the manner in which the Jews were killed by the Nazis in the camps to the mechanisms employed in modern agriculture in his critique of technology--his only mention of the Holocaust, apparently).

H.L. Mencken used to call William Jenning Bryan "the Great Mountebank." I feel much the same about Heidegger.

But to be frank I like to poke at sacred cows, and there's none more sacred in philosophy.

As the character played by the incomparable Strother Martin in Cool Hand Luke said (the Captain?), what we have here, is failure to communicate. Not on your part, but on the part of Arendt.

If she is saying what you think she's saying, it would be a relatively simple thing to express, I believe. I don't think she does do so with any clarity, and leaves us to wonder what's going on with freedom and what it has to do with sovereignty and why giving up sovereignty will make us free. I think she gets caught up in the avalanche of references, names, debates on causes and free will, and dualisms she unleashes on the unwary reader. But perhaps I'm too impatient. Or, perhaps I've been a lawyer for too long, and so am suspicious of what seems to be a set-up, or an effort to "baffle them with bullshit."

I understand she's making a distinction between ancient and modern points of view regarding freedom. I don't necessarily agree with the distinction I think she makes, but believe there is a difference.

My guess is status and position were more important in Graeco-Roman times than freedom. Julius Caesar was assassinated because he usurped the authority and honors, the imperium, of the Senate, not because the people of Rome longed to be free. His much wiser grand-nephew created a new form of government, the Principate, in which the form of the rights and privileges historically held by the Senate was preserved and honored, while actual authority was held by Augustus and his successors.

Totalitarianism is at least as old as the work of its first and possibly greatest proponent, Plato. Freedom wasn't an issue to him because it was insignificant at best, an inconvenience at worst. Plato dreamed of the ruthless and regimented imposition of perfection. The Christian conception of freedom would be much the same during the time the Church dominated society, though the Church likely thought freedom more dangerous and opposed it with greater zeal. There was one truth, one goal.

That began to change, though, and my guess is that concerns regarding freedom as we understand it now began to arise in the conflict among nations and sects that arose when theocracy failed. Just a guess, though.

The question is where freedom fits in relation tot his Stoic enterprise of overcoming unreasonable or unnatural desire. I don't know enough of the topic to be sure, but at first blush freedom does not look to be of great significance to the Stoics. — Banno

Not much significance at all. It's more a concern for those who desire or disturb themselves over things or matters which aren't in their control.

Ciceronianus might be happy to note the essay can also be read as criticism of Heidegger, who still holds on very much to an idea of freedom and authenticity in conversation with oneself. Arendt invokes the political. — Tobias

I rejoice in any criticism of Heidegger, but frankly wish he had spent far more time "in conversation with himself" than he did.

It is clear to me that she thinks freedom is not to be identified with sovereignty... Do we at the least agree here? That Arendt, for better or worse, thinks freedom is to do with choice and novelty within the re publica? As opposed to the capacity to achieve what one wills without regard for the public space?

The discussion of "inner freedom" at about p146-7 seemed to be an oblique reference to stoicism. The implication is that Stoic ideals such as control of one's passions or acting in accord with nature morphed under the influence of Augustin and Paul into something closer to modern ideas of freedom as acting in accord with one's will. I take the change to which she refers to be between a more ancient notion of the freedom to choose within a polity to a supposed freedom to chose despite a polity. — Banno

I'm under the impression that she speaks of "individual freedom" or "inner freedom" as if it's a kind of "sovereignty" over oneself, which it would seem is consistent with what appears, to me, to be a tendency on her part to believe in a kind of inner dialogue or conflict between one me and another me, one me being the will, one being desire, another me being acting-me, yet another being acted-upon-me; I don't know, it gets confusing (not enough mees in me to comprehend this, perhaps). But I may be wrong. I find it difficult to follow her thought, distracted as I am by the names she so relentlessly drops throughout the article.

I don't think the Stoics were all that concerned about freedom of any kind, except perhaps to the extent that it was necessary to act in accordance with nature. Virtue was the good for the Stoics. One could be virtuous without being free to do whatever one likes. For them it was quite unnecessary, and even improper, to exercise sovereignty over anyone--for Epictetus I'd say in particular, as others are not within our control. Epictetus was a slave and if one believes he said what Arrian says he said, it didn't matter to him that he wasn't free for much of his life. He thought it unimportant that Emperors and others could punish or kill him if he chose to act virtuously (so it seems did certain Roman Senators who were Stoics, who were executed by Emperors). Stoics didn't associate themselves with any polity, believing with Diogenes the Dog that they were citizens of the world.

I would say that is probably influenced by a dualistic approach at seeing oneself and one's own actions. — Garrett Travers

Dualism has plagued us for centuries. I doubt there has been any greater source of philosophical futility.

It constitutes an act of sovereignty over one's own self and the exercise of the sole right to the action therein contained. Human action is sovereignty, and it requires force to impede, or compel. — Garrett Travers

I have a fondness for Stoicism, and think there are things which are in our control in significant respects. In these dark times, I think of Montaigne's saying that "Not being able to govern events, I govern myself." But I think when we speak of governing ourselves or having sovereignty over ourselves, we should understand that we speak metaphorically. I think Arndt isn't doing that when she refers to individual sovereignty, and in this fashion makes individual sovereignty appear equivalent to the imposition of authority over others, and as objectionable.

I confess I don't understand why she claims that freedom is identified with sovereignty to begin with, except to the extent she does so for rhetorical purposes. It's not clear to me that my freedom to act necessarily constitutes an exercise of sovereignty over anyone. She refers to Epictetus, but I would say that he clearly maintains that we need not be subject to the sovereignty of others, and that we shouldn't exercise sovereignty over them. She may be distinguishing that view from the more modern view she feels has developed. It seems to me, however, that sovereignty is for her a bete noir and she juxtaposes it with freedom to persuade others to think of it as such as well.

It's not often that a field of science has arisen from the Philosophical Radicals of Bentham and latter John Stuart Mill all the way from England. Bentham and John Stuart Mill had a profound influence on the development of the United States. Sadly, the birth of socialism from the Philosophical Radicals in England found no welcoming from the United States. It seems that selfishness and greed prosper more than anything else nowadays instead of Bentham's liberalism. — Shawn

It's interesting that Mill subsequently (after the adoption of the Reform Act of 1832, supported by the Philosophical Radicals) argued in favor of plural voting, with the more educated given a greater number of votes than others in his Representative Government. It seems he became more leery of the idea of universal suffrage under the influence of Coleridge and others, even lauding government by an elite he called the "clerisy."

I don't know that Utilitarianism has triumphed, bu it remains a useful practical standard to apply in ethical and political issues.

Well, she was Heidegger's lover, poor woman. It's not surprising she wondered how she could go on, after that. It must have been a struggle.

Clearly, I'll have to listen to this. But in reading (not all that much, really) about Hermes Trismegistus and works attributed to him, it seems they're inconsistent in some respects, and very busy, if you know what I mean. There are all sorts of beings involved, some of whom were, it seems according to one account stuffed into humans as a kind of punishment. It gets a bit confusing. Esoteric knowledge by its nature may be available only to those with skill who have studied deeply confusing matters, but I wonder if it's worth the effort.

I think philosophy is incapable of addressing spiritual matters and that they are more in the realm of art. Mysticism or esotericism is interesting to me to the extent they may address those matters, but one hopes for something simpler. Or at least I do. I think it's difficult to say with any certainty what took place in the ceremonies and rituals of the ancient mystery religions (particularly in the case of Mithraism, which I find fascinating) and I wonder if they were less complicated than they've been made out to be by those who claim to interpret them.

It surely is a right. My behavior is such that I allow you to use it, yes, just as my behavior is to allow you to speak when I give you the right to speak freely. — NOS4A2

I don't think I understand you. Are you saying I don't have the right to speak freely unless you give it to me?

I would simply caution throwing out that framework prematurely, dig? — Garrett Travers

Ever read Tom Wolfe's article Radical Chic: That Party at Lenny's? It's about a party Leonard Bernstein held for the Black Panthers in 1970. Bernstein would respond "I dig absolutely" to statements made by the Panthers. I'm showing my age by referring to it, and no doubt by thinking of it in response to your question.

Not that you're a Black Panther. In any case, I do dig. Absolutely.

I can give you the right to borrow my lawnmower whenever you require it. — NOS4A2

I don't think you give me a right, though. You allow me to use it; my use is contingent on your consent. I have no right I can exercise regardless of what you want.

Either rights are a commonly understood recognition of the sovereignty of individual boundaries, or, simply put, anything goes. In a world of no rights, one has no business ever arguing for or against any action undertake by a human, as they have no right to do so. — Garrett Travers

I think it quite possible to determine what we, and others, should or should not do without recourse to the concept of "rights." And I think one is able to do so without needing to assume the existence of some right-giving, non-human authority, which I consider a benefit. To assure that things are or are not done, however, is another thing. I can claim the right to do whatever I please, and likewise can claim that others may not do things in violation of my rights. That is what may create a situation where it's impossible to maintain that actions taken may not be taken.

Absent a common understanding, you would say. But what, and where, is that common understanding? Do you think what you conceive to be your rights are recognized by all, and would not be violated by them absent any penalty which you believe is appropriate (and which you may not be able to impose)?

The concept of rights is a useful one for purposes of limiting the power of governments and regulating conduct. But governmental power may be limited without the assertion of a right, by a prohibition for example.

I know I repeat myself, but what the hell, that's what we all do, especially here.

There are no rights but legal rights, e.g. rights having the sanction of law, recognized as such, and which may be enforced through the mechanism of the law. It's sad but true, sorry. What we call "rights" if they're not legal rights are what we think should be legal rights, but are not; which we think should be honored, regardless of whether they are. But what we want, what we think we're entitled to, is simply that and no more, absent incorporation into the law--wanabee legal rights. Why speak of them at all, except in the context of seeking their inclusion in the law? As well declare yourself master of the universe (or sovereign citizen, for that matter).

Philosophers (and others) have, however, dreamed throughout history of a possible "benevolent despot" who would control the "common herd," guide us and teach us and, having done what was required to organize society and enlighten us to the point we could govern ourselves wisely, would give up his powers. Even J.S. Mill, if I recall correctly, thought a benevolent despotism desirable in some cases. Some thought Napoleon would be such a despot. And, of course, we know that Everyone's Favorite Nazi thought Hitler would do the job as well. There seems to be something about some intellectuals which moves them to worship powerful men.

I confess to nostalgia.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iAHJCPoWCC8

My main issue in life is an inability to accept my mortality. — Yvonne

If it's death itself that disturbs you, I think you should consider what it is about death you find disturbing. You already know you will die, and that there is nothing you can do to prevent it. Are you unable to accept other things beyond your control, such as the fact that you will feel pain or will age? What is it about one thing that's beyond your control which you are unable to accept, while you can accept other things beyond your control?

For my part, I think Epictetus was right. It's essential to our happiness that we know the distinction between what is or is not in our control. Death isn't, but how we live, and how we think of death is. We shouldn't let things beyond our control disturb us, whether it's the fact we'll die or something else inevitable, but instead do the best we can with what's in our control and take the rest as it happens.

“

An individual pursuit in the sense of a way of living, as a life of virtue would be? That I can understand.

The Stoic ethical framework is almost exclusively predicated upon individual behavior. — Garrett Travers

Yes, behavior. Our behavior involves others, necessarily. Behavior in accordance with nature--the rational selection of things according to nature--according to the Stoics, includes the due consideration of the effect of conduct on other beings, which are a part of nature.

I suppose I shouldn't reject that work out of hand, never having read it, much though I find her objectionable. But if I do so some here may demand that I read Heidegger (whom I've repeatedly deplored here and elsewhere) more than I have--a frightening prospect.

I appreciate the references. I fear our ability to understand the ancient world in many respects, especially regarding religious and spiritual considerations (I refer to Greco-Roman world) may be lost forever thanks to the relentless expurgation of it by Christianity. What remains allows us to speculate and infer to a certain extent only regarding what it was and what was believed by its people.

I haven't read the work you referred to earlier. I read her fiction, and The Virtue of Selfishness, and some other odds and ends. My understanding and my recollection is she was very fond of Aristotle, and also, it seems, his great imitator, Aquinas. I prefer Aristotle to Plato, but think Aristotle's perspective on most things to be narrow.

I think Nietzsche could be brilliant and insightful, but whether due to a lack of patience or an excess of emotion he was disinclined to provide reasons for his insights. He was declarative, even imperious. He was a preacher, I think.

However, do your thing. — Garrett Travers

Oh, I will. It's true I'm not fond of Rand. I'm not particularly fond of Frantic Freddie (as I like to call him) either, by the way. I read a good deal of both Rand and Nietzsche years ago. I think the Sturm und Drang movement continues, and they're both representatives of it in their own way. It had an appeal to me for a time, but no more. But we venture too far beyond this thread.

Come now. What do you think "Ayn Rand is to philosophy what L. Ron Hubbard is to religion" means? Plainly, it asserts a similarity between them and how they're interpreted, the one in relation to philosophy, the one in relation to religion. That's what I address. This similarity need not relate to the quality or coherence of their beliefs; it may refer to their status, their impact, their characters, the character of their followers, their biographical data, their reception by others.

You'll find Rand has been discussed in quite a few threads in this forum. There may be those who would be interested in her philosophy. I'm not one of them.

I wonder what Scientologists think about L. Ron Hubbard. I suspect they feel about him much like you feel about Rand.

He looked into the abyss, then turned and waved his bare arse at it. — Banno

Far better than thinking the abyss looks back at you, or weeping over life, expounding on meaninglessness or crying "woe is me!"

There is something virtuous, or at least admirable, about facing the inevitable without care or with a laugh. Certainly that was the case with the Romans. I wonder if that's the case because bravery is admired or useless misery and weakness despised.

The fact that a ten dollar note is money is not a property of the physical paper. In 5000 years whatever nation backs it will have long since collapsed, the piece of paper will only have the historical curiosity of once having been money. No matter how well preserved it is. — hypericin

It will be a historical curiosity, and interesting, not because it is a piece of paper but because it was money. What significance would it have then, or would it have had in the past, as a piece of paper? Imagine the museum exhibit: "Piece of paper."

Thank you.

I think love of another person can become cold when subordinated to an ideal.