Or then that implosion can come from that 'New Army' that is now created. — ssu

War is messy and chaotic, you're going to find pretty much anecdotal evidence for pretty much anything.

Also, keep in mind a large proportion of Ukrainians speak perfect Russian.

The videos you post seem genuine (and mean absolutely nothing in terms of evaluating the war), but it's worth noting that Ukrainians can easily fake pretty much any kind of propaganda material they want and it will just be immediately posted to Western front page news as "Ukrainian intelligence says".

There's a huge effort to do that. By Putin, actually. — ssu

↪boethius :up: — apokrisis

If you think the Russian state is on the brink of collapse because of a few protests and a tiny minority of people leaving the country, you are truly living in fantasy.

Even if it was remotely feasible, it would cost hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian lives, perhaps millions, and for zero benefit to the average Ukrainian accomplish, certainly not to attempt and fail.

And from what I understand from Ukrainian Nazi planning on this issue, the idea is not that Ukrainians themselves would defeat Russia but that NATO would do it for them. From this perspective, Ukrainians being nuked is a good thing because they believe NATO would nuke Russia in turn.

That is extremely low odds of happening. Very high odds now of Russia using nuclear weapons; they've basically said they are going to do this, said they are not bluffing, and are now setting up the laws to make it essentially legally obligatory for them to do. Logic will be exactly the same as the use of nuclear weapons in Japan: that it will save lives on both sides compared to more fighting.

How will NATO respond? Likely, diddly squat.

How can NATO respond? They've been flexing their sanctions and weapon supplier muscle, but if they actually wanted to a nuclear standoff with Russia they would have sent boots into Ukraine before or then anytime during the war and dare Russia to nuke them.

Since that has not happened, nuking Ukrainian military positions is not an attack on US or any NATO member and there is simply no legal mechanism in which to retaliate. Neither the US nor any NATO member is in a legal state of war with Russia; there's really no way to just nuke a country out of the blue that you're not at war with.

What about the Ukrainians? You may ask ... well, what about them? Afghanistan government was a literal ally of the US, just let's not put labels on things and this "non-committed relationship"; what happened to them?

Ohhhh noooo!!! but they're brown muslims Boethius, you may cry out! The literally live in a "corrupt stan"! It's right in their name, at the back, see!! Stan! S. T. A. N. spells Stan!

Sure, that's true, but US military and NATO are pretty woke nowadays and have non-discriminatory and equal opportunity throw your "allies" under the bus policies.

US cares not for Ukrainians, but want cold war 2.0 and a irrelevant EU on the world stage.

Nukes in Ukraine accomplishes that, and both the US and Russia get what they want. Why would they bicker about it?

I was talking about the implosion of Putin’s regime following a failure in Ukraine. Different thing. — apokrisis

If the implosion of Russia follows failure in Ukraine, that's definitely one way to defeat Russia.

If the war is with the Russian state and through war the collapse of the Russian state is caused and is no more, that certainly qualifies as victory over the Russian state.

And who's stating "He's [Putin] in trouble and he knows it"?

Jame Clapper.

The very same James clapper who was Director of National Intelligence and also ...

Following the June 2013 leak of documents detailing the NSA practice of collecting telephone metadata on millions of Americans' telephone calls, Clapper was accused of perjury for telling a congressional committee hearing that the NSA does not collect any type of data on millions of Americans earlier that year. One senator asked for his resignation, and a group of 26 senators complained about Clapper's responses under questioning. — Jame Clapper - Wikipedia

Why should we take the words of James Clapper at face value, and how does he know what Putin "knows" to begin with?

All he really did in that interview was say that the White house has been telling Putin "not to use nukes" but also maintaining "strategic ambiguity" about what the US would do.

News flash: US is extremely unlikely to strike Russia with nuclear weapons when the US nor any of its actual allies isn't attacked. Why would it?

If his rump of the old empire finally crumbles into its parts, why would it be so bad to be a clutter of small ethnic states on the edge of NATO and the EU? Some might be corrupt stans, others might thrive like the Baltic states. — apokrisis

A racist statement all the more absurd that even in 2020, before the war, Ukraine ranks below Kazakstan on the Corruption Perception Index and well below several other Persian and/or Muslim and/or "others" filled countries (whatever "ethnicity" is being referred to by "ethnic state").

If his rump of the old empire finally crumbles into its parts, why would it be so bad to be a clutter of small ethnic states on the edge of NATO and the EU? Some might be corrupt stans, others might thrive like the Baltic states. But in what way would the West be the bad guys in such a world? — apokrisis

And, so nobody misses it, this statement is simply accepting my main point since the last few dozens pages and the absolute madness of the view held by the extreme Ukrainian right, Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainians Nazi's as well as left-wing liberals in the West, that continued fighting without diplomatic compromise is justified.

For, indeed, that only makes sense if you manage to collapse the Russian state; i.e. defeat Russia.

However, if that's a delusional fantasy for which there is no evidence then all that is accomplished is tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands by the end, killed and wounded, and extreme damages to Ukraines economy and general welfare.

And for what?

If you can't actually defeat Russia (because NATO doesn't actually give a shit about you and isn't about to use nuclear weapons on your behalf and people employing Churhillian rhetoric ... at a distance, is just stupid), the alternatives to diplomatic compromise are: endless war or losing the war.

How would endless war or losing the war benefit actual Ukrainians that aren't Nazi who declare war their "way of life" and their mission in life to destroy Russia?

Well, if those options can't be explained as benefiting the average Ukrainian, then what would the diplomatic compromise be that Ukrainians are fighting for.

Which was the explicit policy only a few months ago: fighting to a better position at the negotiating table.

What's the plan?

Zelenskyites here seem to interpret an inability to answer basic questions about their position as "strawmanning", which is not what strawmanning is, it's how debate works: asking and answering questions.

If people never explain how continued fighting without diplomatic compromise is a justifiable and feasible plan of action, nor explain what diplomatic compromise they think is feasible and why more fighting (for now) somehow makes sense to achieve that compromise, pointing out that people never answer these questions is not "strawmanning", it is simply underlining their denial and delusions.

And what's that foundational delusion that supports the house of cards of their racist world view (which, so it's clear to everyone, "Some might be corrupt stans, others might thrive like the Baltic states" is a racist statement)? It's that somehow all this chaos and madness is going to lead to the destruction of the Russian state and any and all sacrifice (by Ukrainians) is a worthwhile if there's a one percent chance of achieving that possibility and even if the desired process risks global nuclear war world leaders now discuss completely casually ... like it's just Sunday afternoon tea with Nanna.

↪apokrisis Ah, the desperate need to strawman, when you cannot prove wrong the other one. — ssu

What strawmen? can you backup your assertion with any citations.

Furthermore, your friend @apokrisis spends several pages defending what he finally admits to be "hyperbole" ... well hyperbole to make what point?

The video also explains just why Russians have declared so many HIMARS systems being destroyed: — ssu

Again, if the HIMARS are so effective why doesn't the US send: A. more launchers and B. more missiles and C. different kinds of longer range missiles?

Combat-Proven Solution:
The HIMARS solution is highly reliable, combat proven, fielded system that has exceeded all performance requirements. There are more than 540 fielded systems worldwide that have accumulated over 2,000,000 operating hours.

Precision Fires Capability
With a recognised and proven range up to 300km. — HIMARS, Lockheed Martin

The 16 launchers given to Ukraine so far don't seem all that much, especially considering the US has other weapons that perform similar functions. But if the goal is the "defeat the Russians" why limit the range of the missiles given to Ukraine? Why bring the HIMARS in only after Russia stabilises the front from Kherson to Donbas instead of day one?

What's the evidence that the US and NATO are even remotely attempting to achieve the following:

If his rump of the old empire finally crumbles into its parts, why would it be so bad to be a clutter of small ethnic states on the edge of NATO and the EU? Some might be corrupt stans, others might thrive like the Baltic states. But in what way would the West be the bad guys in such a world? — apokrisis

How am I strawmanning this argument?

My counter arguments on the factual likelihood are simply pointing out NATO's own stated policy is only to allow Ukraine to "defend itself" and not enable Ukraine to attack Russia; whole justification for sending shoulder launched missiles, light arms and no heavy weapons that would have been needed for counter-offensives in the South (before tens of thousands of Ukraines best troops were KIA or casualties), in the first phase of the war was to not threaten Russia, much anyways.

In addition to the obvious policy and its implementation, there is no more evidence for the collapse of the Russian state than backed the chorus of predictions on literally day 2 of the invasion (which obviously didn't happen).

And clearly, by drip-feeding weapons systems to Ukraine NATO this is completely coherent with the "we won't let Russia actually lose" policy.

As for the goal of collapsing the Russian state no matter the cost ... is this really a policy that benefits Ukrainians? Is this even NATO or US policy? Is this even Ukrainian government policy?

Or is it EU-Nazi fantasy?

↪boethius For precision sake, I added Eurasian philosophic circles. — Olivier5

Yes, yes, keep the precisions coming. We might be getting somewhere.

because it is well known in philosophic circles that Russians are like little children who can't rule themselves. — Olivier5

... go on.

This is not true. China is an economic powerhouse ascending to superpower status. Russia has now lost its status as regional power and its economy is medieval. Any dream of equality with China is gone now. — Tate

As we've just seen with this gas thing in the EU, your factories don't run without the raw materials.

You cannot dominate a party that you are dependent on, and China depends on Russia for a lot of its raw materials. To free yourself from dependence you can go take these things you need for yourself, but in this particular situation you face the same problem NATO is facing which is nuclear weapons.

Russia also depends on China for components, but there are other potential suppliers of key components, like India.

No, it doesn't, at least not the news sources I see. It's just a little conflict in Eastern Europe. You can see parts of it live on reddit. That's about it. — Tate

It's been front page news on CNN and BBC et. al. for months at a time ... Putin just said "all weapons systems will be used to defend Russian territory" and then Blinken went and made a speech that this was "bad, bad boy talk" at the UN.

I honestly don't see anyone describing this war as a little conflict in Eastern Europe.

The highest article on reddit front page (for me) is about the Irish PM calling for Russia to be removed from the security council.

Which is honestly one of the dumbest parts of all this, the whole point of the UN was to avoid another world war, which means the big powers can veto military action. Otherwise, the UN would just be "my boyz when WWIII starts"; i.e. the mistake the League of Extraordinary Nations made and the UN was designed not to repeat.

Or as SuperGenius98K informs us:

The UN is the biggest paper tiger ever created. — reddit

I suppose they could engineer some sort of Hundred Years War, but their main ally, quickly becoming their master, is China. It will be Xi's call whether they can wage on indefinitely or not. — Tate

For certain the war is only possible with Xi's blessing.

However, Russia-Chinese relationship is far more equal than Western media presents. Russia has the commodities China needs and Russia also has a large arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Definitely Russia is suffering a lot of losses, but the geopolitical game (that I'm sure few Russian actually care about) is pretty cunning. By waging an essentially war of attrition with the entirety of NATO and creating this madness in Easter Europe that then commits NATO buildup, pressure is taken off all Russia's allies and friends: China, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and anyone else that has beef, big or small, with the US, which allows the creation of an alternative global payment and economic system to that of the US to be created between all these parties.

The Western media presents the war as Ukraine standing up to the "mighty Russia", while simultaneously calling Russia incompetent and in no way a danger, but geopolitically speaking the war is Russia standing up to the "mighty NATO" and that message is not lost on any leader outside the West.

And that would be Putin's final act as leader of Russia. I'm sure he knows that. — Tate

I honestly don't know what would happen, I doubt anyone knows.

Luckily, Putin hasn't wanted to find out yet either.

This honestly "feels" to be changing, but it could all be just posturing to just make NATO hesitate to pour in more arms, or then on the way to a diplomatic resolution (hopefully).

Well, they're losing previously taken positions, they're running out of troops, they've lost face with their allies. I mean, it looks like they're losing to me. Not to you? — Tate

Looks can be deceiving.

For months Russia was gaining ground, but obviously had not "won", and now Ukraine has gained some ground back. Obviously things can swing back and forth.

Ukraine has taken heavy losses in the recent offensives from everyone I've heard talk about it (including the Washington Post). Russia has just mobilised 300 000 additional troops. Russia could also use tactical nuclear weapons, which some claim would not be effective ... but I honestly doubt anyone walked away from Hiroshima saying "wow, underwhelmed, fail, so ineffective".

What is also critical is that Ukraine is now entirely reliant on NATO, so even making a real attempt to "beat the Russians" would be a NATO decision and not really a Ukrainian one.

It could be NATO is fully committed to pushing back the Russians (using Ukrainians) and calling Russias bluff about nuclear weapons or then actually wants Russia to use nuclear weapons for some reason (there being no other possibility), or it could be that NATO wanted to have a little moral victory before they either wrap things up diplomatically (something they can do anytime) or then guide things into a frozen conflict.

I honestly don't know NATO's intentions but not every NATO member is happy with the war.

Definitely Russias strategy is to hold onto these territories and see how winter plays out, and these are still long distances, 1000km front, so I don't see Ukraine being able to get some decisive victory by winter; and, as far as I can tell, the only "big" victory feasible, perhaps not decisive but big, would be cutting the land bridge to Crimea / Kherson, which there's no reports of the Ukrainians even trying to do. Of course, if you want a moral victory you'd avoid such a critical battle and focus on the areas your opponent is the least focused on.

As for "running out of troops," the Russian population is 144 million and Ukraines population is 44 million, and the Russians could mobilise 25 million conscripts.

Of course, there's political and economic impacts to mobilisation, we're already seeing some.

There is little question that if the Russian population as a whole really wanted to crush Ukraine they could, even with conventional weapons.

The question is one of motivation, why morale always keeps coming up.

Ukraine is in a total war posture and Russia certainly meant to win with a purely professional force (and that certainly failed), but considering Ukraine has fully mobilised everything they could and gone into total war and Russia has only now announced a very partial mobilisation, that's not necessarily a good sign for Ukraine if things are as tight on the front as they seem to be.

Of course, mobilisation could unravel the Russian state somehow, but as dramatic as mobilisation seems, it seems to me less pressure and risk to the Russian state than the start of the war and the sanctions, but of course it's possible. Protests don't seem to ever stop any war the state is committed to, so I don't see why Russia would be an exception to that rule.

It's pretty clear that Russia is losing this war. Exit strategy is what they should be thinking about. This was a disaster for Russia. — Tate

How is this in anyway clear?

Lol.

Oh really, it doesn't matter if the elections are fraudulent or not to you? Right. :rofl: — ssu

You're the one that contradicted my point that these votes are significant (to the war), saying that's nonsense.

Now your outraged by the idea it doesn't matter if the elections are fraudulent or not. So, seems pretty significant events to you after all.

It does not matter to the point we were discussing, of whether these votes are significant or not.

The significance in terms of these votes, whatever you think of them, is that it is the step to formal annexation of these territories by Russia, and, again, regardless of whether other countries recognise that or not, it will become Russian territory for Russia.

I explicitly say you are free to argue the legitimacy of these votes, that's a different topic as to their significance to the war and how the military and diplomatic situation changes.

Definitely appears to me that annexing these territories makes it exceedingly unlikely Russia would agree to give them back, which makes a diplomatic settlement likewise exceedingly difficult, which is a significant change to the situation.

For those curious of why the words "tactical retreat" have suddenly become such hot topic, it is because it is optimum military strategy to inflict maximum casualties while minimising your own.

In order to assault a location you need to move forward and are far easier to see. So a small group of even lightly armed defenders can setup in a location and then as soon as they see you fire ATMG's at your vehicles, sniper rounds and mortars at your infantry, and call in artillery and airstrikes. Then they can burry a bunch of anti-tank-mines, just retreat 5 kilometres and repeat the process. Likewise, a camouflaged tank that isn't moving is going to have a lot easier time seeing a tank that is moving, can fire a bunch of shells, pop smoke and then run away.

So, there's a large spectrum when it comes to retreat: from being basically overrun and most of your troops being captured and the rest retreating under fire and suffering high casualties, to a very well ordered staged fallback to inflict maximum casualties with the above methods.

Of course, the disadvantage of the tactical retreat is if you keep doing it, eventually you fallback to your backs against an ocean and it's difficult to continue the tactic underwater (or some similar obstacle).

Russian military doctrine and training puts particular high emphasis on the tactical retreat because they have a particularly large amount of space to work with.

The US military, to contrast, doesn't train so much to defend a land invasion on US soil from Mexico or Canada, so if they deploy it is to capture territory oversees (so there's little use of battalion and division level tactical retreats; US deals with counter offensives by bombing the shit out of everything, which is why their doctrine is to only deploy ground troops when they achieve air superiority).

Of course, two can play this tactical retreat game, and so to deal with their enemy using this particular good idea, the Russians have developed the counter strategy of simply advancing slowly with masses of artillery. If you're a well hidden defender waiting for the enemy forces to advance into your firing line, it stands to reason "enough" artillery will eventually get you.

So, what we will see in the next days and weeks is if this whole doctrine "works" or if a sufficiently determined offensive by a foe willing to suffer high casualties simply pushes on and destabilises your entire defensive system.

Yeah, I was just referring to the fact that the major breakthrough started hours ago. It appears they are no longer trying for a break through, but have accomplished it and the encirclement of a lone BTG on the other side of the river. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Even assuming all this is true and will result in encirclement of a BTG, this is still not what I would call a major strategic victory of penetrating deep into Luhansk. Most of river is still in Kharkiv region.

There were reports of units being encircled but then rescued in Kharkiv.

That's why it seems like a poor use of resources given other priorities. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Who's to say what the priorities are. It could be poor use of resources, or then maybe Russian military is content with trading Bakhmut for some space in Luhansk. A lot of youtube analysis presents Bakhmut as some critical strategic location (though I have no idea if that's true).

Of course, maybe Ukrainians defend Bakhmut and advance into Luhansk, or maybe they trade or maybe something else happens.

However, for certain Russian commitment to defending all of Luhansk is very high, so if advances continue there beyond the edges then that is a strong signal Russian forces have a big problem.

If things stay on the edges, then it could be Russian forces simply implementing their doctrine of tactical retreats to inflict maximum casualties (of course, suffering some losses also in the process).

Russian commanders know too that it's a symbolic victory for Ukrainians to get back some of Luhansk territory, so instead of suffering high casualties to prevent that they could pull back knowing Ukrainians will then poor in troops to get that symbolic victory and then keep advancing for a real strategic victory. It very much depends on the casualties and losses on each side, until there is clear strategic locations taken.

Definitely continuing to advance in Bakhmut could be a false show of confidence, or then good strategy, or misallocation of resources as you say. I have no way to evaluate that from the information available now.

However, as I said weeks ago, taking Kherson would be a litmus test for Ukrainians offensive capabilities.

Now, knowing Russia is committed to Kherson, it's of course possible to develop some higher level thinking strategy of an offensive in Kharkiv and Luhansk instead.

My basic criticism of such a strategy is simply that Kharkiv and Luhansk are very close to the Russian border and don't threaten the land bridge. Cutting the land bridge and then blowing up the bridge to Crimea is what I would be worried about as a Russian general, and that doesn't seem to be threatened in these current offensives. So, maybe unfortunate loss of territory (that certainly no general wants to see) but does not seem pressure on critical military positions (but rather mostly political optics). Kharkiv and Luhansk are also the easiest places to re-conquer as they are so close to the Russian border.

The other data point is that certainly Russian generals were worried during the initial Kharkiv offensive (even if they ordered a withdrawal, things can still get out of hand), and so they ordered the strikes on the electricity grid.

I assume they would do that again if things are indeed falling apart and there's "irreversible momentum" as claimed by the West.

Just so weird.
— boethius

You tried narcissist - why not upgrade to psychopath? — unenlightened

Onwards and upwards I guess.

Wheel of progress never stops.

Unfortunately for Russia, the front has not remained still. There was a large break through across the Oskil, and the flow of liberation announcements and geolocated abandoned vehicles is reminiscent of the recent breakthrough on the other side of the river. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I literally say this:

To continue my analysis of the military situation.

At the moment seems Ukrainians are trying to make a breakthrough into Luhansk region, where they are currently occupied a small portion around the edge, and, while this is going, on Russians are trying to take Bakhmut and have advanced to the river there. — boethius

So I completely agree that:

Time will tell how serious it is. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I also mention, while the Ukrainians are trying to make a major breakthrough into Luhansk, Russians are trying to take Bakhmut, and literally state:

We will see today and coming days if Bakmut falls and Luhansk line is defended, or then vice versa (or nothing changes much). — boethius

So we agree.

Definitely Russia is under military pressure or they would not have withdrawn from Kharkiv, not shutoff the grid for the first time, and not called up 300 000 reserves in a partial mobilisation.

And before anyone interjects, yes, they clearly had a contingency plan in place to withdraw from Kharkiv, shutoff the grid, and also bomb the damn in Kherson river, doesn't mean they "wanted those offensives to happen" just means they clearly had a plan in place as otherwise their response would not be immediate.

Another serious breakthrough and encirclement would suggest the poor morale that lead to the prior rout remains a serious issue, and newly mobilized forces are unlikely to change that (particularly those BTGs made from criminals or those arrested for protesting mobilization). You might see something akin to the disintegration of the Third Corps, who were worse than useless, essentially just handing over hardware to the enemy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not so convinced of the morale argument. There's morale issues in every army and general mood never stays constantly high. There has been serious morale issues on the Ukrainian side as well.

As for the current battle in Luhansk, I don't think it's really possible to tell what's likely to happen at a distance.

Definitely time will tell if the Ukrainians can continue their offensive deeper into Luhansk.

What I can say is that reports seem pretty consistent that Ukrainians are suffering heavy casualties in these offensives, so it could be that Russian operations are in disarray or they are simply letting these offensives exhaust themselves to inflict maximum casualties.

Anyone interested in the military analysis part, an important footnote is that Russian doctrine is literally to tactically retreat as much as possible, hit the advancing army with artillery and other long range munitions, make them go through mine fields, and stretch their supply lines, so this is what they train to do. Russian military trains this way because Russian territory is pretty big so their basic idea is to run around and exhaust any invading force and not risk armies in decisive battles.

So, except for strategic locations where we are sure Russians are committed to defending (such as Kherson, Crimea, Donbas) it's extremely difficult to tell the difference between a tactical retreat and just being straight-up defeated. To evaluate these non-critical changes in the front we'd need to know the statistics of losses. Anecdotes don't tell us very much as we'd need to know the whole circumstances and result of the battle to evaluate things.

And when I point this out it is because I genuinely don't know. I do not know the current state of neither the Ukrainian army nor the Russians. Things could be a lot better or worse than they seem on both sides, or then suffering from exactly the same problems.

Well thanks, but it wasn't us, and it wasn't even grassroots Conservatives, who were given the choice of madwoman of no fixed opinion, or millionaire bloody foreigner, and chose the homegrown disaster because they are majority racist. — unenlightened

Oh, I understand, but, still, the leader of the country is certainly in some sense a collective effort over several generations.

It is honestly surprising to me that she's even more extreme in her rhetoric that Boris, but it's often said this is an overcompensating feminine perceived weakness, so we'll see what her policies actually are.

She doesn't say how she feels about it though. — Benkei

That part I lift from her general demeanour of smiling and upbeat "nuclear-woke", get-things-done, courageous keep-calm-and-carry-on attitude.

She doesn't even say a preamble that the nuclear strategy is a pretty big state secret, very serious, that she'd of course do everything possible to avoid nuclear war, but if for some reason it was the only option available etc. ... and she would feel "something" before killing hundreds of millions of people.

Just so weird.

Additionally, there's been a lot made of Putin's remark that "all weapons systems" would be used to protect Russian territorial integrity (something the US says all the time with "all options on the table" to signal the same thing vis-a-vis Iran or whomever).

However, what is getting less attention is nuclear sabre rattling from Western leaders:



This interview is just insanely bizarre.

I paraphrase, but basically:

Question: You've been ordered to annihilate the earth how do you feel? (As framing of the question is she has no other choice than to launch nuclear weapons for some reason, and the result is definitely world annihilation ... caused by her next actions, not some ongoing process that, why not, let's go out with a bang)

Liz Truss: I feel great, I launch, it's an important duty of the Prime Minister (... to annihilate the world when ordered to do so?!?!).

The whole interaction makes zero sense, and the crowd goes wild!

Are you not entertained!!

But props to the British for managing to find someone even more of a loose cannon than Boris.

Obviously these votes will basically exclude the possibility of any negotiated settlement with Ukraine. — boethius

In the short term at least. NATO would need to essentially abandon entirely Ukraine for there to be a negotiate peace now, barring some super diplomatic surprise no one expects.

However, it's difficult to imagine NATO entirely abandoning Ukraine so the only likely options seems to be frozen conflict or then escalation to nuclear conflict (limited or large scale).

I suppose there's a third option that NATO truly believes Russian state will simply disintegrate and that would be a manageable thing. But this claim is made repeatedly since the very beginning of the conflict and does not seem any more evidence for it now; of course could happen, but seems to me will result in use of nuclear weapons, but if limited and doesn't prevent Russian state disintegrating maybe US / NATO views that as a good process to be welcomed, no matter how many nuclear weapons are used on Ukrainians on the way down.

Naturally, if the hypothesis about Russian "identity" is correct, it seems exceedingly implausible there would be some large scale revolt enough to destabilise the Russian state. Far weaker states have seen far greater disruption and protest and revolt and not collapsed. The only recent examples are caused by direct intervention (like bombing everything in Libya that could potentially support something that could potentially support something that could fly) or then entirely running out of money as with Sri Lanka. Even massive support to proxy forces (without direct bombing) was not enough to collapse the Syrian government. So, this idea of Russian state collapse seems remote to me.

Which, of course, is absolute nonsense and should be remarked as it. — ssu

Nonsense?

Obviously these votes will basically exclude the possibility of any negotiated settlement with Ukraine.

Doesn't matter if you think the votes are legitimate, or fraudulent, or whatever; it's the most significant thing happening today (in the war in Ukraine) and, presumably if the votes conclude as basically everyone expects, results in a dramatic shift in Russian policy.

Again you can disagree with this change in Russian policy, or argue it's counter productive, and obviously you can argue you don't accept the annexation, but it's obviously a significant fact that it is (presumably) changing along with partial mobilisation.

Whether you lend these regions any legitimate power of self determination (such as Kiev demands for itself, and "right to join NATO!" was a rallying cry to reject the offered peace terms for weeks) or then you do lend them that but claim the votes are fixed, or then have some nuanced approach to self determination and democracy that mean some votes matter but not others, doesn't change the fact that these votes are currently happening and have a dramatic impact on Russian policy and the military and diplomatic situation.

To continue my analysis of the military situation.

At the moment seems Ukrainians are trying to make a breakthrough into Luhansk region, where they are currently occupied a small portion around the edge, and, while this is going, on Russians are trying to take Bakhmut and have advanced to the river there.

We will see today and coming days if Bakmut falls and Luhansk line is defended, or then vice versa (or nothing changes much).

Of course, the most significant thing happening today is the referendum votes to join Russia.

This is (presumably) a legal point of no return for the Russians where they must after the votes (assuming the result we're all assuming) be fully committed to not only defend the current territory but also take the rest of these regions.

Up until now the Russians have been threatening to do this if Ukraine refuses the offered peace terms of accepting annexation of Russia, autonomy in some sense of Donbas within Ukraine (they declared some sort of independence, but could still rejoin Ukraine presumably; certainly much easier than if they formally join Russia).

It's difficult to imagine the Russians doing these votes without the military confidence to defend the territory, that the failed attempts to take Kherson may have provided, at least in the short term.

However, NATO can always provide whatever support is needed to win battles (in my opinion) and likely the Russians as well. NATO could provide f-16 (or even f-35 if it wanted to), missiles of all kinds and more HIMARS trucks, western tanks and other armoured vehicles, more artillery etc. Training is always a concern but that's just a matter of time.

Which could explain the conversation immediately transitioning into nuclear weapons.

If Russia is committed to defend this territory then nuclear weapons maybe the only means to do so if NATO provides enough military assistance to Ukraine.

Diplomatic resolution of the conflict seems remote at this point (due to NATO's policy to undermine and scuttle all diplomatic efforts), leaving NATO with the options of frozen conflict (support Ukrainians enough to defend, eventually lose all the regions that have been annexed and then a front stabilises) or then go on the offence.

However, after these votes escalating the conflict with more weapons and more weapons systems really does seem now will be met with nuclear weapons at some point.

It's possible NATO wants that to happen for long term reasons (make the world a more dangerous place and thus US more relevant to the West as top dog), but it's unclear how NATO would be able to respond to the use of nuclear weapons. NATO may see the long term benefit to the arms industry of the use of nuclear weapons, basically a forever wet dream, but an impossible short term situation to navigate militarily or diplomatically. I honestly don't see any other option other than do nothing. Therefore, I find it likely US / NATO will not escalate even if US they would really, really want Russia to use nuclear weapons (other members of the alliance may simply not be willing to go along with it if there's no coherent military or diplomatic plan to deal with the scenario).

If there is no significant escalation now from NATO, it seems likely to me that autumn will slow the front down and Russians will conduct their offensives in the winter. We'd then see in the spring EU's appetite for further escalation.

"Still, what’s unlawful is not always impossible" — Jamal

Can also just be made legal tomorrow.

However, in discussing Russian draft dodgers relevant to the situation, should be kept in mind there are draft dodgers on the Ukrainian side and also USA had plenty draft dodgers last time they drafted people.

There's few historical instances of draft dodging actually affecting a war much.

People leaving Russia is perhaps more relevant economically speaking, but so much intellectual work is done via computer and at a distance these days. Large bulk of Russians are simply unable to leave economically speaking, and many that do may continue the same economic contribution as before, managing their business or app development or engineering consultancy at a distance. Generally speaking, "brain drain" has never actually collapsed an economy.

Apparently, when asked Putin simply said "let them leave" basically, so otherwise-trouble makers leaving could be a net benefit in the circumstances.

Although maybe you have different opinion on the affects of professional class people leaving Russia.

I don't think we have here much of a disagreement. — ssu

Yes, as I've said before, if everyone here was pro-Russian I would make the case for the Ukrainians, in hopes of helping a negotiated peace.

It should be said that here Putin did follow what was reasonable in the military terms, but bad in political terms (as obviously the Ukrainians got a huge moral boosting victory). A more pigheaded politicians wouldn't have dared to disengage this way. — ssu

This is an astute observation.

Yet, if the ONLY objective would have been to create that land bridge with Crimea and help the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics, you wouldn't have had the 1st Guards Tank Army attacking Kharkiv. — ssu

1st guards Tank Army was reformed in 2014. There's a prestigious history (but not so prestigious as to avoid dissolving it in the first place).

And even if it was "super elite" then, again, it can be part of the diversion to commit some elite troops so your counter parties think that's the real objective.

You have to invest for such an operation to work.

And, I would not disagree that the pressure on Kiev did not have as a first objective the capitulation of Kiev and accepting the offered peace terms, but clearly it's secondary objective was to then divert as much Ukrainian military potential to the North as possible in order to secure the land bridge and complete the siege of Mariupol.

Now, as to how probable the Kremlin or Russian generals thought the capitulation of Ukraine would be, I don't know. Likewise, even if the evaluated the probability of Ukrainian capitulation as low (lot's of reasons to believe Ukraine would fight) I have zero clue if they would have therefore not invaded. The war is going on since 2014 as you've recently noted, 2 agreements failed to resolve the conflict, so invasion maybe evaluated as needing to happen at some point or another, as Russia could not sustain the separatists indefinitely without regular troops invading which would mean official war with Russia itself (whatever they want to call it).

That they had a plan B does not mean that they thought plan B was likely, just that their planning obviously wasn't irrational. The thinking maybe "80% likely Ukraine will capitulate with this here plan A, and, if not, that's unfortunate but our best option in that case will be this here plan B". Or maybe they thought Ukraine capitulation was 20% likely but worth a try in case it worked, and if they are in anyways committed to the land bridge and taking the canal at Kherson then the whole plan makes a lot of sense (they did accomplish that); the offensive to establish the land bridge did work, of course winning a battle isn't winning a war.

They do, but one cannot deny that Russia is under severe pressure - otherwise Putin would have not made his announcement today. — Manuel

Certainly pressure is high, no disagreement there. And definitely even partial mobilisation has a economic and political consequence, but my guess is that it's no longer as big a concern as mobilisation even a few months ago. Things that need alternative service and supplies to Western one's will have things worked out by now, and if not they can be foregone.

Of course Ukraine has lost plenty in the war, but at the moment they are looking better militarily than a few weeks ago. — Manuel

This is debatable; these sorts of evaluations depend on casualties and material losses. There was certainly a much needed propaganda win, but for the terrain to be "worth it" the offensive needs to then continue into strategically critical locations, which does not seem to be happening.

The area around Kharkiv was a buffer zone on the flank to the strategically vital region of Donbas (what Russia claims the whole point of the war is about). However, Kharkiv itself was not in Donbas and losing the territory has pros and cons (one of which is there need not be a referendum in the Kharkiv region, which would be cynical motivation to abandon the region but politically and militarily convenient).

Looks like Russia is running out of options. And while in a more rational society this might be an impetus for negotiations, now there is a ramping up - on both sides. — Manuel

Zelensky has made his position clear that any compromise is rejected (at least right now).

As for running out of options, the current situation is not a military bad one for Russia: they still hold Kherson and the whole land bridge back to Donbas and Russia.

Best report I've seen into actual conditions on the front is this Washington Post article:

A clear picture of Ukraine’s losses could not be independently assessed.

Denys, sitting upright on his hospital bed, said almost every member of his 120-person unit was injured, though only two were killed.

A 25-year-old soldier being treated for shrapnel wounds said that, within his unit of 100 soldiers, seven were killed and 20 injured. Ihor, the platoon commander, said 16 of the 32 men under his command were injured and one was killed. — Wounded Ukrainian soldiers reveal steep toll of Kherson offensive - Washington Post

The whole article is insightful, but the above first-hand casualty reports should be concerning to anyone who thinks Ukrainian victory is "in the bag".

The size of the attack and the use of paratroops to seize a central airport doesn't logically sound as a diversionary attack or feint. It goes totally against, actually the thing you mentioned, the Schwerpunkt-tactic. And what then was then the effort that was called Kyiv convoy, a 64km long convoy stuck there to do what? — ssu

For a diversion to work, it must be believable. To tie up large amounts of troops requires real fighting.

The difference is simply that in an actual offensive the orders are to try to push through and get to various objectives, whereas in a diversionary fixing operation the orders are to push until enemy resistance is encountered and then minimise casualties.

Definitely there will still be casualties with a large manoeuvre intended to tie-up whole armies and there will still be commanders trying to do things as efficiently as possible, which may involve taking an airport.

And, no disputing that the idea outcome is Ukraine simply capitulate and accept the offered peace terms.

The debate has been between the idea that the entire operation in the North was some sort of failed attempt to storm Kiev or the first phase of conquering all of Ukraine. I.e. the "facts" you seem to laud against the propaganda of just calling everything Russia does incompetent.

Incompetence would have been not even getting out of Crimea ... and even then not necessarily incompetence but because Ukraine did the logical thing and blowup the bridges and heavily defended the coast.

Where the Russians did succeed was in the south attacking from Crimea. I think these formations were from the South and had seen combat in Georgia/Chechnya, so they were also a bit better (and obviously the Ukrainians basically were defending the North and the East. — ssu

Aka. the operations in the North meant they were unable to defend the South, the obvious military objective of creating a land bridge to Crimea that military analysts pointed out the Kremlin would be very much wanting to accomplish.

You basically lay out in your own words the logic of feinting / diverting / fixing / distracting, whatever you want to call it, operation in the North.

Two responses ... two emoticons.

If you're trying to express how deep and sophisticated your soul is ... I'm not sure this is the way to do it.

For those interested in debating the actual situation in Ukraine.

Russia has just announced a partial mobilisation, calling up 300 000 reserves as reported by the BBC:

Mobilisation essentially means assembling and preparing troops for active service.

According to Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, this will apply to just 1% of the country's total mobilisation resource.

Russia's estimated to have around 2 million reservists. These are people who have done their military service - it's compulsory in Russia.

The 300,000 reservists being called at this point are soldiers with military experience - although it is not clear what that means and who that refers to.

Shoigu did say that students won't be called up. — What does Putin mean by partial mobilisation?

Of course, Ukraine has been in total war, banning military age males leaving the country, and forcibly conscripting.

Why mobilise now and not before I think has a bunch of explanations. First, had Russia mobilised before the war then Ukraine would have mobilised and this was not necessarily an advantage to start the war. Why not mobilise after can be explained either because the Kremlin believed a negotiated settlement was possible or then for political and economic consequences of mobilisation outweighed the benefits. Definitely, mobilising during the first phase of the sanctions could have been economically disastrous.

Additionally, Russia has been holding off annexing new territories. Again, this could be explained due to a desire to negotiate or then for purely tactical reasons of either first wanting to conquer the territories concerned or then fearing a Ukrainian offensive during the annexation process. The timing now can be interpreted as either retaliation for the recent offensive or then simply it is now safe to conduct the votes if the offensives have stalled and it will take time for Ukraine to organise a new one.

Whatever the reasons, annexing the territories is the pathway of mobilisation to then defend Russian territory.

It is repeated on reddit a lot that Russian reservists and conscripts will be super low quality soldiers. This is debatable (especially in quality comparisons of Ukrainian reservists and conscripts), but likely calling up reservists allows more rotations of the professional army corp for offensive manoeuvres.

Of course, how this plays out politically, economically and militarily is not certain, but mobilisation is certainly a military advantage and the question would be to what extent along with the political and economic costs.

You are imagining you are talking to some unsophisticated soul. — apokrisis

This is definitely how I imagine things to be. Yes, we agree on this description of the situation.

I’ve no illusions about how the world really works. I’ve seen how it works up close. I’ve written about it professionally. — apokrisis

Please, prey tell. How does the world really work?

Or instead, the FSB’s expensive network of political stooges were meant to ensure a swift and easy win. — apokrisis

You do realise this is a Zelensky and co. complaint, that Russia took over Kherson and South-West Ukraine with hardly any resistance due to Ukrainian traitors taking bribes.

↪boethius What a dull and confused reply. Nothing to see here. :yawn: — apokrisis

I get it, the rest of Western social media is just repeating whatever Ukrainian "officials" say unquestioningly, asking zero questions that might be critical of NATO or Ukrainian government policies, and taking some unimportant ground around Kharkiv is supposed to be some cathartic moment that means full victory and the war essentially over already, Russian lines disintegrating as we speak, Putin about to be assassinated etc.

It's a comfortable propaganda bubble for Zelenskyites to live in and it's necessary to guard this delusional state to simply repeat the propaganda here and believe that doing so makes it more credible, being posted to a "philosophy" debate forum and all ... rather than actually debate on a debate forum.

most of times your line is slavishly following your masters' propaganda. — Olivier5

What propaganda?

Can you cite a single sentence of mine that is "propaganda" and not either plausible facts and premises or then reasoned argument from those plausible facts and premises.

For example, I stated a Ukrainian offensive or counter-offensive would not be possible with only small arms such as shoulder launched missiles, and these recent offensives utilised many armoured vehicles. A plausible assertion that proved true.

Another example, I've asserted there is no end to the war other than a negotiated peace that will require compromise, as there's no way Ukraine can defeat Russia and force a Russian surrender (Ukraine could win every battle in Ukraine and that is still not winning a war with Russia). No alternative to this view has even been presented.

I've even elaborated how NATO could have, before the war or even during the war, sent in ground troops and created a Cuban missile crisis style standoff and then negotiate a rapid resolution to the conflict (again, would require compromise), and made clear I would support NATO making such a move (if it worked) as that would have prevented the war and could have, and still could, end the war rapidly at any moment preventing further child suffering, death and trauma (my "constituency" in this fight).

That NATO has not provided Ukraine sufficient armament and training to defeat Russia in Ukraine, much less in Russia itself, is just obvious fact, with each weapons system drip-fed and provided only when previous weapons systems prove insufficient (after thousands of Ukrainian KIA and casualties demonstrate that empirically).

One can argue that the US should do this policy to "fight them there rather than here!" but that's obviously not a policy with Ukrainian interest in mind, but is to use Ukrainians to bleed the Russians.

As for the geopolitical realm of things: Russia has not collapsed, has not been abandoned by key allies, and economic hardship from the sanctions are changing governments in Europe and not Russia. These are facts.

Since my position is to support a diplomatic resolution of the war, and I've explained how this is done (minimum understanding of the Russian perspective in order to negotiate in the first place and then minimum compromise to reach a deal), I am not so interested in "just war arguments" (it could be Ukrainian cause is just ... just that they can't defeat Russia so it's relevant in terms of resolving the conflict now). However, I've also made clear I'm willing to debate who has just cause or then "more just cause", and I've asked questions that would start such a debate: such as how many Nazi's would be too many Nazi's (in order to evaluate that Ukraine does not reach this threshold of Naziness) and also a political theory in which US invading Iraq on pretext of bioweapons that weren't there was not-a-war-crime but Russia invading Ukraine and actually finding military bio-labs is a war-crime (or then make clear both are war crimes and doesn't matter if Iraq actually had WMD's or Ukraine actually has bio-weapons labs or not); i.e. is there a theory that US has just cause in its various wars but Russia does not have just cause for the exact same reasons? Of course, neither has just cause is also an acceptable position, but proponents to a moral theory about Russia should demonstrate how it applies to other cases, is the main point.

You're position basically boils down to the idea that pointing out Ukraine cannot defeat Russia (a critical factor in evaluating what to do; only a force destined to win need no diplomacy, such as the Russian defeat of the Nazi's the first time), but if you cannot force a capitulation then the options are diplomatic resolution or then no-end to the conflict ... or being eventually defeated yourself.

Of course, if the only practical option to end the war is diplomacy, and compromise will be needed for that, then every day Ukrainians fight on to support an uncompromising position is lives lost for nothing, for they are, under such conditions, not actually fighting to anywhere but merely "for Western values" -- aka. a symbolic gesture -- as Zelensky himself notes.

The idea the Russians have poor performance, no plan, irrational, etc. is just completely dumb propaganda.
— boethius

So the truth is that Putin is doing a good job executing a rational plan. Sounds legit. :lol: — apokrisis

You literally cite me right above your sentence, where I use the words "irrational", "no plan" and "poor performance" (discussing the Russian military) and you then paraphrase that as talking about Putin doing a good job. I.e. you literally respond to my comment pointing out propaganda with the propaganda of wildly misrepresenting my statement and throwing Putin in there when I wasn't talking about Putin.

The discussion was about Russian military planning and performance (responding to @Wolfman assertion that Russian infantry run around like headless chickens), which has nothing to do with Putin or civilian leadership in general: a competent military managed by people who can think, can be sent to fight an unjust and foolish war ... cough, cough, Iraq, Afghanistan, cough, Vietnam, cough, cough, cough.

And evaluating Putin's job performance (or the political decisions in general, such as going to war in the first place) is a completely different matter, that will be mostly about value judgements, international relations and economic consequences, and not so much military strategy and tactics. Discussion that would certainly be fruitful.

I'm an anarchist and so don't like authoritarians, but I do not view authoritarianism as irrational and certainly for people that do just want a strong man then Putin's actions are very rational.

If Putin was a peacenik good vibes loving hippy with dreadlocks living in a tent on the Kremlin commune lawn and smoking the herb all day talking about oneness and shit, then suddenly launched this war; ok, sounds irrational. However, Putin isn't a peacenik good vibes loving hippy.

Given Putin's state of beliefs (which are entirely typical for nation-state leaders both now and since thousands of years), the war in Ukraine and broader global economic conflict was and is certainly a big gamble. That it has "worked" so far (Russia hasn't collapsed economically or politically, hasn't been isolated in international relations, and the land bridge to Crimea and Kherson is occupied) should be evidence enough that the plan has been well thought out and, indeed, executed competently by Russian military and civilian leaders.

That does not mean the plan will ultimately work, maybe the Russian government will collapse tomorrow, but the Russian successes so far and things being so "on edge" militarily and politically, is really abundant evidence that it was a rational gamble to make (if you have the kind of goals Putin has).

Ziehan's analysis – that the real ambition is to push all Russia's boundaries back to defensible mountain passes before demographic collapse leaves its armies starved of recruits – is always going to be more plausible. — apokrisis

This idea seems just completely unsupported. Russia simply doesn't have the military manpower to push all the way into Poland and Romania anytime before these demographic changes happen anyways. Zeihan also doesn't explain how Russia would plan to deal with NATO and why nuclear weapons are not a better deterrent that preserves what younger generation you have ... which killing most of them in a war with NATO would be counter-productive to fixing demographic problems.

If the special operation achieved these limited aims in weeks, then onwards and upwards. The geopolitical logic was still the old Russian dream of control of the steppes all the way to defensible borders. That means Poland to the edge of Warsaw, the Baltic States, etc. — apokrisis

As has been discussed several times, Russia did not assemble a force remotely capable of occupying all of Ukraine and, from even before the war, offered extremely minimal peace terms compared to occupying all of Ukraine. Without occupying all of Ukraine there no way to go "onwards and upwards" in a military conquest of Eastern Europe.

So where would you argue halting Putin's ambitions? You would let him eat your hand, but not your arm? — apokrisis

This is just annoying. You start your post disputing my statement the Russian military has competent performance and planning given its achievements so far, but then seamlessly transition to Russia as the great bogeyman of Geopolitics capable of conquering nearly all of Eastern Europe.

You can't have it both ways, on the one hand ridiculing the Russian military capabilities and Putin's political acumen, but on the other presenting Russia as the doom of mankind that, if not stopped, will devour the whole world (or then at least Eastern Europe) somehow.

↪apokrisis This reads like fiction. — Benkei

This is what's so interesting about Zeihan, is that he brings up all sorts of interesting facts and history ... and somehow manages to weave a tale that reads like fiction.

To be fair again, Russia has been better with logistics since that time, but their overall performance on all but one of the Ukrainian fronts has been lackluster thus far. — Wolfman

The "all but one front" that actually mattered.

If you followed this issue before the war broke out, the "limited war goals" military analysts would talk about was "land bridge to Crimea" (and likely the maximum ambition given the forces assembled); this is what military analysts talked about as a difficult goal to achieve.

Russians achieve it in less than a week:



The idea the Russians have poor performance, no plan, irrational, etc. is just completely dumb propaganda.

Now, if the maximum goal with 200 000 troops was land bridge to Crimea, then the best commanders and forces will be committed to conquering and securing said land bridge. Second tier commanders and troops will be committed to a fixing operation to pressure Kiev and their orders will be largely to advance until resistance is met and to then entrench and wait for artillery, which is what we saw. Of course, supply lines are still vulnerable to ambush and less experienced commanders will still "try some shit" that then maybe fails, but if the goal is to fix Ukrainian troops in the North then it doesn't really matter what areas are conquered or not; i.e. there's no actual military objective in terms of a point on a map, just to keep the pressure on.

Furthermore, yes Russians suffered a lot of casualties, but so too Ukrainians, so to judge the North operation even of itself it would only be a failure if casualties were a lot higher for Russians.

Of course, that brings up the question of why not withdraw sooner if it was a fixing operation. The answer is that they withdrew at the logical time for a fixing operation.

Russian generals main fear after the first week would be if the siege of Mariupol was broken, so the fixing operation needs to stay in place until then.

the siege, which was part of the Russian eastern Ukraine offensive and southern Ukraine offensive, started on 24 February 2022 and concluded on 20 May 2022, when Russia announced the remaining Ukrainian forces in Mariupol surrendered[47] after they were ordered to cease fighting. — Siege of Mariupol

The battle of Kyiv was part of the Kyiv offensive in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine for control of Kyiv, the capital city of Ukraine, and surrounding districts. The combatants were elements of the Russian Armed Forces and Ukrainian Ground Forces. The battle lasted from 25 February 2022 to 2 April 2022 and ended with the withdrawal of Russian forces. — Battle of Kyiv (2022)

Yes, Russians suffer losses in the North but if their strategic priority is Mariupol, it is far better to suffer losses in the North than a offensive in south Ukraine that may relieve the siege of Mariupol. Had Russians not pressured Kiev in the North, the only thing for Ukrainians to do would be try to fight a salient to Mariupol, which would be intensely motivating to save their "Azov heroes" and massive propaganda victory and real, tangible and irreversible embarrassment to Russia that could not be "spun": they had the Azov Nazi's surrounded but their superior "brethren" fought all the way to break the siege; it would be truly a battle worthy for song.

Being pushed back from Kharkiv is, to contrast, not a comparable embarrassment and is reversible by simply regaining that terrain or then victories elsewhere.

And the roughly 2 weeks between the final surrender of Mariupol is not an unusual timing. First, the decision would need to be made that there are no further key objectives which the operation in the North would serve (Russians also want Donbas but do not decide on a major offensive there, but instead withdraw from the North and switch to incrementalist tactics), and second the complete withdrawal would need to be planned and orders delivered to all the key officers and again they may require some days to prepare to withdraw. So, that all that would take about 2 weeks after the Mariupol surrender is entirely reasonable time frame, and without such a hypothesis there's really no alternative to why Russia went to Kiev and why they withdrew when they did (occupation of all of Ukraine was clearly not feasible; the plan was not to conquer all of Ukraine and then they "settled" for South Ukraine, but obviously the plan was the land bridge to Crimea and securing the canal the supplies Crimea with water, and that was achieved).

And yes, Ukrainians in majority think that it is worthwhile to chase the Russians from Ukraine. You are welcome to disagree, but your opinion is not really important here. You're not fighting this war. — Olivier5

This is obviously untrue in itself and your opinion on @Benkeis opinion or anything Ukraine would likewise be unimportant and you should have just been repeating that from the beginning.

However, if our if our tax dollars are being used to finance Ukraines war effort and supply arms and also government implementing sanctions to harm Russia ... how is that not our direct issue as European citizens?

Sure, if Ukraine was doing its thing entirely alone, under its own power and resources, it would be less relevant to non-Ukrainians.

But that's not remotely the case.

An alternative strategic view of the "Russia has already lost" narrative, is as follows:

Obviously Russia hasn't already lost, but still holds most of Donbas, Kherson, Crimea and the space in between.

Before this new offensive, even the Western narrative was shifting towards questions like "can Ukraine win?" and "is supplying arms enough?" and "time to discuss the diplomatic resolution of the war?"

So, Ukraine knows it needs a win to keep its Western backing and Russia knows it too, offensive is for sure coming before the fall and winter. The mud may figuratively freeze Ukrainian offensives (Scott Ritter posted above is quite convinced of this), and then winter may literally freeze Ukrainians on the front line where the supply line is stretched out 1000 km, easily targeted, and likely much easier in winter with IR signatures much more apparent.

It was certainly in the realm of possibility a few weeks ago that Ukraine actually break through and take Kherson, or then anywhere from there to Donbas. For example, an attack East of the Dnieper, if it were to succeed all the way to the coast would isolate the Russians on the West side of the river. These sorts of things would be major strategic blows and major embarrassment, followed by re-damming the canal that supply Crimea.

The retreat from Kharkiv regions is certainly some embarrassment, but no-where near anything the embarrassment and actual strategic problem of the fall of Kherson, or punching through the "land bridge" all the way to the coast at any point.

It's said Russians repositioned significant forces from Kharkiv region to reinforce other places on the front. The logic certainly is that they don't intend to defend Kharkiv if the offensive comes there.

So, the situation is now that Ukraine has certainly a propaganda win, that they critically needed; however, battle field conditions are not clear and momentum of the offensive seems to have stalled back to incremental gains on both sides. There's certainly no collapse of the Russian lines and critical strategic locations are being overrun. The territories exchanged are at the moment highly debatable in military significance.

What's next?

Russian strategy since the withdrawal of Kiev offensive, has been clearly to stop armoured offensives and advance with significant artillery bombardment (basically bombard a place until Ukrainians leave it), minimising casualties, and making "geopolitical moves" until Winter.

Russia has successfully navigated the sanctions and their partnerships with China, India, basically the entire rest of the world outside the West, as well as just closed various deals in the SCO meeting, including Iran. Time will tell what significant this all has, but seems in the positive direction for Russia. There's a theory that sanctions are "eroding" Russia economy, but I find that implausible given the economic links with China and positive revenue flows. This is in no way comparable to North Korea or Venezuela, of which sanctions didn't "work" in those far more favourable conditions. I find it far more plausible that any direct infrastructure problems happened in the initial sanctions shock and alternative components worked out since. True, some Western equipment may simply be impossible to repair, but if you have money you can just purchase an entire substitute from China, maybe a bit less efficient but economies don't entirely collapse due to efficiency drops in various capital equipment. Likewise, for normal people's lives, there been plenty of time now to adjust to new jobs and habits.

Unless Ukraine does succeed in some catastrophic breakthrough, the next phase in the war is slowing either retaliation or then genuine need to slow Ukraine down by hitting infrastructure and then seeing how the gas situation plays out in winter.

If everything on the front line is stabilised again by winter, nothing much happening for the months between now and February, when the gas shortages and prices really start to hit home, talk of negotiated settlement with Russia may build back momentum again.

Moods change, today people cheer on the Ukrainians because they're told they're "winning", and people like winners, but if that narrative flips again, mood can easily change to "time to end the war" and "it's gone on long enough" and "it's better to make peace with Russia", obviously fuelled by gas pains.

Diplomatically, the whole thing could be wrapped up by the EU in about a week, by coming up with a resolution Russia can accept and more-or-less forcing Ukraine to accept it whether the like it or not. EU leaders simply choose not to try to resolve the conflict, but at some point real economic domestic pressures may simply overwhelm any churchillian fantasies or just distaste at losing face to Russia, and the leaders that spearhead peaceful resolution will get the credit for doing "what needs to be done" and being on the side of peace and so on, and putting things behind us; if gas prices go down, it will be a political win.

It's only a (highly debatable) political win today insofar as the full consequences of the war aren't felt by people. At some point Europeans aren't going to care much about some strange idealistic fight that has no clear end point in Ukraine, and will want their leaders to fix economic problems (that are far easier to fix with cheaper gas and oil).

My prediction is the main European leaders will push for a peaceful resolution the moment all the smaller European countries start to essentially capitulate diplomatically for the gas. If there's no prospect to the end of the war with more fighting, and an essentially pro-Russian factions starts to grow bigger within the EU itself, the more powerful European leaders will have no other choice than to attempt to make peace and put things back "to normal".

This my best guess to the basic thoughts of the Kremlin at the moment: everyone comes crawling back for the gas, sooner or later.

Not to say this strategy will succeed, but I think this is in broad strokes what the Russians are trying to accomplish.

On the subject of Ziehan.

I do think he's a good faith actor genuinely believing what he says, and has lot's of interesting facts and I think generally is at least discussing the relevant topics, just with extreme US bias (which is good perspective to have for the sake of argument in any case).

However, sometimes his analysis is basically "what the hell are you smoking?"



He feels using tactical nuclear weapons wouldn't be effective (wrong, they are very effective at blowing stuff up) and Russia won't use them (very likely, it's obviously a massive line to cross that Russia would have crossed already if that was the plan).

... but then goes onto casually state Russia may flatten European cities with Nukes?

But also Russia, even Putin, doesn't want to end the human condition and have all out WWIII. I'm honestly unable to follow the reasoning: "tactical Nukes ... nah, but sure let's nuke entire cities?"

And the reason not to use tactical nukes is because that will frustrate the ultimate goal of taking key strategic locations Poland and Romania ... but also Ukraine will defeat Russia.

Russians merely tactically retreat form Kharkiv or was it an actual gain? — Benkei

There's been a lot of internet debate on "tactical retreat" vs. "just retreat", which I think is worth clarifying to said internet denizens.

The mini controversy seems to take place under the erroneous conception that tactical retreat is synonymous with "brilliant military manoeuvre" and that you "actually wanted to retreat all along".

This is of course not true.

Tactical retreat can refer to a re-positioning, a deceptive pre-planned trap, or just then retreating under pressure as a tactic, and in all cases is not by definition the best move.

It's "tactical" when it is used as a manoeuvre to reposition and inflict casualties on the advancing forces, which may or may not be successful. It's "successful" if the pros outweigh the cons, obviously.

Which definitely, as you note, we cannot easily evaluate. We don't know the cost to Ukraine in pushing the Russians out of Kharkiv and we don't know what Russia plans on doing next.

Russians merely tactically retreat form Kharkiv or was it an actual gain? Are the Russians having problems with their supply lines or are these news items exagerrated? Is Western material support sufficient or not? I can't tell and I don't think anyone on this site can accurately gage it. — Benkei

I think it's safe to assume everything is exaggerated in Western media.

However, NATO could definitely pour far more arms into Ukraine than it currently has. Could have provided Himars and satellite targeting of those from day 1 of the war, likewise flood Ukraine with AA systems, along with NATO tanks and far more artillery.

NATO has not. So what one needs to ask to understand the situation is "what's the evaluation criteria of what to send and not send". Why only 16 Himars trucks when the US has over hundred such systems.

Of course, NATO mostly simply doesn't explain the criteria, Ukraine must be happy with what it gets, but on occasion claims their criteria is they send as much support as they can ... until their own defence is compromised.

Well, that's really not plausibly true at all, as if that was the criteria Ukraine would at least get a bit of everything already. If the current US stockpile of shorter range Himars missiles really was running "dangerously low" then they'd have already supplied some of the longer range missiles that are at full stock.

Other weapons systems that Ukraine doesn't get at all, like F16's (not to mention F-35's), obviously US could spare at least some (especially aircraft that's being phased out of the US air fleet). Would require training ... but Ukrainians have be doing training for months in UK and other NATO nations (and non-NATO nations like Finland too). It can't take that long to train a fighter pilot on a new aircraft, and even if it did the war may go on for years so better to get started.

What can we deduce from NATO arms supply policy is that the criteria is not support Ukraine up until some imaginary standard of compromising own security (which doesn't really hold water in itself ... should everyone be willing to take some risks for this holy war?).

Rather, quite obviously, the policy is to supply arms and training enough to Ukraine to not suffer embarrassing defeat but not risk actually winning on the battlefield either.

US and NATO do not care about the Donbas and whether Ukraine has it or Russia has it.

The policies that actually matter: new cold war and arms sales bonanza and securing a hard-power future where US is top dog in it's little club, while also undermining European security with a flood of advanced weaponry on the black market. These policies are achieved by a prolonged war where Ukraine support is calibrated to neither win nor lose.

Russia may also want exactly the same thing: cutoff from the West, alternative financial system booted up, alternative component supply lines worked out, permanent justification for the war economy, increased arms sales to non-NATO partners, increasing uncertainty and price of everything it sells.

Of course, the key partner to do all that is China, but that maybe why the invasion was launched after a long meeting between Xi and Putin.

And the Western idea that China is unhappy about Russia's "anti-Western-liberal-order" moves in Ukraine, is just stupid.

True, China has economic leverage over Russia, but Russia has commodity leverage over China. and as we've just seen with the EU, it's pretty big leverage. Russia actually has more leverage over China than the EU because the EU is at least food self sufficient whereas China has major problems there and is facing much harsher climate change impacts.

So, true, we cannot evaluate the conditions on the ground, exact casualty statistics, but we can evaluate what is and isn't sent to Ukraine and infer the actual criteria is not-win but not-completely-lose. And if that's the criteria than what we see fits that hypothesis: Ukraine is unable to take Kherson (a strategically vital position for the Russians) but can take a bunch of more-or-less buffer space around Kharkiv. Ukraine asks for more arms and longer range missiles to continue the momentum ... US hums-and-haws and warns Russia about using tactical nuclear weapons (which would provide easy victory in military terms ... some on the internet, like Zeihan, are claiming tactical nukes aren't effective, but that's really dumb).

boethius means winning as a surrender, much the same way the Dutch and French surrendered to the Germans and the Germans surrendered to the Allies and the Russians. Winning like that is nigh impossible. I think that's a bit of a semantic trick though. — Benkei

Yes, in the context of "we will not negotiate!" then winning is the surrender of the opposing side.

Then there's winning meaning reclaiming the above and Crimea. That's exceedingly difficult and to me it's pretty obvious that that should not be attempted from a cost-benefit analysis (costs in human lives). At least as things stand now and appear to continue for the foreseeable future. — Benkei

Winning meaning reclaiming Donetsk and Luhansk and the southern occupied territories is already much more difficult. Not impossible but I think that also depends on what of the stories are true. Did the Russians merely tactically retreat form Kharkiv or was it an actual gain? Are the Russians having problems with their supply lines or are these news items exagerrated? Is Western material support sufficient or not? I can't tell and I don't think anyone on this site can accurately gage it. Along with those uncertainties, the question also becomes one of whether the costs (eg. Ukrainian deaths first and foremost but also Russian deaths which are mostly men like you and me forced to fight). My personal feeling about that, is that territory is much less important than people. But then I've never been a nationalistic or patriotic type so I might misunderstand the psyche of Ukrainians in that respect. — Benkei

None of these scenarios are "winning the war". This is the key point that Zelenskyites refuse to address.

Take back Donbas, take back Crimea ... the war would still be on.

Not only would the human and material cost be very high to retake all Donbas and even higher Crimea, Russia can re-enter Ukraine at any point along the 2000 km border with Ukraine at any time (and, presumably also the 1000 km border with Belarus).

The "front line" discussed today is only a small part of the actual front line that stretches some 4000-5000 km.

Even if the the above scenarios were to play out, there would still be a state of war with a lot of border to defend.

Winning meaning locking up Russian forces in a stalemate which will lead them to eventually accept some type of truce or even peace deal, I think is highly probable. And I'd rather see that sooner than later. — Benkei

I also agree that a negotiated peace is the best outcome, but definitely this is not a "win" according to Zelensky standards and it's difficult to say a war was won when 20% of territory is ceded.