Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia — neomac

You're just so delusional.

Obviously this statement is not compatible with a concern for Ukrainian welfare. The goal is to just harm Russia, not actually stop Russia from achieving it's objectives in Ukraine (which, unless you invoke basically magic, is not compatible with Ukrainian welfare).

So just say you are willing to sacrifice Ukraine and Ukrainian welfare to harm the Russians, and argue that point. Sometimes great achievements require great sacrifices (of other people).

It's just crass and cowardly to show your cards, what you truly believe, which is harming Russia is your priority and not Ukrainian welfare, which is not "mentioned" as you say, then say "no, no, no, there's nothing logically impossible about "not stopping Russia" and Ukrainian welfare!!

That's just dumb, obviously if Russia isn't stopped, Ukraine loses the war at great sacrifice, this isn't "good" for Ukrainian welfare.

If it's an acceptable end game for you, then it's acceptable for you to sacrifice Ukraine for your objectives.

So maybe stop your torrent of psuedo intellectual bullshit that doesn't even have anything to do with your actual position in this matter: which is:

Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia — neomac

Russia hasn't made this change recently. They have said this far earlier than now, actually. — ssu

They've mentioned their previous policy before of using nuclear weapons if attacked with nuclear weapons or to defend against a threat to the existence of the Russian state, but news seems

Russia is thought to be considering adding a preemptive aspect to its nuclear doctrine, Vladimir Putin has said.

If added this policy would allow it to strike with nukes first, not just in a retaliatory manner.

The Russian doctrine of using nuclear weapons is currently different to that of the USA, which does have a first strike clause. — Daily Star

Normally I wouldn't cite the Daily Star, but it seems just citing Putin's speech. If you want to quibble that they haven't technically changed the policy just yet, feel free. Clearly the policy of what policies are under consideration have changed in that case.

Conventional response means non-nuclear in this case. NATO and the US use the arm of the forces that is most powerful, which is the air forces and cruise missiles. I don't know why you are insisting the case for ground forces, which make an obvious target. Air attack is the way to keep the response limited. You can stop the attacks instantly. It's Russia's choice then to escalate.

The deterrence of nukes isn't hypothetical, but the use of them on the battlefield is. — ssu

I'm not insisting on ground forces, other people talk about ground forces in Uktaine, including main stream media. I am just listing and considering the possible responses and noting they are all problematic. We both agree ground forces would be highly problematic.

Yes, air attacks are the likely option, but as I point out using only cruise missiles is of limited damage, and there are large risks in sending NATO planes into Ukraine. Maybe they would be highly effective, teach the Russians a lesson, and then maybe Russia won't escalate further. But both elements there are problematic. NATO cannot know its air combat effectiveness against Russias integrated air defence system, and any essentially any losses are going to be embarrassing.

It's also simply doesn't seem possible to implement air superiority without striking AA systems in undisputed Russian territory, which NATO is unlikely to do in this scenario. So even if you pushed Russian air craft out of Ukraine they would still fly around on the Russian side firing missiles at your planes.

The deterrence of nukes isn't hypothetical, but the use of them on the battlefield is. — ssu

We agree we're talking hypotheticals, just obviously not rhetoric. Rhetoric is what you use to try to convince your interlocutors or simply justify your actions. Threats (that are not empty) are not rhetoric.

NATO letting Russia to win? Bit of hubris there from you. — ssu

NATO could have been training Ukrainian pilots on F-35 and modern NATO main battle tanks and supplying every sort of missile, from day one of the invasion, or even years prior. If your goal was to see Ukraine win, this is what you would do, yet they don't even supply F-16's or older NATO tanks. Sure, would take time, but the war may still be on during that time frame in which case you want this option.

Why doesn't NATO do this?

Because they don't want to "escalate" beyond a certain point. What's that point? A point unacceptable to the Russians. What would be unacceptable? Actually losing.

If you didn't care about Russias own metrics of evaluation and what's acceptable to them, you'd simply provide all the equipment and training that maximises the Ukrainian force to allow them to win.

The two concepts of holding back weapons systems and Ukraine winning being your main priority, are incompatible. It's like if I say I "really, really, really want you to win this cross country ski race", but I give you second hand skis that are a major handicap, while holding on to plenty of shiny modern skis in my garage. Obviously, my first priority isn't seeing you win the race, but there's some other priorities that lead me to hold back the support I could provide, but choose not to. Sure, maybe I would wish for a world where I give you shitty skis and you manage to win the race somehow anyways, but that's not how priorities and decision making work.

LOL!

Oh you are so funny again. Yes... the evil Commission of the European Union!!!

The next argument will be that I'm referring to experts with military intelligence background or military leaders themselves. Or perhaps all the interviews of Ukrainian people that have been tortured? All of them are just propaganda! — ssu

Can't help but notice you ignore the "s" to "funders" and don't bother to even put United States Department of State and BAE Systems plc as the next entries on the list.

The whole reason think tanks exist is because you can simply buy the analysis you want whereas academia is more difficult to control.

The whole reason academia is more difficult to control is because biased analysis and censorship (of intellectual debate) proves harmful to society and so a few (however limited) mechanism were developed to limit such harms, such as tenured professorship as well as a general context of needing to at least encounter different points of view.

You really think the funders on that list are going to finance producing analysis that criticises their polices?

Nevertheless, noted, that you can only come up with a strawman that my issue was "only with the European commission" and I believe they are evil caricatures of some sort.

What you cite has literally no sources.

Since these activities were critical to the Russian theory of victory in the operation,
it is important to outline these plans to appropriately contextualise the role of the conventional
force. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org

How do we know what the Russian theory of victory was or is? Did the Kremlin publish it somewhere? Why then do they directly contradict the theory of victory they themselves published, it in public statements saying they were prepared for this outcome and the Northern offensive was a fixing operation to capture the South etc. Do the authors just telepathically read the Kremlin and Russian army top commanders minds and "know what they really think"?

The assumption appears to have been that Ukrainian government officials would either
flee or be captured as a result of the speed of the invasion. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org

What the hell is "assumption appears to have been" doing in purported serious analysis. Is everything that follows just deductions from what "appears" to the authors?

Complete trash.

It was also anticipated that shock would prevent the immediate mobilisation of the population, and that protests and other civil resistance could be managed through the targeted disintegration of Ukrainian civil society. To manage these protests Russian forces would be supported by Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) and riot control units. Meanwhile the FSB was tasked with capturing local officials. The Russian counterintelligence regime on the occupied territories had compiled lists that divided — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org

What does "targeted disintegration of Ukrainian civil society" even mean?

Do the authors have the FSB list?

How do they know the categories:

Ukrainians into four categories:
• Those to be physically liquidated.
• Those in need of suppression and intimidation.
• Those considered neutral who could be induced to collaborate.
• Those prepared to collaborate. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org

The entire paper is just an unsourced narrative based on (in the authors own words) "appearances" that Ukrainian partisans would certainly wish to be true.

And who are the authors?

Oleksandr V Danylyuk served as the Special Adviser to the head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, and as an adviser to Ukraine’s Minister of Defence. He currently heads the Centre for Defence Reforms and is a coordinator of the NATO–Ukraine intergovernmental platform for
early detection and countering hybrid threats. Oleksandr is an Associate Fellow at RUSI. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org

Literally includes Ukrainian intelligence.

And ...

Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi was born in 1973 in Dnipro, Ukraine.

[blah blah blah got promoted a bunch]

Today he serves as First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Supreme Council of
Ukraine on National Security, Defense and Intelligence. He has been awarded with state awards, including the Golden Star (with the Hero of Ukraine status), Danylo Halytskiy Award ІІІ class, and Bohdan Khmelnytskiy Award III class, as well as Military Distinguished Service Medal І and ІІ classes, and the Military Virtue Medal. In 2012, he was also awarded with personal arms by the minister of defence of Ukraine. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org

You're really stating here, in this forum, today, placing your posting reputation on, sear by the scared runes, that this RUSI paper represents unbiased and well sourced analysis and simply trustworthy expertise?

... and not a total farce of the most transparently stupid propaganda?

In “normative legal force” the expression “normative” refers to the fact that laws are norms and “legal” is a specification of “normative” since there are also non-legal norms. Now “normative force” and “law” or “legal system”, or “legal force” are part of very common jargon in the juridical domain. Google it if you have no idea what I am talking about. — neomac

I know what the words mean, obviously you don't. You could have said "normative and legal force" (and then explain your non-legal theory and your hegemonic normative theory) but a normative statement is not the same as a legal statement. The Nazi genocide was "legal" as well as US slavery and segregation, but we have normative issue with such legal states of affairs.

Certainly we would want law to conform to our normative disposition, but until A. all people have the same values and B. little or no corruption exists, then that won't be the case and just prepending "normative" to "legal force" means you don't understand the subject matter.

To make matters worse, "normative" is not at all the same as a "norm" and laws are also not necessarily norms. It's illegal to jay-walk, but can be entirely the norm, likewise it can be illegal to take bribes but, likewise, just as much a norm as jay-walking.

Furthermore, powerful states invading or interfering smaller states that "defy them", in your jargon, without any UN security resolution, is the actual "norm" on this subject matter. You spent some time justifying why the US can invade countries to maintain their hegemony for the simple fact that they are the hegemon.

Now, if you actually do google "normative legal force" you get a whole list of entries that explain the difference between normative and legal statements.

After distinguishing some other senses of the “normativity” of law, this chapter addresses its moral force. It is argued that all deontological accounts of a prima facie duty to obey the law, other than the argument from consent, fail for being unable to show that the moral value of law as an institutional order implies a duty to obey each and every legal rule. The argument from consent fails for familiar reasons. This leaves an instrumental account of the moral force of law as the only option. The upshot is that, for individuals, the moral force of law is variable, and often weak. The case is different for state officials, as subjects of either domestic or international law. Here the instrumental case for obedience is typically strong. — Chapter 3, The Normative Force of Law, Individuals and States, Liam Murphy

Is literally the first result for doing as you suggest, which is a paper explaining how there is no prima facie normative connection to law.

Not only, as you account for yourself in your next paragraph, no actual UN legal basis for the West's intervention (no security council resolution), but your reference to "normative legal force" just leads directly to an explanation that even if there was a UN security resolution that would not be sufficient to establish to a duty to implement it (it maybe legal but wrong, due to, for example, resulting in a worse outcome for the citizens concerned, such as we saw in Libya).

Besides your legal quibble is irrelevant wrt he original point of contention: I referred to the UN resolution against the Russian invasion of Ukraine to clarify my original claim about Russian defiant attitude toward the West. — neomac

If you're moving the goal posts back to this argument, then certainly you'd agree that Russia's actions in Ukraine are entirely justified by Ukraine's defiant attitude toward Russia, and that Russia is only "wrong" in your framework if they fail to teach Ukraine a lesson.

As long as I don’t understand how you apply your notion of “justification” I can’t really assess if it’s consistent (BTW does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?!). — neomac

What a ludicrous straw man.

First, justifying one's actions to others is independent of whether the actions are justified or if others agree. The actions can be justified but you fail to convince anyone. Likewise, the actions could unjust but everyone agrees with you.

Indeed, one maybe engaged in a process of justification one knows to be false (lying to investigators, or throwing out UN resolutions as having "legal force"), but hope other parties agree. Of course, in this scenario, presumably one has some internal justification for presenting a false justification.

Even more bizarre is the idea the entire world would need to agree as a condition for justification, which doesn't even make any internal sense. For, if the proposition isn't justified until everyone agrees ... why would one be justified to try to convince people of it's truth, which is by definition is false until everyone agrees.

Obviously in any remotely common sense ethical framework, the truth of a justification is independent of others agreeing it's true.

Since your arguments don't make any sense and are mutually incompatible, also take note of your trying to flip the burden of proof of what "justification" means, as it's very clear your actual position is that you're a fan of US hegemony, which, by definition, non-US partisans should not be a fan of by the same logic of lust power. Of course, if people under hegemonic control, such as Europe, can be convinced the hegemony is good for them, that's a better situation, even if one knows that's the self delusion copium of de facto captives and advancing their own interests, rather than the hegemon's, would, by definition, be in their interest to do.

You've made this position clear, showed your hand so to speak, so maybe argue this position and that the US actions in Ukraine will strengthen, rather than overstretch, their hegemonic position, vis-a-vis their largest hegemonic competitor: China.

The rest of your comments are basically just word salad, but I'll respond to the meaningful part:

The fact that I didn’t mention "Ukrainian welfare” in that statement is not enough to conclude that there is zero consideration of the Ukrainian welfare on the NATO/US’s part. — neomac

The fact you don't mention Ukrainian welfare is obviously because that is not a priority. Describing how the US / NATO endgame need not be Ukrainian "victory" but just sufficient harm to Russia could nevertheless be compatible with maximising Ukrainian welfare is just a farce.

In what plausible version of the world, would Ukraine losing the war, with the death and casualties so far and likely at least as much but likely many multiples on the way to losing, and then losing, would be compatible with Ukrainian welfare?

Sure, "logically" we can imagine a universe in which somehow every single Ukrainian gets a billion dollars (without any inflation problem from that) and every dead Ukrainian comes back to life, and all bad memories of the war are replaced by happy cat videos, nothing "logically incompatible" between that and:

3. The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. — neomac

You literally state NATO/US involvement need not be to "stop Russia".

And you accuse me of quibbling? You literally need basically magic to imagine a scenario in which "not stopping Russia" is in the welfare of Ukrainians. Sure, "logically" we can imagine by some unexpected turn of events that magic is real, reincarnation a breeze, memory replacement facile, and so on, Russia isn't "stopped" and this is actually great for Ukraine.

Indeed, "logically" there is nothing that prevents Russia winning but this somehow results in Zelensky becoming emperor of the entire planet, immortal, and a just and wise ruler who solves all our problems.

Do you even consider a few seconds what you are writing?

You do not mention Ukrainian welfare in your "endgame" because you do not care about Ukrainian welfare. You care only about harming Russia due to some irrational fear (especially when combined with the belief that the Russian military is incompetent ... of which the corollary is they are nothing to fear); i.e. your entire position rests upon Russuphobia and, as you say, not mentioning Ukrainian welfare.

I mean, I thought "practical rationality" was your pseudo-intellectual slogan, and you dare move the goal posts to "logical compatibility"?

First and foremost, this is rhetoric on both sides now. Russia hasn't used nuclear weapons and hence NATO's response is also hypothetical. But when the issue has already come up, I think that the situation is different than where the West was in 2014. — ssu

Clearly the situation is different than in 2014, there is a full scale war.

However, it is not first and foremost rhetoric. The nukes are very real and have a real impact on decision making. Putin recently harmonising Russian nuclear policy with United States policy to allow first strike against a non-nuclear opponent, is not rhetoric.

The original issue we were discussing was if nuclear weapons would be effective or not, which I think we agree they would be effective against a number of military targets, but Ukraine could continue fighting anyways.

Why would they be sending ground troops? If the response to a hypothetical use of nukes would be a conventional attack, that likely would be done by cruise missiles and aircraft. Then Russia would have to think if it wants to escalate further and strike NATO countries. And really, if it now has problems to fight a war with Ukraine, is the solution to start a war with countries it even before it's attack in February didn't match? De-escalation through escalation is simply a shock-and-awe strategy which can work when the other side is totally unprepared for it. — ssu

Ground troops are the other conventional response, but if you agree that's unlikely then no need to debate it further.

The problem with a conventional air attack on Russian forces in Ukraine is that it may simply not be as effective as the nukes. If we're talking long range cruise missiles, those maybe in limited supply to do damage remotely similar to the damage Russia just did with nukes in this scenario. So there's a real risk of "cost of doing business", as I've mentioned.

Significantly upping the damage would require planes, but it's entirely possible that Russia can shoot down a significant amount of NATO aircraft. It would also not even be possible to establish air superiority without attacking SAM's and air bases in undisputed Russian territory.

I would definitely agree that NATO could do significant damage with its air power, no questions about that. The problem is the tolerance for losses. Western audience will be expecting literally zero losses, stealth is magical, Russians are incompetent and so on.

Stealth has been around now for decades and the Russians have put significant effort into defeating it. I think the odds of zero losses is pretty low, so the question becomes how many NATO losses would be tolerable in such an operation. On top of this analysis of the operation itself there's the risk of nuclear escalation, such as tactical nuclear missiles launched at NATO air bases.

The other problem is that even if such operations are successful with acceptable losses, no escalation, everything seems "fine" ... it doesn't end the war, Russia would still be there, and essentially in a permanent hot-war with NATO firing at any aircraft that comes near and so on, maybe withdrawing from and re-invading Ukraine regularly, using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine at will, potentially for decades.

The logic that Russia uses a tactical nuclear weapon, NATO spanks Russia, profit, I just don't see how that actually works. Even if successful, one needs a plan for what happens next.

Russia has gotten already the benefit from it's nuclear weapons: NATO hasn't openly interfered in the war. There aren't any "no-fly-zones" being patrolled over Ukraine.

Hence to start actually using them is in my view really pushing the limit. Russian armed forces aren't on the verge of imminent collapse in Ukraine. Hence it would be really strange just why to continue to be so reckless. — ssu

We agree here. There's lot's of reasons not to use nuclear weapons; I'm just disputing the idea NATO has an obvious and easy retaliation that would make it clearly "bad" for Russia in military terms, and also the idea nuclear weapons would not be effective. We agree, however, on all the political reasons not to use nuclear weapons.

And, although I'm not sure NATO can so easily implement a no-fly zone over South Ukraine, for sure one retaliation would be more and more sophisticated weapons to Ukraine.

As I've outlined before, the scenario in which Russia would consider nuclear weapons seriously is if they were actually losing. However, if NATO is essentially letting Russia win by the weapons drip feed, only introducing the next weapons system when the previous one proves insufficient, and everything is very predictable and controlled, then Russia has no need of nuclear weapons and their use only introduces plenty of unknowns and risks that have no need to be tested.

One would need a situation where there is serious risks of not-using-nuclear weapons, such as actually being routed at large scale on the battle field.

All this analysis, in my view, NATO has done, which explains their policy to let Russia slowly win but inflicting (tolerable) damage and limiting the scope of victory. When NATO considers trying to escalate to actually defeat Russia in the field with the weapons (NATO tanks, NATO planes, cluster munitions, thermobaric weapons, "whatever Ukraine needs") and the training that would require ... then that does start to look like a situation Russia would consider nuclear weapons, which NATO doesn't have any obvious and easy response to, hence the decision is not to supply these systems.

Lol.

Let's first notice just what Russia had in mind if their planned 10-day operation would have been successful and they would have gotten Kyiv: — ssu

You are citing from:

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank. Our mission is to inform, influence and enhance public debate to help build a safer and more stable world. — Rusi.org

Which is difficult to take you seriously when you don't mention their top funders 2020-2021:

Over £1,000,000
European Commission

£500,000 to £999,999
United States Department of State

£200,000 to £499,999
BAE Systems plc
British Army, Futures Directorate
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
Global Affairs Canada
John D. And Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tetra Tech International Development Ltd
Verification Research, Training & Information Centre (VERTIC)
ZemiTek, LLC

£100,000 to £199,999
Alion (US DoD/EUCOM)
Alliance for Intellectual Property
Carnegie Corporation of New York
Goldman Sachs Gives
Google, Inc.
Lockheed Martin UK
Palantir Technologies Ltd
Philip Morris International Management SA (PMI Impact Fund)
Redacted, Inc — Rusi funders

And just "maybe" their analysis is biased towards being essentially pure propaganda for their funders.

But, if nevertheless you are certain this analysis is just pure-truth, then I'll respond to it.

However, make very clearly you believe the analysis you posted is really true, the authors have access to the the (Russian?) data required to make their conclusions.

As for opportunities to end the war, the biggest opportunity of ending the war was before the war, implementing the Minsk agreements in good faith and actually end the civil war, and also licensing Nord Stream 2 (or then not allowing it to be built in the first place; which you may say isn't sufficient justification to start a war, but that's just the reality of geopolitics and Russia starting about it, show their "serious", is an expectation ... and Germany allowed the pipeline to be built because buying the gas is to their own benefit).

The next biggest opportunity was when Ukraine had successfully arrested the Russian offensive, this is the common sense and obvious time in which to negotiate a peace deal with a larger invading force, the time of maximum leverage. Again, if the West encouraged, even de facto ordered, Ukraine not to negotiate a peace deal at that time, that is a major fuckup (if the goal is Ukrainian welfare) that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and injury, and millions of traumatised and disrupted lives since.

It is pretty conventional and classic war theory that the thing you want to avoid doing in a fight with a superior force is a protracted war of attrition (why would a smaller force have an advantage in doing that?) and the more such a war goes on, the more the invading force would need to get in a peace deal for it to be "worth it" for the home audience. So the choices (after initial resistance and demonstrating will and capacity to fight and the cost of further fighting) becomes a much worse deal and suffering significant damage or then fighting to some sort of victory (which may not even be possible).

Of course, Western neo-cons would be upset that Ukraine makes any compromise and Russia gets anything, like recognition of Crimea and independent Donbas, and so on, and they'd be doing their little tantrums about it. However, is the destruction of the war so far really worth not-compromising over the Donbas?

Now, the counter argument would be "Russia will just take more later!" but the whole point of the fighting is to demonstrate the cost of such an operation.

The scenario where concessions just encourage more land grabbing, is if land is given up without a fight ... if it's at no cost, why not take more? However, if a heavy cost is inflicted, like hundreds of tanks destroyed, one's army and people demonstrates the will to fight a war, the whole point of doing that to show land grabbing is at a significant cost that is not worth it. But it's simply the reality that a superior force is going to need something to end the war, to sell it to the home audience. You may say "that's not fair" but that's just reality. Alternative is entering a long drawn out war of attrition.

So, are you really arguing that concessions (such as Nord Stream 2, which isn't even a concession but a mutually beneficial "comparative advantage" trade project) before the war or then in the first stages of the war (no NATO, which you keep saying was never a possibility anyways, independent Donbas still part of Ukraine, and recognising Crimea), would not have been worth it for Ukraine to avoid the current situation?

But boethius, the West isn't intervening in Ukraine as in Iraq. And in Libya there are quite many countries all around meddling in it's internal problems (also Turkey, Russia, Egypt, Qatar,...). Ukraine is basically getting arms and intel from the West, but it's doing the fighting all alone. So — ssu

Sending funding (basically bankrolling the entire Ukrainian military payroll), sending weapons, providing intelligence, covert meddling, are all in themselves interventions.

You are going back to the idea that we are not morally responsible for the outcome because Ukrainians want to fight and die, and if it's a total disaster for them that is the obvious outcome that we clearly see coming ... then that's fine. We can rediscuss this idea we aren't somehow "intervening" in Ukrainian agency, it's somehow all Ukraine and we aren't a party to the conflict, if you want.

However, my argument was simply that the West has no track record of intervening militarily in countries and producing vibrant democracies as advertised. There is no reason to believe that's ever seriously intended in the interventions so far that have catastrophically failed on this humanitarian metric, and so there is no reason to believe that is the intention now with regard to Ukraine, and there is even less reason to believe that will somehow magically happen.

No, actually where the West can fuck up big time isn't now (of course, if they just abandon Ukraine to face of Russia all alone would be that fuck up), it's later. The West can fumble after this war in the promised rebuilding of Ukraine. Done lousily that can simply increase corruption, which the Ukrainian people hate. And simply if it disregards it's own requirements, values and laws in case of Ukraine. The rebuilding of Afghanistan is a prime example how these things go bad. — ssu

No, the West can definitely fuckup now by actively obstructing peaceful resolutions, encouraging hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries and millions of traumatised and disrupted lives and the complete destruction of Ukraine which Zelensky does not hesitate to tell us is being done for "your values" (i.e. the West, not necessarily good for Ukraine) and to protect Eastern Europe (not necessarily good for Ukraine).

That we won't help rebuild Ukraine in any sense remotely commensurate with the damages our weapons have helped cause ... goes without saying. Obviously we won't do that.

Again, that the use would result in NATO making a conventional attack on Russian forces in Ukraine is believable enough to make the use a very, very bad decision. — ssu

First, this is no longer making the point that nuclear weapons are somehow not useful militarily, so I think we agree there, that there are useful.

We also seem to agree that NATO would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, why would it?

As for conventional retaliation, this is really a problematic thing. You don't just casually destroy Russian forces. The options are fairly limited.

For example, let's say you launch a conventional attack on Russian military bases in Russia ... how would Russia be sure this is a conventional attack and not a nuclear first strike? So, it's not so easy.

Sending in boots on the ground into Ukraine ... does any Western nation actually want this? No one disputes Ukrainian forces have suffered high casualties, far higher than is the usual tolerance for Western armies. When does "teaching Russia a lesson" turn into just getting stuck in a quagmire with Russia with no options to actually defeat Russia, just continuing exchange of offensives without any clear outcome?

Also, if the Russia declares Ukraine free-to-nuke, and then nukes NATO forces in Ukraine ... does it really fear a nuclear retaliation? This is not even clear, so not only is it not clear that any NATO country even has the appetite for a full scale conventional confrontation with Russia in Ukraine, it's not clear whether they have any reasonable followup to being nuked in Ukraine, which, in this scenario, Russia just demonstrated it is willing to do, so it a fairly common sense followup to say they will not distinguish Ukrainian and other forces that are in Ukraine.

Certainly, there are plenty of reasons not to use nuclear weapons we would agree on (domestic politics, China and India's reaction); however, that Russia is reasonably deterred by conventional military means, or reasonably deterred by nuclear means, or believes nuclear weapons are not useful, are fairly weak arguments.

There is no post goal shift. The UN resolution expresses the majoritarian will of its voters (the West/US among them) as much as a democratic election expresses the majoritarian will of the voters: if one political candidate would violently rebel against the results of such democratic elections despite their legality or without legally appealing against them, this political candidate would be defiant of what has been ruled as expression of people’s majoritarian will. So concerning the Russian “special military operation”, there is a UN resolution which has a normative legal force and such resolution widely expresses the will of the West/US. And yes the international law resolution against the Russian “special military operation” LEGALLY JUSTIFIES the western policies of the West against Russia. — neomac

Again, "normative legal force" is just pseudo-intellectual bullshit. Are you adding "normative" to "legal force" because you are aware there is no actual legal force involved in the situation? Or do you just have no idea what you're talking about?

In terms of the situation, legal justification for military action under the UN system requires a security council vote, which Russia obviously vetos.

As for the votes you're talking about in the general assembly of the UN, they have no legal force in military matters, and they didn't even represent a majority of people on the planet, so are not the "people's will" which seems important for your argument.

Now, if you say number of people doesn't count because countries joining the UN agree to the 1 vote per country rule ... sure, but they also agree to the security council and veto system on any military issues.

An international law based justification for intervention in Ukraine would require Russia to sign off on it, which they obviously haven't. You may say that's not fair, not "normative" according to your moral standards, but that's not how the law works. If you make a legal system where a minority has asymmetric power and favouritism, perhaps it's not fair but it's still legal.

For example, the US senate represents a minority of voters due to the states with lower populations having the same amount of seats. So, the US senate does not represent a "people's will", and US senators act in "defiance" of the people's will and are "normatively" unjustified according to your own argument, but the way the US senate works is still legal despite this defiance.

You keep talking about “justification” without clarifying what you mean by it. To me the term “justification” is pretty general and it expresses the idea that some relevant shareable rational requirement is satisfied. — neomac

Although "rational requirement" means nothing in this context, just pseudo-intellectual bullshit that the pseudo-intellectual, usually of the "economics" variety, adds to statements to make themselves feel better about their lack of knowledge of the topics they come to conclusions about, I do agree with your key word "shareable".

Indeed, justification can be anything you mention, but the essential element is we are justifying it to others with some relation to the concept of "justice" that's universal in some way. Of course, what sorts of theories and arguments can be used to justify an action is wide open, the common element is that justification is towards others; arguments we want other to agree with.

"Regardless of justification" in the context I use it, refers to the US/NATO, or you own, justifications to others about the policies. You've made it quite clear you are on the "side of the West" and simply want the West to win. That is not a justification to me, or to other third parties that need not pick a side (India, Africa etc.), and certainly not less Russia.

Now, you may accept that what you want you cannot justify to others (although it maybe still useful to your purposes to fool them into believing the actions are justified) and have a separate internal justification for your actions. In this case, within your own head, there becomes two uses of the word justification; one use is essentially how you try to trick others, say a public position on the matter, and another use is why you are actually doing what you're doing, say a private position. So, in this duelism it can make sense to talk of your justifications for trying to convince others of your justifications which are not your real justifications, but it serves your real justification if others believe your justifications for other reasons.

For example, being the "Hegemone" maybe your "private position" and you may justify that by saying having more power is a "rational requirement" of all "rational agents", but since this applies to everyone else, you cannot simply justify your actions seeking more power simply because you want more power, as you recognise other actors want the same power: i.e. that you want more power is not a justification for others to give you more power. So, you think to yourself "how can I justify these actions" and then create arguments, for example protecting a "rules based order", that you may recognise are insufficient justifications but the gullible may believe them, or then one's opponents are perhaps at least flummoxed a bit in needing to deal with them.

If I clearly stated several times what you attribute to me, you can easily quote myself, but I don’t see any such quotation. Besides your understanding of my claims is under question, your serial misinterpretation of my claims is intellectually creepy, so using the word “clearly” is no assurance of your understanding at all. — neomac

This is insanely clear:

So what? There are three reasons your question is failing to take into account:
1. We are in the middle of the war so we don’t see the end of the war nor the full consequences of such war. The Soviet–Afghan War lasted 10 years, could anyone see the end of it and the following collapse of the Soviet Union while they were in the middle of it back then? No, because they didn’t happen yet.
2. Russia was complaining about NATO enlargement since the 90s, did Russia see NATO enlargement stopping for that reason? NATO/US can be as determined as Russia to pursue their goals in Ukraine at the expense of Russia. And since Russia, especially under Putin, took a declared confrontational attitude toward the hegemonic power, Russia made sure that NATO/US will deal with Russia accordingly as long as they see fit.
3. The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. — neomac

Point 2 applies what you obviously actually believe: "And since Russia, especially under Putin, took a declared confrontational attitude toward the hegemonic power, Russia made sure that NATO/US will deal with Russia accordingly as long as they see fit".

As I pointed out at the time, if US hegemonic status is a justification, which you clearly state it is, then if Russia wins the war then it's just asserting its hegemonic power over Ukraine, and likewise justified. If the US can't stop Russia then clearly it isn't a global hegemone, as it was unable to determine the outcome of this even that happened on the globe. US may, nevertheles, have a larger sphere of hegemoning than Russia, but it is not global.

In particular, your point 3 is extremely clear "the end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian."

Your "end game" involves zero consideration of Ukrainian welfare nor any notion that it would be justified, in terms of your international law arguments that are in any case wrong, to seek such an outcome. The goal is quite clearly to simply harm Russia as a power competitor.

Which, whether the war is even doing that, would be an interesting question which I'm happy to debate. It could be the war is harming Russia, but it could also be Russia will come out of this war with a far more efficient and powerful army, more autonomous economy and new international banking system and so little reason to ever stop "defying the West" (had Putin implemented the sanctions himself this would have certainly caused serious domestic problems, but since the West did it for him, it's easy to say the West doesn't want to do business with Russia ... sort of what sanctions mean), rapidly replace any equipment, and all its neighbour's far less (rather than more) willing to "defy" Russia, seeing as they clearly can and will do what it takes to destroy your entire economy and the West clearly doesn't have a solution to the needing gas problem.

So, if you want to stop advancing propaganda, we could discuss what you actually believe, which is that the US / West can and should use this war to harm Russia in pure power competition terms. Ukrainian welfare doesn't matter, nor any other justification, just harming Russia.

The problem with your position is that historically wars, even extremely harmful wars in the short term (such as the American civil war, or WWI or WWII), generally result in any non-losing-party having far more powerful military at the end of the war.

Indeed, even losing parties can radically increase their real military power, such as Germany after WWI still had all sorts of "war experience" benefits even if physical war fighting capacity was essentially dismantled, despite this and the high casualties it is applying the experience and lessons of WWI that Germany could then rapidly rebuild their military power and fight WWII.

However, in the case of the war at hand, there is little probability that Russia will lose. At best, it "won't win".

Furthermore, in your hegemon's got to hegemon, you don't consider at all China.

Viewed as a proxy war between Russia and the US, perhaps US is winning something at some expense (at the expense of the destruction of Ukraine), but viewed as a proxy war between China and the West, China is winning a great deal at no expense; indeed, if the first view is correct, the West is weakening due to this war as well as Russia, an otherwise regional competitor.

So, if this war with Russia is satisfying some "rational requirement" of a global hegemon, there should be some argument as to why this helps against China, a more economically powerful adversary.

For, if China is a larger threat to US hegenomic power, which was the basis of all this talk of "pivoting" to East-Asia for over 2 decades, then optimum hegemomic strategy would be to "divide and conquer" the would be Russia-China alliance, and certainly not expend immense material and political capital in trying to harm the weaker of the two in such a team.

↪boethius, if you think something's off then hit the report button/link. It's a small flag at the bottom of posts. — jorndoe

Sure, if you see no reason explain what your point is, then yes, hopefully the moderators will remove this sort of content. If you are not supporting a point, nor offering any analysis of what you're sources say and and why you think they are trustworthy, then it's just propaganda.

It's about the Ukraine crisis, not just your own take, though that's cool too, despite the occasional curious tunnel vision. — jorndoe

What other "take" have I suggested be removed from the discussion? The problem with your propaganda is that it's not a take, just spamming links. There's generally nothing to respond to, just a few unverified anecdotes that don't even relate to any topic of discussion.

You keep ignoring that Putin, Pavlov, Solovyov, Patrushev, Chernyshov, with Peskov, Matviyenko, and others in tow, speak of liberating Ukraine from a Nazi regime (previous posts, all over actually), a ruse, an excuse, false. For that matter, it's pretty clear that Kremlin has no particular concern for the Ukrainians (also prior posts). — jorndoe

If you actually followed the discussion, instead of just spamming, you would have read a long exchange on this exact topic that obviously Russia produces propaganda as well. Of course, as @ssu has pointed out numerous times, the best propaganda is based on truth. So that the Kremlin says something, and that we know they will also produce propaganda same as you, doesn't make it untrue (the problem I have with your propaganda is that it generally has nothing to do with what's being discussed, lending zero additional weight to any position, but clearly designed to just impress the gullible).

I also make clear that people are free to argue there are not enough Nazi's to justify invasion.

If you were actually engaged in the discussion and not just toiling away at spamming propaganda, you would have actually argued why there is not enough Nazi's with enough power in Ukraine to justify invasion, which starts with setting a bar of what "too many" Nazi's would be, that would justify invasion, and then demonstrating Ukraine is under this threshold. That there are Nazi's elsewhere does not serve such a purpose, as the distribution of Nazi's is obviously not uniform.

Clearly the actual number of Nazi's and how much power they have is essential to the West's, generally speaking, argument that appeasing the Nazi's was a mistake (i.e. they should have gone to war sooner). For example, Hitler, in himself, was no reason to attack Germany. If Hitler was literally the only Nazi in Germany at the time, and it was only himself and his book and no one listened to him and he had no power or influence, there would have been zero reason to attack Germany to fight Naziism. The appeasement argument rests on there being more Nazis than just Hitler, and at some point too many Nazis and war is preferable to appeasement.

One could also argue that, yes, there's too many Nazi's in Ukraine and there has been for a while, and the West should not have appeased these Nazi's by sending them weapons, but, nevertheless, the Kremlin is simply cynically exploiting the otherwise completely justified invasion to kill said Nazi's in order to accomplish unjustified objectives such as steal resources.

Whether something is used as propaganda is independent of whether it is true. Not everything Zelensky says is false, for example. Likewise, even a true justification for war may also be propaganda, if the war does not actually serve that purpose. For example, maybe it was justified to attack Saddam and the Taliban simply because they are bad and there was the means available to do something about it (a key element that maybe lacking vis-a-vis Russia, or China, or North Korea or any number of authoritarian / totalitarian governments that maybe as bad or worse than Saddam / Taliban); however, if the war is then prosecuted in a way that does not actually help Iraqis or Afghanis, but simply transfers wealth the arms industry, creates some forward operating bases to threaten Iran and so on, then the justification is not actually for the actions, but similar actions that did not actually happen and was not the actual goal.

Which is a synthesis of my criticism of the West's intervention in Ukraine. If Iraq and Afghanistan and Libya were now vibrant democracies, benefits of the Wests reconstruction and tutelage of these places far exceeding the cost of the war to bring it about, then by all means go help Ukraine become a happier place. However, the West simply has no track record of actually fulfilling our promises, but rather abandoning our allies.

Maybe it was entirely justified, in itself, to remove the Taliban from power and support democratic forces in Afghanistan. The problem with this scenario is that we under-supported, enabled and engaged in corruption at all levels of governance, and then abandoned our so-called allies in Afghanistan the moment they no longer served entirely different purposes to "democracy" and "welfare", which was control of resources and transferring funds to the arms industry.

We will abandon Ukraine the moment they are inconvenient to the actual objectives as well.

Even if the current intervention was somehow justified (which I highly doubt), it does not matter as we will abandon Ukraine to the cold and dark, and our claims to bringing the light will be something that we just keep telling ourselves. Indeed, I would argue we already have.

They are perfect for deterrence, but not so great in actual warfare because of the obvious drawbacks and the obvious escalation. — ssu

... how would something that doesn't work deter an opponent?

And again, Ukraine does not have nuclear weapons so MAD does not apply.

To update my analysis of the military situation:

The new NATO Wunderwaffe is the German Flakpanzer Gepard, latest entry into the weapons drip-feed to keep Ukraine just well enough to keep fighting.

The Gepard can fire bullets at drones and cruise missiles, and supposed to deal with the attacks on the electricity system, but that idea is just dumb as an electricity grid is simply too vast with too many targets to protect with a system like Gepard.

Zelensky is now basically just complaining that Russia uses too much artillery and they can't deal with it. News has certainly arrived from the front that the weather makes war fighting no longe or very fun (a warrior "lifestyle" as a Nazi in one of the videos I posted phrased it).

Drone attacks on Russia air bases do not seem significant or sustained in anyway to matter militarily; just a dose of propaganda.

The devastation of Ukraine is severe.

Yes, air campaigns don't win wars (except when they do), but sides to military conflicts still lose.

The dynamic NATO has created is sending out Ukraine's best troops with "just enough" weapons to lose, starting with the Javelin and Stinger type systems, then when they can't win (and a lot of them die), provide the next military system to not-lose, rinse and repeat.

However, it's not clear to me how long this strategy can go on for. Continuously attritting your best troops in battles they can't win, then compensating the loss with more sophisticated equipment to make the next tier as effective (but not more effective), has clear limitations in man power.

I see zero indication NATO is coming to help their "friend".

What is the point of your posts?

You're just microblogging and news aggregating.

Again, there are places you can do that without betraying your fanatical devotion to propaganda by simply reposting material without scrutiny, criticism, nor even any link to the discussion.

I posted 6 videos of Western journalists investigating Nazi's in Ukraine and all concluding that there definitely seems to be Nazi's in Ukraine.
— boethius

Sure, Nazis, and they're a problem, wherever, anywhere (even in Russia). — jorndoe

The videos I posted show Western journalists investigating Nazi institutions and Nazi groups receiving arms from Ukrainian military (that came in turn from NATO members ... including members who needed to pass laws to make clear that was illegal to arm Nazi groups, but Ukraine does it anyways). These are not fringe organisations.

Western journalists who point out this arming of Nazi's and the clear Nazi sympathies, links and lying by the Ukrainian ministry of defence in arming the Nazi's even if NATO was claiming they shouldn't and weren't.

But, I am happy you agree that Nazi's are indeed a problem and should be liquidated, and whether the Russian war is justified or not, if they've killed some Nazi's along the way, in Azov Battalion and Right Sector and Ukrainian Intelligence and in the ranks and elsewhere, then that's at least happy happenstance we can all celebrate.

But I wasn’t talking about the American invasion of Iraq, I was talking about Russian invasion of Ukraine. To repeat it once more:

I listed facts that support that claim, like the fact that Russia didn’t halt its invasion even after a UN resolution against it as widely voted by West/NATO/US, with ensuing sanctions and continued military support to Ukraine by the West. If that’s not an act of defiance by Russia against West/NATO/US, then I don’t understand your usage of the word “defiance”: if X is warned, condemned and sanctioned by Y for a certain choice, and X knowingly pursues its choice despite of that, that’s for me enough to call X’s behavior defiant toward Y. EVEN MORE SO, if X were to question Y’s authority with “tu quoque” arguments (as you suggest with “but also the US has little respect for international law”)!!!
Your criticism doesn’t address my claim and plays with words (“maverick”, “justification”) in interpreting my original claims which weren’t using such terms. Your conceptually confused or caricatural way of rendering my claims is good to mislead or brainwash you, not me. Anyways yes the Western reaction against Russia is justified on geopolitical and legal grounds. — neomac

This is just a word salad and has nothing to do with your original argument.

Your original argument tied "defiant" to justification of Western policies ... you've just moved the goal posts to Russia is doing things the West doesn't like. Yeah, no shit.

Now, does not liking what someone is doing justify any particular course of action?

No.

People do things I don't like all the time, I wouldn't call it "defying me" but you're free to say that, but, what matters here, is that whatever you call it, that does not in itself justify arming their competitors, or any particular course of action.

Russia and the West are at odds over Ukraine, no one disputes that. If Russian "defiance" against the West justifies Western policies, then the Ukrainian "defiance" of Russia justifies Russian policies.

And you've already laid your cards on the table, in that you simply want the West to win this confrontation, so you support Western policies regardless of justification or trying to reconcile with what they West itself does and rights it claims (pre-emptive war, shock and awe, etc.), and regardless of whether they are a benefit to Ukraine.

You state clearly several times the only objective that needs to be achieved is harming the Russian military (not Ukrainian victory, not any benefits at all for Ukraine, even the total destruction of Ukraine is acceptable if Russia is also harmed).

So, argue this position, rather than throw out pseudo-intellectual bullshit that is quite clearly just trying to prop up the propaganda (in this case the US's claim of holding up the "rules based international system" as reason to arm Ukraine, is clearly where you sourced your "defiance" justifies Western policies, but you can support that because it's a bullshit argument, so you move the goal posts to simply someone is defying something in this situation, which is clear: Ukraine is defying Russia, therefore, according to your argument, Russia is completely justified in destroying entirely Ukraine to put a stop to that defiance).

You may think of yourself as an astute intellectual, but you are not.

Astute intellectuals make a clear and meaningful point.

Propagandists throw shit against the wall, see what sticks, throw more shit at whatever spot they think has landed, which is what you do.

Nukes have their military use, which is to wipe out all mankind and give the earth a well-deserved break from us critters. — Olivier5

This is not correct.

MAD theory does not apply to Ukraine as Ukraine does not have enough nuclear weapons to destroy the planet, or any nuclear weapons.

And this whole idea that nuclear weapons would not be useful militarily ... but of course could destroy the entire planet, is just dumb.

Take this argument for example:

That is where nuclear weapons work: deterrence. If this would be a non-nuclear armed country attacking Ukraine, it is likely that a no-fly zone would have been enforced. — ssu

Why would nuclear weapons serve as a deterrent to a no-fly zone if nuclear weapons are not effective?

Why would implementing a no-fly zone be the obvious and easy response to the use of nuclear weapons?

Nuclear weapons are right now deterring a no-fly zone ... but if nuclear weapons would actually be used then the deterrence would evaporate and of course there would be a no-fly zone?

The argument seems to be nuclear weapons are not useful militarily, but serve as a deterrence (because they're not useful?), and of course so powerful that they can destroy the planet, but cannot be made less powerful to be useful outside the context of destroying the planet?

Makes no sense.

Obviously, there are many political reasons not to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but the idea they would not be useful is just absurd. Now, they may not be some magical weapon that produces instant victory.

But to take the bridge example, the situation could be that conventional missiles failed to destroy the bridge, or there's effective missile defence defending the bridge (that a nuclear hypersonic missile could penetrate), or simply too many conventional missiles would be needed and it would be nice to conserve them, and the bridge is essential for an offensive operation, and a tactical nuclear weapon can destroy the bridge, completely and totally with zero chance of repair.

It is very, very easy to see a scenario where a small nuclear weapon would be useful in military planning. Would destroying said bridge, or bunker, or bridge head, or air field, or fortified arms depot, etc. win the war in itself? No, but there are reasons these are targets of military strikes even when the target can easily be repaired (like an air field), as it would be convenient to get rid of them; so, if nuclear weapons can do that (which they can), then they are clearly useful.

And the fact is US has no reason to nuke Russia for Nuking Ukraine and any conventional retaliation would be lower than out-right victory in Ukraine. Move-fast-and-break-things, "cost of doing business", is just a page out of our corporate play book.

Hence, drip-feed theory is alive and well, of supplying Ukraine only with enough weapons to lose, and so keep the political reasons to not use nuclear weapons a sufficient deterrent, and since Ukraine is once again losing, we now hear talk of supplying cluster munitions, and people trying to restart the discussion about jets.

Meaning? — neomac

Meaning pointing out US's invasion of Iraq was not an act of "defiance" does not create some situation where the "contrasting" the concepts of maverick and defiance has anything to do with anything.

You receive criticism ... can't deal with it, then move the goal posts. Obviously, you're no longer remotely arguing that Russia's breaking or not breaking international law is a justification for Western policies.

First, you keep repeating that I made a strawman argument. Do you know what strawman argument means? Explained that to me. And show me how that applies to my counterarguments. — neomac

I point out that your argument about "defiance" is unsound and invalid, at no point does party A defying party B tell us anything about who is justified and what any of those or then third parties should do about it, and you then formulate my position as somehow contrasting maverick with defiance ... but they are compatible. Sure, you can also have the maverick defier, but that was not my statement which was just pointing out the US invasion of Iraq was not "an act of defiance" and then pointed out how your whole topsy-turvy defiance logic makes no sense.

Which you've entirely abandoned, formulating your position as very clearly support for US hegemony.

Forth, every time you call my claims trivialities, that means you agree with me. — neomac

No, when we say you've moved the goal posts to something trivial, the triviality maybe true, but that doesn't support your position.

You have a bunch of elements in an argument that doesn't support your position: we point that out and then you move the goal posts to focusing on just one element, such as "defiance", or then just generalising your argument into a tautology which you quite clearly didn't say, but very clearly said something specific but unfortunately unsupported.

Besides my arguments are always the same ones. Just looping through them for a while now. And if I find your approach conceptually flawed, I don’t feel rationally compelled to stick to it.
Fifth, quote where I made such a claim “Russia is defying international law”, you serial liar. — neomac

Do you just not remember what you've already written and what we've been discussing?

And the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law till aiming at establishing a new World Order in alliance with at least two other authoritarian regimes (China and Iran) [1]. — neomac

Clearly your position at the time can be summarised as Russia defying international law, the West/NATO/US therefore needing to apply that law somehow, and to make things more abundantly clear "violation of international law" is another way to say "defiance of international law".

What do you mean by “justification”? I clarified for the thousand time my point when talking about practical rationality. While you keep playing with words. — neomac

So you're saying something that is of "practical rationality" to do would not be justified to do it? Why would it being both practical and rational to do ... not therefore be a justification to do it?

How is "practical rationality" anything other than a pseudo-intellectual bullshit way of saying "justification".

If I ask why you did something and you answered with the practical and rational reasons for doing it, how is that not you justifying your actions with those reasons?

No, there is no reason to constrain the field to region in the sense you suggest here. When great powers struggle for hegemony they can do so over all domains within their reach on earth, sea, space, virtual space. Small powers pick their side according to their means and convenience. Besides I don’t reason through caricatural slogans like “might is right”. I’m not sure it makes even sense. — neomac

Again, so if Russia wins the "struggle" over Ukraine then it's actions were justified all along and Ukraine just picked the wrong side since 2014?

You're only substantive criticism of Russia seems to be they haven't won yet ... but the US hasn't won this struggle yet either. "Might is right" is not a slogan, it's just exactly what you are describing: if the US can dominate Russia in this confrontation then it should do so, which of course exact same thing applies to Russia dominating Ukraine.

When you are asking ME your questions you look as dumb, yes. I don’t share your conceptual assumptions. And for exactly the same reason, your rhetoric attempt of emotional/moral blackmailing me looks even dumber to me. And if you are doing it for your fans and sidekicks, I don’t give a shit about it. — neomac

You say this question of cost is both dumb and emotional/moral blackmail ... while stating you already answered this question literally a few sentences later:

s the cost to Ukraine of such a policy morally acceptable?
— boethius

I answered yes and argued for it a while ago. It was among my first posts to the thread. — neomac

Nothing is preventing anyone here arguing the cost is worth it. No one in the West hesitates to argue the cost to defeat Hitler was worth it. Sometimes great causes have great costs.

Of course, in the case of WWII the people arguing the cost was worth it actually sent their own soldiers to fight and share that cost. Saying the cost to Ukraine is worth it for our policies, such as not needing to "win" just damage Russia a lot, is quite clearly a cynical exploitation of Ukraine for our own ends.

However, nothing stops anyone from arguing the cynical exploitation and manipulation of Ukraine for our own ends is justifiable, that we will save more lives in the long run in the Baltics and Poland.

However, my question is not some "conceptual framework" that makes sense to reject. If you advocate some goal, such as in this case harming the Russians, "what would be a reasonable cost to attain that goal?" is just common sense. Obviously you wouldn't sacrifice every single American to harm one Russian soldiers knee ... so between that and achieve your objective at the cost of a cup of coffee there obviously some zone of acceptable cost (to the US, to NATO, to Ukraine) which you're comfortable with.

It's simply a common sense question to participants who reject a negotiated peace and any essentially any compromise whatsoever, what cost to Ukraine they think would be worthwhile in refusing to compromise. Would 300 000 lives be worth it to conquer Crimea? Is clearly a reasonable question. Of course, people can argue that 300 000 lives wouldn't be worth it, but it can be conquered with some amount of lives that is worth it. However, to be an honest participant in this debate one should be able to answer such simple questions.

That the questions simply point to a total incoherence, ignorance and Russophobia underpinning your position doesn't somehow make these simple questions as part of some "conceptual framework" that can be rejected.

Russia can still do lots of damage and especially at the expense of the American allies. Indeed if there is going to be a more direct clash between the 2 powers, this is going more likely to happen in Europe than on the American soil. — neomac

Like who? The Baltic states? Poland? Germany?

And in what conditions and scenario does Russia just start invading East-ward?

Also, if Russia can do what you say here, doesn't that just make them the Hegemon?

Here:
"move fast and break things" maverick attitude, and not some sort of act of defiance.
— boethius — neomac

You are contrasting "maverick attitude" with "some sort of act of defiance", as if if they were incompatible, while Russia can be described as both. — neomac

Your full sentence was referring to Russia, whereas my statement was referring to the US invading Iraq was not "defiance". Maybe follow the context.

You then setup some sort of maverick-defiance strawman stated above, which obviously has nothing to do with anything. As the following statements you cite demonstrate, pretty much doing anything can be construed as "defiance" of someone who disagrees.

Why are we talking about defiance? Because your argument about the West needing to deal with Russia's "defiance" (originally of international law) justifying Western policy, couldn't standup to @Isaac's criticism so you've again do what you always do and focus on some trivialities and moving the goalposts: in this case moving the goal posts from Russia is defying international law and that broadly supports your position, to Russia is defying the "West".

Secondly, the US’s invasion turned out to be a reputational failure for the US and set a dangerous precedent exploitable by anti-Western authoritarian regimes. Still the US is the hegemonic power which the Westerns rely on, so Western countries are not compelled to treat Russia with the same submissiveness they treat American abuses on geopolitical grounds. Russia is no peer of the US on the geopolitical arena. Period. — neomac

Notice how this, your actual position of supporting US hegemonic power, has nothing to do with justifications of US actions you throw against the wall to see what sticks and we've been cleaning up for hundreds of comments.

Putting that aside, let's deal with this argument. First thing to notice, is that if Russia is a Hegemonic power in its neighbourhood then Ukraine should be compelled to treat Russia with submissiveness.

The only justification here is who has the hegemonic power in the region should call the shots in Ukraine. If Russia comes out on top in the war then it was the Hegemonic power all along, Ukraine should have submitted and that would be that.

Your argument basically boils down to might is right, so who has the might is the key question which the war is going to uncover.

Your question is based on assumptions we do not share. It’s like asking to an atheist: is being gay a sin against God or not? Likely the atheist answer won’t be based on what is claimed in the Bible, but on his disbelief of any such thing as “sins against God”, right? — neomac

Just wow. The question of whether the cost to Ukraine of our policies of encouraging, financing, arming more war is worthwhile cost so far to accomplish ... "liberation" of the Donbas? Crimea? well whatever it's accomplished compared to the offer at the start of the war, and what further cost do Zelenskyites think would be reasonable to pay to accomplish the objectives of the "common cause" ...

... is akin to asking if being gay is a sin against God to an atheist.

The same blablabla. We have already been through this, here is my answer once again:
The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. — neomac

Your whole premise is:

Russia is no peer of the US on the geopolitical arena. Period. — neomac

... So what's there to fear?

And notice how just after lauds the "common cause", it's made as plane as day there is no common cause as Ukrainian defeat is completely acceptable as long as enough damage has been done to Russia along the way.

Is the cost to Ukraine of such a policy morally acceptable?

It’s like asking to an atheist: is being gay a sin against God or not? — neomac

Truly remarkable.

Convenient, that Ukraine and others could come together in a common cause, huh? :D Democracies against autocrats, defenders against invaders, ...? — jorndoe

Again, if you declare martial law and disband the second largest political party, that does not qualify as democratic.

But even putting aside that, is the cause common?

Zelensky and his followers certainly want to "defeat" the Russians, that's certainly their cause, so if the cause was common what would follow from that is Ukraine would already have the weapons systems, training, even allied troops to accomplish this "common cause".

We don't see that, so perhaps because the causes are different.

US and co. is certainly happy to see the Ukrainians suffer a lot to make the Russians suffer somewhat, but unless the goal is to "win" I don't think that's what Zelensky et. al. have in mind.

Hard to tell what would happen if, say, the UK was to deploy 6000 troops + equipment, Poland 6000, France 6000, Romania 3000, Spain 5000, the US 10000, Australia 2000, Luxembourg 10, Norway 800, in Ukraine. (just whatever came to mind while typing, and assuming this stuff would go through whatever procedures the respective governments have, however unlikely, but invitation accepted) Would Putin play the victim card (again)? Take Kim Jong-un's offer? Tell Lukashenko "Send what you got!"? Ukraine could become quite the battleground. Not sure how realistic something like this is, but one might hope not all that likely...? What might happen? — jorndoe

Yes, seems incredibly unlikely.

If you agree on that point and just want to discuss hypotheticals, you haven't listed enough troops to make a significant difference.

Cropsey's comment ↑ there doesn't need NATO so close by. NASAMS (and others) can help. :up:

Lavrov says Ukrainians will be liberated from neo-Nazi rulers
— TASS · Nov 26, 2022

Getting old, the Nazi thing (and Lavrov perhaps). Been shown the door. Repeating doesn't make it so. — jorndoe

I posted 6 videos of Western journalists investigating Nazi's in Ukraine and all concluding that there definitely seems to be Nazi's in Ukraine.

But let's get back to that later and focus here on your argument form:

Ukraine keeps blaming Russians for the war ... has that gotten "old" in your definition?

How simply the same as now. Keep the course. Let's see after next year. As long as Ukrainians are willing to fight, it's their decision. It is them who are actually paying the cost, not us. — ssu

Our proxies will keep being proxies so therefore we should continue to use them as proxies? It's their country that gets fucked, not ours?

And to accomplish what?

First, "Ukrainians" make decisions now without any critical press or critical political parties and in a vast stew of propaganda. We don't really know what Ukrainians think and whether polls are accurate considering any dissent is viewed as "Russian collaboration" and may get you imprisoned and/or killed.

Additionally, the West keeps saying it will support Ukraine indefinitely and with "whatever it needs" and so on, so even if the decision to fight was genuinely democratic, it maybe based on the Wests assertions about support.

And, more fundamentally, they are still our weapons and we are still responsible for the outcome regardless of what the Ukrainians want to do. It maybe simply not morally acceptable to have Ukraine fight a lost battle even if they want to.

There are also many benefits to peace.

Simple: to continue to undo "the greatest tragedy of the 2oth Century". Russia to claim dominance over it's "near abroad". — ssu

... Like Belarus and Kazakstan and Georgia?

Places Russia already dominates?

What is the next step of this "rebuild the Soviet Union" plan?

And the West has given him this: After annexing Crimea and starting in limited insurgency in the Donbas, what did Putin do? He took take the next step to make a large scale attack on Ukraine. Did then the West and NATO respond as it has now? No. There's your example from history. — ssu

What Putin did next was negotiate Mink I, which Ukraine didn't respect and the Western "guarantors" didn't use any leverage to pressure Ukraine to respect it, and later Ukraine said was just playing for time to build up their forces to have a big war, and then ... negotiate Mink II, which had the exact same result.

However, the more important question remains what we can do about it.

This whole "Russia will keep expanding in an unexplained way without any evidence or rational" is simply to justify the Western policy of having Ukraine pay an enormous price for harming the Russians. A price that will never be compensated, may not achieve even close to the military outcomes, and in which the West could intervene at any moment to provide real help, but doesn't.

Tell that to people. (I have to remember to quote you later.) And btw radiation on the site where a tactical nuke has been used, it is a problem. — ssu

Radiation of tactical nuclear weapons simply isn't much. If there's a scenario in which a tactical nuclear weapon would be under consideration for military purposes, the radiation would not be a major concern. Of course, if there's zero military reason to use a nuclear weapon then the radiation, among a long list of things, is an additional reason not to use them.

Where radiation from nuclear weapons is a real problem, is in a full strategic nuclear exchange. Strategic weapons create far more radiation, far more fallout, and there would be hundreds if not thousands of them exploding around the world. Additionally, you may have nukes hitting nuclear power plants (that contain far more radiation than a nuclear blast) or then just society collapsing and melt-downs and nuclear fires at various defunct nuclear power plants.

Again you have no idea what you are talking about. In the age of drones and instant fire-missions that can rain down in few minutes, artillery poses a threat at any time to any concentration of force. That's why you don't see columns of Ukrainian tanks... or nowdays of Russian armour moving along. The unit size is smaller than before (Soviet doctrine was to operate with fronts and armies). This is obvious from the fact that the Russian forces, already before the war started, were deployed as Battalion-combat-teams. You don't operate with larger formation, brigades, divisions as in WW2. — ssu

Let's say Ukrainians form a bridge head over an important river and need to pour in significant resources to consolidate that bridge head ... drop a nuke on said bridge head and not only all those forces are gone, but it become clear that there is basically no way to ford the river in peace.

The idea Nuclear weapons have no military use is just insanely naive.

If there was no political reasons to not-use nuclear weapons, and it was just one of many capabilities, military commanders would find tactical uses for them.

Now, if you're saying nuclear weapons would not "guarantee" victory, again, totally false. Russia could drop a nuclear weapon on every Ukrainian city and every command centre and the war would be over in a day.

Again, there's lot's of reasons not to do that, but the idea nuclear weapons are some sort of nothing burger in a theatre of war seems just bizarre.

I think it's obvious from what has been leaked even to the public. A conventional attack on Russian forces in Ukraine and Naval ships operating in the Black Sea. Hence notice the level of escalation: Russian sites in Russia aren't attacked. Then again Russia has an option to escalate: does it enlarge the battlefield to outside Ukraine and the Black Sea. — ssu

It seems, if what you say is true, Russia can suffer some acceptable losses for the privilege of nuking Ukraine.

There would be a "cost of doing business" is what you are saying?

Of course, we are in agreement that there are plenty of good reasons for Russia to not use nuclear weapons (the main one being they are sitting on the land bridge to Crimea and Ukraine can't seem to do anything about that anyways).

However, that the cost to Russia of using nuclear weapons doesn't seem to be much, maybe explains why the West is careful to not create a situation where it would start to arguably a good idea to start using nukes: i.e. a situation in which Russia is actually losing in conventional warfare.

Let's remember that for example in the Korean war the Soviet Air Force fought the USAF on a limited airspace next to the Chinese border. That indeed the two Superpowers were engaged in fighting was simply kept a secret by both sides not wishing to escalate matters. — ssu

We totally agree.

Again, maybe just explains why the US and NATO aren't actually escalating to "help Ukraine win" which is why Ukraine has so far not won and suffering immensely for the honour of representing Western interests, in some vague way.

But then again, this is the "sabre rattling" to Russia's "sabre rattling" in the first place. What actually NATO would do or not is another thing. Medvedev could be right and NATO wouldn't do anything, but be outraged. — ssu

Of course the West wouldn't strike Russia, why would they?

However, West seems already at maximum outrage. I don't see what more outrage would accomplish.

You are contrasting "maverick attitude" with "some sort of act of defiance" — neomac

Where do I do this?

I do the opposite. The US's maverick attitude in invading Iraq with sufficient justification or a credible plan, somehow succeeding in making things worse than under Saddam, is an act of defiance against international law and morality. If Russia is doing the same, that's just called "learning" and being a fan, unless defying defiance is a thing, which I assume is what you'll be arguing next.

You are just playing with words (without defining them) and I don't care about your miserable rhetoric games. — neomac

The word play in this little dialogue is your use of the word "defiance" to somehow imply justification of something, in this case, Western policies.

Russia and allies "defied" Hitler in WWII ... did that make Hitler's war justified?

"Defiance" doesn't justify anything. Ukraine was defying Russia by financing and arming Nazi's ... so according to you the entire Russian war effort is justified due to the defiance of Ukraine.

What I care about is the substantial security threats that an expansionist Russia constitute for the West. — neomac

Again, what threat? Make your case. Russia is about to invade all of Western Europe? ... with it's incompetent army that can't do anything right?

What is this threat to the West you keep talking about?

Here I re-edited your caricatural bullshit to something that can express justified Western security concerns. BTW the West is doing something about Russian defiant attitude, no matter what the Western propagandist and the pro-Russia propagandist like you is saying. — neomac

The key question of the recent dialogue is "at what cost to Ukraine?" and is this cost reasonable to ask a proxy to pay.

You and all the other Zelenskyites simply keep dodging the question.

For example, Russia can just destroy the Ukrainian power grid. Is this a reasonable cost to Ukraine for the West to be seen "doing something about Russian defiant attitude".

And what's the end result? There is no guarantee that the current policies actually turn out bad for Russia.

In the current trajectory, Russia will have a far stronger army, ramped up arms industry, and has already reoriented its entire economy away from the West so if the West isn't willing to do more, Russia now has basically a free hand vis-a-vis it's neighbour's.

What has the war established so far?

It's mostly established NATO cannot defeat Russia through proxy means and is unwilling to intervene directly and sanctions are an empty threat that have already been expended, and the Russian military is willing to suffer large costs to achieve military objectives and can and will destroy your essential infrastructure if you "defy" them.

We keep on being told Ukrainian victory is just a battle away, but that hasn't happened.

Appeasing the bully will just encourage Putin. — ssu

Encourage Putin to do what exactly?

Sure, it sounds good to say we're "standing up to a bully", but what cost to Ukrainians do you think is worth it for the Western policy of not doing anything that risks Ukraine "winning"?

And why is the West's policy to not go into Ukraine, no no-fly-zone, as well as severely limit weapons systems to Ukraine?

Resulting in this situation where Russia has no particular need to use nuclear weapons.

The disadvantages of nuclear weapons far outweigh the benefits ... but only because the West isn't really stopping Putin.

- China is against the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. — ssu

The US/NATO are 100% clear that China is the real "competitor" and so on and they are enemies. China may have zero problem with Russia nuking NATO troops in Ukraine and then taking advantage of the uncertainty and fear to invade Taiwan.

Point is, what China would want in what scenarios we can only speculate. Certainly China's current stance is that nuclear weapons would be a bad thing ... but also there's simply no reason to use nuclear weapons at the moment.

Hence, why we don't see NATO troops in Ukraine as that may not only be reason enough for Russia to nuke them, but also their friends may see it is indeed reasonable course of action. As we've already discussed, Ukraine, with or without NATO troops, getting nuked would not be a reason to nuke Russia in turn.

Furthermore, actually losing in Ukraine may change the calculus to the Kremlin being what China thinks no longer a primary concern.

Hence, perhaps why we don't see Russia actually losing in Ukraine.

- There's a serious risk of this escalating the war and not cowing the West push for cessation of fighting, but to do the opposite. — ssu

Obviously using nuclear weapons could escalate to more nuclear weapons and this is a reason not to escalate.

... again, maybe why we see the US placing limits to weapons and assistance, and everything organised around the principle of not threatening Russian defeat in any realistic sense.

- Ukraine is next to Russia, hence radiation can easily travel to Russia by winds. — ssu

Radiation isn't all that big a concern when it comes to tactical nuclear weapons.

- Destroying Ukrainian forces with tactical nuclear weapons is difficult: troops on the modern battleground are very dispersed. — ssu

The utility of nuclear weapons would be in the scenario where Ukraine is actually advancing a sizeable concentration of force. Dispersed forces are a defensive measure and not an offensive measure.

There's also other uses of nuclear weapons such as destroying bunkers, bridges, logistics hubs, air bases, EMP and so on.

Of course, if Russian troops aren't actually at risk of any real defeat there would be no reason to use nuclear weapons against any such target. For example, right now Ukrainian airforce isn't doing much ... so why blowup air bases with nuclear weapons?

But, again, for the sake of argument, let's imagine the West actually supporting Ukraine in anyway it wants, and actually trained and equipped the Ukrainian airforce since the start of the war and now F-16's, B-2's, F-22's and F-35's, plethora of advances drones, and so on are an actual problem for Russia, then maybe nuking those airbases would be the only effective military option, and even China may see that as a reasonable response.

Again, why the Western media, politicians and officials simply accept the framework of "support Ukraine ... but, shhhhh, not too much".

- Forces operating in nuclear fallout areas will need training and equipment Russia doesn't have now: basically you will create a small no-go zone for your troops also. — ssu

Again, nuclear fallout of tactical nuclear bombs isn't all that big an issue, and you can just avoid these areas entirely or then, if it was a problem, only employe nukes far behind enemy lines to take out key infrastructure, such as the air base example above.

- After the initial quick-capture strategy went bust (on day one) and created the logistical fiasco, Russia has actually been very risk-averse. Suddenly such an escalation would go against the way that Russia has fought the war after the initial push. — ssu

Agreed ... but the reason why is that their parallel operation to capture the land bridge to Crimea was an amazing military success and they are in a defensive posture to protect these gains. Capturing the rest of the Donbas would be a political victory, but doesn't secure the land bridge any better in and of itself (only if it was captured at a cost benefit maintaining or improving relative strength terms, which explains the super slow advances that minimise casualties and simply withdrawing from positions that are difficult to defend).

- Russia has no interest to initiate World War 3. If the "Escalate to De-escalate" doesn't work, then there is nothing to gain from this kind of escalation. It has suffered severe losses in Ukraine already and the last thing would be to escalate the war to a totally new level. — ssu

Definitely. However, the question is what escalation the West would do that would be responded to with Nuclear weapons by Russia ... that the West would then not respond with nuclear weapons.

It's NATO that would be escalating to a point of Russia using nuclear weapons and then ... nothing, which NATO wants to avoid, and is avoiding by limiting assistance to Ukraine, excluding things like a no-fly zone, certainly not sending troops, and so on.

Nuclear "sabre rattling" has already deterred significant amount of actions that NATO (already "appeased" the nuclear bully in your parlance) would certainly have done if all this rhetoric was drummed up against a non-nuclear power.

And, you may say, "what's wrong with that! of course we don't want to harm Russia so much that they may actually use nukes!!" ok, yeah I agree, but then we're not really "standing with Ukraine" but we have a policy of appeasement. Our actions are more symbolic than practical.

This is the central absurdity of the West's position. It argues right up to its policy line with extreme rhetoric, standing up to Putin, Churchillian "never surrender" type stuff, Putin's a war criminal and the Russians are literally terrorists, and the entire world order is at risk, and basically the greatest moral imperatives you can think of etc. But when it comes to the question of "well, why not do more then, send modern tanks and fighter jets or then go in with our own planes and troops" the exact opposite direction of appeasement is argued that "of course the nukes". Well ... which one is it? Are we "doing what it takes" and fighting on the fields and beaches and and in the air and seas and so on, or are we actually tiptoeing around any actual risk to the Kremlins core goals and making clear we are appeasing with respect to those core goals so no need for any desperate measures?

Now, when it comes question to just adjust a tiny bit this balance between fighting pure evil and appeasement, then what's trotted out by Western retired general is "don't worry about the nukes!" ... but that's disingenuous as if you really weren't worried about the nukes then it wouldn't be slight policy adjustments under consideration (such as ... well, still not sending Western tanks, but at least scrounging up old Soviet tanks)-; if you were really not worried about the Nukes you'd be right back to no-fly zones, and send in the cruise missiles, and troops and strike Russia on their own territory and so on.

However, what this different arguments on different sides of the policy to sort of "squeeze it" to where NATO wants it to be means, is that there is no actual justification in any coherent moral or political philosophy. Different incompatible justifications are used to support conflicting elements of the policy framework. Putin is Hitler so we need to send some arms ... but also Putin isn't Hitler so we aren't going to actually go defeat Putin as we defeated Hitler. The analogy is only as relevant as we say it is!

Why? Because the actual policy is just to separate Europe from Russian resources, in a cynical realpolitik move that has no moral justification.

P1. If West/NATO/US has little respect for international law, then Russia didn’t violate international law in defiance of West/NATO/US
P2. West/NATO/US has little respect for international law
C. Russia didn’t violate international in defiance of West/NATO/US — neomac

Again, more bullshit soup.

What's the purpose of "defiance" in your strawman here?

Obviously if West/NATO/US has little respect for international law, then breaking international law is a homage to their realpolitik "move fast and break things" maverick attitude, and not some sort of act of defiance.

You seem to be holding on this word defiance like mould to stale bread because if Russia is "defying" the West ... then it follows in the topsy-turvy mental gymnastics of the propagandist the West must do something about that "defiance", regardless of the consequence on Ukrainians or even if our anti-defiance policies even work.

So no, Russia didn't violate international law in "defiance" of the West/NATO/US.

If the "WMD's" in Iraq that no one could find were justification to invade Iraq, then certainly the biolabs the US admitted in public were in Ukraine are more than enough justification to invade Ukraine. Russia is just paying homage to the West/NATO/US understanding of international law, if anything it's a sign of deep respect.

From the Russian point of view, the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine would mean NATO did not wait to be directly attacked before fighting Russians. — Paine

These would not be "NATO" just whatever country they are from.

For example, say Estonia announced they weren't going to just talk shit and launder money anymore, but actually put their beliefs in practice. "We're going to Ukraine!" they announce.

And then they go. And, if this isn't NATO doing anything, then that would be announced and clear, that Estonia is making a bilateral alliance with Ukraine and declare an official state of war with Russia (as they have the sovereign right to do!) and they are going in! This would not create an article 5 situation. NATO would make clear that Estonia is on its own now in declaring .

Now, let's also assume that Estonia troops don't matter in the slightest on the battlefield. Nothing would change in the current situation, except maybe Russia invading Estonia. That's what happens when you declare war on another country, and article 5 does not cover that.

The reason this is not even considered by these countries is for the reason I explain. No one actually believes the propaganda that Russia is can or plans or even wants to conquer all of Easter Europe, it's just propaganda. If people actually believed that their own countries are in danger, "going in" would be a serious consideration.

One of the ironies of the collective nature of NATO's decisions is that they protect Russia from individual nations joining the fight by themselves. Any boots on the ground from any member states would be treated as an attack by all. Cue WW3. — Paine

That view does not take into account the language of limited escalation being used by both Russia and NATO when it comes to Article 5. — Paine

Both these statements are not really true.

First Article 5 is not "we start WWIII" but is technically only a commitment to meet and respond in some way.

More importantly, NATO's article 5 does not cover troops in other countries anyways. For example, attacks on US troops in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria or anywhere not in the US or some analogue they'll consider an attack (like an aircraft carrier), has nothing to do with NATO's Article 5 as these are not attacks on the US and article 5 is never invoked about any military interventions or wars of occupation.

Countries within NATO could send in troops to Ukraine if they wanted to and them being attacked in Ukraine would have nothing to do with article 5.

Countries don't send troops into Ukraine to help out because they don't care about Ukraine, and they don't actually believe that Russia will keep on expanding if not "stopped in Ukraine" and so have no actual security interest to ally with Ukraine.

Ukraine is simply a tool of both realpolitik by the US, essentially as a gas play (wise or not), as well as an outlet for Russian resentment (in East-Europe) and virtue signalling in West-Europe.

The war is the best possible distraction to all those starving children in Afghanistan. We're the good guys again, hurray!!

In the case of both East and West Europe the policy of maintaining a total war rhetoric without an actual justified total war scenario, is insanely dangerous, and not just because of the nukes.

Who is actually likely to attack other Eastern European countries once the war is done with Russia ... is Ukraine. They may not have an army big enough to go and defeat Russia, but they will be a formidable force to any of their neighbours, have zero economy and the likely outcome of the war for Ukraine is a "ultra nationalist" government dedicated to warfare. If they can't beat the Russians their attention will turn elsewhere. Anyone who thinks this war has made Eastern-Europe one happy family all of a sudden has never been to Eastern-Europe.

Obviously, for Western Europe, the smart thing to do would have been to just trade putting online Nord Stream 2 to avoid a disastrous war ... a pipeline that (sans war that started immediately after the project was cancelled) benefits Western Europe and very obviously would maintain the peace. The idea of "sovereign" states allowing the pipeline to be built but then advancing a policy against their own countries interest to not open the pipeline, is just dumb and even more dumb that they then claim to be supporting the "sovereignty" of Ukraine by supplying arms. Of course, maybe the pipelines not a good idea, but the time to decide that is years, preferably many years, before it's completed. It's just common sense diplomacy that you don't let your neighbour build a 10 billion Euro infrastructure project to your own benefit and then just not let it start. No credibly sovereign state would actually do that.

Now, what the US and Europe and other countries will do is a pretty open question, but what's not very difficult to guess is they aren't sending any troops to go help their non-ally.

And, if people think you can have allies that you don't go defend when they are attacked, that's just not what ally means. Ukraine is a tool, willing or not for more or less actual Ukrainians, of Western, mainly US, policy.

They will be the new Iraqi's, Afghanis, Kurds, whoever we were supporting in Libya, that, like them, in a relatively short amount of time we will have forgotten about and will be just a dirty word in any of, what @Olivier5 calls, "decent" conversation.

Indeed, as far as I can tell that process has already started as no one in the West wants to hear Ukraine is being completely destroyed and millions are suffering intensely ... as that would have a followup question of if we're actually going to do anything substantive to help and maybe even some sole searching of why we encouraged and financed Ukraine into this situation.

Once-upon-a-time leaders of countries were viewed as responsible for actual outcomes of their policies.

That "the enemy" did bad things to you ... sort of goes without saying that that is their function, what makes them enemies.

But people who lose wars, or get their country destroyed in the process of some disastrous stalemate, who throw their hands up in the air and say "our enemies did this": no shit Sherlock. Either avoid making them your enemy or have some plan to deal with the consequences.

Why, perchance, the finger pointing has begun with Zelensky trying to throw the mayor of Kiev under the bus and blame him for not preparing for the obvious next step in the war ... what NATO retired officers were literally mocking Russia for months not doing on day one and being "weak" and then deducing Russia ran out of missiles after a month ... as clearly if they had the missile capabilities we thought they had they would take out Ukrainian infrastructure, but they weren't doing that, the incompetents!

Light naturally travels in a straight line but, because it has mass, it will follow the contours of a gravitational field. — alan1000

Light does not have mass, it has momentum but that doesn't matter either.

It's more correct to say light travels in geodesics in curved space. A geodesic is a straight-line in flat Euclidian space and in (smooth) curved space will appear straight over any sufficiently small distance, but over larger distances may appear curved (such as gravitational lensing).

The central mass would only need to be slightly larger than any we can observe. Is that your position? — alan1000

This is correct and is already built into the theory of black holes.

A collapsing star would, in any case, collapse to a density just enough to become a blackhole on its way to infinite density, and if that actually happens we cannot observe both because it's a blackhole and also we have no devices that count to infinity. That we cannot measure infinity anyways is the more general problem for all conjectures of real infinities in any context (size of the universe, electron density, whether space / fields are continuous in some aspects and so on).

Beyond the event horizon there can easily be a force that stops further collapse.

For example, neutron stars are pretty close to the threshold of becoming a blackhole.

We can easily imagine the universe being such that neutron stars were a bit more dense and became blackholes, and so in this thought experiment, even if we came up with the idea of a neutron star, we could never verify they do actually exist as they'd all be hidden by event horizons.

So if there was some force after a neutron star collapses that kicks in later and prevents further collapse, but was dense enough to be a blackhole, then we'd be in the same situation of having no idea about these forms of matter that prevent further collapse.

And this is not all that counter intuitive, no more strange than why a planet doesn't collapse into a blackhole, the only difference being that we can't see what forces may be at play preventing further collapse in a blackhole.

Also of note, if you want to create a particle accelerator large enough to "really find out", you just end up creating blackholes in your collisions and still can't see what's going on.

They are still better than nothing. — Olivier5

How do you know they are better than nothing? How do you know without the West first making the entirely false promises and expectation that Ukraine would one day join NATO in a useful period of time (say anytime before Russia invaded) and also encouraging total war rather than a negotiated settlement early on, Ukrainians would not be far better off?

How many allies does Russia have, again? — Olivier5

Ukraine does not have allies. Ukraine has arms suppliers.

There's a big difference. Allies would be in Ukraine right now fighting on behalf of their ally.

Because we are stingy and reactive rather than proactive. — Olivier5

Behold Ukraine's friends / liabilities: stingy and reactive.

Oh, you lost the plot again! You can evaluate or criticise everything you want. Even Putin, if you ever wanted to…. Ha ha ha. It’s no skin off my nose. You keep on trying to make it personal, trying to hurt. But the war is not fought here on TPF and there is no point in using violence against other posters. Go fight in Dombass if you want to kill other human beings. Here, you will not succeed. You can yell at me at the top of your lungs, I don’t care and I won’t mind. I’m not the one calling the shots. — Olivier5

What violence?

But anyways, again, excellent demonstration of the incapability of understanding a position other than pro-Zelensky or pro-Putin.

I'm not going to go fight for Russia, nor Ukraine, and I'm not going to support my country going to fight for Ukraine and I recognise the obvious reality that the West isn't going to go do any actual fighting, actual "defending Ukraine". Ukraine is not our ally, not our friend, but a tool for Western policy.

I do not view much difference between Ukraine and Russia. Neither represent "freedom".

What can the West do?

The West could try to broker a peace, which will take compromise and if the West wants a good outcome for Ukraine it would use the leverage it has.

Since the West has dug itself into a propaganda whole of Russia ending up even with Crimea would be a "win" for Putin, compared to this delusional position any peace agreement is essentially by definition a win for Putin. But that's purely a consequence of Zelensky and the West's delusional approach to basic features of reality.

The alternative is more war.

After 8 months it's now clear what more war means. Russian soldiers are harmed, but the harm to Ukrainian society is orders of magnitudes worse.

Compared to the offer Zelensky rejected early in the war (independent Dombas still part of Ukraine, recognising Crimea as part of Russia, neutral Ukraine), the price Ukraine has since paid to accomplish nothing remotely close to a better situation than this deal ... it's obviously a regrettable to any common sense person that doesn't actually want Ukrainians to suffer.

So you think NATO countries should hand over tanks to Ukraine? They’ve taken thousands of them from Russians already. Ukraine now boasts the largest panzer army in Europe. What they really need is an airforce. — Olivier5

Ah, so we've gone from modern Western tanks would obviously be useful for Ukraine ... to Ukraine is totally fine just capturing Russian tanks. Not that your figure is remotely credible, but even if it was true what happens when all those tanks are destroyed; would it not by definition be useful militarily to be conducting the training and setting up the logistics of Western tanks "just in case"?

Likewise for the anti-air. Why didn't the West send in sophisticated anti-air systems "just in case" the Russians attack critical infrastructure? There was 8 months to prepare to deal with the US own playbook of Shock and Awe.

Why didn't we?

I am the only poster to actually describe how an actual Western military intervention (in particular before the war) could have worked, why very likely it would have worked (send in troops, offer economic benefits like Nord Stream 2 going ahead: probability of war very low, mutual beneficial outcome for Russian and Europe ... but no new gas market for the US so of course we can't have a common sense peace).

You are arguing against this sort of actual support for Ukraine.

Why? Because any peace before or during the war would be "not-bad" for Russia. That it would be orders of magnitude better for Ukraine is not even part of your thinking.

You and the other Zelenskyites are not pro-Ukraine. You are simply war horny Russophobes and so reject any peace plan or even military plan that does not result in continuing this mode of warfare with Russia.

Now that you see the cost of your position, it creates cognitive dissonance neatly resolved by "it's the Ukrainian decision" and the West and citizens of the West can wash their hands of it.

Have you guys discussed this article yet? It argues that the war in Ukraine amounts to genocide. I am hard pressed to disagree. Yet it doesn't even go into the destruction of power infrastructure, which I am worried will lead to mass civilian casualties. — hypericin

The problem is that what the Russians are doing is simply Shock and Awe, which is a US military doctrine and involves targeting civilian infrastructure.

Of course, when the West does it then it's because that infrastructure is required by the opposing military and for society to "function" and also we "don't count bodies".

Although Ullman and Wade claim that the need to "[m]inimize civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral damage" is a "political sensitivity [which needs] to be understood up front", their doctrine of rapid dominance requires the capability to disrupt "means of communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and other aspects of infrastructure",[8] and, in practice, "the appropriate balance of Shock and Awe must cause ... the threat and fear of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary's society or render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical destruction." — Shock and Awe, wikipedia

Is a brief description.

Anything the US also does, such as Shock and Awe as well as torture, the Western media isn't all that concerned about. Nothing wrong with a little "enhanced interrogation". Obviously if you have a thing, you'd want an enhanced version of the same thing.

People in the West have been very convinced that Russia shouldn't do these things since the beginning of the war, but is there any feasible way to actually stop a nuclear power?

In the words of Zelensky:

We expect the reaction of friends — not just observers — Zelensky

Apparently your arms dealer isn't your friend after all, as otherwise he wouldn't say this sort of things but just thank his friends the arms dealers.

And so we're back to the truth of the matter: It mattered/matters less than what you can make people believe. — jorndoe

You're talking about everyone here?

And that's your preferred form of government, what actually matters, and you're just a loyal patriot willing to believe?

But otherwise, I fail to see your point.

Things changed between the Poles and Ukrainians ... for now ... so presumably they could also change back? Or things change between the Poles and Ukrainians so presumably will change with the Russians too ... they'll remake the USSR after all?

↪boethius I don’t know what the Ukrainians would be willing to endure. My country sacrificed 2 millions men in WW1. The USSR sacrificed 9 million men in WW2. — Olivier5

That's what we're discussing.

However, you're only argument here is "Ukraine business!", and it would be Ukraine business and mere academic interest for us, if we weren't sending them weapons.

First, if we're sending them weapons knowing it is not enough to win anyways would that be a price worth paying (or telling Zelensky to pay)? Having Ukrainian sacrifice so much and still lose?

And if you're talking about France as an example maybe honest to mention ... France capitulated in WWII, precisely to avoid damages once it seemed the war could not be won.

So, if your position is "courage les gas, mais si vous abondonne ... c'est la vie!!" That would be more coherent as following the French example.

But I get it, you won't actually take a position, just defer to the Ukrainians, deny any criticism of the freedom of that choice they are apparently fighting for, and evaluating our arms shipments is off limits, how confident we should be it can and will result in an good outcome for the "common good", or then if it's not enough, certainly tanks are in short supply ... can't spare them at the moment, sorry Ukraine, but we thank you for your sacrifice.

Is there a better way to paraphrase your position?

We can say so, of course. We must. An enormous sacrifice is being paid by Ukraine for the common good, which must be recognised. — Olivier5

Ok, there you go, price is worth it so far.

Assuming it's 100 000 lives to get this far, would you sacrifice (or support Zelensky sacrificing) 300 000 more lives to complete their mission for the common good?

In this context, common good being the reconquering of the territory in question.

Decency? — Olivier5

The decency of supporting a policy (or supporting other people with those policies) that results in thousands of people dying but ... shhh ... we do not say so?

We focus only on the glory.

That's what I was missing? The "decorum" of the elites?

I compare it with the alternative, which is Russia getting its way in Ukraine, which would result in attrocious consequences for both Ukrainians and Russians. — Olivier5

... Therefore Ukrainian lives are a price you're willing to pay (or support Zelensky paying) as a blood price to retake the territory that Russia currently has?

Am I missing something?

For people actually interested in the topic.

What is confusing in this subject matter of international treatise, is that they are written in highly legal language and very formal, but they are of the same nature as informal and unenforceable agreements, similar to just most promises in normal life: promises of love, promises of taking out the trash, promises of being on time, and other informal promises as you may find between bros that have no standing in a court of law.

Of course, your bros may actually love you and be on time to your sick and whack party, even helping to clean up and take out the trash in the morning, but there's no legal recourse if they don't.

Normal people are like OMG the assurances weren't assurances in the Budapest Memorandum, but only because normal people are accustomed to any legal paper being a formal agreement that has legal standing (work contracts, insurance policies, sale terms, and so on) and, almost never, are the informal promises of daily life cast in a formal language.

But, to understand what is really going on in these international relations, just stop and imagine if you made some legal looking paper for promises that you know don't need to be kept. It's fun and ceremonial, maybe has some useful information to note such as keep track of some important information (like who's taking out the compost and when), but it is not really a contract like your work contract is a contract.

So, maybe people do what they say, but evaluating that would have little to do with your little legal ceremony.

Since you can't quote literally any parties to support your claim, you invent your own fictional evidences. You look so dumb, bro. — neomac

You clearly just have no reading comprehension.

The claim that "security guarantees" are as meaningful as "trust us bro" is the claim that, just like between bros promising a sick and whack party, as you've already noted yourself, there's only "historical trends" in which to evaluate if the party will indeed be sick and whack. For instance, if your bros have thrown sick and whack parties previously, then stands to reason that this new party they speak of will be of a similar mintage. However, adding embellishment to the basic promise that the "party will be good" neither guarantees the party will in fact be good nor even guarantees it will happen at all. If your bros absolutely, positively, guarantee you, 100% fresh, the party is both happening and will be incredible ... we are no closer to being any more certain than we are based on the "historical trends" of these party throwers.

Compare this to a company guaranteeing your computer will turn on. If it doesn't, you have legal recourse for damages and can sue this company. Could Ukraine sue the US for not keeping a promise? No.

It doesn't matter how you dress up the promise, Ukraine will have no legal resource and have no reason other than, you put your finger on it, "historical trends" in which to decide the likelihood promises will be kept in an agreement.

Calling the promises "security guarantees" does indeed sound fancy and something you can trust from ol' country, but it's a euphemism. It is a noun in the nominal world referring to an agreement, but that agreement can completely lack any guarantee.

Just like, nominally, the "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances" is very assuring indeed ... but if you actually read it, the actual real substance doesn't seem too assuring at all and didn't actually happen when the time came to "assure" Ukraine about the promises made.

If it was actually assuring, representing some sort of real assuring substance of some kind, there would be no need for talk of any new security guarantees now, mighty fine nations have already committed to making sure Ukraine's borders are respected, so let them do that as they said they would.

Of course they'll have to consult first, but that's just the first step of a much bigger plan they are clearly committed to.

So, considering the Security Assurances were ornamental addition to what amounted to "trust us bro", why would just renaming what is in essence the same thing to "security guarantees" be a single gram of coke lighter than "trust us bro".

The only reason they left Kherson was the suffering they went through. — Olivier5

What is it with your obsession with little me? This war is not about me. I pay no price for it, or very little. — Olivier5

You're the one debating here. Why would I join a discussion to discuss with people that are absent?

But, if you don't have the courage of your convictions to lay out a reasonable price to pay for reconquering all of Ukraine, seems indeed you no longer have any position at all in this discussion. I'll note that down.

You’ve been saying that for 8 month. — Olivier5

This process has been happening for 8 months.

For example, media believed man-portable systems were enough to "beat the Russians", gushed unending praise ... eventually caught up with the reality that wasn't the case.

In the summer Ukraine, the war was all but declared over aft the Russians withdrew from the North, and Ukraine was declared "winning" even if they were steadily losing ground, and eventually the media caught up with that reality.

Right now, while Ukraine has been making advances, media has been gushing praise on Zelensky's uncompromising diplomatic positions, but is slowly catching up to the reality that we have not witnessed decisive battles, collapse of Russian forces and / or the economy and / or the political system, and the media is slowly catching up this reality.

Always weeks and weeks after it is obvious.

What is fallacious in your reasoning is that we are compelled to consider with "zero meaning" the "security guarantee" just because the word "guarantee" suggests to you certainty. This reasoning is utterly dumb and has no ground in geopolitical rationality. Indeed you are incapable of providing any parties (Russian or Ukrainian or Western) that understand the word "guarantee" the way you suggest.
So you built a fictitious "straw man" to argue against. That's how intellectually desperate you are. — neomac

You are literally describing how the word "guarantee" doesn't literally mean "guarantee" ... as why would it be a guarantee in any sense of certainty.

In other words, according to your own explanation, guarantee in this context is ornamental and a euphemism for "trust us bro".

Can we count on these "guarantees": of course not! Don't be silly! is your new position.

Again, you may have "bro trends" or bro leverage or other broformation particular to the broverse in which you base your decision to trust your bros. But is the bro code 100% reliable, "guaranteed" in any meaningful sense. Alas, t'is not.

It’s not my position. You’re very easily confused. I just tried to provide you with an answer to your question, based on what I heard and what seems reasonable to me. You are welcome to address my explainations, but they are not « my position ». — Olivier5

You are really saying after hundreds of pages of arguing the situation in Ukraine, that your position is not Ukraine is fighting a just war, can will, will win and therefore should keep fighting to victory?

Or something very, very close to that ... so close, that this is an accurate and reasonable summary of your position?

Note that the suffering is mutual. Over the past few months, the evidence is that the Russians suffered the most. I wonder why you keep forgeting their sufferings… not allowed in the putinista narrative I guess. Russians ought to be depicted as victors, always. — Olivier5

First, the suffering is not mutual. Ukrainian economy is in free fall, entire cities severely damaged or abandoned, industry in disarray and now the Russians are turning off the lights. Should somebody stop them? Maybe ... but I don't see anyone going and doing that.

In simple military terms, Russians have withdrawn from one week point (West of the Dnieper) and one strategically unimportant area (around Kharkiv).

Zero questions this is not desirable for the Russians and no questions it is embarrassing, especially Kherson. I am 100% aware that annexing territory and then withdrawing from it looks dumb. But that's intense warfare. UK, France, US, Germany, Japan, Russia all had embarrassing setbacks in WWII.

However, embarrassment is not suffering.

Ukraine paid a high cost for their offensives as well as continuing to pressure Russian force. We do not know the cost exactly, obviously every estimate will be accused of bias.

What we can know is that it would be common military wisdom that if the Ukrainians are attacking and in addition the Russians are able to withdraw without being routed, that Ukrainian losses, aka. suffering, will be higher than the Russians.

In other words, if Russia is suffering more losses than Ukraine while defending, that would be unexpected.

Second, to expand on what @Isaac just explained to you, the amount of territory the Russians are occupying is pretty significant.

As I described months ago, what actually matters at this stage in the war is losses multiplied by the distance covered.

We don't know what the losses are, but what amount of losses would be worth it to you?

For example, assuming that it took 100 000 dead Ukrainians to get this far, and just "eyeballing it" at this rate it's going to take another 200 000 to 300 000 Ukrainian KIA to reconquer the rest of the territory, would you pay that price?

Still a liar, my position didn't evolve. — neomac

You went from "pre-condition" to "rational requirement" to "considering the nuclear deterrence they both had" ... that I remind you "Ukraine doesn't have!" but apparently that had no relation to your original use of the word "pre-condition".

That you were just pointing out US and Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons was a precondition for "something" ... just not the kind of deals we were actually talking about that Ukraine also agreed to.

But your conjectures do not prove anything from a geopolitical point of view. What gives meaning to such agreements is the actual geopolitical and historical circumstances, and their trends. — neomac

You start by contradicting my position, that guarantees aren't ornamental ... and then just repeat my position back to me.

We engage with promises that aren't guaranteed in any sense of the word all the time: All the way to the altar. It's in fact the usual state of affairs that people can break their promises to us. Of course, there can be plenty of reasons to trust someone even if there is no real consequence to them for breaking their word to you.

There is very particular (and unusual) set of contractual promises in which guarantee is not ornamental. A company sells you something and guarantees the delivery date, quality, etc. and doesn't deliver, there is actual legal recourse to recover the damages. Of course, not guaranteed in the sense of certainty, but in this legal recourse sense.

Now, if the word "guarantee" is ornamental and basically a euphemism for "trust me bro" then we are indeed in agreement that you'd need to be evaluating other things to decide if the United States, or any other state, is actually going to keep their word.

You've basically transitioned into this euphemistic use of the word guarantee: not certain, not legal, no legal recourse ... but what's the status of such a promise with the word guarantee attached?

It's: trust me bro.

Now, maybe Biden, Sunak, Macron and the rest of them, really are Zelensky's bro's and they got his back for personal bro code reasons that are personal to them, even if it's against the interest of their respective nations. Maybe Zelensky can feel that bro spirit and knows the promises will be fulfilled when the time comes. Or, maybe Zelensky evaluates "historical trends" and determines that whatever is promised will be delivered for a bunch of reasons. Or maybe Zelensky has some leverage that would increase the cost of any party not respecting the deal, for instance we've already discussed the cost to Russia for another war would be primarily ... the cost of another war, Zelensky or a new Ukrainian presidents leverage being the fighting of another war. Zelensky could maybe have some leverage on the US, UK et. al. such as invading Poland or something, that would increase the cost of unkept promises.

I explain at some length that there can be other reasons outside of what wording is used in an agreement to believe that people, even an entire nation, will keep their word: nearly all of it is called circumstances and leverage.

However, if you want to be more certain than what amounts to futurology of historical trends, if you want a real and substantive "guarantee" from the parties, to be really sure they're keeping their word on their honour: is not on offer in international relations.