You might have to tell about your point 3 above to the Ukrainians, because they don't seem to be aware of it... Some 80% of them believe they can beat the Russians. — Olivier5

Correction, 80% of Ukrainians think NATO can defeat Russia using Ukrainians as proxy soldiers. No one believes "Ukraine", as such, can defeat Russia.

If NATO wanted to "standup" to Russia it would have done so before the war broke out.

NATO doesn't want to, it's quite content selling some arms, creating the new cold war, and not "defeating" Russia, which would just complicate everyone in NATO's life (everyone that matters anyways).

Indeed. but you are not asking about what the truth is, but what the plan is. The plan is to win - the truth is everyone loses. — unenlightened

No qualms from me on this.

That seems unarguable. But it is in general the case that wars are prosecuted on the basis that: — unenlightened

Not really at all.

Most wars are resolved in surrender of one side (or the negotiated resolution to preempt complete surrender while there is still some leverage) ... the exact opposite of "we shall never surrender".

War is always 'to the death'. There is no other plan. The welfare plan involves health and safety officers and hospitals, not tanks and bombs. — unenlightened

Again, completely untrue. Most wars throughout history are not fought to the death but one side capitulates.

In hunter gatherer times, when one side clearly lost they would withdraw and go elsewhere (wars being generally over territory).

In Imperial times, the losing side is absorbed into the winning empire administrative system as a vassal state or direct administration.

In nation-state times, the losing side accepts the economic and diplomatic policies of the winning side, with occasional changes in territory.

Indeed, most individual battles are resolved with the surrender of the remaining enemy troops rather than fighting to the death.

Fighting to the death is quite rare in the history of warfare. Very few cultures developed such an ethos (because cultures can survive different administrative changes over centuries, but cannot, by definition, survive even one battle to the death they don't win).

Your position so far seems to be:

Step one: everyone on Western social media agree Russia is bad

Step two: everyone on Western social media agree that Ukrainians fighting and dying to kill Russians is good

Step three: ...

Another way to understand the basic criticism you are facing is we're just asking what step 3 would be, even if we did accept step 1 and 2.

Ok, Russians bad and Ukrainians good ... what's the plan even assuming that's true?

If there's no answer to step 3, then it seems to me at least Ukrainian welfare is not a consideration in this position and the moralising of bad faith to begin with (along with no one ever answering how many Nazi's would be too many Nazi's).

People don't change perspective, most of times. Cf. any debate on TPF for evidence of that. — Olivier5

I second @Benkei in his response above, but again, even assuming you are right,

if:

1. Russia isn't going to change it's perspective
2. NATO isn't going to defeat Russia on Ukraine's behalf, following through with their Churchillian rhetoric
3. Ukraine can't defeat Russia

What is the alternative to a compromise that takes into account Russia's unchangeable perspective and that Russia may accept?

↪Benkei The Nazis had their perspective too. — Olivier5

You still fail to even get the point.

Even assuming Russia is entirely in the wrong and no one else is responsible for anything, NATO isn't going to go "defeat" Russia and Ukraine can't "defeat" Russia.

So, how does the war end?

How does more fighting improve the negotiating position or then being at war forever is somehow the best outcome for Ukrainians?

What is even the negotiating position that could plausibly bring a resolution to the war?

And, if your goal is to turn Europe into a pale reflection of the US across the pond.

The recent hundreds of billions of weapons purchase commitments is only a tiny step in that direction.

What you'd really want to do is a coordinated missile attack on European civilian aircraft.

Which will be super dramatic and super traumatic, as planes are not only blown up but planes in the air will not know where it is safe to land, people crying on TV and everything. So it will be many hours of intense anxiety and as many planes as required can easily be shot down in order to change European policy into whatever one's heart desires.

The weapons to do this are now "out there", already in Europe and it only takes a single covert organisation, of one form or another, somewhere with relatively modest funds to accomplish what will basically be EU's 9/11.

Of course, some will ask "why are our own missiles we sent to protect freedom or whatever being used to down our own planes with the obvious consequences of creating a EU security state?". Fortunately, the great thing about a security state is it doesn't have to answer.

So we'll all be able to rest easy.

Also brings up the other big irony is that the war is only a policy possibility for Russia due to climate change opening up the arctic for shipping crude oil: gas has critical economic functions (for the EU) but was not a majority of Russia's fossil revenue in any case and the threat to go without Russian gas to hit Russia's revenue was always a nonsensical and empty one (only practical purpose is to harm the EU economy).

So, European leaders create the conditions for war by immorally doing nothing much about climate change for decades, and the war will now further frustrate any effective action on climate change, which will continue to benefit Russia in relative consequence and power terms (eases energy exports and exploration while increasing food production while those things diminish globally).

European NATO leaders (all of them) do not veto US expansion into Ukraine, tolerate supporting literal Nazi's, despite many calling it a bad idea that can only lead to war.

War comes and European leaders are all Pikachu face and still do absolutely nothing in terms of soft power to try to end the conflict, rather just supply some arms (obviously not enough to win, just cause more bloodshed), and buy into the kindergarten framework of international relations that their decision making and state policies must be deferred to Zelensky ... he was on the cover of vogue and a social media god after all.

They are not morons, they just serve a different master than any EU constituency, even their own domestic elites, for the most part, the others simply begin and end their political analysis based on what's trending on social media today.

The greatest tragedy of course is there will be no further potential to even pretend to agree on climate change and environmental policies.

Again, something only EU was advocating for, and US, Chinese and certainly Russian elites sort-of-kind-of-wanting business as usual to continue, certainly don't not-want it to continue.

Its international relations 101 that peace would be required for international collaboration on climate change, European prosperity to bank it, and that obviously peace requires compromise.

How to explain EU leadership policies?

Bitches. Bitches all the way down.

I think it's also worth pointing out the great irony of the geopolitical situation for Europe, is that cheerleaders for the war are "liberals" but the outcome of the war and it's disastrous consequences will be right wing and anti-liberal governments across Europe.

Indeed, training ten's of thousands of Nazi's in Ukraine will directly lead to more literal Nazi government takeovers or "influence" as some people here like to refer to it; the formula worked out in Ukraine is not really useful in "defeating" Russia and as soon as that becomes clear and the conflict is resolved or frozen, the focus of these Nazi organisations will branch out to neighbouring countries to expand said "influence".

Economic hardship has as a consequence both rallying behind "strong men" to "fight the scapegoats" as well as the weakening of neoliberal welfare state parties that require economic prosperity to be able to promise and deliver welfare state policies.

Of course, authoritarians (in today's political context; not some logical necessity) are generally right wing with elite backers who want to lower taxes, anti-environment protections, sell state assets and unwind welfare state policies in parallel to the fighting of scapegoats.

In the "name of the liberal oder" that the EU is conducting warfare in Ukraine, will lead to the direct collapse of liberalism in the EU. And not "in the distance", recent elections in Sweden are the first example of this.

Again, EU society unravelling into a fascism is good for US investors and corporations.

Everything turns up roses from the US Imperial perspective. Of course, without the EU economic stability there is no counter-weight to Chinese and Russian economic policies on the world stage, but they are no real threat to the US and are more freinemies that mutually justify each other's totalitarian war economies.

How many F-35's and other war equipment just got sold again?

Indeed, the whole affair is basically a Christmas miracle for the US military industrial complex, going from losers that fucked up Afghanistan to true heroes and defenders of "freedom" in a few months.

A failure to try to understand either, means parties cannot reach a diplomatic solution — Benkei

Not only this, but also leads to faulty analysis of the military situation.

For, the premise that Russian soldiers are low morale and will collapse ... any day now and Russians will overthrow Putin ... any day now, which was the only justification of both total war and the sanctions at the start (that this would somehow "defeat" Russia via low morale), is based on the idea that Russians have no alternative perspective to Western propaganda. If Western propaganda announces expansion to Ukraine was not a threat to Russia, then Russians too believe that and therefore don't see any possible legitimate point to any of the fighting in Ukraine, and morale will collapse months ago.

And if you think victory will be delivered through the magical thinking operation of other people you don't know all feeling the same as you, then there is no reason not to fight and there is also no reason to have a rational plan for your fighting ... just keep fighting, Russian morale will deliver ... any day now.

I have not been following all the interchanges here, but I am curious where the taking of Kiev 'free of cost' idea refers to. Who spoke the quote marks, "for free."? — Paine

@Olivier5 argued that if Ukraine didn't fight back and Russia simply marched into Kiev unopposed that would mean the feint (though I think "fixing" is more appropriate for this context) operation would have failed.

Obviously, if your battle plan goes unopposed that's not a failure, and every manoeuvre simply conquers territory whether it was meant as reconnaissance, feint, fixing or the main battle.

Of course, even if Ukrainians offered no resistance, Russians may not have entered Kiev anyways fearing Guerrilla warfare or simply the administrative burden of a large capital. @Tzeentch has pointed out that obviously that didn't happen so discussing what the Russians would have done in the case of zero resistance is pretty irrelevant.

However, if you haven't been following, what is more interesting is the main debate, which is proponents of Zelensky's policies (whatever they are at the moment), which usually boils down to military victory, versus neutral analysis of the war (in the case of @Tzeentch) and proponents of diplomatic resolution (@Isaac, myself and on occasion @Benkei).

The pro-Zelensky interpret all other points of view as "pro-Russian", so the debate simply goes in unfruitful loops.

Pro-Zelensky want military victory and basically Russian surrender, but there's simply no military way to achieve that.

Whenever Zelensky declares he will not negotiate or then makes unrealistic demands, pro-Zelensky faction will basically yell approbation and that Russian's can't be trusted anyways and shouldn't be negotiated with etc.

Whenever there is rapprochement and diplomatic advancement (which has happened several times) it's failure is squarely on the Russians for not accepting whatever Zelensky wanted. At no point is Zelensky's diplomatic strategy a legitimate subject of criticism.

The whole debate is profoundly confusing to pro-Zelenskyites, because their basic argument is simply moral condemnation of Russia directly justifies any and all fighting against Russia.

Of course, even if their moral condemnation is correct, that does not actually in itself support a fight to the death.

For example, I may invade your home and hold you at gun-point to rob you. Barring some extenuating circumstances (such as being myself a police officer and the robbery legal, or then in a war and I'm an intelligence agent etc.) it's easy to accept the premise I am in the wrong and you are in the right.

However, simply because I am in the moral wrong for holding you at gun point, that does not justify any and all acts of violence against me, such as if they are foolish and will just get your whole family killed.

The circumstances that would justify any and all acts of violence, regardless of probability of success, is if you believe I am going to murder everyone anyways (more precisely, calculate the probability I will do so is higher than the probability my successfully defending your attack, which maybe a very high likelihood but my intention to kill you anyways even higher).

This is why the war is continuously framed as "existential" even though Russia clearly does not threaten, nor ever has, complete occupation of Ukraine, and, even if it did, that's only existential for the Ukrainian state and no necessarily Ukrainians themselves. One would have to believe Russia is intent on murdering the vast majority of Ukrainians in the event of total occupation to justify a fight to the death.

Without the fight to the death justified, the policies so far simply make no sense.

The lives lost, people maimed, children killed and traumatised (my own "side"), damages to Ukrainian economy, damages to the world economy and suffering from energy and food inflation, are not worth the demands Russia made at the outset of the war: recognition of Crimea, autonomy for Donbas region, and neutral Ukraine.

The retort is of course "well that's all Russia's fault" ... even if the offer was rational to accept diplomatically and further fighting is extremely unlikely to ever result in a better deal, and certainly no better deal that is worth the price in blood.

For the war to be "worth it" (from a purely state perspective, ignoring any human value), at this stage, Ukraine would need to resolve the conflict occupying a large areas of Russia.

Of course, the Western policy is not to defend Ukrainian interests, but to defend US interests of bleeding the Russians (which is not really what's happening, but that's a different topic), and more importantly destroying Europe as a geo-political competitor.

Only the Euro could have replaced the USD as a global competing currency, and the war in Ukraine now precludes that from happening.

The strategic options for the US was to either accept multi-polarity in a largely peaceful world where economic and diplomatic clout shifts to Europe as a fair arbiter of world economic affairs, or then break up the world into a new cold war paradigm and destroy European soft power.

US, at this stage in Imperial development, has only hard power as leverage, and Europe is the only soft-power competitor around, and the war in Ukraine guarantees a hard-power brokered world going forward in which US is "top dog" in a greatly diminished Western sphere of influence.

Geopolitically, what we are witnessing is the USA destroying its own allies economies in order to remain dominant over them. Of course, this means the West as a whole is abandoning a world leadership position, but all the problems that result from that are far from America's shores. Only Europe directly pays the cost for America's imperial projects within NATO, which makes those projects easy to carry out from US point of view, and the Ukraine war is the culmination of that process (so far mostly in the middle-East and North Africa) and sacrificing Europe as a piece on the geopolitical chess board, on the off chance is might become an equal partner, which it was close to achieving but its leaders sold Europeans out, basically.

How this happened is basically the anti-Russian propaganda since a solid decade precluded European leaders from saying "we're going to go make peace with the Russians and hammer out a deal, and if the Ukrainians don't accept it then they'll be left militarily alone and we won't even allow US supply to go through our territory". Peace that would have been easily achieved; Russia did not invest in Nord Stream 2 on the premise a war with Ukraine was guaranteed.

Which is why the pro-Zelenskyites basically view the war with Ukraine as a good thing and discard any diplomatic resolution at any point as a bad thing.

But that view point meets with the criticism of "then how will the war end?", which they are unable to answer and likewise unable to answer how tens of thousands of lives (other people's sons and daughter) are worthwhile to sacrifice for no rational plan but merely as a "heroic gesture" to make a moral point.

It's clear they don't even understand their own position, as it rests on a common fallacy that is typical in denial. For, in the situation that you are my hostage and you make some heroic attack that immediately gets you and your family killed, it is not really the case that your actions are immoral. I would still be in the wrong, still doing the killing, just that the result could have been avoided (by you) if I was not intent on killing you anyways. On the individual level, such actions we could categorise as unfortunate, perhaps even amoral (as you are not prepared for the situation), but clearly unwise (if it's clear I only want your television and I'll be on my way, and your attack is so surprising that I kill you and your family by accident).

However, such analogy with a individual in a difficult situation does not directly translate to nation states. A nation state is morally responsible to be prepared for a war and its conduct and making unwise decisions that get people killed is not morally neutral. For, the least we can say in the hostage situation is that you are gambling your own life, it is much different if your actions get immediately others killed, and you are fairly safe and have time to reflect, and, moreover, the decision to have others die increases your power and wealth, whereas wise decisions might save hundreds of thousands (even millions) of lives but end your political career (as a compromise never satisfies everyone).

To which they will respond that it's Russia that's bad at fault for everything and the debate goes around in a circle again.

In the background to all this is a parallel moral-logico propaganda loop that NATO is right to oppose Russia and "stand with Ukraine", but of course that means not taking any actual risk directly to NATO nor actually "standing with Ukraine" in any sense that involves actual standing with Ukrainian soldiers on the front line, and is right to limit arms shipments in a way that guarantees Russian victory on the battlefield -- that last part is easily fixed by just claiming Ukraine is winning somehow (because ... basically, Russia could be winning even harder right now, Ukraine could have capitulated, but they aren't winning as hard as is conceivable ... therefore: Ukraine is winning).

Sure, demonstrate your fanatical devotion to your preferred propaganda by proudly explaining your closed mindedness on a debate forum.

It's not a time honoured tradition to not address what your interlocutors actually say.

If you want to honour this tradition you're talking about, you should first address what's actually said and then carry on your project of speculating what unexamined assumptions there maybe.

For instance, in the Socratic method (indeed, time honoured) the way to do that is: asking questions.

Otherwise, just paraphrasing erroneously people is called: disrespectful and a waste of time.

For example, to take the text in question (and not risk erroneously paraphrasing you myself):

↪Tzeentch And you seem to assume that the Russian side never makes any mistake, and that "everything is going according to plan". So the reason you are "struggling to see where this idea comes from that Russia is losing" is simply that you assume that whatever happens is a desirable outcome for the Russians. — Olivier5

Nowhere does seem to assume never makes mistakes; the point was it that the idea of a significant Ukrainian victory (as plastered everywhere in the Western media at present) is questionable.

And those are just the facts (so far).

Kherson offensive had very little impact (so far at least).

Around Kharkiv, Russians simply withdrew (avoiding getting trapped or overrun, which could have easily happened had they not retreated, and would have been far worse).

The conclusion of the recent offensives (so far) is nothing really changed in the strategic situation and it appears a high cost in lives for Ukrainians to achieve a largely propaganda victory (which they certainly need to motivate more Western aid ... but wars are not won by propaganda alone, or Ukraine would rule the entire world by now).

In addition, Russia has demonstrated it can disable half the Ukrainian power grid.

This all could be a good setup for a diplomatic resolution, which the Europeans could easily force (if they weren't bitches ... but I think that boat has sailed a long time ago).

It's subconscious, I think. — Olivier5

If you're battling other people's subconscious, shouldn't you do that subconsciously and in silence?

And you seem to assume that the Russian side never makes any mistake, and that "everything is going according to plan". — Olivier5

I don't see anyone claiming this.

Rather, a good military plan includes what to do if certain missions fail.

Certainly plan A was Kiev accept the offered peace terms at the start of the war, obviously that plan failed.

However, there was clearly a plan B which was take the key Southern regions and liberate Donbas by force, do some denazification and so on.

In the current situation, certainly plan A is defend both Kherson and the Kharkiv region, but plan B is that if defending lines in Kharkiv fails to withdraw.

In chess the "not-best-moves" are categorised into inefficiencies, mistakes and blunders.

The ant-Russian propaganda presents the smallest of Russian setbacks as catastrophical blunders, and when it's explained that's obviously not the case then the retort is "you think the Russians don't make mistakes!"

Fact of the matter is, in purely military terms, Russians have no blundered. Being stuck in Crimea would have been a blunder, a rescue of Mariupol.

The offensive to Kiev obviously had pros and cons. Certainly involved many inefficiencies and mistakes ... but so too the Ukrainians.

When you send soldiers to war some of them are going to fuck up and die, it's just a fact. There's no evidence that Russians do more of this than the Ukrainians. To make a strategic appraisal we need to know if one side is fucking-up and dying more than the other.

And this key information we simply don't have. If the Russians killed a lot more soldiers and destroyed more vehicles, and of higher quality, than the Ukrainians in the Northern operations, then it is successful engagements of attrition, in addition to distracting Ukrainian forces from the South, it they had way higher losses then maybe it was still worth it as a fixing operation (or maybe not).

Likewise with the sanctions; could be a major blunder if the Russian economy collapses as has been predicted since the first week of the war ... but that hasn't happened yet.

The maps do not really put things in perspective.

There is a massive difference between the areas in the North previously occupied by the Russians and the areas in the South, in particular the Donbas, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia (which Kharkiv is not a part of).

The Southern Donbas to Kherson band is of obviously political and strategic importance: Donbas being the pro-Russian separatist region supported by Russia (and at least nominal cause of the whole war), Kherson controlling the canal that supplies water to Crimea and Zaporizhzhia is the region directly in front of Crimea (additional protection and connects to the other regions for supplies).

Russia conquers nearly all this additional territory in the South in about 3 days and then there is prolonged siege of the Azov battalion and other forces in Mariupol.

There is obvious political and strategic value of these regions, Russians conquer nearly all of what they currently have in a matter days, and still hold it and clearly are willing to defend it as we see in Kherson over last few days.

The Northern operation was very different. Russians simply went around towns and tried to surround Kiev.

Analysts kept on telling us it would take at least a million soldier army to occupy all of Ukraine, which the Russians didn't invade with ... well, they invaded with 200 000 soldiers and are now occupying 20% of Ukraine, so maybe the math checks out.

The operation in the North was quite obviously to achieve 3 things:

1. Ideally the capitulation of the Ukrainian regime (accepting the offered peace terms) with the pressure on the capital]\.
2. Failing that, fixing Ukrainian forces in the North to be unable to defend and/or launch counter-offensive in the South (before new fortifications, supply lines setup and towns passified, there is vulnerability to counter-attack).
3. Destroy industrial capacity and various targets around Kiev, which apparently is achieved.

Now, whether doing the above was a good strategy or not is one question, but there was obviously never any even remote attempt to storm Kiev or occupy all the Norther regions the Russians pass through.

How likely the Kremlin believed in Ukrainian capitulation I don't know, but obviously there was plan B which was take in the South the desired lands and strategic locations and destroy Azov Batallion (whether the Kremlin genuinely fears/ despises these neo-Nazi's is one question, but either way it is critical for the home audience to defeat Azov Batallion in particular).

In particular, now that all pro-Ukrainian propaganda is instantly declaring the Kherson operation a fixing attack ... it's just dumb to dismiss off-hand the Kiev offensive as not possibly a fixing attack but failed occupation of the North and storming of Kiev.

As for whether it was a good idea or not, Russian generals have several nightmare scenarios at the start of the war:

A. Being stopped coming out of Crimea and the entire Southern operation falling flat.
B. Even after the South operation succeeds, successful counter attack that (for example) creates a salient to Mariupol and breaks the siege (as well as just counter offensives generally speaking).

Had A or B occurred it would have been a massive embarrassment to the Russians.

Certainly some things have gone well and other things less well for the Russians, but they have not experienced anything like an actual military debacle. Propaganda needs to spin full tilt just to present Ukraine as "in the fight", so imagine if they had just shelled to rubble the bridges out of Crimea and the Russians never got out of there, or valiantly penetrated Russian lines and fought all the way to breaking the Siege of Mariupol.

Keep also in mind, that there is not only these purely strategic elements in the South described above, but that's where Azov battalion, of which defeating is absolutely essential to the entire de-Nazification enterprise. So, failure to take this region would have been completely disastrous in terms of international and domestic image (support for the war etc.).

So, considering the stakes in the South, it is entirely logical to commit forces to threaten the capital which then must be defended at all costs (liquidating Azov battalion maybe a priority for Russia, but keeping Kiev would be the priority for Kiev; so one priority for the other).

Of course, would have been even better for the Russians if Ukraine simply collapsed, accepted peace terms etc. but a military strategy does not take into account political resolution; that for politicians to do or not, military planners will assume there is no political resolution to the conflict in elaborating their plan -- if they are told not to try to take all of Ukraine, they will then simply plan for an eventual frozen never ending conflict a la North-South Korea.

Point is, whether the plan was the best, could have been better, should not have been launched in the first place etc. are all valid criticisms, but the criticism that the plan does not make sense or has already failed is simply not supportable.

Additionally, even for the Russians to withdraw at this time, it would still be less embarrassing than being stuck in Crimea or Azov Battalion being rescued.

Russians have (even if they withdraw now) demonstrated the massive amounts of man power, equipment and money required to deal with (200 000 of) them. From purely international relations perspective its not "so bad" if Ukraine has clearly paid a heavy price for the withdrawal (that no other rational party would want to pay). One cannot draw the conclusion that the Russians are push-overs, certainly neither the Ukrainians, but this doesn't necessarily encourage anyone to seek conflict with Russia anytime soon.

However, I very much doubt the Russians will withdraw and until Kherson West of the Dnieper is reconquered by Ukraine I have a hard time believing they have the offensive capabilities to seriously threaten Russian presence East of the Dnieper.

The regions the Russians are committed to holding have now dense and integrated fortifications, concrete shelters for tanks, bunker networks etc. electronic warfare setup, and is extremely hard to assault, as the recent offensive in Kherson demonstrate.

Russian tanks emerged from newly built cement fortifications to blast infantry with large-caliber artillery, the wounded Ukrainian soldiers said. The vehicles would then shrink back beneath the concrete shelters, shielded from mortar and rocket fire.

Counter-battery radar systems automatically detected and located Ukrainians who were targeting the Russians with projectiles, unleashing a barrage of artillery fire in response.

Russian hacking tools hijacked the drones of Ukrainian operators, who saw their aircraft drift away helplessly behind enemy lines. — Wounded Ukrainian soldiers reveal steep toll of Kherson offensive

Yes, offensive in Kharkiv (not part of Donbas ... no strategic importance to Crimea) did succeed, but none of the above was put in place.

The reason to tactically retreat from a region you are not intent of occupying long term (whatever the reason: political, terrain and/or man-power) is to save as many of your own troops as possible while inflicting significant casualties on the advancing army: artillery, mines, gunships, missiles and bombs in predetermined kill-zones.

Exactly. And such is often neglected by people who think "inside the box". — Olivier5

Agree, but the point of geopolitical analysis is to try to tease out what is more or less likely to happen, rather than be satisfied with the observation that many things are possible.

So what? The point is that a better Russia could emerge from this war, IFF Russian forces lose the war. — Olivier5

Sure, yeah, that's possible.

Of course, in theory a worse Russia could also emerge from it, eg if a leader even more nationalist than Putin get to replace Putin. — Olivier5

Also possible.

Bottom line is: the future is wide open, Ukraine can win and Russia can change. — Olivier5

I don't disagree.

We've been discussing these recent military developments, but there is still all the political and economic part in which many things are possible too.

Putin's failure to invade Ukraine will probably lead to his death and/or replacement by someone else at the helm of Russia. — Olivier5

Again, this has been claimed since basically day 2 of the invasion.

Sure, maybe, but as simply a propaganda statement to keep social media spirits high ... I don't think they could be any higher at any point of this conflict; however, the conflict clearly is not won or lost on social media.

There's also one detail that's fairly puzzling in this new narrative that Kharkiv was the real prize and Kherson just a fixing operation, which is that it seems agreed Ukraine lost about 5000-6000 KIA in the this alleged Kherson fixing operation.

That seems incredibly high for a fixing operation.

But again, to really evaluate things militarily we'd actually need to know KIA, wounded and material losses on both sides (and quality of those losses, such as the KIA in Kherson being the experienced elite, NATO trained units that can do offensives), and we don't know losses on both sides.

Thousands of Ukrainian KIA might be worth the territorial gains if somehow Kharkiv region is some critical strategic thing and the offensive continues from there ... or then simply there are more KIA Russians in these operations.

The war still remains mainly of attrition at this phase, and we'd need to actually know losses to evaluate what's happening militarily.

However, the grid attacks seem more significant to me and we'll see the fallout of this in the weeks and months to come. I honestly don't see how Ukraine could maintain their grid under conditions of continuous attacks and I honestly don't see how Ukraine can deal with simply not having grid based electricity over larger areas.

Foxes and sour grapes, again. When the Russian are booted out of Ukraine, you will say that Ukraine was not strategically important! :-) — Olivier5

This seems to me completely delusional.

And again, I stated my position before these offensives: taking Kherson would be a turning point.

I have not changed my goal posts.

The pro-Ukrainians changed their goal posts as soon as the Kherson offensive failed, but for months were talking about taking Kherson, praising the brilliant Himars attacks on the bridges that would make Russia unable to defend Kherson etc.

If the Ukrainians take Kherson, then I would view that as step one.

There was zero talk of the region around Kharkiv as having any importance before this offensive, the idea it's important is entirely retroactive. Before this re-definition of things what was important was: Kherson, Donbas and also the Nuclear plant, and all talk was on those 3 important things.

Ukraine achieves nothing on those important things ... so goes and does something no one was claiming was important to do and declares a major victory.

And, it's a broken record at this point, just a couple months ago Ukraine "pushed to the border" in Kharkiv region and that was somehow a major victory.

It seems to me people are attributing a little too much to this offensive. The fact that the captured territory was defended by tripwire troops implies it was not of any importance to Russia. — Tzeentch

Agreed.

Losing Kherson would be both bad militarily (likely thousands, if not tens of thousands, stuck and captured troops) as well as intensely embarrassing.

Retreating from around Kharkiv is certainly some embarrassment, but if it's not important area to hold then Russia can easily reverse the embarrassment with an important victory elsewhere.

Russia has clearly stated its main war objective is conquering the Donbas, which the Kharkiv region is not a part of. So, if Russia goes on to complete conquering all the Donbas then it can declare "winning" this key military objective.

The only goal, in my opinion, that Ukraine has achieved is that it has signalled to the West to still be capable of offensives, in the hopes to garner more aid. An army that cannot conduct offensives is broken and has in essence already lost - an impression that certainly must have crept in with Western leaders after the failed Kherson offensive. — Tzeentch

I believe this is an excellent summary of both my and @ssu debate and position on this subject. Definitely important to show at least some offensive potential.

However, it's entirely possible the withdrawal from around Kharkiv was pre-determined and also pre-determined it would be followed by attacking Ukrainian's electricity grid as militarily "logical" to both home and diplomatic audience (rather than out of the blue).

To followup my post above comparing to Isreal.

Perhaps a good diction for this sort of analysis, is defining military-diplomatic victory, which I would say Isreal definitely achieved in its various confrontations and negotiations with Arab neighbours, in contrast to purely military victory (such as defeat of Nazi Germany by the allies).

The Isreal example is a good example of what to do when you cannot simply defeat your opponents: win battles and negotiate acceptable resolutions.

Isreal did not continuously declare "we will not negotiate!" throughout all these conflicts with neighbours. Neighbours, useful to keep in mind, that had far more extreme rhetoric and really would have completely annihilated Isreal if they could, than Russia has against Ukraine.

That's called: statecraft.

Isreal did not throw temper tantrums and announce completely unrealistic demands in negotiations it rebuked as cowardly.

Isreal made consistent reasonable demands (such as the right to exist) as well as offers of compromise acceptable to opposing countries (despite anti-Isreal rhetoric 1000x more extreme than anything Putin has said about Ukraine), resulting in negotiated peace with Egypt, for example, that involved withdrawing from the Sinai (only way to make peace with Egypt).

Whether one approves or not of Isreal policies vis-a-vis the Palestinians, through force and diplomacy they have achieved key objectives, but it would be foolhardy to dismiss or minimise Israeli diplomats and statecraft in those achievements.

So, it's when people say Ukraine does not need to negotiate and can "win" militarily, which is when I point out that without diplomacy "winning" means conquering and defeating your enemy; otherwise, the war just continues forever.

Could the Russians hold Donbas and Crimea if they settled into just those regions? — jorndoe

Crimea seems truly completely unfeasible for Ukrainians to ever reconquer, without NATO supplying systems like an entire fleet of ships and hundreds of fighter aircraft.

With enough NATO support (and Ukrainian willingness to fight to the death as NATO proxies) I would guess it would be possible to push Russia out of Donbas.

However, the risk for NATO of even trying to do that is Russia resorts to tactical nuclear weapons.

NATO policy is very clearly to give enough support to Ukraine that they don't outright lose, but not enough that they can "win", even in very limited definitions of achieving some key war goals.

The situation, however, is very unstable.

However, the dream of a long war that bleeds the Russians may not survive Russia finally implementing NATO's Shock and Awe playbook of disabling the electricity infrastructure.

It was not clear to me how long Ukraine can hold out without electricity (both militarily and civilian endurance). True, people have withstood significant hardship without electricity in past wars, as @ssu points out ... but that was before electricity was a critical need to pretty much all modern social and economic activities.

No, this is only what it means for people who want to invade other people's land. But for people not bent on invading other countries, winning a war can mean something else, to be defined in each specific case. — Olivier5

Hmmm... has then Israel won any of it's wars against it's neoghbors? It still has them around and never have Israeli soldiers entered Damascus, Amman or Cairo. — ssu

Sure you can define "win" in some way that doesn't involve defeating your enemy, why for the context I'm talking about I put "winning" quotations.

The context where "winning" comes up and where I define "winning the war" as meaning defeating Russia, is addressing the idea of Ukraine not requiring a diplomatic resolution to the war but can achieve victory through military force.

For, even Ukraine pushed Russia back to the border ... that wouldn't be an end to the war, the war would still be on.

And Isreal is a good example of this; without defeating their opponents the war isn't actually over. It's only in hindsight that it makes sense to call the 6 days a war over 6 days, and a win for Isreal. Had fighting re-intensified then it would have been just the first engagement in a larger war.

For example:

Following the war, Egypt initiated clashes along the Suez Canal in what became known as the War of Attrition. — Wikipedia - Six day War

After following other Arab nations in declaring war, Mauritania remained in a declared state of war with Israel until about 1999. — Wikipedia - Six day War

Is the kind of thing that happens when a military battle or campaign is "won" without actually defeating the enemy. States of war continue and the word choice quickly becomes debatable.

6 Days War was initiated by Isreal attacking Egypt pre-emptively ... so according to the definition of repulsing an invasion is a "win", Egypt actually won that war. Obviously, Israelis may argue very differently.

Point is that military conflicts that do not end with one side being defeated are only ultimately ended diplomatically; states of war simply persist even without fighting, and it doesn't make sense to say the war is over ... but a "state of war" persists.

War refers to both military conflict as well as a diplomatic relationship between nations or groups (that may not involve fighting all the time).

Now, in the case of Mauritania's state of war with Isreal that persisted for decades, it doesn't matter all that much because Mauritania did not have practical means to invade and attempt to defeat Isreal any given day. These sorts of state of war is symbolic, but nevertheless there is still technically a war.

However, the Ukraine-Russia situation is very different; pushing back Russia to its borders would not result in a situation such as Isreal and Mauritania where the persisting state of war could be said to be symbolic and there is no real threat. Russia would still be a considerable threat to Ukraine and could re-invade at any moment, the war would not be "over" and Ukraine would not have "won".

To force Russia to accept Ukraine's terms would mean going and defeating Russia, you know: "winning".

The alternative to winning in a military sense to end a war, is a diplomatic resolution (how most wars end); a diplomatic resolution is not a surrender, and so neither side is defeated and neither side "lost the war". Of course, one side will have lost more than the other, but this will always be debatable and each side will point to some evaluation criteria that implies they won, and certainly didn't do as badly as the other side claims.

For example, I have heard Americans mention many times that they sort-of-kind-of won in Vietnam because they killed way more Vietnamese.

In the case of this war, even if Ukraine pushed Russia back to the border and then a diplomatic resolution that ended the war ... at what cost in lives, trauma and infrastructure and economic development? If the West does not rebuild Ukraine as sort-of-kind-of-promised, is that "winning"? We can debate it.

However, this would be fairly hypothetical debate of what clear "winning" would be in a diplomatic resolution after pushing the Russians out of Ukraine, as Ukraine's current stated "war goals" is re-conquering all of Ukrainian territory including Crimea, which really seems completely unfeasible.

Currently Ukraine does not have enough military potential to push Russian's out of their enclave West of the Dnieper which would be a miniature version and far easier task than pushing Russians out of Crimea. And, definitely Ukrainians would push Russians back across the Dnieper if they could; it's a major strategic pain the enemy having a large bridgehead across a water body.

Additionally, for sure Ukraine cannot defeat Russia in any of the proposed definitions of "winning" and has never been in a position to be able to.

The conflict is one between Russia and NATO with Ukraine serving as proxies using NATO weapons, NATO training and NATO intelligence.

And, as I've stated, I believe NATO can defeat Russia in a conventional conflict and can supply Ukraine sufficiently to produce some lighter form of battle field victory, even without Nukes which NATO could provide to even the playing field but obviously chooses not to (for the same entirely good political reasons that Russia doesn't nuke Ukraine).

My position is not that NATO does not have the capacity to push the Russians back to the border using Ukraine as proxy soldiers.

My position is that NATO chooses not to.

You seem to be of the opinion that Ukraine could not win this war. It can, and it will! — Olivier5

That's obvious.

First, "winning" the war would mean defeating Russia, which is pretty obviously Ukraine is not capable of invading and conquering Russia. That's what "winning a war" means.

For example, allies "won" against Germany by conquering Germany in WWII.

Even if they pushed Russia out of Ukraine that's still not "winning" a war, the war would still be on and Russia could re-invade anytime which is not an end to war in a "winning" state.

There could be military victories followed by a truce that people would consider a win, but there is basically zero chance of that, it would just be a frozen conflict.

Second, retaking Crimea does really seem not feasible from a military point of view, so even Ukraine's "winning light" definition, really does not seem militarily feasible.

Third, Russia could nuke all of Ukraine at anytime, so even if Ukraine did either of the above it's not because Russia "cannot" defeat them military, but because Russia chose not to for political reasons (obviously good political reasons, but not a straightforward military defeat).

Now, what diplomatic resolution to the war would be some sort of "win" is always up for debate, but if we're talking about winning wars in a military sense the conditions are clear: defeat the opposing military, conquer their territory or force surrender in the process of doing that.

Nope. Anyone serious hasn't said that. — ssu

Have you followed Western media?

However, if you're simply stating that the "retired generals" and other talking heads in major Western media aren't serious, but propagandists, then of course I agree.

With every tenth Ukrainian being a refugee, the GDP having crashed and the possibility of hyperinflation would be devastating politically in peacetime. — ssu

I'm not talking about those things, but the electricity grid which is required for things like the train system.

Even if Russia's objective isn't to take of all of Ukraine, basically just the Novorossiya-part, it is an existential fight for the Ukrainians. — ssu

So even if Russia's objective is not to threaten the existence of Ukraine ... it's still an existential fight for Ukraine?

That Russia has now postponed those referendums to join Russia tells very clearly to Ukrainians what is at stake. And there's still the option that Putin goes for martial law. — ssu

I'm not sure I understand what you mean here about postponing the elections. I'd interpret that as simply due to practical considerations of the war intensifying or then a diplomatic message that the status of these regions can still be negotiated (if would be more problematic, even perhaps impossible, for Russia to hold elections that declare independence, Russia recognises that independence and then "gives back" the territory; that would no longer make any legal sense).

For us Europeans, living in our comfortable peacetime, energy shortages can be a huge issue. — ssu

Electricity is not just about comfort. Having all sorts of systems running smoothly throughout the war was of critical strategic benefit to Ukrainians, not only in making military operations far easier but also less civilian problems to deal with.

Yes, generators are easy to run for military systems.

However, standing next to a generator is the "most likely to be killed" spot according to my military training. You can place them farther from your encampment but voltage and just the weight of cables places severe limitations on that.

Generators produce significant and persistent IR signatures.

Being able to conduct a war with access to the civilian grid all over the battle space is a major strategic asset (all sorts of systems either need to be plugged in or require battery recharge). Of course, it was a strategic asset gifted by the Russians that they've now clearly ungifted.

Grids are insanely fragile to explosions.

Point is, we are not seeing the war clearly "swing" in Ukraines favour (such as taking Kherson I would agree Russia would be clearly embarrassed, although that still would be a clear sign Ukraine could continue East of the Dnieper).

There are pros and cons for each side in recent developments.

Even ignoring the grid, to evaluate Ukrainians gains we need to know the losses, which don't. If they lost significant and unsustainable armour and troops to take territory that Russia tactically withdrew from, then that's not a victory.

As usual I think we agree, you are making the case developments are good for Ukraine (but we lack information to really know) and I am criticising that position but recognise things are clearly not "100%" in Russia's favour.

I have always accepted that surprises are possible in any way, just I (personally) could not see how offensives without armour would be possible to do, which the current events support (significant armour was used, so a critical question is whether armour attrition rates are sustainable not only for Ukraine but for NATO as a whole).

There you are going on against a lot of military analysts, to whom it's their actual job to analyze these. — ssu

The same analysts that said Russian troops have low morale and will completely collapse ... like 2 days into the war?

Doesn't take an analyst to see Russia still holds Kherson.

I states that Kherson was the litmus test of Ukrainian military potential, it is still in Russian hands ... so I'm not so impressed.

If Kherson fell, then I'd completely agree things are clearly bad for Russia, but that didn't happen. I see no reason to change my analysis to the idea that Kharkiv region was the real prize all along.

There's nothing really in the Kharkiv region, you just have to cross it to take Kharkiv which the Russians have never tried to do, and it's gone back and forth precisely because the Russians have no reason to defend it fiercely and what they are trained to do is tactically retreat and bombard enemy forces.

It's these back and forth manoeuvres around Kharkiv which is where Russia is doing exactly their military doctrine, so it's difficult to say doing what you say is a good idea is somehow an embarrassment.

The reason Russia trains this way is because Russia is massive, so it's better to retreat, bombard as you go, regroup and then counter attack (hopefully) enemy formations that have overstretched their supply lines (see: Napoleon, Hitler).

Really? — ssu

We're not in disagreement. I agree being able to do any offensive is better than being able to do zero.

However, Kharkiv region itself is not critically strategically, unless you want to take Kharkiv. But anything else you want to do you can easily go around, unlike Kherson that is a critical bridge head for the Russians West of the Dnieper and controls the canal bringing water to Crimea (although I assume you'd need both sides of the river to shut that off again, but obviously taking one side is the first step to taking two sides).

What's critical in the current situation is Kherson for the reasons above, and Donbas for the political reasons that is where Russia declared it wants to liberate.

And I made clear I'm not saying this is a "good development" for Russia in some topsy-turvy reasoning. Any general would prefer not losing any ground and not losing any troops, no denying that.

However, development isn't all that great for Ukraine either.

What's a critically strategic battle is something like taking Mariupol or Donetsk; Russians say they're going to take it, Ukraine says they're going to defend it; the commitment of both armies to the battle is clear and the stakes are clear. That's power: you say you're going to do something, then you do it and no one can stop you. Ukraine said they would take Kherson, started something, were stopped. Now they say that was the pan all along, but that still presupposes they don't have the power to take Kherson.

From the Russian point of view, had they lost Kherson that's a major embarrassment they can't spin, so they commit serious troops there. Places that are less important will just be retreated from, counter attacked later if there was reason to.

That's pretty normal strategy.

But I agree that doing any offensive at all is better than doing nothing.

And it is still clearly bad thing even from Russia's perspective, as they've now escalated to Shock and Awe NATO playbook of destroying the electricity grid.

So, yes, militarily speaking that Ukraine can do any offensive is certainly good for Ukraine, but losing the power grid (potentially permanently) is bad for Ukraine.

Also of note, my prediction that Ukraine could not do any offensives at all was without armour in the "javelin hysteria" phase of the war, but these offensives had heavy use of armoured vehicles.

And this is still an important consideration, as it's unclear to me how much armour Ukraine has and can get. If these offensives heavily attrit their armour and if that can't be replaced, then we are not seeing sustainable gains (even if the attacks on the grid aren't a problem).

↪ssu Pity poor boethius who thought this could never happen. — Olivier5

What are you talking about?

I stated taking Kherson is the litmus test of Ukrainian counter offensive potential.

It is obviously vulnerable and obviously strategically critical, as holding Kherson West of the Dnieper is a major strategic pain (Russia can constantly threaten counter offensive West of the river, which would be significantly harder if they were stuck on the East side of the river).

Ukraine had a serious offensive there that did not work. It's now said that it was a "faint" to attack around Kharkiv, but that doesn't seem the case to me.

Furthermore, if you could take Kershon you would for the reasons above, there would not be a strategic reason to not take it and hitting the brides is an obvious first step for a serious effort to take it.

The last times Ukraine suffered a strategic defeat, they would take land around Kharkiv, which is not strategically important and the Russians simply tactically retreat to the Russian border, re-advance later, as their war doctrine instructs.

Just a few months ago Ukraine "fought to the border!" and raised a flag, and this seems like
more like a repeat of that .

Kharkiv is simply not a strategically important offensive.

Of course, that they can do any offensive is still meaningful, obviously more than zero; however, armies are tested fighting over strategically important locations and everything else is "tactical retreat" and does not mean so much in itself.

Granted, it's not a good thing to lose territory, so Russia has responded by hitting power plants and taking down half the grid in Ukraine. In terms of pure military analysis, this sort of infrastructure is pretty important for Ukraine's war effort.

Ukraine has not just "won the war" as some parts of the internet seem to think.

Far, far from it.

Could they win?

Yes, with enough NATO support it's possible. But NATO does not give that "enough support".

My position is not "Ukraine can't win", but, as I've made clear many times, my position is US and NATO policy is to support Ukraine just enough to prop it up but not enough to win.

A sign of a "winning" army would be taking Kherson (which I have not said that Ukraine "can't possibly take it", just pointed out that whether they do or not is the best signal of their military potential), and that they couldn't take Kherson so instead attacked land Russia policy is clearly to just retreat from whenever attacked is very much compatible with the hypothesis that US and NATO will not support Ukraine enough to actually win.

Now, the reason the Russians tactically retreat from around Kharkiv whenever there is an offensive there is because it's not strategically important area. The area around Kharkiv only strategically matters in taking Kharkiv, which the Russians have never tried to do

Except giving military and financial aid to Ukraine. Which actually rarely happens. — ssu

That's not "standing" with someone, it's supplying arms.

How isn't the ANNEXATION of Ukrainian territory clear evidence of this? — ssu

Because there's an important port in Sevastopol which an anti-Russian government supported by literal Nazi's would threaten, and Crimea was Russian not long ago and is filled with ethnic Russians.

Of course, you can argue Russia should not have annexed all of Crimea to protect a military base, but it's clearly a large and credible motivator and is not related to absorbing all of Ukraine.

Or the Russification that Russia is doing in the occupied territories? — ssu

Again, what's at issue here is that the idea that Putin and the Kremlin's goal is now, and has been all along, to annex all of Ukraine and destroy all of Ukrainian culture. That's the proposition being contested.

I'm pretty sure you've mentioned yourself several times that the preferred outcome of the first phase of the invasion was regime change to a government friendly to Russia, which is what fits the troops committed and the rolling tanks to the capital and soft hands on Ukrainian infrastructure.

A total war of annihilation would have looked very different.

And again, if Russia's goal was total destruction of Ukraine and Ukrainian culture it could easily use nuclear weapons to largely accomplish that.

If you retort that: ok, ok, ok Putin and the Kremlin's priority isn't the total destruction of Ukraine, as it has the tools to do that and has not done so, and there's all these other goals and conditions to consider ... but, but, but they'd still love to own Ukraine if they could by magic.

Ok sure, I'm sure Putin and the Kremlin would like to own the entire world if somehow it was magically feasible. However, in the real world, if you claim someone has an objective, they have the tools to achieve that objective, and they don't ... then that's clearly not their objective and speculating about what people would wish, or rather, or prefer if they could somehow magically have it, isn't very useful.

I'm sure Trump would have preferred to own the whole world too if it was magically feasible, but claiming that was Trump's objective as president is dumb.

I won't post the bat-shit insane things the neo-Nazi's have said, as I don't want to deal with Nazi apologetics just right now.

Maybe in a few days.

Still, after all these months, no one has actually answered the question of how many Nazis with power and influence would be too many Nazis with power and influence.

A circle jerk of factoids and propaganda is not a philosophical discussion.

You can say "Russia's bad" and "Russia could withdraw" all you want, but if there's no political or military plan to do so, what's the point.

And, the only person who has actually proposed a military "tough way" plan to "force" Putin to back down, is myself. Of course, that's not interesting to any pro-Ukrainian interlocutor, because the fantasy of supplying arms as literally "Standing with Ukraine" is so entertaining.

In a situation like this your arms dealer is the same as your drug dealer.

Feels good every hit.

#StandWithUkraine

Again, no one is actually "standing" with Ukraine, except a few foreign fighters.

If Norwar and other NATO countries were actually standing with Ukraine, then Ukraine could easily be defended.

Which then brings no the retort that that would start WWIII.

Ok, but if "Standing with Ukraine" that way may start WWIII, then doing so in a substitute way has the same risk.

Solution, no matter how "bad" Russia is, arm Ukraine just enough to reduce Russia war aims ... but not enough to actually be any sort of loss.

Currently Russia has nearly all of the Donbas, Crimea, Kershon, and Ukraine has not been able to budge Russian lines West of the Dnieper.

Literally since day one of the war we are told Russian military morale is bad and will collapse any day, sanctions are hitting and Russian state will collapse any day.

On a related note, here is a recent opinion piece by Fiona Hill and Angela Stent in Foreign Affairs: The World Putin Wants:

Vladimir Putin is determined to shape the future to look like his version of the past. Russia’s president invaded Ukraine not because he felt threatened by NATO expansion or by Western “provocations.” He ordered his “special military operation” because he believes that it is Russia’s divine right to rule Ukraine, to wipe out the country’s national identity, and to integrate its people into a Greater Russia. — SophistiCat

We see statements like this, but never see any evidence.

People in the West are living in a fantasy world where the war can be won on social media.

Meanwhile tens of thousands of Ukrainians have been killed, many more traumatised and displaced, as a consequence of social media bloodlust.

The narrative doesn't even make any sense, since if the first phase of the war was a disaster for Russia, then easy to negotiate a peace on good terms.

Of course, Russia would never give back Crimea, so if your bloodlust extends to that, then at least have the decency to append "with hundreds of thousands of lives spent doing it".

In Kekkonen's and Koivisto's time yes, but in the 1990's the tabloid press started to be "normal" even in Finland by European standards. For the last thirty years they would go for the jugular when these kind of pictures / videos come out. And now, in our time, the "old media" just has to respond what already has happened as is already discussed in the social media. — ssu

Oh yes, I totally agree it would be an issue for a male, especially prime minister, but some woman see it differently. But how bad an issue, and also what would be a comparable situation is difficult to judge.

I'm not sure just how well that "boys will be boys" thing will go in the post me-too environment. — ssu

The power of boys will be boys is fading, but I would not say it is close to impotent.

But I think we are largely in agreement on the issue.

Apparently the PM has now been chastised and pledged an end to partying.

And of course, if it would be a male PM, however good looking, he would be out. I think just a photo of a male intimately dancing with a female singer when his wife and daughter are at home would be enough. Nobody would believe the "we're just friends" answer. — ssu

My woman friends claim it wouldn't even be an issue if it was a male politician. There's a bunch of examples of male politicians getting blackout drunk on official visits and so on, but my counter-point is they weren't Prime Minister, but things like cultural minister (representing Finnish drinking culture).

However, a male getting drunk and frisky at a party I don't think would be automatically interpreted as cheating. Easily have a "boys will be boys" narrative around it, but I do agree the leaving your wife alone with the child to go party would be viewed as classic douche archetype ... but that's not necessarily so damaging politically.

(Some of Sanna's friends using the prime ministers residence information room to get cool photos. She first tried to say the pictures were taken at the toilet. Notice the same "Finland" sign and Sanna himself has acknowledged that they are genuine, which she regrets.) — ssu

First I need to point out to everyone how confusing it is to be in Finland until you realise Finn's will use he / she pronouns interchangeably in reference to the same person in the same sentence.

So many stories I'm like: this couple has a really complicated relationship.

Above all, last year when the first partying videos emerged from the prime minister's official residence, her polls did actually go up. Because then it really was just about singing and dancing. — ssu

Basically in complete agreement with your whole analysis.

The issue is really about the video not being "just" dancing. If she was just busting moves, even awkward one's, it would be an endearing video showing she's "just like us".

But the video, how things look and all the details you mention, is not just dancing.

Of course, legal complaints are spurious, but a pretext to just keep talking about the video, make sure everyone sees it a bunch.

As some random reddit poster pointed out, that I unfortunately forget where, there's an older crowd in Finland that frowns upon this sort of dancing and partying. However, there's also a middle-age and younger crowd that doesn't do this kind of partying as either they think it's stupid or they would like to, but don't have that kind of money and friends, and have fomo about it.

Not everyone does this sort of crazy, out of your mind clubbing.

Of course, count me in.

I think you and me will have to wait about 30 years before we have a reasonable view of what likely happened. — ssu

Sure, it might be so.

So your " completely open to speculation of essentially any plausible motive", yet you have decided that NATO expansion "is clearly a main driver of the hostilities and tensions". — ssu

Obviously NATO expansion is a plausible motive and clearly a main driver of hostilities and tensions over the decades since the end of the cold war.

It's clearly a main driver of events.

Well perhaps "a main driver" is better than "the main driver". — ssu

Exactly why I say "a" instead of "the", as other plausible ideas of motives still feature NATO expansion as a main driver, and certainly legitimate to some degree, but serving more as pretext for the real main drivers (such as imperialism or Putin's legacy and the like). And even if one were to posit that invasion would occur regardless of NATO expansion in the counter-factual, the fact NATO does expand makes it at least a main driver of the events we actually see.

I would not find it credible a theory that proposed NATO expansion has nothing to do with it and is not a main driver of events. Certainly Russian policy vis-a-vis NATO expansion (or then because they will invade anyways) is also a main driver, but the speculative part we're considering is what's exactly the motive behind the Russian policy.

The point I was making in my last post is that the context is still NATO expansion over decades, these are facts, so any explanation of motive needs to account for this (whether some sort of good faith, bad faith, or even nefarious "Russia engineered NATO expansion" somehow), to contrast with a popular Western framing that presents the invasion as essentially out of the blue (no invasion of Georgia after the NATO announcement, no coup in 2014, no civil war against ethnic Russians since, no advanced Baltic missile bases to protect against Iran and so on).

Well, if it was just NATO membership, Russia wouldn't be annexing parts of Ukraine. It is as simple as that you cannot deny that. You simply cannot. Regime change yes, annexation no. — ssu

For certain there are other considerations. NATO expansion I mentioned as main driver since the end of the cold war, at least of the particular events as they particularly occur. Of course, the counter factual of no NATO expansion is completely legitimate to argue would be "Russian imperialism unleashed" as much as mundane EU integration.

Regime change has obviously failed. However, Russia did offer to completely withdraw for recognition of Crimea, neutral Ukraine, independent Donbas (within Ukraine) and Russian speaker rights protected.

There are several interpretations of the annexations, ranging from leverage to still try just to achieve above, to Crimea being a completely legitimate critical security issue that then needs water, to the plan was to start annexing more and more of Ukraine whenever the opportunity arises.

By annexing territories of other sovereign countries. Right. :roll: — ssu

Definitely you can say the reaction is unjustified, I go to some length to explain that.

For example, I would certainly agree I have provoked more than a few people on this forum from time to time, and if one of them came to my door and shot me, I would not agree that's reasonable or justified, but it is still true I provoked them.

Provocation does not entail some moral fault. Pretty much any protest is provocative vis-a-vis police and whoever's being protested against.

However, the only evidence available is that NATO / Ukraine does something provocative, and then Russia reacts to that provocation. Saying annexing territories is totally "out of line" is of course a legitimate line of argument.

Where provocation is relevant is in terms of evaluating pre-planning which is the narrative I have issue with. If you go to a bar and get provoked and get into a fight, even if totally overreacting and committing crimes where the provocation is legal, it still demonstrates you didn't go to the bar with the intention of getting into a fight. Of course, unless you go to a bar that you know you'll get provoked in so as to have an excuse to punch a guy.

We've had this discussion in this thread of what Crimea meant for Russia, how Crimea is now seen as integral part of Russia and how it is now seen by Putin an illegal act and so on. — ssu

I have zero problem with the idea that Russia "wanted" Crimea anyways. The debate (between plausible theories) could be framed as whether Russia is using events as an excuse to overreact and Annex territory or then had no such plan but feels it necessary as events unfold. I.e. is the 2014 coup a genuine surprise and the annexation of Crimea a snap reaction to secure critical defence positions, or was it the plan all along and simply waiting for the reason to do so.

Professor Mearsheimer does not exclude this latter scenario, just that there's actual evidence supporting it. However, even if Russia is reacting, again, doesn't mean Russia is the victim or that the reactions are justified.

If your are blind to the fact that Russia wants to dominate all of it's former states and does want parts of Ukraine, if it can, then there's not much to change your view. — ssu

I have zero problem accepting such a premise.

The question is what to do about it.

I go to some length to develop the feasibility of having implemented (more difficult now but could still be arranged as a "peace keeping" thing) a military standoff with Russia by sending in NATO troops, thus daring Putin to attack NATO. Sending boots on the ground in Ukraine is obviously not directly attacking Russia, it would still be Russia starting a conflict with NATO if it were to attack Ukraine and whatever soldiers are there.

Of course, as a some sort of ballsy Western cowboy move, probably would result directly in WWIII as other posters have mentioned.

However, accompanied by a diplomatic theory more sophisticated than kindergarten name calling, with enticing compensatory offers to Russia (Nord Stream 2 and so on), not only would I expect that to work, but I still, even now, would evaluate it as more stabilising and less risky than the current policy (which, as we've seen, gets us super close to WWIII anyways as well as a chaotic and destructive war, in itself a risky thing).

What I have issue with is the "well, we won't actually take risks ourselves to prevent the war using 'force', the only language Putin understands and respects according to our narrative, so we'll just pour arms into an incredibly unstable and destructive process that affects the entire globe in terms of food and energy prices, triggering the first event we could consider global famine."

If protecting Ukrainian sovereignty is a moral imperative, then y'a gotta do what y'a gotta do and send in troops to do that protecting.

If avoiding WWIII is the moral imperative and a conflict with Russia over Ukraine is a pathway to that ... then gotta compromise and basically let Russia have major concessions concerning Ukraine to avoid war; and indeed, concessions would involve ceding territory, such as Crimea, and accepting the risk Russia may take more land later.

It boils down to simply both principles being in conflict and you can't have both; you can't minimise conflict with Russia to avoid probability of WWIII but then also stop them militarily taking what they want to take.

Pouring in arms is a worst of both worlds in my opinion: widespread destruction, Ukraine loses territory, and still incredibly unstable situation (globally) that can lead to WWIII anyways.

Again the "Putin attacked Ukraine because of NATO-membership" argument? — ssu

That's not what I nor Philip short is stating.

The thesis is clear:

Nearly six months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is still widespread disagreement in the west on Vladimir Putin’s motives. — Philip Short - has written authoritative biographies including Putin

We don't really know what the motives are, there is widespread disagreement, and several narratives have come and gone about it in the Western press.

I'm completely open to speculation of essentially any plausible motive.

I think everyone agrees that one single reason doesn't explain a decision to go to war and obviously Russia wouldn't like Ukraine to be a member of NATO. However this idea that this was the most important reason (or only reason) depends on the idea that Ukrainian membership was possible/realistic/imminent. — ssu

Again, neither I nor the author I cite is claiming this.

However, it's pretty clear that declaring Ukraine and Georgia will join NATO some day is the trigger that set's in motion the violent events that follow starting with the invasion of Georgia. Professor Mearsheimer point about that is that there is simply no evidence of any plan to invade Georgia nor Ukraine before declaring they would join NATO.

It is clearly a main driver of the hostilities and tensions.

The significant escalation in 2014 is again only after a violent coup against a "moderate" (from the point of view of Russian relations) and the rise of anti-Russian neo-Nazi groups who then start a forever war in Donbas against separatists, refuse all settlement proposals.

No one is claiming Russia engineered the coup, and there's literal audio evidence of USA "choosing their man" as president. Russia, Ukraine and EU came to a resolution before things got further out of control, then several peace processes failed, and people were being shelled and dying for 8 years.

Now, what to make of this context is of course up for debate. One can speculate that somehow it was Russia that engineered all these things to get to this point of invading Ukraine. But, it would speculation and there is no evidence for it.

The only prima facie interpretation of the context available is that Russia is reacting to clearly hostile moves. Ok, even if one accepts that, one can argue Russia has no right to react to such hostile moves, they're not "all that hostile" considering it's not realistic Ukraine will join NATO even if NATO is publicly saying that's the goal and Ukraine places it in their constitution.

However, the context is just facts and what the facts have issue with is a narrative of Russia suddenly and without provocation invading a weaker neighbour who then valiantly "stand alone".

There's of course lot's to debate; one can accept declaring Ukraine and Georgia will join NATO is a provocation without accepting that is reasonable or moral basis to invade, or even wise to invade even it if was just and reasonable to want to.

One can argue that somehow "this is what Russia wanted all along!" and has engineered events to go this way, knowing Ukraine would refuse all reasonable proposals for peace they keep proposing reasonable resolutions at every step of the crisis in a sort of bad faith prediction of the counter-party bad faith; it's certainly possible, I don't put anything past the cloak and dagger under world, but there's simply no existing evidence for that.