I would think so too. — AmadeusD
We definitely agree on this point so I will try to synthesize the debate so far as well as transcribe some key passages of MacIntyre.
My position is essentially MacIntyre's position except with a Kantian "boost" as it were to upgrade some of his claims to categorical imperatives.
For example, MacIntyre doesn't like manipulative social relationships, I would simply upgrade that not-liking to a categorical imperative: we can disagree, we can be at odds, we can compete in different contexts, we can try to convert each other to our own view, we can fight, we can come to blows, maybe even kill each other to resolve our differences, but I view it as a categorical imperative not to manipulate you; i.e. deceive you into acting against your own objectives by making you believe falsehoods (which is not required for coercion, which I still view as necessary for society to function, but we can be coercive without being manipulative), which of course is Kant's central thesis: treat people as ends in themselves, as echoes in many religions: do onto others as you would have them do onto you.
That being said, MacIntyre's description of contemporary Western society and how we got here and where it's headed, and his own proposed program I fully agree with; it's all quite brilliant so I will try to do my best in finding the best passages to present it.
As I don't know A.Ms work, I'll take your word for it - but this actually exemplifies exactly what Im talking about. Taking a moral framework pigeon-holes the positions you're allowed to take, and what consittutes a virtue under it. I take no such position so it's somewhat Hard to respond. It all seems incoherent to me without first accepting that Morality is invented and obtains only between the margins of those frameworks. — AmadeusD
I have not yet really presented MacIntyre's argument, but his starting point is exactly that you need a moral tradition in which moral ideas and decisions even have meaning, and it only from the standpoint of one tradition that it is even possible to comprehend the claims of another tradition; one can not be traditionless. I'm not sure that's exactly compatible with "obtains only between the margins of those frameworks", but we can get into that when I make a thread presenting MacIntyre's After Virtue positions.
I'm unsure this has to do with my position. I would, in general, agree, but the social consequences have v little to do with my moral position. My intuitive reaction to them is what informs my moral position on any given act. I couldn't predict what I would think morally correct in a novel situation, for example. My intuitive reaction might include some consideration of the social consequences, but that doesn't support my moral, let's say, claim. The claim is just that it makes me uncomfortable, so I wouldn't do it and prefer others didn't. Because It makes me uncomfortable. No other reasons. — AmadeusD
As mentioned, the purpose of developing the social consequences is claritive.
All these sorts of questions are with the purpose of understanding your position.
As you may appreciate, a significant amount of moral-relativists (whether emotivist or straight nihilists or some other flavour) essentially operate by "grandfathering in" a long list of moral rules and social opinions that they take for granted. The fact that in normal situations it's "off limits" to advocate those positions (such as torturing children) they take to mean it's therefore off limits as criticism (i.e. that they are only defending what is already socially acceptable); however, if someone makes the claim "there are no moral obligations whatsoever" of then "all moral positions are as good as another" what's entailed by that is there is no moral obligation to not torture babies nor interfere with someone so engaged.
Agreed. I largely reject the usefulness of thought experiments for this reason, within moral discussions. — AmadeusD
I strongly disagree here; thought experiments are the primary tool of developing a moral theory.
Of course, I understand you would want to avoid that if you're theory is simply based on spontaneous emotional reaction to situations that arise ... but one such situation that arises is someone putting to you a thought experiment in which you'll have an emotional reaction too.
However, the examples I've provided are not even really thought experiments, they are real examples: people really do torture, murder, rape, extort and take bribes.
It has. But the mistake in the previous seems to still be live, despite your acknowledgement. But, as with the bit you quoted, I could just be misunderstanding, so it's not too important. — AmadeusD
It is not a mistake if a question is honest and not a criticism.
It is not a gotcha. If you propose no moral claim is better than another and are willing to "pay the cost" as MacIntyre says about people who take this to it's logical conclusion, then the debate would proceed from there.
Of course, in normal society a debate is "won" when a proponent (from their point of view of course) leads a position to a conclusion which society already disagrees with (at least in their opinion), ideally some taboo (such as Nazis and pedophiles and so on). But of course, even if those premises are all correct, it simply begs the question of whether "society" really is correct about that moral position. Maybe Nazis were right after all.
An authentic criticism would thus require an actual justification that society is correct on that particular point to form a sound and valid argument.
Which I have not done yet, as I want to fully understand your position before critiquing it.
I'm unsure this has to do with my position. I would, in general, agree, but the social consequences have v little to do with my moral position. My intuitive reaction to them is what informs my moral position on any given act. I couldn't predict what I would think morally correct in a novel situation, for example. My intuitive reaction might include some consideration of the social consequences, but that doesn't support my moral, lets say, claim. The claim is just that it makes me uncomfortable, so I wouldn't do it and prefer others didn't. Because It makes me uncomfortable. No other reasons. — AmadeusD
Well this is quite important to know in order to understand your point of view.
I am not. I am invoking the (probably, largely ignored) fact that the surgeon has taken on the patient's emotional position. If they have not, and are a sociopath, your point would be apt for them. In this way, my personal moral position is just don't hire sociopaths as surgeons to avoid this problem. But that's mechanistic, not moral. The problem is moral and only exists in that I, personally think it sucks the surgeon did that. — AmadeusD
We certainly agree it is better to avoid the situation, but the issue is what duty does the surgeon have to the patient.
In a world of no duties, then the surgeon has no duty to perform the surgery to the best of their ability and obviously until completion.
Obviously in our society the surgeon would be convicted of gross negligence and likely murder, but that process is completely predicated on society's existing belief the surgeon has a duty to perform the contractual engagement, perform as best he can, and certainly "do no harm". However, if the truth is there is no duties then there's no foundation upon which society could legitimately demand any of this and no way to maintain a system (with detectives, prosecutors, judges all performing their duties) to enforce accountability to those demands.
No, there is not. I don't invoke one. There is no duty. There is the fact that, upon hte patient's emotional state, completing the surgery successfully would be preferable. If the surgeon actually didn't go in sharing this state, then fine. Walk away. I don't care. — AmadeusD
Obviously we both prefer no one to be needlessly harmed, so we agree on what is preferable.
The disagreement is on whether what's preferable can also be morally obligatory.
Your view is quite clear on this topic.
It will take another thread to actually critique your view.
I don't understand this passage, or it's genesis apparently. Suffice to say, I disagree. It might be another discussion, once I get across what you're doing with this part of your response.
that society might end. And that might be good. — AmadeusD
Not at all. The quote you present immediately after this is my denying that it matters, or that there would be a 'crisis'. The society would end. So what? — AmadeusD
Again, just trying to understand your position.
All the duties I will argue along with MacIntyre are real actual duties ultimately aim to continue humanity.
If you're ambivalent to the continuation of humanity then that is likely the very heart of the difference.
If people choose, collectively to do things, Great. I don't ascribe any duty to it at all. Society is cool. I have no other thoughts on it really. — AmadeusD
My points were derived from what many moral relativists do which is to deny there are any moral truths (in one way or another) but then continuously argue that society will continue on being "good", which makes no sense if there is not good and bad.
All points of mine on this theme is not only in relation to what moral relativists usually do, but also people in general in Western society: moral relativists language is used to avoid criticism of one's own actions ("don't criticize my diet I can eat what I want!! It's my life!!"), while moral absolutist language is used to criticize opponents ("I condemn my political opponents!! This is a violation!!").
Now clearly this doesn't apply to you, but I spent some time on this post to be sure of it as well as for the benefit of anyone following our discussion.
I would say so, as all these objections sit well with me. I'm not a Libertarian. — AmadeusD
We definitely agree here.
Yep. I also 100% disagree with your framing of the situations you refer to. But, obviously, this is not hte place Apt for it**. I did anticipate this type of disagreement :P — AmadeusD
We definitely will need to go deeper in another thread, so we can maybe return to this point and contrast framings.
This is a bit bad-faithy-sounding. I said nothing of the kind, and intimated nothing of the kind. I spoke about hte emotional undercurrent of the discussions. Obviously it 'has to do' with past colonialism. Heydel-Mankoo covers this from the perspective of a colonised minority (maybe not hte right kind, though ;) ). — AmadeusD
Again, I'm asking a question to better understand.
But as with above, if you're not arguing for some sort of market utopia but we just ignore the initial distribution of wealth, then this isn't too relevant to you.
I've argued a lot with libertarians so all these points are easy to retrieve from memory. However, if you're not a libertarian then markets, today or in the past, isn't really a core issue of contention. However, I have also been thinking of a thread critiquing Western imperialism (as a lot of the differences in other political threads basically come down to "Western imperialism good or bad"), so taking up Heydel-Mankoo would perhaps be more relevant there.
I disagree ;) Particularly that these issues aren't really philosophical. He's ignoring empirical facts about the political state of most countries - the majority of people take no part, and are not involved. But, as I've not read him, I await your thread/s to discuss that bit further ** — AmadeusD
Yes, you may reevaluate your position on MacIntyre after debating the specifics.
MacIntyres historical account is not one of individual political agency, in which case definitely most people have very little and certainly don't perceive themselves as involved in politics (although I would strongly disagree they are not actually involved); he is more concerned with how the moral frameworks in which the political debate of the day occurs develop and are changed. These more fundamental moral changes are mostly a critical mass issue, often happening against the will of the elites; an example of this sort of major change is the reformation.
From this perspective, normal people under feudalism would perceive themselves and be perceived as having even less political involvement that normal people now in Western society, but then they start to rebel against the Catholic Church and consequences are profound. The reformation was certainly not the Catholic Church's idea, nor would it have worked if it was just "an idea" a few intellectuals and nobles had; normal people getting involved, taking significant risks, was absolutely fundamental. This sort of change is what MacIntyre is more concerned with.
No. This is, exactly, what is actually happening as has happened for the majority of definitely Western Culture - perhaps, all culture. — AmadeusD
Certainly has happened until now.
What I am claiming is bold is that ridiculous levels of political stupidity do not now pose an existential risk to humanity. Of course, if you are unconcerned about humanity continuing, as you say above, then seems an irrelevant point to you either way.
Im not sure why you're asking this. I don't think society 'succeeds' or not. It seems odd that your next passage is somehow a reductio to this position. It's not absurd at all. There is no objective measure of success, and I don't have the (socio-political) framework in place to assess the same way you do. Simple :) I could "simply" be wrong about that. — AmadeusD
These points are in relation to your criticism of my claim that Western society is failing.
There is definitely an objective measures of social success, such as people having enough to eat and society at least continuing.
Objective and quantifiable.
You may have no problem with society ending, but I don't see why you wouldn't agree that would indeed be society failing in whatever it was trying to do.
;) You'll need to figure out where I assessed 'success' in moral terms. I can't see it! If i have implied that, please explicitly point it out because I am uncomfortable with that, if it's the case. — AmadeusD
Then you are using the word success in pretty unusual way.
In its usual meaning, success requires some goal which requires some moral framework to formulate.
Your intuitive-spontaneous moral framework is still a moral framework from which you derive your objectives.
This is wrong in terms of my position. I think it is. It isn't successful or unsuccessful. There is no ultimate goal or aim of Western society. It continues to move (forward, backward, whatever). Maybe you can use that as a yardstick in which case my position holds anyway. But that's not me. That's just a suggestion. I don't think it success or doesnt succeed. It just is, or isn't. I admit, entirely, that my asking your view on this was more a poke-the-bear than anything. Defend it failing. I don't think you did, on your own terms. But, that's because I don't recognise what would constitute success or failure in your account/s thus far. — AmadeusD
Seems incongruous to laud Western society in one place and then claim is has no goal or aim in another.
But again, if society destroys itself that is clearly failing.
Your position seems to be that you're fine if it fails as well as humanity as a whole, simply fails and comes to an end.
To argue the more fundamental point that we have a duty to try to avoid humanity failing, will of course take another more dedicated thread to elaborate the argument.
However, my point here is that the assumption that Western society, humanity as a whole, will simply muddle on is a false one; society can end and so cease to muddle.
Yep. I've not called you 'wrong'. I think you're making a mistake in moral reasoning. That doesn't make you wrong - and in fact, could only be true if you were convinced of my position - which would negate that conviction :P This is why my position is consistent. It doesn't apply to anything but me and my actions. — AmadeusD
It's good to see you are advanced enough in understanding your own position to realize it is inconsistent.
And this would be the fundamental moral duty I would put forward: a duty to try to be consistent.
Now, if you are committed to an inconsistent position there is not "arguing against you" per se as you can simply be comfortable with any inconsistency, comfort is your guide, and so there is no problem.
So, perhaps at best we can exchange views, but you clearly like to argue so with enough of it perhaps you simply become uncomfortable with inconsistencies and so convert to my avoid-inconsistencies moral code.
If no one is willing, and it's morally right to defend the country and you're not inferring that conscription is morally acceptable there... then... What are you suggesting? That seems a dead end.
I take the rest of that passage to be incoherent in light of the above, so I wont touch it yet. Could entirely be me. — AmadeusD
Since we've already established you aren't concerned with social consequences, these considerations aren't so relevant.
However, in your framework people can obviously conscript other people and force them to fight at the end of a gun, if they're comfortable doing that.
My goal here is not to debate conscription (I happen to be also against conscription, though not against taxing people who do not server higher for life, to avoid the free rider problem), but again to simply understand your position.
The underlying purpose of questions on this theme is your view of the state. Seems clear you're ambivalent, and don't really care what happens to the state, which is very much compatible with being ambivalent to what happens to society as such.
What I'm reading as childish, is that it seems your passionate responses presuppose your moral framework. It seems your framework has to take account of your emotional positions. It seems you are enacting the exact same, let's say, discontinuity in your position, that you outlined about moral relativists near the top of the post. — AmadeusD
My questions and examples are the logical enquiries.
If someone says they don't view any act as morally better than another, then before debating first principles I want to be sure they really are taking that view.
If you're ambivalent to anyone doing anything at all, just more comfortable with some happenings over others but that's just you're own feeling of comfort and doesn't give rise to any moral claims (including claims about conscription for example), then I want to be sure you really are ambivalent.
As I've mentioned, most people who use moral relativist language are not actually moral relativists, they still want to condemn Hitler and assume that's given to them: but obviously it's not, if no one is right or wrong, Hitler is as right as anyone else.
This is the childish mistake you are making. Your underlying point, I would reply to with "Yes. That's correct".
But the fact you've entered a value judgement on the part of your interlocutor is worrisome. I don't think it was laudable, or detestable. It happened. Does it make me, personally, extremely uncomfortable? Even repulsed? Yep. Which is probably what you want to know. But that's nothing but an emotional reaction to hearing certain information. For me that is absolute, in the sense that I can't, currently, feel another way. But that is a state of affairs. Not a moral claim. — AmadeusD
I said "as laudable" to just mean they are equal (which you can say "equally good" or "equally bad").
Which seems very much your position, you have no particular gripe with Hitler and the Nazi project: happened, they were clearly comfortable with what they were doing so doing right by their own comfortableness (certainly comfortable enough to carry out their project).
Again, it's not childish, it's the adult question to ask: when someone says they see no better or worse morality, then clearly the obvious and logical point is make is that entails Nazism is thus no better or worse than any other ism.
Correct. No issues. It makes me uncomfortable. I have nothing to appeal to in telling them no to do it, other than the potential consequences for them - reason with them. Would I bother? Maybe. If i were uncomfortable enough. — AmadeusD
This is exactly why I develop the consequences of society changing its view of right and wrong, that "you shouldn't do X because society will hold you accountable and there will be consequences" is not a valid argument.
When you say "consequences for them" clearly the negative consequences to serial killing personally to the serial killer would be getting caught. But why would anyone catch you if no one thinks serial killing is bad?
I don't. I haven't presented any. You seem to be importing some upper-limit to your conceivable moral behaviour matrix and ascribing those limits to my position. I don't share them. I have limits of my comfort and pursuit of comfort occurs. These are arbitrary, as far as another person is concerned. But, by-and-large people share the same limits of comfort within a society, and so 'getting on with it' can occur without a shared 'moral' framework. This is, probably, what the West does well, compared with many other societies. — AmadeusD
You just rejected, above, any measure of success or failure in evaluating societies, but say here that Western society does something well. You just said Western society has no goal.
However, it's simply wrong that there is no shared moral framework.
There's a shared core moral framework: such as serial killing is evil and justifies a very large effort in stopping, law enforcement shouldn't take bribes and so on.
It is this core moral framework that is overwhelmingly dominant that allows Western society to function (at least until now and certainly for at least some time further).
Obviously you are well aware of the reaction to serial killing or child torturing of the vast majority of people: that their position is that it's an absolute moral wrong, evil, must be stopped and transgressors put away for some time. Likewise, the reaction to a judge taking a bribe.
This is a shared moral framework.
Of course, even if there's an absolutely dominant consensus on some core values that make civil society possible, there can be visceral disagreements on less-core things, such as abortion. Whether abortion is legal or illegal, society does not simply all apart (such as if murder was made legal).
Where society can afford to muddle is in policy choices that are not existential to the formation of civil society or then any society at all.
I don't, other than to say 'Well, this is what's going on". The norms are the norms and tell me about a collective emotional status of the society. — AmadeusD
Your position is getting pretty confusing to me.
In some places you seem to hold a total ambivalence to what happens and are not concerned with the social consequences whatsoever, and not only are you unconcerned for what happens to society but there is no way to measure the success of society as such (you're ambivalent to society succeeding or failing and moreover assert there is no measure of success or failure anyways), and in other places you seem to argue society, in particular Western society, is doing well.
You seem, at least give the vibe, of being pleased with Western social norms.
This one is troublesome because, prima facie, there shouldn't be. At least not beyond social consequences - which are pretty much arbitrary - and policy is just this, after collective deliberation. BUT, i would freely let you know that the idea of there being no consequences for certain actions makes me uncomfortable. Again, that's just a state of affairs. Not a moral claim. So, I dislike this, and it makes me uneasy, but I take it wholesale to be the case. Legal and social consequences are arbitrary, other than that they meet a collective emotional benchmark. — AmadeusD
Again, arbitrary is a strong word, even your framework is not arbitrary but founded on your spontaneous sense of comfort.
Social consequences are also clearly even less arbitrary. The consequence of going to prison for murder is not arbitrary; if you can just get what you want by killing who you want when you want, then society quickly ceases to function much at all (certainly nothing remotely close to Western society is feasible if murder is permissible).
Likewise, claiming "other than that they meet a collective emotional benchmark" is another way of saying they aren't arbitrary.
Now, it will take another thread to develop an alternative position to your view. To broadly describe it, I will be arguing that emotions are not foundational. For example, even in your own system you are clearly making the claim that "you should do what you're comfortable with"; there's a logical moral structure you're ignoring that takes emotions as inputs and is not therefore by definition itself emotional. However, this would be simply a starting point.
There is not enough space here even to finish responding to your points, so I will have to in another comment.