Personally I think this war was going to happen no matter what. Many presidents, including Trump and Obama, tried to change the course of US foreign policy, but were unable to fight 'the Blob'. — Tzeentch

Well I agree the war was extremely likely and it's definitely a testament to the power of the neo-cons that they can simply continue the policy without presidents having much say in it.

Nevertheless, I have no problem recognizing Ukrainian "agency" in parallel to the US policy.

It may certainly be true that Zelensky is Nuland's "our man" and the leverage and compromat Nuland has on Zelensky essentially guaranteed rejecting any peace or negotiation before the war.

However, not only are there other actors in Ukrainian society, once the war started and the stakes were clear I think Zelensky did have real agency. In extreme circumstances many previous obligation, pressures and considerations that seemed important before are swept away in force majeur. Had he wanted, Zelensky could have chosen to be something other than be a patsy and instead play an astute diplomatic game playing the sides off each other and making use of his leverage to cut a deal, playing the Americans and the Europeans, while keeping a step ahead of hardliners (aka. literal Nazi's) in Ukraine.

Of course, you may retort that Zelensky is an idiot and could not possibly come up with some sophisticated play that would have shoved a peace down the throats of Nuland and fellow patsies in the EU. And for myself, personally, I would not care much to defend more than the agency of an idiot.

However, it is a common refrain from apologists for US foreign policy that the disasters are co-created with "agency" of local players. It may not seem too relevant to you that the US is "invited in" to get a bunch of people killed, poisoned, maimed and tortured, but it is very important in the foundation of psychopathic analysis that victims "want it", or then at least had hypothetical chance to prevent it. So, for the sake of these fragile souls I have no problem admitting the agency of American agents does in fact exist—yeah, sure, why not I say—, but I would still leave it to them to argue what kind of agency we're talking about. The agency of a moron like Zelensky maybe little more than hypothetical and seen as Nuland elects the Ukrainian leader since 2014 then it would follow that Ukrainians have little say in the matter.

In my view, it is thinkable that they knew the Russians were going to invade, and also knew the Russians would eventually prevail, since the decision not to put NATO boots on the ground was obviously made in advance of the conflict. — Tzeentch

Agreed.

To add to your observation, there's no actual rush to make Ukrainians as effective as possible. Drip feed theory, the centre piece of my analysis here, of only supplying the next weapons system when the previous weapon system fails to deliver any sort of victory for Ukraine, I would argue definitive proof there's no real intention to even try to defeat the Russians.

US officials have managed to impress upon the fungible minds of even the most ardent war zealot that there's some rational reason for holding back weapons all while "doing whatever it takes" to win ... but this is clearly untrue given that they can send the very weapons one day they presented as simply common sense they could not possibly send the day before. What changes as time passes is not some reevaluation of these "of course not" arguments for not sending more sophisticated weapons, but rather the destruction of Ukrainian's war fighting capability.

As the RAND paper insists upon multiple times, support to Ukraine must be "Calibrated" to avoid any real inconvenience to Russia that risks escalation, which isn't good for anyone.

Maybe the goal of project Ukraine really was to incorporate Ukraine into NATO/EU, but perhaps this was just the red herring to provoke Russia, and the actual goal of project Ukraine lies elsewhere - perhaps the goal was a forever war between Russia and Europe. — Tzeentch

Well, I'm sure if Russia just "let it happen" then Ukraine and Georgia would be in NATO already, but since Russia didn't the neo-cons saw the opportunity for a new war that would be good as far as war making is concerned. The gas and destroying the Euro as a competitor the USD as well as making European states essential permanent vassals without the possibility of "playing off both sides" anymore were additional benefits. However, I'm pretty sure the neo-cons just like killing as many people as bureaucratically possible (they can't just launch nukes at random and live out their fetish of rebuilding civilization in a bunker, for example, because other bureaucrats would stop them ... for now).

So, I certainly agree with your point:

For example, European energy dependency has been a thorn in the United States' side for at least a decade, and it ties in nicely with the US blowing up Nord Stream. — Tzeentch

But that's just dirty money business, Tim Cook has money for god's sake; no, money isn't the main motivation, you really know you're powerful when you get a lot of people killed due to your creative engagement with the world. Money is only a tool, not an end in itself you know.

Apologies, it seems I have mixed up our discussions with someone else's. — Jabberwock

That's good to know.

It wasn't intended as a complaint. — Echarmion

Well then it seems we are of one mind on the matter and Zelensky disagrees with what is obvious truth to us.

I haven't said anything about what I think the terms actually were, and I have already decided that it's pointless to discuss specifics with you as our views just diverge too much. — Echarmion

I agree it's mostly an academic exercise and speculation what the best deal possible was at the time, though I would not say useless; what would have been the best diplomatic strategy (what concessions were achievable not only from Russia but the US, NATO, EU) could inform similar situations in the future.

As for the subject at hand, seems we agree that Zelensky should have been willing to accept neutrality, recognizing Crimea and some degree of independence for the separatists, certainly getting as many concessions as possible from all the involved parties for agreeing to those points.

Whether the Russian offer was "bad faith" or would result in some future war seems also now of academic interest.

Though, as I mention, if an offer is in bad faith it is still good to accept it. Likewise, even if you think a war would only be postponed for later one still needs to be confident of winning a sooner war.
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Clearly we do not inhabit a shared reality (mentally, that is). — Echarmion

We seem to agree on the major points.

Whether the Northern operation was worth the cost (which we actually know Russia casualties), and whether there was a better strategy available, it made military sense to undertake and did help achieve the military gains in the South.

Of course, geo-politically, economically, in terms domestic politics, the whole war certainly has many consequences. On these issues my position is that it is not a given that Russia is being harmed by the war, or then being more harmed than NATO as a whole (even if there is relative benefit to the US relative Europe), and of course the big winner is China (and whether Russia is a relative loser vis-a-vis China, strengthening the China block is not necessarily productive for the West). The latter point even US mainstream analysts seem to be adopting as well.

Mostly all the fighting in 2022 after the first couple of weeks. — Echarmion

Then we are in agreement, by start of the war I mean the general period from before the fighting even starts to then the first weeks of fighting.

My point being that period of time Ukraine had more leverage than now. At what point it had maximum leverage is again a somewhat academic speculative exercise. The Kremlin may have been willing to make more concessions to avoid the war entirely, in which case maximum leverage was before the war. Once fighting begins then "exact leverage levels" I would argue are pretty volatile as a lot depends on perceptions and worries of decision makers.

There's huge risks in military operations of this size so as days go by the major risks may seem to be radically bigger or smaller.

What military leaders, the Kremlin and Putin are most worried about and would motivate them the most to settle the conflict so as to be sure to avoid, are potentially things that Ukraine doesn't even have the capacity to do or then doesn't ever attempt to do even if they could.

To give an extreme example, a major invasion and/or missile attacks on undisputed Russian territory is certainly something Ukraine could do, and even if doing so would likely solicit Russia responding with massive military call up (not only "unlocking that ability" in the Russian legal code but the Kremlin may feel obliged for international prestige to react as hard as possible), Russia still needs to deal with the sanctions and so such events, even if terrible for Ukraine, risk also havoc in Russia that the Kremlin legitimately believes maybe overwhelming. Maybe the Russian people band together to crush the insolent Ukrainians or maybe things start falling apart militarily or economically.

So, at the start of the war, Ukraine has this theatre level chaotic wildcard sort of leverage over Russia as well as simply the costs and risks of the fighting itself.

If it interests you, or then anyone following, to evaluate risks and stakes on this level you need to keep in mind all the possibilities. By committing to the defence Kiev and re-posturing forces for that, Russia anxiety may significantly decrease as the possibility of Ukraine actually invading Russia decreases.

The Russian plan is to prosecute the first phases of the war with 200 000 troops supplemented by mercenaries, so, at minimum, Ukraine invading Russia would cause a problem to the Kremlins preferred strategy.

I use this example not simply because it's extreme to illustrate the point of risk perception, but also Ukrainians and neo-cons have (after nearly 2 years) realized this themselves that forbidding Ukraine from invading Russia was a significant strategic weakness.

But for the subject at hand, Russia could not know for certain in any case at the start of the war that the US would forbid Ukraine from invading Russia nor that Ukraine would head such limitations; it is the risk, not what actually happens in the future (that is not known at the time), that is leverage at the negotiating table. Of course, Zelensky having zero experience was likely clueless about anything and just a snow flake on spring breeze blowing higher and tither in his understanding of the situation.

Making irrational ultimatums in public to close the door on negotiation entirely, is a sign of a weak mind that is unable to deal with complexity so seeks to simplify the situation by making the choice of the day (or hour or minute) permanent and so not need to think about the options anymore; certainly serves no diplomatic or military purpose.

Yeah, at least in terms of relative battlefield advantage. You can of course argue that the russian losses will make it harder for Russia to justify any kind of settlement, but psychological effects like this are hard to measure.

It's possible that Ukraine has passed it's peak and the war of attrition will slowly accumulate russian battlefield advantage, as well as erode Ukrainian will to fight. Certainly the very public show of disunity recently is not a good sign. — Echarmion

Well I think it's more than possible Ukraine has passed its peak, but for the sake of completeness "we don't know for certain" relative casualties.

We will see how the war unfolds.

But there doesn't seem to be a reason to assume either side will collapse any time soon and a lot can happen in a long war. — Echarmion

A war of attrition at this scale of intensity leads to sudden collapse of the one side if it continues.

This is not an insurgency where the insurgents mostly hang out among the civilian population, in well hidden and remote bases, as well as other countries entirely and can sustain a low level conflict indefinitely.

At this intensity of fighting, continuous supply of munitions is required, continuous replacement of casualties adequate enough to hold the entire front.

It's only difficult for either side to advance insofar as they must penetrate heavy fortifications and mine fields into artillery bombardment and under risk / pressure of counter attack and degradation by suicide drones, and if you manage to advance despite all that it's simply all redeployed and rebuilt 5 or 10 km further away and you need to do it all over again.

A total collapse of one part of the line would allow deep penetration where none of these things exist anymore likely leading to a cascade of collapse along the entire front.

Now, Ukraine is massive so they can always retreat far enough that they are simply out of range of Russian logistics to chase them, but it would be a massive win for Russia. If Russian history is anything to go by, collapse of the front results in political changes in the capital.

Even so, as has been discussed at length with @ssu, Ukraine could still hold plenty of defendable positions (such as the giant river in the middle of the country) as well as sustain an insurgency for years if Russia did occupy the whole country (which is unlikely for this reason), but collapse of the front would mean Russia could take more territory, possibly significantly more.

Collapse of one side of the other is essentially guaranteed at this level of intensity.

"Freeze theory" depends on the Russians giving up on advancing and so lowering the intensity to a sustainable level. Why I think this is unlikely is due to there being too many standoff munitions and drones being too effective and Russia being now totally committed to doing whatever it takes to win the war (Russia started the war with significant self-limitations clearly to make a way back to peace with the West easier' progressive deescalation was perhaps feasible before Nord Stream was blown up).

In principle, Ukraine could hold out and the Russians exhaust their offensive capability (what Western media keeps saying), but as it stands my own view is that Russia has simply too many advantages, in particular artillery and in the air with heavy standoff munitions.

Fair enough. I was just reminded of the phenomenon that, in the proxy wars of the 20th century, junior partners often acquire outsized influence, because the prestige of either the US or the USSR was bound up with their fate. So both powers ended up much deeper in wars than they really wanted. — Echarmion

We're in agreement here. If you read carefully the RAND report cited above, they emphasize repeatedly that escalation of the conflict is not good for the US and advise resolving the Donbas conflict, using arms support only in the context of essentially a negotiating tactic to achieve the best resolution.

There's certainly forces in Ukraine that wanted a war and played the part exactly as you say.

However, a bigger factor I think is that the war festers during the Trump presidency and Russia gate was an overriding US political game that prevented the Trump administration from doing what RAND suggests for domestic political reasons.

What I notice about your view, and this also goes for Tzeentch to a different extent, is that in your "myth", or perhaps we should use a more neutral term like "narrative", noone has any agency. Decisions are ultimately just reactions to the shadowy machinations of an abstraction like "US imperialism" or "the neocons". Hence why Zelensky must be manipulated by a myth. Perhaps he is even entirely a puppet. The russian actions, too are ultimately just a reaction to the actions of the masterminds. — Echarmion

You obviously didn't read what I wrote.

I explicitly stated I disagree with the narrative that the US forced Zelensky to abandon negotiating but needed to persuade him. I even go so far as use the word seduce.

The reason I use myth instead of narrative for things like Putin wanting to conquer all of Ukraine, or Russian military incompetence and Zelensky as the modern Churchill, is because there's not enough elements in these ideas to even constitute a narrative.

The other reason I use the word myth is that there's an epic dimension to these ideas; heroic defence of freedom and so on.

I wouldn't have much of a problem with the use of the word narrative but I feel myth building is more appropriate in this case.

Now, the US not being able to literally force Zelensky to do or not do things doesn't mean they didn't do their best to convince him. Where they did clearly intervene is in the coup of 2014, so that was more US agency than Ukrainian but Ukrainians had 8 years to make peace with Russia if they wanted to.

What is also of note is that all the imperialists in the Kremlin also want this war as well. Imperialists look at a map and ask why this part here isn't ours, and wars as the opportunity to make it theirs.

The US and Russian imperialists are more freinemies then actual adversaries when it comes to this particular war.

This is almost a truism, isn't it? If the deal is good enough to avoid fighting then the deal is good enough to avoid fighting. — Echarmion

It's a truism that you state.

I agree with your truism and then you complain about me agreeing with your truism.

What is not a truism is that we agree that the Russian terms on offer, at least as they appeared to be and were interpreted by diplomats and the West's own media, were reasonable, you even go so far as to say generous (a term I would hesitate to use; generous would be just leaving all the occupied territory).

Now, what is notable, is who doesn't accept this truism is Zelensky. He rejects further negotiation until his demands are met, rather than negotiate and see if there's a deal good enough to take and thus he should take it.

But it's an additional truism that you negotiate before an agreement not after your counter-party accepts your terms.

So maybe it is an obvious truism that you should negotiate and take a good enough deal if it's on offer, but it's clearly not so obvious as to be accepted by Zelensky nor his cheerleaders in the Western media.

Ukraine rejects the terms before the war and also, we are told, the whole Minsk process of diplomacy before was just a ruse and those previous settlements to the conflict were agreed to in bad faith.

And further fighting did improve Ukraine's position. Whether that will be be the case going forward is another question. — Echarmion

What further fighting improved Ukraine's position?

You think now Ukraine is in a better negotiation position than it was at the start of the war? And only going forward from now their negotiation position might decrease?

That is particularly apparent in their complete misunderstanding how and why Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries have joined NATO. — Jabberwock

What misunderstanding?

Can you even cite where we've even discussed Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries joining NATO?

You're literally making up conversation that has not occurred, but please cite where we even discuss other countries joining NATO and explain again what we don't understand about the reasons for doing so.

The reasons Ukraine would want to join NATO before or even now are obvious: not only direct military protection but nuclear deterrence.

The problem is that, if you haven't noticed, Ukraine isn't in NATO. NATO could have flown to Kiev and made Ukraine apart of the club one night by surprise anytime in the last 8 years, or even right now. The explanation of why that doesn't happen by explaining that plenty of countries (including the US) doesn't want Ukraine in NATO simply expounds the obvious reason why Ukraine isn't in NATO as we speak.

If there are "rules" that would prevent NATO allowing Ukraine to join, those rules could be changed if NATO was so motivated to help their friend Ukraine. If there are common sense reasons why no one would change the rules for Ukraine, that is simply another way of saying NATO (and its parts) does not want Ukraine in NATO.

The whole point of being in NATO is to avoid exactly the war that is happening now.

So, if NATO isn't going to do you the favour of rushing over and making you apart of the club and defending you, fighting the war that you want NATO to protect you from to defend the principle of "having the right" to join NATO, is dumb.

And that was the argument for a while, that Ukraine has the "right to join NATO" and so Russia does not have the right to ask neutrality as part of a peace agreement and so Zelensky is right to reject negotiation.

Russians never got into position to shell the city itself with artillery, so all they could shell were the far outskirts of the city and even those were sporadic. That is why there was no massive shelling reported and that is why the number of victims is low and most of those are attributed not to shelling, but to missiles. So if massive shelling of Kiyv was one of the goals of the Northern operation, it failed. — Jabberwock

But I did not assert anything of that kind. I have claimed that Russian shelling had a negilgible effect. Given that you were able to produce evidence for only two targets, I fully support my claim. — Jabberwock

Your first claim was literally:

All i can find are residential areas on the outskirst of the city. — Jabberwock

So for the benefit of anyone following that does not already think you are a complete fool, that is called moving the goal posts.

You literally "can't find", despite an honest search, anything other than residential areas on the outskirts of the city being shelled.

I explain the "outskirts" is exactly where industrial zones are situated, provide the most reported shelling on an entire industrial zone, then literal "military facilities" being shelled.

Anyways, here's more evidence:

Unlike on Monday, Russia did not shell central Kyiv in the first weeks of its invasion. Instead, it primarily targeted the city’s outskirts and a military plant where advanced weaponry is manufactured. — Aljazeera

Casualties would be low if Russian focus is on shelling industrial facilities, such as factories for advanced weapons manufacture mentioned above, rather than residential areas.

It's called propaganda. Western propaganda only reported when shells landed on residential areas, but since there wasn't all that many civilian casualties you then conclude that therefore Russia must not have shelled all that much after all.

Truly marvellous specimen of someone who is willing to believe anything that fuels their preferred narrative.

No, the road traffic was not disrupted, as Russians did not get into range, as I wrote repeatedly (the rail travel was suspended in a larger area due to the risk of air attacks). And people were hiding in subways because of air/missile strikes, which was unrelated to the ground operations. — Jabberwock

Road traffic was not disrupted on the roads Russia literally occupied?

Anyways, it was widely reported when Russia got into artillery range of the remaining Southern road, and as you note yourself rail was suspended due to the risk of air attacks.

In other words, Russia is significantly hampering supply roots into Kiev, also known as blockading the city, also known as a siege.

No, the Northern campaign played mostly a negative role. Had those same troops stood at the border of Belarus, the fixing effect would be the same, because Ukrainians would still have to commit forces to the North and Russians would not sustain such losses. — Jabberwock

This is so stupid it is almost not worth responding to at all.

Actual fighting is going to absorb more troops, more resources, more amunition, more C&C reaction and planning capacity, than just sitting on the other side of a border and there being no fighting.

No, the Russian plan most likely assumed that there would be resistance, but it would not be able to react and hold against the blitz movement from the North. That is why there was an attempt to take Hostomel and Vasylkiv. — Jabberwock

Again, as actual experts have already informed you, Russia did not have the troops to effectively occupy a large city such as Kiev, much less the other major urban centres, and even if Russia took major urban centres without costly and long Urban combat (which unlikely) that would not end the war due to there being zero reason to believe Ukrainian partisans won't continue fighting from elsewhere in Ukraine.

The Northern operation obviously had the military effect of aiding Russia's conquest of the South, because that is what literally happens. Certainly the Kremlin would have preferred the pressure was enough to pressure Kiev into a peace agreement, but if that doesn't happen the Russians take also shell targets of industrial and military value while they are there.

Even if you don't believe Wikipedia's estimate that 15 000 to 30 000 Russian troops took part in the siege of Kiev (7 - 15 % of the overall force), the entire 200 000 Russian force is not enough to occupy major Ukrainian urban centres, likely not even sufficient to occupy only Kiev, especially if the population is extremely hostile to the Russians (which plenty of Ukrainians are).

The alternative view is, instead of attempting to do something that is basically unfeasible, the Northern operation puts pressure on Kiev, keeps Ukrainian resources and operational focus there instead of in the South, shells a bunch of valuable targets, and when the South is secure and it becomes clear peace is unlikely, the Russians retreat (as expected in a fixing operation once the principle objective is accomplished elsewhere).

So you claim that the Russian diversion was so cunning that they have knowingly sent their elite troops to be massacred, just to pretend they want to take an airport? — Jabberwock

First, there is zero evidence that the battle at the airport was some sort of "massacre".

Conversely, CNN described the airport's fall as "the first major victory notched by the Russians" in the invasion.[48] The Washington Post also stated that "still, the Russians had their bridgehead" after capturing the airport on 24 February. — Battle of Antonov Airport - Wikipedia

All the analysis that concludes the battle was a failure for the Russians presumes their goal of capturing Kiev, which doesn't happen so the argument goes that failing to completely secure Hostomel is the critical event that prevents taking Kiev.

Now, if the Northern operation was a fixing operation, makes sense anyways to attack the airport to destroy the AA and other assets that are there, which Wikipedia informs us were destroyed in precision strikes, prevent Ukraine from making use of the airport, but also make it seem right off the bat that Russia is committing to taking Kiev, which the whole narrative around Hostomel definitely served to establish.

As for sending special forces on special missions ... that's pretty much what they are for in conventional warfare. What you want to avoid is throwing in special forces into a large infantry formation doing conventional manoeuvres where there's little or no difference between special and regular infantry.

Whether they suffered greater than expected losses or not, an air assault on an airbase to both destroy assets there as well as make the enemy believe "the real goal" is Kiev is exactly a mission where special forces can do their special thing and have an disproportionate effect on the theatre.

So, the use of special forces in a special mission is entirely expected.

Furthermore, your objection that this would be too cunning for the Russians to try to solicit over commitment from Ukraine to defending Kiev, while the entire South is conquered, is just bizarre. These are extremely banal and standard military ideas that are literally thousands of years old. If you want to take position A then if you can you will try to get your enemy to be at not-A.

If we are discussing the allies in WWII deceiving the Nazi's as to where they plan to land in Normandy it goes without saying that this this is both a good military idea as well as there are officers that can plan and execute a deceptive campaign.

However, if we consider the idea that the Russians deceived the Ukrainians as to their primary military goal and getting Ukraine to overcommit to defending Kiev, suddenly its ludicrous that Russian officers have even read a single book on military tactics and strategies.

The sticking point is of course what you consider "neutrality" to mean. If it just means "don't join NATO but you get some multilateral security arrangement" then yeah that sounds like a pretty good deal that I would definetly take over fighting. — Echarmion

We seem then to be on agreement of the principle point that if there was a suitable peace available based on an "acceptable neutrality", before or at the beginning of the war, then that was far better for Ukraine as a state and Ukrainians as living breathing people compared to the situation now.

If we furthermore agree that using the Ukrainians to their detriment simply to harm Russia some is immoral, which I assume if you agree peace is preferable you'd agree with this additional point, then the West rejecting peace on such a basis rather than the interest of Ukrainians was certainly an immoral decision, whether it succeeds in some grand geopolitical strategic sense or not (which I have my serious doubts, countries generally getting stronger militarily, rather than weaker, from this kind of war).

Of course if "neutrality" is understood to mean that Ukraine ends up internationally isolated, with no ability to, for example, join the EU or make security arrangements with anyone but Russia, then that's a far worse deal, and would likely just be postponing the conflict. I would only accept that if I had some plan to make sure I don't just end up invaded 5 years later in a much worse situation. — Echarmion

Yes, certainly if a deal would likely end up in a worse situation later, then it's better to reject it.

Nevertheless, the logic of "better to fight now than later" still requires the expectation of winning. For example, the criticism of appeasement is levied against the great powers of the time - France, UK and the United States - who have reasonable chance of stopping Nazi Germany and completely defeating if need be. We do not direct the criticism towards Poland for not fighting to the last Polish.

What deal would have been attainable at the time we can never know for sure now, but what I think is clear is that Ukraine, particularly Zelensky, believed further fighting would improve their position; my argument of why Zelensky believed further fighting to be a better course is the various myths quickly built up around the war: Russia was incompetent and easy to beat, Putin an irrational actor as well as some sort of nostalgic reenactment of WWII Western allied solidarity ... just without anyone coming to actually help.

And we have evidence that they have shelled ONE FACTORY. Given that your initial argument was LITERAL QUOTE: 'shelling targets of military value for 2 months', giving evidence for shelling one factory is coming up a bit short, I would say. Even if you do it twice. — Jabberwock

This was the most widely reported and only one example is required to disprove your assertion that Russia did not shell anything of military / industrial value.

Here's another example of shelling something of military value:

A military facility in Brovary, outside Kyiv, was destroyed in recent shelling. (Genya Savilov/AFP/Getty Images) — Another example of shelling stuff - CBC

But let me get this straight, shelling is cheaper than missiles, Russia has artillery with a range of up to 30km, Russia is in position around Kiev where we now agree much of the industrial capacity will be outside the city ... but you are arguing Russian forces elect not to use this opportunity to shell targets of military value, such as industrial zones and literal military facilities?

Your argument is Russia didn't shell much of anything? Or only shelled residential areas of no military value?

In any case, my point that the Northern operation allows Russia to shell targets of military value and that's one advantage of undertaking such an operation is obviously true even in a bizarre scenario where Russian forces simply elect not to shell anything of military value.

It WOULD be a siege, if, as the colonel said it, if Russians did manage to 'isolate and completely detain Kiev and start applying pressure'. The obvious issue is that they never did that. They shelled one factory and a few residential suburbs and they were never close to blockading the city, as most of the roads were outside of their range. — Jabberwock

A siege, how the word is usually employed, starts when an army gets to a city or fortification and starts the process of assaulting it or then starts the process of blockading it.

There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful, the defenders manage to prevent complete encirclement, or then were always partial with supply roots in and out of the city (for example a coastal city being under siege from the land) but nevertheless the siege succeeds.

Even the term blockade does not require the blockading force to "isolate and completely detain" the defending force, but simply disrupting supply roots is still a blockade. Indeed, most sieges and most blockades in history are not perfect for obvious resource reasons that perfecting something takes exponentially more resources and resources are needed for other things; restricting most supplies to a city is perhaps sufficient and obviously still blockading said city; likewise attacking a city, aka. besieging the city, does not require a perfect blockade of the city nor any blockade of the entire city at all.

It's honestly bizarre your fixation on not only me using the word siege but as you admit yourself the mainstream media.

Saying a city is under siege is conjures up a different idea than saying a battle took place near a city, a much better idea to describe Russia's approach to and process of encircling Kiev. Obviously the siege of Kiev is not successful in terms of taking the city by force or then pressuring a peace deal, but no where in the definition of a siege is need be successful. There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful and the attacker failed to completely encircle the city, failed to starve the city into submission or then failed to storm and take the city by force.

You seem to be living in a world where we should only use the word siege if the attacker perfectly implements a blockade. That is not how the word is used.

No, they were not. That is obviously false and repeating that will not make it any more true. If you have trouble finding the map in the very article you quote, I will provide it here for you: — Jabberwock

That map you post shows Russians blockading, to use your definition, essentially half of Kiev and due to the range of artillery able to significantly disrupt traffic on the remaining roads and rail into Kiev, which is a perfectly sensible siege of a city. People are literally living in subways at this time and you're telling me that if you were there you'd be willing to go down into the subway system and explain to them that Kiev is not under siege?

Sure, but I do not question that. The point of the discussion were the planned purposes of the northern campaign and assessment of their successes. — Jabberwock

As I've stated several times, insofar as the purpose was to compel a peace deal, the Northern campaign failed to do that.

Insofar as the purpose was to absorb focus and resources in the North so as to contribute to success in the South, the Northern campaign was a success.

The Russians do conquer the strategically critical land bridge to Crimea so overall the initial invasion is a military success and the Northern campaign played a critical military role.

Did Russia commit the troops necessary to conquer Kherson in siege and urban combat? And yet they have taken it. Did Russians commit enough troops for a siege of Melitopol? And yet they have taken it. Not to mention that forces required for a siege also typically need to be larger than the defending forces, for the simple fact that they need to be spread around a large area, while the defenders can attempt to break the blockade at any given point, not to mention to defend the blockade ring from the outside attemps at rescue. So if the siege was the supposed plan, Russians would need even more troops. — Jabberwock

Where cities simply capitulated obviously Russia did not have to besiege the city and take it by force. If there was fierce resistance in Kherson then either Russia would have needed to commit the troops required to take the city or then not take it.

I'm not sure what your point here is, that the Russian plan was based on assuming Kiev would just capitulate without a fight?

The only issue with the theory that the northern campaign was just a diversion and a fixing operation is that it is complete nonsense contradicting all the basic facts of the campaign. You do not send your best VDV troops to get massacred in Hostomel in a 'fixing operation'. — Jabberwock

Actually you often do send your best troops on the fixing operation since it is a more difficult mission that requires greater skill and discipline and military wisdom and also greater bravery knowing one is in fact facing superior numbers. It is a much more sophisticated operation than just busting through with overwhelming force. If you send your worst troops they risk just getting completely destroyed or captured immediately and then the enemy can anyways reinforce where you are actually attacking.

Indeed, that is exactly one purpose of elite forces in conventional warfare, is to go and deceive the enemy of where the main attack will take place.

So if indeed elite troops were committed to the North that is not unusual.

Attacking Hostomel with elite troops and making it appear that the plan is to take the airport and then fly in reinforcements to take Kiev is exactly the kind of plan special forces would come up with if they are tasked with a fixing operation.

In fact we can be sure of this because it happened. In 2014. — Echarmion

Yes, obviously the separatists cannot prevail by themselves and already required support in 2014 and support would inevitably require escalation to either a peaceful settlement of the Donbas conflict or then a full blown war.

So the evidence we do in fact have that Russia offered some extremely generous terms to Ukraine and the west prohibited Ukrain from taking the deal are: Schröders vague allusion and the statements of Mr. Michael von der Schulenburg (who provides no further justification). I guess we could also count the coincidence of Boris Johnsons visit and the end of the negotiations as evidence that Boris Johnson somehow did it, as the article does. — Echarmion

Interesting that you describe the alleged deal as extremely generous.

Are you agreeing that assuming such terms were on offer (neutrality, recognizing Crimea, Russian speaker protections in the Donbas) that, at least in hindsight, that was a far better deal at that time than continued fighting turned out to be?

The main point of issue in the present debate is whether (since all present seem to agree a peace agreement is the only viable end to the conflict) Ukraine's leverage increased or decreased since the first phase of the war. Whatever Russia was offering, if Ukraine's leverage was higher in the past then they had the best chance of getting the best deal at that time in the past along with avoiding further loss of Ukrainian lives.

What a deal would have actually looked like is subordinate to whether it was a better deal than whatever Ukraine can ultimately negotiate from here.

As for what the terms actually were, Russia made the offer and key points publicly so Ukraine could have accepted publicly. One topsy-turvy narrative is that Russia was making the offer in bad faith and therefore Ukraine was right to reject the offer and insist on a military defeat of Ukraine; however, the correct negotiation move when a good offer is made in bad faith is to simply accept it and if the counter-party renegs then one's position is improved by clearly demonstrating the bad faith of the opposing party.

One issue I think is important to address is the framing are statements such as "the west prohibited Ukraine from taking the deal". US / NATO I do not think had any hard leverage that essentially means they were deciding for Zelensky / other Ukrainian leaders, but they needed to persuade Zelensky et. al. and absolutely essential to this was the mythology that was rapidly constructed to portray the Russian invasion as somehow a complete failure, Ukrainians fiercer fighters that are more motivated, Zelensky himself a brazen war hero and so on.

In short, Ukrainian decision makers, and in particular Zelensky, needed to be seduced to the neo-con world view that what actually matters is what Western people can be made to think and somehow reality will flow from such beliefs, whether they be true or false initially or at any point in the future. The promise of military aid, "whatever it takes", and tens of billions of dollars certainly helped.

If these are the deal-breaker conditions for a peace negotiation, is it completely irrational for Ukraine and its Western allies (like the United States) to resist peace talks, even assuming a COMPETENT and HARD TO BEAT Russia? Teach me your theory of rationality, I'm eager to learn from you. — neomac

No problem, I am happy to teach you.

First as I've already explained, it's completely irrational to refuse negotiating as the weaker party to a conflict. Not only are Russia's demands maybe their starting position and through negotiation you "talk them down" but Ukraine was also in a position to get concessions also from both Europe and the United States.

So if you don't negotiate you can't know what exactly is on offer. Perhaps Russia is offering some compensation for Crimea that makes a peace more palpable and so forth. Perhaps other European states that do not want a protracted war with Russia would also offer compensation that would make life better in Ukraine.

As for your point about deal breakers, if you mean giving up claim to Crimea or declaring neutrality are deal breakers, those are irrational deal breakers. If Ukraine has not military option to retake Crimea then maintaining that as a deal breaker is simply irrational, it is much more rational to seek to get as much compensation for recognizing reality that you have no hope of changing through military intervention. Likewise, if Ukraine has no hope of joining NATO anyways and no hope of defeating Russia in military terms, then the rational course of action is to seek as much compensation as possible for accepting neutrality.

The justification for Ukraine's refusal to negotiate and declaring delusional objectives and ultimatums, such as only being willing to negotiate once Russia leaves all of Ukraine, was the theory of victory that Russia would fall apart under the pressure of the war, Western sanctions and domestic opposition to the war.

None of that I would argue was rational for Ukraine to believe, but the US made quite clear that their theory was a protracted war with Ukraine, sanctions, blowing the up the pipelines, would weaken Russia long term. This is made quite clear by

“I like the structural path we’re on here,” Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham declared in July 2022. “As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person.” — Aaron Mate

Which makes clear the US does not view Ukraine's choice as a rational one, but a good path for the US (what "we" refers to in this context).

And this is nothing new, using fanatical fighters as a proxy force to weaken a rival is post-WWII great-power conflict 101.

For Ukraine, the point of maximum leverage was in the initial phase of the war (or even before the war) and the rational thing to do is negotiate when you are strongest.

The myth building undertaken by the United States that the time to negotiate is not at the start of the war but Russia is incompetent and weak and can be pushed back, was to encourage Zelensky to reject peace as well as reassure European allies that supporting Ukraine militarily is a worthwhile endeavor (rather than forcing Ukraine to accept a peace deal, which the Europeans could have done even without the United States). Some parties in Europe were of course as enthusiastic for Ukraine to fight the Russians as you could possibly be, but many people in Europe were skeptical.

Now, certainly your reply is that Ukraine really wants Crimea back and really wants to be in NATO, perhaps agreeing already with:

It's beyond me how anyone can take this seriously.

Not only was there no way for Ukraine to join NATO with the Donbas conflict unresolved.

Launching a demonstrative attack on your neighbours capital to get them to not join a defensive alliance with your enemies must be the dumbest plan I've ever heard. "Hey look how easily we can threaten your capital and take your land. Better not get any protection, that'd be bad. Also we're going to retreat after loosing some of our best troops and a bunch of equipment, so you'll know we mean business". — Echarmion

Of which the answer is literally right there in these statements.

Ukraine has no hope of actually joining NATO as @Echarmion literally states. Obviously it would have been nice for Ukraine to join NATO anytime before the war or even now and have other countries come and fight your battles.

... However since Ukraine has essentially zero hope of joining NATO, then what is rational is to try to seek compensation for recognizing what you can't have anyway. What is totally irrational is to fight a costly war to defend "the right to join NATO" even if you can't actually join NATO.

To answer the question of why Russia invades to try to force Ukraine to give-up it's goal of joining NATO when Ukraine has essentially no hope of joining NATO, again the answer is right there in @Echarmion explanation of the situation.

Ukraine can't join NATO due to the war in the Donbas, but continuing that war indefinitely is not a reasonable solution for Russia. Just like Ukraine is clearly at a massive disadvantage in a war of attrition with Russia, the Donbas separatists were at a massive disadvantage in a war of attrition with the rest of Ukraine. There is clear limitations of sending "volunteers" and other covert actions to help the separatists rather than formal military formations. Eventually Donbas would be attritted away (or just leave or die of old age) and Ukraine would prevail without direct intervention of the Russian army.

Therefore, the plan of keeping the Donbas conflict alive in order to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO essentially necessitates an eventual escalation of direct intervention of Russian forces to prevent the collapse of the separatists.

The conflict in the Donbas and the cutting of fresh water to Crimea were also serious political problems. Ordinary Russians expected the Russian government to "solve" those issues one way or another.

Again, the portrayal of the invasion as some some sort of whimsical irrational act on the part of an obsessed imperialist in the Kremlin was again myth building to portray Ukraine as an innocent victim, rather than creating problems for Russia that would inevitably lead to escalating the de facto war with Russia in the Donbas since 2014.

The reason so much effort was spent by the Western media to assert there was no "provocation" was that there was obvious provocations that are easy to understand (such as cutting off fresh water supply and killing ethnic Russians, in one case locking them in a building and lighting it on fire, as well as going around with Swastikas and espousing Nazi ideology), and accepting the reality of these provocations significantly reduces a feeling of moral imperative to help a victim that provokes aggression.

If you recognize the obvious reasons for Russia seeking a military solution to obvious problems, then corollary is that Russia is a rational actor with reasonable concerns and perhaps a peace can be negotiated that is better for everyone, and likewise greatly diminishes a feeling of obligation to send free money and arms to Ukraine.

The myths required are founded on mostly just ignoring obvious facts but also just Western ignorance. Since the Western media mostly ignored the conflict in the Donbas and ordinary Westerners mostly ignore the Western media anyways, the Russian invasion came as a surprise (to them) so it is easy to build on that and portray the invasion as irrational and unprovoked, just sort of out of the blue.

You can of course argue Lindsey Graham's point that it was good for the US to create the myths required to encourage Ukraine to give up their leverage through fanatical fighting as that will "damage" Russia, but it's difficult to argue that it was rational for Ukraine to do so.

Once it started to become clear that Russia was not weak and would not be easily beaten, the new justification was that the war was existential for Ukraine, again based on the myth that Russia wants to conquer all of Ukraine: therefore it is reasonable to fight even "to the last Ukrainian" because the battle is existential. However, that argument is not only simply wrong (Russia doesn't have the force necessary to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine and there's no gain in doing so) it is also a fallacy anyways confusing what is existential for a state and what is existential for a people. The only time it is reasonable to fight to death against impossible odds is if the aggressor anyways plans to murder you if you surrender.

If I am attacked by a larger and more skilled opponent that I am convinced is trying to murder me (not coerce me into giving him my watch) then it's reasonable to fight back even if I am fairly certain I will lose, as there is always some chance, no matter how small, of prevailing due to luck in fighting or then the lucky intervention of external forces.

However, not only is there zero evidence Russia plans to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine, there is even less evidence Russia wishes to do so in order to murder every Ukrainian.

The war maybe existential for Zelesnky, but it is not existential for the average Ukrainian and there is no rational basis to fight a losing war.

If you are losing a war then your leverage decreases over time and does not increase. The closer the war comes to a military termination (where you lose) the less reason the opposing side has to offer any concessions and of course the more people and infrastructure you lose due to continuing to fight; and to make matters even worse, the more you lose a war the faster you lose the war in the future as the destruction of your fighting capacity means further disadvantage and asymmetry of losses.

For people interested in actual reality, the second most basic of all military strategies immediately following the use of force, is deceiving the enemy.

If your objective is A you want your enemy to believe your objective is B.

If you want to break through at a point at A, let's call is A1, then you want to trick your enemy into reinforcing other points other than A1, ideally not even in the vicinity of A but to move forces to B and C and so on.

This is called "Defeat in Detail" or more popularly "Divide and Conquer" described by Wikipedia as:

Defeat in detail, or divide and conquer, is a military tactic of bringing a large portion of one's own force to bear on small enemy units in sequence, rather than engaging the bulk of the enemy force all at once. — Defeat in detail - wikipedia

The end result of all these deliberations is that Russia divides Ukrainian forces between defending the North and the South, allowing Russian forces to overwhelm Ukrainian defenders in the South and conquer critically strategic terriroty.

The opposition here wants us to believe that this happened accidentally or then as a "consolation prize" to Russia's actual plan of defeating and occupying the North and installing a puppet regime, dedicating about 10% of their overall force in Ukraine to this primary objective.

This latter narrative has so little support that proponents are reduced to simply refusing to accept the common use of words like "siege".

What is more interesting than debating what "siege" means, is why the myth is developed that Russia has completely failed, incompetent, irrational, in disarray, in comparison to a standard of performance expected from the Russians (easily defeat all of Ukrainian forces in a few days, as little as 3, and occupy Kiev) that no expert expected before the war, is that it supports refusing negotiations, which is what the West, in particular the US, wants Ukraine to do.

That's not what happened. — Echarmion

That's exactly what happens.

The "limited excursion" into South-Eastern Ukraine refers to establishing a land bridge to Crimea.

Literally called by the author "Sub-COA 1c: Create a Land Bridge from Rostov to Crimea".

Which is the third "Courses of Action Subordinate to COA 1" in an order of likelihood, following the most likely in the authors opinion:

1. Sub-COA 1a: Deploy Forces to Belarus

and 2. Sub-COA 1b: Overt Deployment in Donbas

Both of which also happen.

The situation on the ground at the moment is that Russia implemented exactly this reports top 3 likely things.

The options to view actions in the North that were abandoned are:

A. Putin and his generals also believed he could waltz in and take Kiev with 20 000 troops.

B. The northern operation was primarily representing a little thing in military parlance called "deception", to divert focus and resources in the North, while more feasible military objectives are achieved in the South.

The evidence for B is that Russia does not commit the troops remotely necessary to take a city of 3 million people, bypasses all urban centres (which are critical to capture for the purposes of long term occupation, but better to avoid if the operation is ephemeral) and does not engage in any Urban combat at all, whereas in the South fierce Urban combat takes place, particular in Mariupol, as the author predicts is necessary:

Securing a land route from Rostov to Crimea would require taking the heavily defended city of Mariupol — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine - Institute for the Study of War

So, what is more probable? That Russia tried and failed to conquer and occupy Northern Ukraine with 20 000 troops ... or that the plan to do what Institute of the Study of War finds feasible with Russia's available forces involves a tiny bit of subterfuge and making the Ukrainians believe, at least at the very onset of the war, there is a full scale invasion with the purpose of taking the capital. Subterfuge perhaps aided by the West repeating at face value a "leaked plan" where Russia would take Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa, and all of Ukraine in one blow.

What is remarkable, and rather ridiculous, is the need of some people to paint any Russian failure (because the northern WAS a failure, by any reasonable means) as some kind of cunning Russian plan — Jabberwock

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. — Jabberwock

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. — Jabberwock

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality. — Echarmion

I was pointing out that the article specifically described missile attacks as 'shelling'. — Jabberwock

Well, considering the shelling I was referring to is explicitly described as artillery shelling by the primary source for the information (the municipality of Kiev) in Ukrainian based publications, your issue with the article is totally irrelevant to our debate.

Yes, that is one target of shelling which we have already mentioned. Russians were able to target it, because it was far on the outskirts of Kiyv. — Jabberwock

As I already pointed out, industrial zones are usually beyond the residential zones, and artillery can have up to 30 km, so your point that Russia gets to the residential zone of Kiev should indicate to anyone familiar with "cities" generally speaking that the Russians would have a position to shell industrial zones (that have military value in terms of producing, or being retooled to produce, military hardware), that it would be one thing the Russians might do ... and indeed the Russians do shell industrial targets and so that it one positive (for the Russians) of their Northern operation.

Except the military expert himself never used that word... And yes, encirclement of Kiyv was one of the expected scenarios. — Jabberwock

You are correct, as far as the original source goes, the citation is:

If the Russian troops move forward at the same pace, it will be two days before they reach the suburbs of Kiev, followed by an operation to isolate and completely detain Kiev and start applying pressure. — Col. Margo Grosberg

Which Wikipedia correctly paraphrases as "siege".

All of which is a response to your claim that:

No, the Wikipedia does not say the 'siege' lasted in that period, in fact it did not use that term at all (only you and the sensationalist press insist on using that term, clearly not understanding what it actually means). — Jabberwock

Which is even more directly contradicted by the Wikipedia authors themselves paraphrasing the colonel with the word "siege" as it is at their discretion to describe the situation as a siege, which it obviously is.

Another appearance of the word "siege" in the Wikipedia page is a source, The Washington Post, who publishes an article literally called:

European leaders travel to Kyiv as Russian siege of Ukrainian capital continues — European leaders travel to Kyiv as Russian siege of Ukrainian capital continues - The Washington Post

But I guess this is the "sensationalist press" that wants to sensationalist an army encircling most of a city as "a siege".

Sure, but it does not apply to the battle of Kiyv in any way. As you see, the necessary condition for a siege is a 'blockade'. — Jabberwock

The Russians are definitely blockading Kiev by the process of encircling it and cutting off most roads to Kiev.

Your complaint is that the siege is not entirely complete or not entirely successful, which is fine, a siege does not require perfection or then a siege must be successful to be a siege. Which is simply not the case.

It's honestly a strange obsession of yours to refuse to characterize something that is so obviously a siege as a siege.

I am sure you have no problem watering down your arguments to the point that they do not resemble what you have previously argued for, in order to maintain the illusion you were somehow right. — Jabberwock

The issues of contention in this particular part of the debate is:

1. Incompetence, as expressed by Jabberwock explicitly stating:

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality. — Echarmion

2. Whether the intention of the Russians was to take and occupy Kiev, as expressed by you stating:

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. — Jabberwock

I, and also @Tzeentch, explain why the Russian actions are neither incompetent nor incoherent, that they make sense and achieve plenty of military objectives while also applying pressure on Kiev to accept peace terms (which clearly does not happen), to which you reply to these points with the straw man that:

Yes, the southern campaign was much more successful. What is remarkable, and rather ridiculous, is the need of some people to paint any Russian failure (because the northern WAS a failure, by any reasonable means) as some kind of cunning Russian plan, in spite of quite obvious facts. — Jabberwock

No where do I say the Northern operation is some "kind of cunning Russian plan".

What are the obvious facts:

1. The Russian military operation as a whole secures the land bridge to Crimea and the Northern operation clearly contributes to the military success in the South by diverting Ukrainian resources and attention.

2. Russia does not commit the troops necessary to conquer Kiev in Urban combat and occupy the city.

From this we can conclude that insofar as the Northern operation was designed as a fixing operation to be sure to take critical strategic targets in the South, it is a success.

Insofar as it is designed to pressure Kiev into accepting a quick peace, it is a failure.

Nowhere do I say the Northern operation is entirely successful. When I explain one purpose of the Northern operation is to pressure Kiev into accepting peace terms, I am very well aware that did not happen and the war continues.

Likewise, no where do I state that the Russian actions represent the best possible strategy. Perhaps things would have gone better for the Russians without the Northern operation, or then perhaps they would have been bogged down in trench warfare trying to break through the Donbas and their columns would have never left Crimea as Ukraine would have done the obvious thing of blowing up the bridges and digging in to prevent that from happening if they were free to focus on what is happening in the South.

The position I am defending is that the Russian plan makes sense and achieves some critical military objectives.

I state clearly that I do not know what probability the Kremlin assigned to Kiev completely capitulating or then accepting peace terms early on, but what is clear is that preparations are made for that not happening and the major military focus is placed on securing critical gains to have "something to show for it" if there is no peace agreement.

The key paragraph to understand the report is on page 14:

Unless the United States and some NATO states actively participate in the fighting, the major variables are the time it takes the Russian military to achieve these aims and the cost it will have to pay in blood and equipment. The outcome of the initial fighting itself is not in doubt.

Reports of the plan and most discussions of the invasion stop at this point. — Report in question

The report explains the narrative in the media of what Putin is allegedly planning to do, and notes that the analysis then just stops at "Russia wins".

However, the author then explain how the alleged plan makes absolutely no sense if it were to be executed. Russia does not have enough troops to occupy all of Ukraine, nor the troops for massive urban combat in multiple cities, and even if cities would surrender as desired (which the author finds exceedingly unlikely), Ukrainians would very likely then conduct an insurgency and trying to do this thing of full scale conquest, even if initially successful, would not achieve any political objectives; it would be just attempting to conquer Ukraine for the sake of it and then have massive problems to deal with.

So either Putin is irrational or then whether intentional or not, Western media plays into what the actual plan is: a fixing operation in the North while the South-East (a feasible objective that serves a strategic purpose and conquers Russian speakers that are easier to pacify) is achieved, which is what happens. Also of note, many parts of the alleged plan do not ever happen, such as an amphibious assault on Odessa.

If the report is read carefully, the only military objective that is feasible with the forces under consideration is taking the land bridge to Crimea / Kherson ... which is what ultimately happens.

For example:

However, the deployment of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) at scale would pose a considerable challenge to Russia’s ability to flow supplies and reinforcements in by air until they established a wide perimeter around the airfield and along the landing approaches to it. — the report

To explain (one of many reasons) why taking Odessa in an amphibious assault would be exceedingly difficult.

Furthermore, the noted effect of MANPADS is what happens in the actual war, forcing Russian air power to stand-off positions, and so would have basically stranded any landing party trying to take Odessa in a full scale invasion as explained ... which maybe explains why that didn't happen, but ultimately only feasible military objectives were taken and occupied long term.

Russia conducts no urban combat in the North (essential for long term occupation) again: because there is no intention to occupy the North long term is the reasonable explanation.

Yeah, and if you'd continue reading rather than take out of context the one paragraph that seemingly agrees with you, you'd notice that the report is laying out exactly the plan Jabberwock and me consider to have been the likely intent. — Echarmion

What are you talking about? Are you unable to read??

The report literally starts by stating that conquering all of Ukraine is basically impossible if you take a closer look but Putin may conquer South East Ukraine ... which is what happens.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is amassing a large force near the Ukrainian border and reportedly has a military plan to invade and conquer most of unoccupied Ukraine. Western leaders are rightly taking the threat of such an invasion very seriously, and we cannot dismiss the possibility that Putin will order his military to execute it. However, the close look at what such an invasion would entail presented in this report and the risks and costs Putin would have to accept in ordering it leads us to forecast that he is very unlikely to launch an invasion of unoccupied Ukraine this winter. Putin is much more likely to send Russian forces into Belarus and possibly overtly into Russian-occupied Donbas. He might launch a limited incursion into unoccupied southeastern Ukraine that falls short of a full-scale invasion. — Literally the first paragraph of the report in question

Now, the report uses the term "invasion" to mean intent to fully conquer Ukraine, and "limited incursion" for doing something like take a land bridge to Crimea.

I would not use this terminology as clearly invading anywhere in a country is still an invasion, but the paper is meant for other experts and the "invasion / incursion" distinction is made clear.

It analyses what an invasion would entail and that it's basically impossible with the forces Russia has so concludes it's exceedingly unlikely ... but what Putin "might" do is "a limited incursion into unoccupied southeastern Ukraine that falls short of a full-scale invasion".

Which, if you haven't noticed, is what Putin ultimately does.

So, is 20 000 troops in Norther Ukraine really Putin ignoring the "risks and costs" and believing he can completely conquer Kiev and all of Ukraine with 20 000 troops from the North ... or is the purpose of the Northern operation something that makes sense and is feasible to achieve with 20 000 troops of a fixing operation so focus is on Kiev and away from the South-East?

The end result is rational and achievable (limited incursion to establish a land bridge to Crimea) and accomplishes critical strategic objectives such as securing a long term defence of Crimea and something as trivial (in your analysis) as fresh water ... but somehow the start is irrational and the plan is to fully conquer Ukraine with 200 000 troops and only 10% of that force committed to the capital?

Why would irrational actors have rational results in a process as chaotic and complicated as a war?

What was RAND corporation saying before the war:

Alternatively, Russia might counter-escalate, committing more troops and pushing them deeper into Ukraine. Russia might even pre- empt U.S. action, escalating before any additional U.S. aid arrives. Such escalation might extend Russia; Eastern Ukraine is already a drain. Taking more of Ukraine might only increase the burden, albeit at the expense of the Ukrainian people. However, such a move might also come at a significant cost to Ukraine and to U.S. prestige and credibility. This could produce disproportionately large Ukrainian casualties, territorial losses, and refugee flows. It might even lead Ukraine into a disadvantageous peace.

Some analysts maintain that Russia lacks the resources to escalate the conflict. Ivan Medynskyi of the Kyiv-based Institute for World Policy argued, “War is expensive. Falling oil prices, economic decline, sanctions, and a campaign in Syria (all of which are likely to continue in 2016) leave little room for another large-scale military maneuver by Russia.”22 According to this view, Russia simply cannot afford to maintain a proxy war in Ukraine, although, given Russia’s size and the importance it places on Ukraine, this might be an overly optimistic assumption.

There is also some risk of weapons supplied to the Ukrainians winding up in the wrong hands. A RAND study conducted for the President of Ukraine found reasons for concern about the potential misuse of Western military aid. While Ukraine has been tarred by Russian propaganda claims that it mishandled Western military aid, the RAND team also found that “Ukraine’s paper systems for tracking equipment are outdated and vulnerable to corruption.”23 Moreover, the RAND team also expressed concern that, absent reforms to Ukraine’s defense industry, Western military equipment might be reverse- engineered and enter the international market in competition with U.S. suppliers. — Extending Russia - RAND Corporation

RAND essentially argues against what the US policy ultimately does:

The conclusion of the brief of their report on extending Russia is:

Thus, besides the specific risks associated with each option, there is additional risk attached to a generally intensified competition with a nuclear-armed adversary to consider. This means that every option must be deliberately planned and carefully calibrated to achieve the desired effect. Finally, although Russia will bear the cost of this increased competition less easily than the United States will, both sides will have to divert national resources from other purposes. Extending Russia for its own sake is not a sufficient basis in most cases to consider the options discussed here. Rather, the options must be considered in the broader context of national policy based on defense, deterrence, and—where U.S. and Russian interests align—cooperation. — Overextending and Unbalancing Russia, Brief - RAND corporation

The whole idea that Russia was expected to easily win is total mythical fabrication that was created after Russias initial success that saw some of the fastest armour advances in all of history so did seem (to lay people who have no clue) that Ukraine was collapsing and Russia was easily going to take the whole country.

However, anyone who has experience of soldiery or done honest study of war could easily point out that sustaining such advances at the same rate is logistically impossible, that Ukraine is huge and cannot possibly be overrun entirely in a matter of days or weeks, that one part of the Ukraine built up defences in the South collapsed but other parts didn't move at all, and that US intelligence capabilities is a massive advantage in coordinating a defence, Ukraine has hundreds of thousands of troops and many hundreds of thousands more that can be mobilized etc.

Therefore, when Ukraine arrests the initial invasion / Russia reaches logistical limits, it seems like a great and unforeseen victory and we can all enter magical thinking land where it will be easy to defeat the Russians and no need to ever negotiate!! Hurrah!!

Of course, arresting the initial invasion does not mean being poised to win the war, even if completely uncontested Russia could not occupy all of Ukraine with 200 000 troops.

What ultimately occurs was not unexpected. Ukrainians will likely fight back; that's what they've been preparing for and training for and what soldiers are conditioned to do. Ukraine can resist ... for a time. Russia has certainly the capacity to achieve some objectives (such as the land bridge to Crimea), but not all. The war could last but Russia has a heavy advantage.

We've discussed this already at length, what experts were saying before the war:

Likewise, article also gets right:
Likely Ukrainian Initial Responses to Full-Scale Invasion

"The Ukrainian military will almost certainly fight against such an invasion, for which it is now preparing.19 Whatever doubts and reservations military personnel might have about their leaders or their prospects, the appearance of enemy mechanized columns driving into one’s country tends to concentrate thought and galvanize initial resistance. It collapses complexities and creates binary choices. Military officers and personnel are conditioned to choose to fight in such circumstances, and usually do, at least at first. There is no reason to think the Ukrainian military will perform differently in this case."

— PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS — boethius

This is from conversation here nearly two years ago.

Of course, boethius knows, but people for example in the White House had "zero clue". :roll: — ssu

He is saying the same thing as I just said, that Ukraine can put up fierce resistance but

The Ukrainians have learned an enormous amount, but the advantage is still heavily in Russia's favor,

So you're talking about a scenario where there could be heavier casualties, but the outcome doesn't really change. — what SSU literally just cited

Their helicopter and jet fleet could be essentially "wiped out quickly" (which is essentially what happens and the West needs to scrounge up MIGs from elsewhere).

The author is not explaining how Ukraine will collapse in a matter of days but that Ukraine has "learned a lot" and does have fighting potential, just that Russia has a heave advantage and fighting the Russians will result in heavy casualties that does not ultimately change the outcome.

This is pretty much what all the analysts were saying before the war: that Ukraine can put up a fight, they do have hundreds of thousands of soldiers, a lot of equipment, and an immense territory.

Now, where analysts said Ukraine would lose relatively soon was in the context of zero support from the West, which I think we all agree here that if the West did not intervene Ukraine could not have lasted this long (at least in terms of conventional military fighting).

Hence you are simply wrong in saying that "people who have no clue" making these pessimistic predictions. People simply thought that the Russian army was way more better than it was in 2022. — ssu

The average public indeed have zero clue, the Russian invasion was ultimately arrested by massive support from the West.

This is the mythology, that somehow the small country of Ukraine that has basically no army and should be easy for Russia to simply knock over in a few days, somehow beat the odds and it therefore must be due to Russian incompetence and weakness, rather than massive support and intervention from the West (weapons systems, intelligence capabilities, finance of the entire Ukrainian military and government).

Of course, the West did not intervene enough to actually threaten a Russian defeat, and therefore, like the author you cite notes, the outcome does not ultimately change.

What is interesting here is that despite the Russian military clearly not being incompetent, achieving and then securing against Ukraine's much advertised offensive, critical strategic ground, effectively destroying not only Ukraines Soviet equipment but a large part of the entire regions, and now destroying Western armour in large quantities, there is still this adherence to what should by now be obvious propaganda.

Propaganda that was critical to justify Ukraine repudiating any negotiation and promising the World victory over the Russians.

Which now we're told was never "really a thing" just something people say to motivate the troops to fight to a better negotiation position that no one can explain how Ukraine's current negotiation position is remotely improved in anyway compared to the start of the war.

My god you have completely lost it. — Echarmion

Russia has now more soldiers and more experienced and battle hardened soldiers and have learned how to effectively employ combined arms at scale (which they did not have experience with until this war, but only on a much more limited scale) as well as integration with drones. This kind of war makes an army (especially the one that wins) far more dangerous than at the start.

In parallel, Russia has greatly increased arms production.

Of course, a lot of capacity is continuously destroyed in Ukraine, but as soon as the war ends there will be a significant arms built up as well as availability for export.

I think the total destruction of Ukraine is out of the question now. — ssu

I agree that Russia does not intend to conquer all of Ukraine in any case, and "losing the war" for Ukraine means losing significant territory.

hat Ukraine would defend itself like this wasn't before anticipated, after all the US offered Zelensky a way out (meaning they estimated Kyiv would fall in days). Now that has changed. — ssu

Not anticipated by anyone who doesn't follow the analysis of this kind of thing, but there was plenty of analysis made before the war that the maximalist war aims of Russia would be taking the land bridge all the way to the Dnieper and Russia did not have the forces available to conquer all of Ukraine and also noting Ukraine has a sizeable army, battle hardened by 8 years of war in the Donbas, has advantage in defending, and is not a trivial army to defeat.

Since most people have zero clue about anything, the Western media quickly took advantage of people's perception of Ukraine as some small and backward Eastern European state that should be easy for "the Red army" (the term even being used from time to time, but I mean here to refer to people's perceptions) to topple over. Creating the myth of Russian incompetence was absolutely essential to establish the logic of refusing all negotiation. If analysts and officials admitted that Russia clearly had a sensible plan and conquered a lot of territory in the South that would be extremely difficult for Ukraine to re-conquer if the Russians had a minimum of sense and experience in warfare (which it turns out they do), then this would have severely undermined the momentum for fighting without any clear end state or viable path to victory.

Now that has changed. I think the Western aid will be to at least enough for Ukraine to defend, it won't be enough to push Russia totally out. What basically Putin can do is sit behind the Suvorov-line and the make limited counterattacks. — ssu

I would agree Ukraine could have certainly been able to defend had they been on the defensive and pulling back whenever positions got compromised.

However, since Ukraine defends political symbols and then even more foolishly attacks Russian fortifications, it's possible Ukraine has expended also its capacity for defence and may experience total military collapse.

In my view Russia does not want to conquer all of Ukraine, but total collapse of the front lines would mean Russia taking whatever it does want.

So I agree Ukraine won't be destroyed, but the main reason for this in my view is that Russia does not intend to completely conquer Ukraine (would be simply a long term liability, rather than Russian speaking regions with valuable resources which are long term assets).

Yet basically after the Ukraine war either halts or goes truly to the frozen conflict mode, then in few years Russia will have built back it's capability. — ssu

Russia's war fighting capability is likely far higher now than at the start of the war.

Since this war and now the war in Gaza and general instability has made the world a far dangerous place, as soon as the war ends my prediction is not only will the Russian military be at essentially a climax of war fighting capability but it will find a hungry market to absorb the massive arms manufacturing pace the war has created.

Not everyone is a friend of the US, as surprising as that may seem to some, and everyone else will be buying battle tested arms from Russia at the high levels of production Russia has built up: this will fuel more wars around the globe.

As our environment degrades and the world starts to feel the pain, the cure for our woes will be the traditional one. Modernity, I would wager, was but a brief delirium between our fits of trembling and fever.

Where you are wrong:

Let's start with the shelling industrial targets which was widely reported but you seem to want to deny:

Note though that this particular article unfortunately labels most air and missile attacks as 'shelling', which is rather misleading. — Jabberwock

The article in question reported both shelling and missile attacks ... perhaps because there was both shelling and missile attacks.

Here is a Ukrainian publication citing directly the original source of the municipal government:

Russian artillery has struck the Antonov factory in Kyiv, the municipal government said in a message on the Telegram messaging service on March 14.

Antonov is a state-owned aerospace and defense concern, famous for producing the AN-225 Mriya aircraft, the largest in the world prior to its destruction by Russian shelling. — Russia shells Antonov factory in Kyiv

Clearly the Russians shelled industrially valuable targets during their Northern operation and this would clearly be one positive outcome for the Russians in conducting said operation. Shelling is much cheaper than standoff air attacks, cruise missiles or drones.

No, the Wikipedia does not say the 'siege' lasted in that period, in fact it did not use that term at all (only you and the sensationalist press insist on using that term, clearly not understanding what it actually means). — Jabberwock

Directly from the Wikipedia article:

Estonian Defence Forces intelligence chief Margo Grosberg estimated that the advancing Russian convoy would arrive to Kyiv's outer suburbs in at least two days, after which they would try to lay siege to the city. — Battle of Kyiv

You have the wikipedia article citing a military expert (assuming intelligence chiefs have some expertise) using the word siege to describe Russias operation.

Now, if you want to say the siege is not entirely successful and not very long, I have no issue with that, but the word siege is still perfectly suitable to describe Russia getting to and then attempting to surround the city. They are sieging the city.

Since you are happy to use Wikipedia as an authority, under the heading "Post-World War II":

The siege of Khe Sanh displays typical features of modern sieges, as the defender has greater capacity to withstand the siege, the attacker's main aim is to bottle operational forces or create a strategic distraction, rather than take the siege to a conclusion. — Siege - Wikipedia

It is not sensationalist to describe an army getting to and nearly entirely encircling a city as "a siege", which the same Wikipedia article defines as:

A siege is a military blockade of a city, or fortress, with the intent of conquering by attrition, or by well-prepared assault. — Siege

Which, ironically, you are making exactly he point that the intention of the Russians is to conquer Kiev by "well prepared assault".

Point is, an army gets to a city, starts to surround the city, people living in the subway: fits the definition of a siege.

If the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal, then running away in the middle of negotiations might not be the best way to do it, in my personal opinion. To cite Peskov: — Jabberwock

I'd have no problem accepting that the Ukrainian resistance is indeed more effective than the Russians expect, and especially the impact of the most advanced Western shoulder launched missiles flooding into the country that equip extremely effective harassing units, and they retreat due to being unable to maintain the siege with the forces they commit.

They achieve key objectives in the meanwhile in the South, so cut their losses and evacuate the North.

As I mention, one con of this strategy is that if there is no quick peace deal and the Norther operation can't be sustained, then retreating will simply encourage the Ukrainians to fight more. So in terms of achieving a quick peace it is a gamble, but if it allows taking the South nearly uncontested (what happens) then if the peace gamble fails then at least there is something to show for the war effort as a whole.

I am not arguing the push to Kiev is some brilliant move that has only positive consequences. There are clearly pros and cons.

However, there are pros and cons, risks and advantages, to every strategy. If Russia only focused on the South, maybe Ukraine would have put up much fiercer resistance, broken the siege at Mariupol at least long enough to heroically evacuate Azov battalion, and the Russian military position would be much worse and that would simply encourage Ukraine to keep fighting.

The logic behind the multi-front war knowing ahead of time there is only resources to sustain the Southern front I would speculate has two foundations:

First, chaos and focus in the North will indeed allow conquering the south to be far easier and so if there's no peace then at least the critical strategic objective is achieved of the land bridge to Crimea and the Kremlin has "something to show for it" even if retreating in the North will be embarrassing on the moment.

Second, historically peace agreements are arrived at very quickly after fighting starts or then wars drag on for quite some time. So, based on historical precedent, if peace is not achieved in the first days and weeks of fighting, probably it won't happen in the short term, so the Russian actions apply maximum pressure at the start and if it does work then they'll fight the long war in the South.

So either Russians cunningly planned to weaken their position in the middle of negotiations or simply had no other choice, because their blitz attempt to take the city failed and they have outstreched their GLOC to the extent that further holding them was untenable. There are many facts that point toward the latter. — Jabberwock

They may have received intelligence or otherwise concluded that Ukraine will not be accepting peace a deal. As I say above, Ukraine may have simply been effective at arresting Russias advance and harassing the Russian supply lines and they are unable to sustain their positions.

Additionally, once Russia has what they want in the South, it maybe perfectly acceptable to the Kremlin that the war continue and they keep their gains. Anyone with an imperialist mindset in the Kremlin will rather the war continue than Ukraine accept the peace deal on offer and be given back all the territory.

If critical positions are achieved in the South, the it would be reasonable to argue that pulling back in the North is militarily the right move, and if Ukraine does not want peace then they shall have war.

Things can be quite complicated, but overall, clearly the Russian military achieves critical objectives with their plan and execution, so they are neither irrational nor incompetent.

This seems less a prediction and more an unshakeable conviction, which is why any discussion with you about reality on the ground just runs in circles. — Echarmion

No, it's called a prediction. Being confident in a prediction, such as the sun will rise tomorrow as it did today, does not take away from its predictive essence.

If the war ends with a deal better than what the Russians were offering both before and immediately following the invasion, then indeed Ukraine has at least achieved better terms of land or other things for all the blood sacrificed.

If the war ends with Russia retaining, even expanding upon, the territory it already occupies then I don't see how anyone could argue Ukraine fought to a superior negotiating position.

Or do you disagree with this diagnostic procedure?

I am perfectly aware of what you were arguing for. You have claimed that the nothern campaign was successful two-month siege of Kiyv that was supposed only to exert political pressure and never intended to take Kiyv, so it was deliberately concluded by Russians when the talks fell through. — Jabberwock

The siege lasted "lasted from 25 February 2022 to 2 April 2022" (to cite Wikipedia), so lasted more than the entire month of March, but true it is closer to 1 month than 2, however the context of the point was simply that the incursion allows Russia to shell many things around the capital and is one "pro" of the operation.

As important to my argument as negotiations obviously not succeeding and pretty bad signs such as negotiators being shot:

Clashing reports emerged Saturday surrounding the death of a Ukrainian identified by media as a member of the country’s negotiating team with Russia.

First, widespread reports in local media and social media throughout the day claimed Denis Kireev, who had been photographed taking part in negotiations in Belarus in recent days, had been killed by Ukrainian security forces during an attempt to arrest him.

Kireev, the reports asserted, had been suspected of treason. — Reports claim Ukraine negotiator shot for treason - Times of Israel

Is that Mariupol was effectively occupied by the end of March:

On 28 March, Mayor Vadym Boychenko said "we are in the hands of the occupiers today" in a televised interview,[182] and a spokesman for the Mariupol mayor's office announced that "nearly 5,000 people" had been killed in the city since the start of the siege.[183][184][185] The Ukrainian government estimated that "from 20,000 to 30,000" Mariupol residents had been forcibly sent[186] to camps in Russia[163] under Russian military control.[186] During the day, Russian forces seized the administrative building in the northern Kalmiuskyi District[13] and the military headquarters of the Azov Regiment.[187] The next day, Russian forces were reported to have likely divided Ukrainian troops in the city into two and possibly even three pockets.[188] — Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia

And therefore, if the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal as well as divert Ukrainian forces while the South is being taken, then the time line of the Russians retreating from the North essentially immediately following the largest Urban centre in the South falling is pretty good support for my argument.

What Russian military commanders would have feared is an operation to relieve the forces in Mariupol either by reaching Mariupol or then allowing for the Ukrainian forces to break out and reach some Ukrainian Salient coming towards them (heroic deeds for the Ukrainians and an embarrassment for the Russians, and also losing the value of capturing a bunch of Azov guys).

So, once critical milestone is reached such as effectively securing the largest Ukrainian Urban centre in the south, then it makes sense to withdraw from the North (which is in anywise undermanned in a fixing operation and cannot last indefinitely) to solidify gains in the South: exactly what the Russians do.

If Russia intended to take and occupy Kiev then they would have committed far more troops and engaged in the kind of urban combat they do in Mariupol.

It's pretty common sense along with the fact that entire 200 000 troops Russia devotes to invading Ukraine could all be insufficient to occupy and pacify a hostile population the size of Kiev; so your theory involves the Russians trying to accomplish something that is commonly accepted wisdom in military schools to be impossible to do with the numbers the Russians have (and that's assuming they have zero losses, their entire force may still be insufficient to occupy and pacify Kiev ... and there would still be Ukrainian "resistance" throughout the rest of the country "doing stuff").

I think it all depends on what assumptions the planners were making. — Echarmion

I agree that Putin et. al. may have believed in a quick and easy victory, either confident in their cunning or then underestimating both the Ukrainians and the CIA. However, the plan the implement clearly prepares for things taking longer and being more difficult and more expensive: otherwise you don't amass hundreds of billions of USD worth of reserves and bullion and you don't put so much effort into being sure to take the land bridge (such as a sophisticated signals and intelligence operation resulting in uncontested advances; Kherson being the most notable in not only taking the city uncontested but bridges across the Dnieper).

Clearly Russia had an immense geographical and political advantage, being able to attack Ukraine at will from several directions with zero fear of a preliminary disruption.

Clearly also Russia had the clear material advantage, and could reasonably assume to have air supremacy as well as a significant advantage in armored vehicles and an overwhelming advantage in artillery pieces. — Echarmion

Despite these advantages, Ukraine still has hundreds of thousands of troops and hundreds thousands more that can be mobilized and a huge area to operate on.

If Russia takes advantage of the massive border to make essentially uncontested advances (what happens) that creates deep salients that are vulnerable to harassment or even being cut off once Ukraine organizes to arrest the advances; to prevent harassment would require widening the salient significantly which in turn requires significantly more troops to take urban centres in difficult Urban combat and then effectively occupy and pacify these regions. To accomplish this in Northern Ukraine would require hundreds of thousands of additional troops; likely more troops than Russia has in its standing army (as the region is intensely hostile; it's far easier to accomplish in Russian speaking regions in the South, which may explain Russias decision to occupy there, in addition to the land bridge to Crimea and securing fresh water to Crimea being of critical strategic importance, in addition to the mineral resources and industrial capacity).

Russia simply does not have the numbers to occupy all of Ukraine or even a relatively small hostile part of it. A basic rule of thumb to be sure to pacify a population is requiring between 10 and 20 soldiers per 100 inhabitants; 10 being probably certain to achieve pacification and 20 being probably insufficient if the population is hostile (these numbers are often cited to explain why the US fails to pacify Iraq and Afghanistan).

Based on such received wisdom, Russia would need millions of troops to occupy and pacify all of Ukraine. Russia could do it, but it would be incredibly costly in terms of direct costs and consequence for the Russian economy as well as not be worth much. The land bridge to Crimea, the entirety of the Azov sea, securing fresh water to Crimea and an additional defensive buffer zone, all the resources there (from an imperial perspective) are "worth" a cost to pay. As it stands, the Russian plan has secured plenty of valuable assets, whereas occupying all of Ukraine would be an immense liability and be completely unworkable long term.

@Tzeentch has explained this several times but above is further elaboration of why Russia likely has no interest in occupying Kiev much less all of Ukraine.

Overambitious military campaigns have been waged with far less obvious advantages. Indeed if you read military history, the amount of people who have been killed by overconfidence and wishful thinking is staggering. — Echarmion

My prediction is this statement will prove to be far more truth for the Ukrainians than the Russians. We'll see how the war ends which side died more on the strength of wishes than sober analysis.

There was never any doubt that the war could only end in some negotiated peace. But the conditions of said peace will always depend on the situation on the ground. — Echarmion

Well the situation on the ground is that Ukraine has not taken back any significant territory for essentially a year in which to affect the negotiation table, and if Ukraine is losing the war of attrition and reaching its limits in terms of man power then their position is even worse as they cannot credibly threaten to prolong the war and credibly threaten significant damage to the Russians (the major leverage a smaller power has in fighting a larger power: that continued may damage themselves but will be costly to the larger power also).

Since we're on a philosophy forum, perhaps we should ask the question in terms of moral philosophy: Is the moral choice to give up and negotiate a peace immediately? How much of a chance of success do you need to morally send soldiers to their deaths in a war? — Echarmion

It depends what the peace deal is.

What I would argue is immoral is simply throwing your hands in the air and refusing to negotiate at all. If the war must end in a negotiated peace at one point or another, then at every point in time there is a deal that exists that is reasonable to take. Ok, perhaps it is not on offer, but you cannot know what deal you can achieve if you don't make an honest effort to negotiate. If the initial offer is too high to accept, well maybe your counter party is starting high to then settle somewhere in the middle; you have to actually make counter proposals that are acceptable to yourself in order to see where your counterparty is willing to meet you: this is what Ukraine does not do, the Russians propose something and Ukraine does not bother to even make a counter proposal.

The point of maximum leverage for a smaller power is at the start of the war and being able to credibly threaten a long and costly war as well as all sorts of unknowns not only in the war itself but external events (some other crisis may emerge for the larger power, so all these risks need to be priced into the situation). Of course, the point of maximum leverage does not mean your counter party sees it that leverage and responds accordinly, but it's when you have maximum leverage that you want to push for the best deal you can easily achieve.

Of course, any peace deal would involve compromise and the West immediately framed things as any compromise would be a "win" for Putin, rather than a rational framework where there is some acceptable compromise that is not a win for Putin but as much a compromise for the Russians as for the West and Ukraine, and most importantly avoids immense and prolonged bloodshed, suffering, global food price increases and a global schism in economic and political cooperation.

Russia could have mounted a tidal wave offensive and rolled through had it the momentum of morale and purpose on their side. — Vaskane

You're very late to the discussion, all these points have been discussed already at length, but the 200 000 troops Russia committed to invading Ukraine are not remotely enough for some sort of total wave offensive.

Russia could have mobilized millions of troops and done what you say, but that would have very likely been both a social and economic disaster and result in years of insurgency and inability to occupy and pacify all of Ukraine.

Russia's war aims are clearly what is achievable without sacrificing the entire economy by mobilizing millions of people to dedicate to years of occupation, which is occupying the areas of Ukraine that are Russian speaking and partial to Russian rule. Crimea has been occupied by Russia since 2014 and there has not been any insurgency because Crimeans are the large majority Russian speakers that all evidence we have genuinely wanted to reunite with Russia.

The idea that Russia could have easily just "tidal waved" Ukraine (the largest country in Europe with the largest army, supported by US / NATO training and intelligence, preparing for exactly this war for 8 years) is just foolish.

It's a foolish mythology that was required to justify refusing peace talks altogether which was completely irrational without the belief that Russia was somehow incompetent and easy to beat. Any rational actor who cannot simply impose their will by force, will at least see what the other side is offering and try to negotiate an acceptable deal (now, maybe no acceptable deal would have been reached if negotiations continued, but you cannot know that if you don't try).

Now that it is revealed Russia is not easy to beat, suddenly even the Western media is reporting Ukraine has "pressure" to negotiate. Which is the obvious end to this and extremely tragic (at least for Ukraine) as there is no way to get a better deal than what they could have negotiated at the start of the war and there's no way to get the hundreds of thousands of dead back to life.

The thing is that nobody denies that Russians got a lot of territory and put Ukrainians in difficult situation. — Jabberwock

... People definitely seem to be denying exactly that:

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality. — Echarmion

But if we agree the Russian plan isn't incompetent then that's progress in the debate.

Yes, the southern campaign was much more successful. What is remarkable, and rather ridiculous, is the need of some people to paint any Russian failure (because the northern WAS a failure, by any reasonable means) as some kind of cunning Russian plan, in spite of quite obvious facts. In arguing for that some people even go as far as make up their own 'facts', such as 'two-month shelling of Kiyv' or 'siege of Kiyv lasting longer than the siege of Mariupol'. Unfortunately for them, such facts are quite easy to check and correct. — Jabberwock

Neither I nor @Tzeentch are arguing it's some brilliant military move, but rather a very ordinary military move. Occupying the enemy with an attack in one place in order to advance in another place is extremely banal military tactic.

And you miss entirely the point, Russia does not need to brilliantly out maneuver or out perform Ukraine, they only need to be remotely close to parity.

Russia has won some battles, Ukraine has won some battles, if it's remotely close to parity then Russia is on the path to victory as they can absorb more losses.

If having capabilities Ukraine lacks entirely, such as significant air power and electronic warfare, gives Russia a better than parity performance (on the whole) then Russian victory is even easier.

Of course, one can argue the Russian population will turn against the war before some sort of military victory emerges. This was the theory at the start of the war, but few people argue it now.

Likewise, one can argue that perhaps Russia will win but the cost is not worth it on some given scale of evaluation.

As several have argued, Ukraine losing is ok as the war damages Russia. Of course, that's terrible for Ukraine and not morally acceptable Western policy for me personally; I also have my doubts whether the war is actually weakening Russia.

What is of interest in the debate about the "Russian competence" in attacking Kiev or retreating from Kherson / Kharkiv (from my point of view) is the mythological role this idea played in encouraging Ukraine to refuse peace negotiations, which if Ukraine cannot "win" (which seems common wisdom now) was a foolish decision (if you care about lives and even Ukrainian territory as Russia was offering to give it back in exchange for a quick termination of the war).

However, if we agree Russia's plan makes sense and was executed with basic competence, I am not trying to argue they are brilliant or over-performing the Ukrainians.

For the purpose of understanding the current situation, one need only believe performance is somewhat close to parity to conclude, as you say, Ukraine is in a difficult position as, by definition, the smaller party will lose a war of attrition at parity.

I strongly suspect Russia has been able to inflict several factors greater losses on the Ukrainians due to their having significant air power and electronic warfare, but I'm not trying to convince anyone of that and we'll have a better idea of losses on both sides after the war. Rather, my basic point, is that very strong evidence would be needed to believe that despite significant air superiority and having more of essentially every kind of capability, that somehow Ukraine is inflicting several factors greater losses on Russian forces.

Accepting such basic facts, how long Ukraine (and Western supporters) can last, and will Russian be able to match that in resolve, and if Russia does have an advantage (now or at some point) due can it translate that into decisive manoeuvres (encircling large Ukrainian formation, taking bridges etc.), are all questions open for debate.

@ssu is confident Ukraine can last many years. I have serious doubts that's possible at the current intensity, but is possible by retreating to more easily defendable positions or then simply territory Russia doesn't want to occupy, and then you'd have an actual frozen conflict. However, if the conflict is actually frozen with few attacks and casualties on each side, Russia would have no reason to randomly go home either. This would be the "rump state" Mearsheimer talks about.

Wars of attrition are not fought to the last man standing, they are fought till one side loses the will to fight and disengages — RogueAI

Well if we agree that the current fighting is attritional, then tiring out the Russians is a much better strategy than throwing battalions at heavily fortified positions based on the entirely delusional belief that it was possible to push the Russians out of Southern Ukraine.

Certainly larger armies have simply tired out and gone home in the past.

However, unlike the US in Vietnam or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan ... or the US in Afghanistan, there are far more reasons for Russians to fight in Ukraine. There's also some critical structural differences between those wars, mainly that it requires far more finance to support Ukraine than the Taliban or the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Insurgency is also common to these examples but not so present in South Ukraine.

I would definitely agree that Russia tiring out would be certainly a possibility after years and years of fighting, but I'm arguing here Ukraine (and Western supporters) can't sustain years at this level of intensity.

This is also a suitable time to remind everyone here that as I predicted at the start of the war, the advanced hand held missile systems supplied to Ukraine will go straight into the hands of terrorists.

On October 27th a number of Middle East outlets reported that during anti-HAMAS operations in and around Gaza IDF uncovered caches of European and US-made military hardware (АТ-4, NLAW rocket launchers) supposedly originated from Ukraine.

Several sources have confirmed that around 2022 HAMAS and Hezbollah have established a clandestine supply line from Ukraine to Lebanon, Iraq and supposedly Syria to deliver shipments of weapons from Ukrainian military warehouses in Lviv, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Khmelnytskyi, and Chernihiv regions. This supply line is operational since 2022. For the past year thanks to this supply line HAMAS obtained an unidentified number of MG3 machineguns, M72 LAW grenade launchers, at least 50 units of Javelin FGM-148 ATGM, several dozens of MILAN ATGM, 20 units of Stinger FIM-92 MANPADS, 20 units of L118 towed howitzers, 30 unites of Switchblade drones, about 100 of Phoenix Ghost Drones and approx 50 Black Hornet Nano reconnaissance drones. — Hamas sourcing weapons in Ukraine

The next Pikachu face moment will be when these advanced compact missile systems are used on European soil both for terrorist and criminal purposes.

And we may even experience actual undesired terrorism, not just terrorism that "just so happens" to serve existing Western policy objectives.

Here are the key points from the latest Time update on the war, just without a paywall:

Yet Zelensky’s belief in ultimate victory over Russia has only “hardened into a form that worries some of his advisors,” according to Shuster, who describes Zelensky’s faith as “immovable, verging on the messianic.” One of Zelensky’s closest aides tells Shuster that, “He is delusional. We’re out of options. We’re not winning. But try telling him that.” This of course runs counter to all the propaganda pumped out by Ukraine and repeated by Western media sources. But increasingly it’s only Zelensky who still believes his own press clippings. — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

Staggering casualties have decimated the Ukrainian army. Ukraine has refused to disclose casualty counts throughout the war, dismissing the increasingly-credible reports of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian casualties as Russian propaganda. But another close aide to Zelensky tells Shuster that casualties are so horrific that “even if the U.S. and its allies come through with all the weapons they have pledged, ‘we don’t have the men to use them.’” — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

Conscription policies are draconian. Another fact dismissed as a “Putin talking point” is that Ukrainians have had to resort to ever-more draconian conscription policies to replenish their military’s ranks. Shuster lays out the unpleasant reality: “New recruitment is way down. As conscription efforts have intensified across the country, stories are spreading on social media of draft officers pulling men off trains and buses and sending them to the front. Those with means sometimes bribe their way out of service, often by paying for a medical exemption.” The corruption became so widespread that Zelensky fired the heads of all the regional draft offices in August, but the move backfired as lack of leadership brought new recruitment nearly to a halt. — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

Morale is collapsing. Even patriots don’t want to die serving as canon fodder for a doomed military strategy. Within the officer ranks, there is growing dissension bordering on mutiny. — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

Corruption is uncontrollable. It has long been a “Putin talking point” that Ukraine’s government was shot through with corruption. And yet Zelensky has been getting an earful about exactly that from its U.S. and NATO allies, who don’t want to see their billions of dollars in aid disappear into the pockets of corrupt officials. — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

In particular the point about casualties is the main determining factor.

To win a war of attrition with the Russians, Ukraine would need to inflict several times more casualties than it incurs; a central myth justifying rejecting peace talks but of which there was never any evidence and plenty of reason to believe it is in fact Russia inflicting heavier casualties due to having superior air power and more artillery.

That's all I'm saying, they went for a quick decapitation of the government alongside a push for a land bridge and as much coast line as they could, including Odessa which would have given them control of the 'breadbasket', a powerful lever in international relations. — unenlightened

Well we agree that Putin would have preferred total unconditional surrender, but there's really zero reason to believe Putin or anyone in Russia thought that likely. Rather, the Kremlin publicly pushes for their peace proposal of giving back the entirety of the Donbas to Ukraine, in exchange for recognizing Crimea, Ukraine staying out of NATO, and some autonomy and language protections for Russian speakers in the Donbas.

But again, that Russia prepares for 8 years and amasses a large war chest and clearly had a feasible plan to deal with "the nuclear option" of massive sanctions (as their plan clearly has worked so far) is really strong evidence the Russians don't think the task easy (else they would have done it sooner) nor that they are confident task will be quick (why prepare such a large amount of finance and gold; indeed, analysts before the war were pointing out the obvious fact that Russia was amassing large reserves precisely to be in the position to fight a big, long war, or then at least credibly threaten to in order to get the deal they want).

Without that regime change, it looks like they are now resigned to at best a frozen conflict for the indefinite future, because they still don't seem to have the numbers to occupy and subdue the whole country. — unenlightened

I guess you can use the terms "resigned to" if you want, but the conflict is not frozen for the indefinite future.

A frozen conflict is one where significant fighting ceases, such as in Korea, and there is a standoff: neither a peace agreement nor fighting and so the military conflict, in terms of fighting, is frozen.

That is not the case in Ukraine, there is intense fighting everyday, and unsustainable rates of casualties and equipment losses on both sides.

The difference is, of course, Russia is a far larger country than Ukraine and so at loss rates even somewhat close to parity, Russia will win the war of attrition.

The media doesn't stop comparing things to the trench warfare of WWI, which is a somewhat good enough analogy, but then simply jumps to the conclusion that therefore it is a frozen conflict. The front line in WWI was immobile for most of the war and most of the front, but WWI was hardly a frozen conflict and the unsustainable rates of attrition meant one side was going to win and one side was going to lose. The United States entering the war made the massive difference of available resources to one side.

What's incoherent about applying political pressure, a fixing operation, shelling targets of military value for 2 months as well as causing a flood of refugees out of Ukraine? — boethius

I literally state:

So it was not 'two-month shelling of military targets' and 'Russia sieges Kiev until Mariupol is fully taken', just two of your claims that were patently false, now it turns out it was never those things you have claimed they were! It was a 'fixing operation'! A 'diversion'! — Jabberwock

It's quite usual that large military operations accomplish several things.

It's honestly remarkable how committed people are to believing the initial Russian invasion that conquered 15% of Ukrainian territory of critical strategic importance to the long term security of Crimea, itself of critical strategic importance to the Black Sea and already housing a large Russian military base, as some sort of military catastrophe for the Russians and brilliant victory for the Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians won some battles but on the whole lost significant territory.

All nations are lands stolen and lies of the people who steal it, who cares which cat-funt of a nation is taking turns pretending they own the very nature they will eventually return to in death. — Vaskane

This is the argument in a nutshel that Kiev should have taken Russia's peace terms before or then after the war broke out: where the border is exactly has relatively little consequence on the lives of the people living in the Donbas (who no one really disputes are Russian speakers that are largely partial to Russia) whereas the war has had quite a large consequence on many people's lives far removed from the Donbas.

Except they did not commit enough resources, that is why they could not maintain the positions they took around Kiyv and had to leave quite soon after they have arrived. — Jabberwock

Again, in a fixing operation, your goal is to commit the least amount of forces needed to tie up a maximum of the opponents forces.

Even if there's no fog of war and your enemy knows you have relatively few troops in the area, they can nevertheless not be certain you will not divert more troops at any moment in a surprise push; therefore, especially is the target is critical such as the capital, sufficient resources are likely to be devoted to make a proper defence (it would be a massive gamble to bet otherwise, and even if you bet right, your enemy may see you're undermanning the defence and take advatnage). So, even if Ukraine / US intelligence, knows Russia's Northern operation is mostly about diverting the bulk of Kiev's attention and reserves to its defence, they may easily have little choice but to do so in any case (which is what actually happens).

Because in Putin's view, Zelensky is an effeminate westerner. A comedian, a joke. — Echarmion

In Putin's view Zelensky is an actor and so perhaps Putin expects it's entirely possible Zelensky plays whatever part the US wants him to play.

For example, maybe

He'd never put his life on the line. When shit hits the fan he'd turn tail and flee. Even the US apparently did not expect him to stay put, as evidenced by the "I need ammunition, not a ride" episode. — Echarmion

Is maybe called "a script" written by Western propagandists to create such a good "episode" as you call it in the Zelensky mythology.

But even if Zelensky fled, the rest of the Zelensky government (especially anything to do with defence) are right wing extremists, so there would be no reason to expect Zelensky fleeing would somehow mean Ukraine capitulating.

What troops exactly? — Echarmion

Russia could have mobilized before the war and committed literally millions of troops to conquering and occupying all of Ukraine, or then simply built up a larger standing army over the 8 years of fighting in the Donbas where it is clear a military resolution maybe required.

Russia doesn't do either of these things, but rather prepares a force that can feasibly take and hold the land bridge to Crimea, which is obviously proven by the fact that are there right now as we speak. Further military goals, such as taking Kiev, would have required far more troops or then dedicating essentially their entire force to that one objective in hopes that it ends the war.

Now, why would Russia not mobilize millions of soldiers has the obvious answer of that being disastrous economically, therefore war aims in Ukraine are limited by manpower and resources.

You're kinda answering your own question here.

Furthermore it doesn't seem like either the russian industrial base or the military establishment had actually prepared for a long war. Nor was the information space prepared. Perhaps the best example is the use of "special military operation" which certainly does not suggest a years long battle of attrition. — Echarmion

I'm answering the question of whether Putin expected a quick and easy war or then prepared for a long war, which is the topic of discussion at the moment. Building up a large war chest is a pretty strong signal of preparing for a pretty large war.

I don't know about that. After all the russian troop buildup was anything but subtle. Secrecy was clearly not the concern. I rather think that the calculus was that the constant pressure would undermine morale and lead to the planned collapse. — Echarmion

The Russian troop build up was clearly subtle enough to prevent Ukraine mobilizing and digging North of Kiev and North of Crimea.

Russia would stage a large exercise every year around Ukraine not simply to prepare for an eventual war but to make it unclear if they were actually invading or not. Many commentators were calling it mere sabre rattling and a show of force. You even had Boris Johnson assuring everyone that there wouldn't be tanks rolling across the plains of Europe, that's not going to happen.

Now, the US did publicly say Russia would invade, but this was pretty close to the actual invasion date and it may not have been feasible to mobilize, and, in anywise, Ukraine chooses not to.

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality.

There's two possibilities: either Russia really planned a sweeping takeover of the country, at least to the Dnieper. In that case the plan clearly failed.

Or Russia simply made an elaborate multi front assault to have an easier time capturing a land bridge to Crimea, as well as Donetsk and Luhansk. In which case they should have had a far easier time and far less losses than they did. — Echarmion

200 000 troops is simply far too little to achieve the first objective, so if they aren't irrational then that was not their objective.

For the second objective, they achieve it, mostly uncontested in the first couple of weeks, and we have little idea of Russia's actual losses and we have even less idea of what their toleration for losses is.

Certainly it's possible that they expected less losses to achieve more. Or it maybe just the cost of doing business from the Russian command's point of view.

What is clear is that the initial priority is to keep losses to professional soldiers and mercenaries in the first phases of the war, and they do achieve that at least for quite some time.

No one here is is arguing that either, at least not any more than any human group is fundamentally irrational at any time. — unenlightened

This has been argued many times, I can cite previous conversation if you want.

But good to know you aren't arguing this, in which case it should be pretty easy to see Russia's strategy does make sense and has worked well in terms of securing the land bridge to Crimea. Of course, there have been pros and cons to every decision which can be debated.

I'm not a military expert, but what happened looks to me to be modelled on the WW2 German invasion of France, a high speed blitz takeover of the Capital avoiding the main defensive forces to remove the government and replace it with a Vichy style government of the strategically unimportant regions, and annexation of, in this case, the entire south coast. — unenlightened

Well that's clearly not the Russian strategy or they would not have bothered advancing in the South at all, they would have only fought in the South insofar as it fixes Ukrainian troops there, so as to dedicate the majority of their resources to take Kiev.

Of course, I have zero issue believing the preferred outcome for the Russians is that Ukraine completely capitulates, and failing that Zelensky accepting their peace deal would be second best.

The Russians military plan, however, is clearly to take the land bridge to Crimea, which is what they do in essentially a week, and then pacify the cities involved, and their operation in the North serves to keep Kiev's main focus there.

Now, both taking land in the South and pressuring Kiev is certainly significant leverage in negotiating a peace deal, especially if Russia was offering to give that land back (which they were) and it was clear after the outbreak of the war that Ukraine was not in NATO and was not going to be. It was certainly the "rational thing to do" from the Russian point of view, but I would have hard time believing the Kremlin doesn't have the experience required to know people don't always do the rational thing as you see it and did not prepare accordingly (which they clearly did, amassing hundreds of billions of USD, hoarding gold, preparing an alternative payment system and so on).

Zelensky removed has no chance to dance to anyone's tune. Given an ex comedian with no political pedigree in charge, that is not an irrational plan. That obviously didn't happen, and then there was a strange pause before the withdrawal and regrouping. It looked like a winning plan until it didn't, which was when the airport couldn't be secured.
There was even a Pro-Russian faction with support from oligarchs and security services waiting to step into the breach. — unenlightened

You seem to think it would be easy for the Russians to replace Zelensky without lengthy and costly urban warfare in Kiev.

The scenario where what you describe is possible (with the forces Russia commits to Kiev) is one where Ukraine forces essentially don't put up a fight and Russian tanks can roll into Kiev uncontested. Again, that would certainly be the ideal scenario for the Russians and they certainly would have done that if there was no resistance.

However, Russian actions are completely inconsistent with some sort of blind belief that taking Kiev and replacing Zelensky would be easy, and as @Tzeentch points out the Ukraine military and government is filled with right with extremists who would just stage a coup if you did somehow manage to put in place a Russian puppet.

Ukraine has been preparing with support of the US for precisely this war for 8 years, there's CIA all over Ukraine, there's Nuland's famous "he's our man" and "fuck the EU" (yet the EU doesn't mind at all; indeed, "please commence with the Fucking" is the EU diplomatic position).

This whole idea that conquering all of Ukraine should have been easy is totally baseless: Ukraine is huge and difficult to sustain logistics even without resistance (it's not trivial to move tens of thousands of men and equipment and supplies), Ukraine has the largest army in Europe with the largest gaggle of armour, and their military is full of fanatical anti-Russian extremists (there are also moderates, and I'd agree that Zelensky isn't a right wing extremists, but there would be zero reason to expect moderates to dominate decision making).

I think Putin thought the same about Zelensky. A puppet he could knock over in a few days.Do you think Russia began this prepared for a long war of attrition? — unenlightened

Even within your own logic, a puppet of who?

Obviously the US, and the US was clearly not interested in peace, rejecting to even discuss Russia's peace proposal before the war nor anything else (as well as forbidding their vassals in Europe of doing so of their own accord).

So, assuming you're correct and Putin views Zelensky a puppet of the US, why wouldn't said US puppet do what he's told and implement US policy of rejecting peace?

Russia built up a massive war chest, over 600 billion USD, over nearly a decade; why would they do that if they were not preparing to finance a potential long war of attrition.

More troops could have been committed to the initial invasion, but if the primary military goal was to secure the land bridge to Crimea then clearly the commitment was sufficient.

There's also not only the military sphere, but the Kremlin needed also to prepared and balance things for massive sanctions and economic disruption: hence prosecute the war with professional troops and mercenaries so as to overcome the initial shock of sanctions with minimal additional disruption to the civilian population.

Of course, certainly it can be argued a better strategy was available, diplomatic or militarily, but this idea that the war was initiated on some sort of whim without careful thought and planning is really quite ludicrous. There was already a war in the Donbas supported by Russia for 8 years, so clearly it is on the minds of military and political leaders that if there's no diplomatic settlement then a military solution is the only alternative. Putin received far more criticism within Russia for not intervening sooner, but obviously a war of this size and right next to Russia would be complicated, hence clear indications of preparation.

Had Russia mobilized more troops for the initial invasion, it risks Ukraine mobilizing and a blitz to take the key territory becomes harder rather than easier.

Likewise, had things been prepared even better, every soldier knowing they will be going to war and exactly what they will be doing, it again risks Ukrainian mobilization and hundreds of thousands additional dug in troops and the bridges out of Crimea mined, shelled and bombed rather than massive columns of Russian armour just rolling into South Ukraine (which clearly the Ukrainians were not prepared for and completely collapses their lines West of the Donbas allowing the Russians to conquer the land bridge).

Which also goes to explain such observations:

Anecdotally, they were running short first of fuel, then of personal equipment for troops, and then of munitions and tanks and even training facilities for the reinforcements. But perhaps that is all Western propaganda. — unenlightened

In addition to @Tzeentch already mentioning that perhaps Russian forces were adequately supplied for the advances they intended to make in the initial invasion, any giant operation is going to have all sorts of anecdotal problems along with major setbacks and confusions. No one here is arguing the Russian invasion went perfectly according to plan, we're just pointing out Russian decisions do make sense.

The idea that Russia is an irrational actor was quite clearly a myth created in the early days and sustained for over a year (sometimes cherry picking true but pretty expected things like equipment SNAFU's as well as obvious lies like exorbitant number of casualties), as it avoids the difficult question of how Ukraine is going to prevail over a far larger opponent.

You don't need a viable plan if you're fighting an army of essentially retarded monkeys.

'Shelling targets of military value for 2 months'? I suppose you mean shelling of residential suburbs from March 4 (when the main convoy got close enough) till March 24, when they were pushed out of artillery range, not so much because Ukrainians pushed so hard, but because they were out of resources (with the most shelling, which was even then not that intense, lasting about ten days)? That is three weeks... care to list the supposed targets of military value that were hit? — Jabberwock

Although of course far more focus was paid to damage to civilian zones, the shelling of industrial zones was covered even by the Western media.

This is from the Hindu Times, just because it's not behind a paywall but it's simply repeating what was reported by AP, Reuters et al.

In this one article you have shelling of industrial zones, such as the airplane factory:

Ukrainian authorities said two people were killed when the Russians struck an airplane factory in Kyiv, sparking a large fire. The Antonov factory is Ukraine’s largest aircraft manufacturing plant and is best known for producing many of the world’s biggest cargo planes. — Kyiv areas shelled but ‘hard’ Ukraine peace talks go ahead - Hindustan Times

as well as how negotiations were to a peace deal:

[Kyiv areas shelled but ‘hard’ Ukraine peace talks go ahead - Hindustan Times;https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/kyiv-areas-shelled-but-hard-ukraine-peace-talks-go-ahead-101647309135539.html]The latest negotiations, which were held via video conference, were the fourth round involving higher-level officials from the two countries and the first in a week. The talks ended without a breakthrough after several hours, with an aide to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky saying the negotiators took “a technical pause” and planned to meet again Tuesday.

The two sides had expressed some optimism in the past few days. Mykhailo Podolyak, the aide to Zelensky, said over the weekend that Russia was “listening carefully to our proposals”. and that the negotiators would discuss “peace, ceasefire, immediate withdrawal of troops & security guarantees”.[/quote]

Now obviously a peace deal was not reached, but shelling industrial zones (of which the military value is repurposing to ) was clearly one purpose of the push to Kiev.

As you note yourself, Russian forces reached residential areas of which many industrial zones will be similar distance, if not farther, from the town centre. And even if you simply refuse to believe Russia got close enough to shell significant industrial zones it was clearly a priority for them, doing so with missiles as well:

[Russia says ammunition factory near Kyiv destroyed by missile strike - Reuters;https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-ammunition-factory-near-kyiv-destroyed-by-missile-strike-2022-04-17/]April 17 (Reuters) - Russian armed forces destroyed an ammunition factory near Kyiv, Russian Defence Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov said on Sunday.

"Overnight, high-precision air-launched missiles destroyed an ammunition factory near the town of Brovary in Kyiv region," Konashenkov said.[/quote]

So obviously advancing to Kiev would also accomplish this purpose of being able to destroy factories of various kinds.

The supposed evidence is Tzeentch quoting an Ukrainian general in the days BEFORE the attack, so take it up with him. — Jabberwock

You have trouble with reading comprehension. I state that even if Ukraine knows Russian troop numbers approaching Kiev they still have to defend Kiev. Furthermore, even if this was your belief you could not be 100% certain the intelligence is accurate or then that Russia cannot move in more troops on short notice, so you'd need to price that risk into your defence of the city as well.

Russia does not require Kiev to believe they are genuinely attempting to take Kiev to accomplish various objectives. These explanations of pretty obvious things is in response to your thesis that:

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. In order to make a threat you have to be visibly capable of employing a force that is able to fulfill that threat. In fact, usually when you make a threat, you try to exaggerate the projected force. — Jabberwock

Which for all the reasons I explain, is clearly not true. It's completely coherent to send a small force to fix a large amount of troops, destroy plenty of factories and infrastructure, apply significant political pressure, while 15% of the country is conquered in the meanwhile.

It's a pretty common sense manoeuvre and if Ukraine "called the bluff" and sent significant resources to the south and undermanned their defence of Kiev, then maybe Russia would have taken the opportunity to pour in troops and storm the city.

Now, if you want to argue the Northern operation was had more drawbacks then achievements, that shelling Kiev simply increased resolve and Western support and allowed Zelensky to play the hero and ambushes on overstretched supply lines make the Russians look bad and beatable, and so on, such arguments make sense. There was certainly pros and cons to the Northern operation to siege Kiev and a lot could be considered.

For example, I'd have no problem accepting an analysis which concluded that short term the siege of Kiev nearly achieved a negotiated peace (but ultimately failed) while assisting the conquest of the Southern land bridge, and in the medium term made increased Ukrainian and Western resolve while making Russia look bad when they needed to retreat, but in the longer term creating a refugee exodus significantly weakens Ukraine structurally (economically, new soldiers aging into fighting age for a long war, less people to do things generally speaking, etc.) which aids in winning a war of attrition.

I'd even be willing accept that had Russia not sieged Kiev and simply took the land bridge that ultimately it would be more likely Ukraine would have accepted Russia's peace deal, as there would be less "bad blood".

However, that may not have been predictable from the outset, it certainly seems logical that pressuring the capital would maximize pressure for a political settlement. Furthermore, if Ukraine was able to fully focus on the South then perhaps it would have been able to counter attack and relieve Mariupol, stabilize the lines far less favourably for the Russians and that would have encouraged further fighting as much as the siege of Kiev.

The Russian strategy makes obvious sense. Certainly there is always a better strategy available, but the idea that the army that has taken and held critical land for its stated and common sense war objectives (land bridge to Crimea, protect Russian speaking separatists) is somehow incompetent or that sieging Kiev has no relation to the accomplishments in the South, is just dumb.

So their plan was obviously NOT a long-term 'siege' of Kiyv, contrary to your claims, because you rightly conclude that it would open them to attacks from the rear and they would not be able to maintain the siege at all. — Jabberwock

"Long-term 'siege' " is a nice but lame strawman. Where do I say a long term siege is necessary to apply political pressure?

Russia sieges Kiev until Mariupol is fully taken (the withdrawal is the week after the surrender of the remaining Azov forces), tries to negotiate a peace during this time, a peace deal is not reached, they can't maintain their positions, so they are forced to leave.

There was clearly many advantages to the Russians of the push to Kiev as well as disadvantages. I have zero problem with the argument that in some final analysis there was more cons than pros, but clearly the strategy made sense and did achieve some key military objectives.

The 'blitz' taking of Kiyv, while risky and obviously unsuccessful, at least has some strategic merit. The northern operation as a 'siege' would be an even greater Russian failure - when you prepare for a siege, you do not issue your troops fuel for four days and you do not bypass major resistance centers (as you pointed out). The loss of material suffered there (not destroyed, but mostly abandoned, which for a long time was the main source of Ukrainian supplies) in no way justifies the supposed profit of vague 'political pressure' from one-fourth of a siege. — Jabberwock

The Russians are not routed and captured but have an orderly withdrawal when they retreat, so they obviously had enough fire power to hold their positions and get resupplied.

If it was a risky mad dash blitz the capital with only 4 days of fuel, then they would have all been captured when that failed.

Now, I have zero problem with the idea that the ideal scenario for the Russians is that the Ukrainians simply fall apart in terms of C&C and there's a near complete capitulation, or then no defence of the city is organized and they're able to take the city with a small force and the population accepts a total Russian victory. However, they do commit enough resources to maintain the positions they take around Kiev the time to accomplish full occupation of major cities in the south, particularly Mariupol.

However, what is clear even in your scenario is that there is not enough man power to take Kiev waging urban combat even against a small amount of defenders.

I of course agree that total capitulation by Ukraine would be the a preferred outcome of blitzing to Kiev, and if that was plan A then the Russians clearly had a plan B, but we seem to agree that their plan is not conquest of Kiev against any significant resistance.

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. In order to make a threat you have to be visibly capable of employing a force that is able to fulfill that threat. In fact, usually when you make a threat, you try to exaggerate the projected force. — Jabberwock

What's incoherent about applying political pressure, a fixing operation, shelling targets of military value for 2 months as well as causing a flood of refugees out of Ukraine?

It's also completely ignorant of the history of war. Laying siege to a city rather than trying to storm it right off the bat is a pretty old and common sense tactic, essentially as old as fortified urban centres themselves.

Of course modern cities are not fortified on purpose but it turns out lots of concrete buildings serve that purpose, and applying pressure by purposefully starving urban populations is no longer "a thing" (except if you're Israel of course), but a siege applies significant pressure nonetheless and created a significant barrier to moving people that are in Kiev to the southern front.

Even if Ukraine knew (i.e. informed by the US) that the Russians did not have enough forces to take and occupy Kiev, they still have to direct significant forces to defend the capital as it's a politically critical target. Furthermore, few things are certain in war, so likely Kiev did not "know" Russian troop numbers and disposition or then what man power Russia could divert to Kiev on short notice.

Meanwhile, during the battle of Kiev, Russia took the land bridge to Crimea and then pacified those regions they are still occupying today.

Another indication of Russian strategy to take the South and not Kiev is that Russia not only did not engage in fierce Urban combat in Kiev but bypassed most urban centres on the way to Kiev, which was a significant weakness in terms of maintaining their position around Kiev as Ukrainians could go out from these bypassed urban areas and ambush and harass the Russian supply line.

Then there is the political pressure of the capital being gotten to from both sides in short period of time and siege starting.

Now, would surrounding the capital without being able to take it and occupy it apply enough pressure to cause a complete unconditional surrender? No, obviously not, if the defence of the city was holding up there would be little reason to just completely capitulate.

However, the Russians were not asking complete capitulation, but at that time there main demands were a neutral Ukraine, recognizing Crimea as part of Russia and an independent Donbas, so occupying the South of Ukraine and slowly surrounding the capital and shelling significant parts of it and causing a refugee crisis etc. was significant pressure to accept Russian demands.

It's certainly a reasonable strategy that facilitates taking the South in the event Ukraine refuses peace terms and wants to continue fighting.

What is completely unclear is what scenario the Kremlin viewed as more likely, Ukraine accepting peace terms or then a longer war. It can be argued both ways. The story emerges, in both the West and Russia, that Russian intelligence underestimated Ukraine, but there's no hard evidence for this. It's pretty typical for countries starting a war to promise their population a quick victory even if the leaders know there is significant risk it can take a long time.

One could also argue that the operation to lay siege to Kiev had serious drawbacks such as creating the perfect scene for Zelensky to rally Ukrainian and Western support, hardening the Ukrainian will rather than weaken it and since the positions could not be maintained long term then setting up a Ukrainian victory.

Pointing out that the Russian strategy made sense and clearly on the whole delivered the result of conquering the Ukrainian lands Russia now occupies, and that the Northern operation achieved plenty of purposes other than storming and occupying Kiev, does not imply it's some optimum military maneuver.

In my view, militarily it was a good strategy and prevented Ukraine from organizing any sort of counter offensive in the South, especially to try to rescue the trapped Azov guys and destroying or capturing Azov Battalion was a significant victory for Russia in terms of consolidating their gains, but also domestic and international politics.

Politically it did have the draw backs mentioned above, but I don't think Ukraine would have been any closer to agreeing to peace terms without sieging the capital.

First and foremost, the battle for Kyiv wasn't some kind of fake attack. Yet the fall of Ukraine didn't happened and Putin (correctly) then withdraw. Yet it's obvious, starting from Clausewitz, that this was one of the most important objectives: either take or surround the capital. — ssu

That there was no intention or plan to occupy Kiev does not mean it was a fake attack.

The purpose was to pressure Ukrainians / Zelensky into negotiating a settlement while also fixing troops while the South was conquered and pacified (and Azov battalion destroyed in Mariupol and prevent some sort of heroic rescue of them).

Pointing out 20 000 troops isn't enough to conquer in urban combat and occupy a capital city of a few million does not mean the attack was "fake", just that there was obviously no intention to do something so obviously impossible.

The Russians also shelled everything of military value in Kiev, such as war industries, so it accomplished that too.

And in the meantime you'll just ignore the evidence because it suits you. Because that's proper epistemology, apparently. — Echarmion

Ignore what evidence?

I went and looked for ISW tally of Russian and Ukrainian losses, as even if heavily biased towards supporting Western narratives, I'd nevertheless be surprised if they were arguing Ukraine is inflicting the many multiple times more losses required to win a war of attrition with the Russians.

I ask you to actually cite the evidence you're referring to in the context of you complaining about the lack of evidence to support facts you don't dispute ... and you just claim I'm ignoring your evidence by asking for the actual evidence??

Oryx I also did not ignore but pointed out their methodology of just looking at videos published by Ukraine and taking them at face value is not even moronically intellectually dishonest but pure propaganda; it's essentially just relabelling Ukrainian propaganda and then considering it independent. Absolute rubbish.

I didn't ask you to prove any of these, but I'm glad you got all that anger off your chest. — Echarmion

What anger. I ask you questions.

That the questions don't need answering because the answers are so obvious closes the case that you are a complete fool.

You ask for "the evidence" to support my arguments, I ask you what evidence you want to see, and then you say you aren't asking me to prove any of the facts needed to make my argument that: bigger army with more capabilities is very likely to win a war of attrition.

Oh god you're actually serious... — Echarmion

Since the invasion, Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands more troops thus essentially creating another army compared to the first army that invaded.

Again, what are you disputing? That Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands additional troops? Or just you'd quibble about calling such a mobilization another army?

At the start of the war everyone assumed the russian army would overrun Ukraine in weeks, as far as I remember. — Echarmion

This is just false. Plenty of military analysts pointed out that 200 000 troops is not enough to overrun Ukraine, that Ukraine is huge, that Ukraine has the largest Army in Europe, can mobilize hundreds of thousands of additional troops, is supported by US / NATO weapons, logistics and intelligence.

Go and find even one expert pre-war military analysis that concluded Russia would overrun Ukraine in weeks, then contrast your failure to find even with "everybody".

Academic, think tank, and even talking heads in the media all agreed that essentially the maximum aim of the Russians would be to create a land bridge to Crimea compared to a minimalist incursion to simply protect the Donbas separatists. The idea Russia would be conquering all of Ukraine in weeks did not exist.

Of course, Ukraine could capitulate, but all there was pretty wide consensus that if Ukraine decided to fight it can put up a serious fight and would not be easy to defeat.

Maybe it cannot, but for one Russia is not as of now fighting a total war in Ukraine and, for another, military capabilities seem to be about at parity for now, which means that Ukraine certainly has not lost the ability to negotiate from a position of strength. — Echarmion

For someone who complains about a lack of evidence to support facts you don't doubt to begin with, you say a lot of baseless obviously false things.

Ukraine still has no air power remotely comparable to the Russians, and their top general complains about it regularly that air power is required for modern warfare.

Air power has been essential for conventional warfare since WWII. The entire US military strategy and force composition is centred around achieving air supremacy.

What parity?

As for negotiating from a position of strength ... Russia was offering Donbas to remain in Ukraine, just with some political autonomy so as to protect Russian speakers, both before the war and during the first phase. You seriously believe Ukraine will be able to get such a deal now?

And even if that was somehow in the cards (which it's not) what could possibly justify over a year more of fighting and such devastation to a deal that was rejected?

However, your focus on capabilities again simply highlights your complete ignorance of military affairs and total lack of understanding of "facts on the ground" you allude to.

The smaller party is going to lose a war of attrition even with parity in capabilities.

Russia does not need to fight a total war to fight with Ukraine, it needs only match Ukraine in man power and then rely on replenishing its forces and greater capabilities to grind down the Ukrainian military to the point of total collapse.

Since it's far larger, Russia can match Ukraine's total war and also keep running its peace time economy at the same time.

The fact that you understand Russia is not at total war but there is a "stalemate" (aka. war of attrition) should be enough in itself to conclude Ukraine is in a disastrous position.

Again apart from the fact that they have alredy suffered three major defeats in this war and have had obvious problems replacing both men and materiel.

To be sure I'm not claiming Ukraine is certain to win, but so far the war has certainly not demonstrated Russia's overwhelming superiority. — Echarmion

Russia needs to balance the war effort with maintaining a functioning economy and also domestic support for the war.

This is what the West was betting Russia would be unable to do, especially under the "nuclear option" of massive sanctions.

That was the theory of victory, some sort of internal Russian collapse. Since that didn't happen, Ukraine is now screwed as there was no military backup plan. Ukraine fighting was supposed to trigger some sort of Russian revolution and so there was no need to defeat the Russian military in the field.

There was never any evidence this theory of victory could likely work (of course, in "hypothetical land" nearly anything can work) but it was an easy sell to a Western audience.