But, then, am I to conclude that the mentally spatialized universe is somehow located in my mind? — charles ferraro
Space is not something objective and real, nor a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation; instead, it is subjective and ideal, and originates from the mind’s nature in accord with a stable law as a scheme, as it were, for coordinating everything sensed externally...
Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities [wirkliche Wesen]? Are they only determinations or also relations of things, but still such as would belong to them even if they were not intuited? Or are they such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates could not be ascribed to any things at all? — Kant - From the SEP article on Kant's views on space and time
Interesting. I see you and ↪T Clark as both talking about intuition as it has developed for each of you. Could you elaborate on what key differences might be? — wonderer1
Someone who understands the way development of reliable intuitions works, can then make relatively accurate judgements about the reliability of his own intuitions in relation to whatever the present situation happens to be. — wonderer1
But building the foundation of justification on intuition, which as discussed by Darkneos,Philosophim and other users is derived from knowledge, seems question-begging. — Charlie Lin
Field theory might be relevant here somehow. We are influenced by the waves all around us (water, sound, electromagnetic… ) — 0 thru 9
Luck? Chance? Unconscious? Animal instinct? Energy? Intuition? Or… ? — 0 thru 9
I suspect we are thinking of intuition differently. — Tom Storm
For me, in the work I do (moderately reliable) intuition means being able to grasp almost immediately if someone has a hidden weapon on them or not and if they might be violent or not. Or if they are experiencing delusional thinking or psychoses. Or knowing if someone can do a very challenging job or not within seconds of meeting them in a job interview. I can generally tell when someone is suicidal whether they will act on it or not, based on intuition. I've gotten to the point when I meet a new worker I can often tell within a minute or two how long they will last in the field and what path brought them here - a relative, lived experience, etc. — Tom Storm
I think there are probably key indicators we can read but you need to be 'open' to them in some way and have relevant experience. — Tom Storm
Is the space Kant discusses in the Aesthetic the same space I experience and move through on a daily basis and is the time he discusses in the Aesthetic the same time I experience passing by on a daily basis? — charles ferraro
I have fond memories of Gould's various takes on sociobiology - albeit with some disagreements in some of the details. — javra
Although 'way of knowing' might be too strong for me. I'd probably frame it more in terms of an approach to sense making. — Tom Storm
I've noticed that intuition seems to work better when you are feeling well and happy. There's something about the mindset required that for me makes it less accurate or harder to pull off when you are feeling down or troubled. — Tom Storm
This leads me to doubt the nature and reliability of "intuition" since this word has been and is being used by philosophers in nearly every discussion. Is intuition constructed by our experience, language or knowledge? Or a particular neuron circuit creates the illusion of intuition, the feeling of "that must be true"? — Charlie Lin
I differentiated morality from other forms of social control because morality involves interpretation and characterisation, while other forms of social control tend to focus on only one's actions. — Judaka
I think we agree here, — Judaka
My intention was for "personal morality" to be characterised by possessing no attempts to influence others. I believe our understandings on this topic are similar, if not the same. — Judaka
OK to this. As a reminder, I'm a diehard fallibilist. But it equivocates between empirical observations (which, yes, could in principle could include hallucinations - hence being technically fallible) and inferences, with these being optimal conclusions drawn from that which is observed (and since no one is omniscient, everyone's inferences could be potentially mistaken at times - hence being technically fallible). — javra
pragmatically, something that we all immediately know as a brute fact that we cannot rationally - nor experientially - doubt: we are as that which apprehends observables (including our thoughts, with some of these being our conscious inferences). — javra
One of these crucial, pivotal inferences is that others are like us in being endowed with this "first-person point of view". Our observations (not inferences) of what they do sure as hell evidence and validate that they are thus endowed. Nevertheless, we do not observe them as first-person points of view. — javra
We, hence, cannot observe other's consciousness and its factual activities - such as, for one example, what the consciousness remembers via the workings of its total mind. — javra
We infer things all the time without seeing them directly
— T Clark
Of course. I acknowledged that we can infer that there are minds, but that the mind is not an object for us. — Wayfarer
there is controversy about what these particles are, whether they're really particles or actually waves, — Wayfarer
But all of that is irrelevant to the question at hand. — Wayfarer
I'll again propose and argue that his attribution is due to inference - much of it unconscious and hence automatic - and not do to (first-person) observation (which can only be direct - rather than, for example, hearsay). — javra
What if I answer "nothing" or "a pink dolphin" or something else and it happens to be a proposition that I'm fully aware doesn't not conform to the reality of what my current recollections are. These examples are obvious, but then I could answer with a proposition that, thought false, would be easily believable by you - and one which you'd have no possible way of verifying: e.g., "I'm now remembering your last post before this one". — javra
You never see anyone's mind. You can see their behaviour or hear what they say, but you never see the mind except for in a metaphorical sense. — Wayfarer
So mind is a thing, not a process? Or both? — RogueAI
So you're claiming that you (or anyone else) can observe what I'm remembering right now? — javra
Maybe, but this would be contingent on how one defines and thereby interprets "mind". — javra
The pros and the cons, the yin and the yang, of my thoughts about prayer. — Art48
mind is never an object to us — Wayfarer
Hmm, you've interpreted these terms "personal morality" and "social morality" in a different way that I had meant to have laid out. I took them as mutually exclusive ways of viewing morality. Personal morality as a code limited to oneself, and social morality where views are applied in social contexts, to influence others and the rules of the group. — Judaka
If you want to piece-by-piece categorise your moral views, as either personal or social, or alternatively using a less binary view, that's a different approach. — Judaka
However, even here, it's hard to imagine that the personal remains personal within the context of morality. So long as your feelings are genuine, then your empathy and compassion will inenvitably manifests in attempts to influence or coerce others. After all, you wouldn't sit back and watch someone else be treated cruelly and unfairly, as though it had nothing to do with you, right? You would want to intervene, and tell the belligerent to cut it out. — Judaka
You can argue that harm is always wrong, and then list exceptions. Or you can say harm is not inherently immoral, and then argue for the cases where it would be. I'm not sure there's much of a difference. Moral systems always involve these games... You won't condemn harm when it's done under conditions that you consider fair & reasonable, so, yes, it's necessary to judge the acts as unfair, wrong, unreasonable and so on. — Judaka
I'd like to hear how you've been defining personal/social morality, and whether you really need to debate with me, that your moral views do not contain attempts to influence anything beyond yourself. I'm sure you can see it false. — Judaka
Personal morality is the path I follow when acting from my heart - empathy, fellow-feeling, friendship. I act in accordance with social morality out of fear or duty. — T Clark
What I was attempting to say was that a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others is not, in my view, really a morality - it's aesthetic preference. My understanding is that it's the intention to influence others which distinguishes moral values and aesthetic preferences — ChrisH
Isn't a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others no different to personal aesthetic preference? — ChrisH
Some claim to approach morality, not with the goal of social control, or even any interest in telling anyone else what to do. That one follows their own moral code or principles and will remain steadfast in that their aims are only personal. One only has these rules for just themselves, with the only purpose being to live a good or honourable life, with no interest in being told or telling others what to do. — Judaka
To me, this is a distortion of the truth of both what morality is, and what is being done by this individual. Personal morality is not separate or distinct from social morality but rather a part of it. — Judaka
One has moral views such as that a man beating his wife is "cowardly", that "incest is disgusting", or that "a man should provide for his family" or whatever else. Then frames them as a personal code or conceptual idea, representing only one's opinions and guiding how this individual should live.
The intention & motivation are distorted but are the same in every way it matters. Moral views can't involve cold practicality & indifference, they have an emotional weight behind them that characterises moral thinking. It is not an emotional feeling triggered only when involving oneself but in general. — Judaka
One will still feel anger towards and lose respect for those who act immorally and they will still argue against rules or conventions that go against their principles. The role their moral beliefs still plays is identical to normal. Encouraging moral behaviour and discouraging immoral behaviour in others, and applying one's moral beliefs in every context as one would normally. — Judaka
The separation seems most useful to someone who resents the attempts of others to influence their behaviour, despite approving of the practice overall. "I follow my own moral code" as in, "don't preach to me", but nonetheless in following that moral code, one will still do the same to others. I believe this is the attraction of the distinction, but it could also be inspired by a resentment of social control in general, and a wide range of possibilities are valid. — Judaka
Personal moral beliefs, though seemingly individualistic, ultimately align with the core features of morality, including social control, emotional responses, and the application of moral principles to oneself and others. I would argue there are very few, if any, notable differences between either approach. — Judaka
A non-personalised approach to morality, which may explicitly demand the compliance of others, isn't distinct in how an individual experiences it from a personal one. — Judaka
One of my all time favourite sci-fi stories. — Wayfarer
Don’t know what others think but it seems to me Loeb has become somewhat obsessive in his quest, to the detriment of his overall reputation. Of course, if the titanium-alloy spherules turn out to be the real enchilada, then I’ll happily eat my words. — Wayfarer
It's been a good while since I've been engrossed in a book like that. Heck, I don't want to rush into my next book just to savor and think about what I just read. — Manuel
urchin — Italy
Transcendental Idealism generally, particularly, with respect to the OP, the first Book in CPR, entitled Transcendental Aesthetic.
Don’t hate the messenger. — Mww
It is not just about "human motivation", it is about characterising human motivation, and that makes it philosophical. How could science provide a definitive answer to whether our motivations were "self-centred" or not? What makes something "self-centred" is subjective, the logic used is subjective, and the verdict reached in each and every case involves making choices about how to interpret, what to interpret, how to characterise and the construction of a highly subjective narrative. There's nothing testable about it, how do you propose any scientific approach could definitively answer such a question? — Judaka
There is an entire Enlightenment philosophy predicated on a similar conclusion. — Mww
I am a firm believer that human psychology is strongly bonded with philosophy itself — Italy
The important part for me is that, in this case, unless you get the science right, the philosophy is meaningless. The discussion is not about what is right and what is wrong, it's about human motivation. That's a question that can't be answered with philosophy alone. — T Clark
cognitive able crow — Italy
It's a characterisation based on interpretation, and so, it is definitely a philosophical statement. — Judaka
You have to boil it twice. It tastes like spinach. — frank
polk salad annie — universeness

lampshade — fdrake
Speaking of which, Alan Arkin died yesterday. — T Clark
everything we do is at its core self centered — Italy
