continue to live our lives as if there is one. — Ciceronianus

I'm with you. "Acting as if" is metaphysics. It let's us keep going instead of spending all our time arguing.

When I was a Christian, I didn't seriously think about the view of being a Christian. I just was, and accepted the idea that God exists without seriously thinking about what that meant. Once I began to seriously take on the view and asking deeper questions about this viewpoint in an attempt to better understand and defend this viewpoint did I come to understand that what I believed simply didn't fit with more objective observations. So it was only in delving deeper into the view that I began to reject the view. — Harry Hindu

Absolute presuppositions can change with changing knowledge.

Right. So for the purpose of this discussion, we accept the view that macro-sized "physical" objects are the interaction between smaller "physical" objects, and that those smaller "physical" objects are themselves composed of the interactions of even smaller "physical" objects. If "physical" objects are really the interactions of smaller objects, then it seems to me that it doesn't make any sense to say that it's "physical" all the way down. It appears that using a pre-relativity physicists viewpoint actually shows that the world is not "physical" but relational all the way down. — Harry Hindu

This is not a discussion on the merits of materialism.

The problem is, that ideas such as this, "there is an infinite number of points between any two points", are very useful principles, which are not true. Work done at the Planck level demonstrates the falsity of that principle. So useful principles, when not true, tend to have their limits, and when employed at those limits, are counter-productive, producing misleading and deceptive conclusions. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a discussion of metaphysics before the discoveries in physics of the 20th century were known. Any absolute presupposition has the potential to limit the kinds of things we look for and can see. That's why they change over time.

We can take the position, that these fundamental principles, absolute presuppositions, need not necessarily be true, (which they are not in actuality), and we can also hold that the laws of physics which follow from them need not be true as well, (they just require a predictive capacity), but we will suffer from the consequences of such a choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. It is both Collingwood's and Kant's understanding that you can't dispense with all underlying metaphysical assumptions. I agree with them. Science cannot proceed without them.

I don't see why. Hey, let's learn as much as we can. I don't think we need to assume that all can be known by sentient creatures. If we found out - how I don't know - that there was a limit, would we need to stop? — Bylaw

I don't agree. As we approach any problem, ask any question, we have to act as if it's solvable, answerable. If we reach an impasse, we just recalibrate and continue on.

Yes, classical and also with the metaphysical baggage, I would argue, from taking a stand against dualisms and transcendant 'things'. So we are left with an ism that seems to be taking a stand on ontology, when really science at least is taking a stand on methodology. — Bylaw

We are talking about metaphysics, not science.

I think slowly we will end up with something like scientific verificationism and drop the seeming ontological stand of physicalism/materialism. Neutrinos and even massless particles, fields particles in superposition or even whole entities in superposition, and even some physicists beliefs in mathematical realism run counter to substance type claims. — Bylaw

This is not a discussion of the merits of materialism or physicalism. It's an examination of what the underlying assumptions of materialism might be.

Is a scientist hampered if the don't assume that the laws have held since the Big Bang (or before ?! that) and if they don't assume it must hold everywhere (deep in black holes, far away across the universe, wherever). — Bylaw

For the purposes of this discussion, we're talking about classical physics before quantum mechanics and relativity. Before knowledge of an expanding universe. Even if we weren't, I think scientists today still need use this same presupposition. We study things billions of years old and billions of light years away. When we find something that doesn't fit our expectations, we rewrite the laws, but we still expect the new laws to apply everywhere.

But once the ship appears in the other galaxy, being open to rules being different seems like a positive idea. — Bylaw

As I noted, we already study things further away than galaxies. I think it's reasonable to expect conditions to be different in different places and times, but not laws of science.

But I would assume people were at least open to if not leaning towards irreducible levels pre-QM because it seemed like there were fundamental particles to some, even Democritus. — Bylaw

People certainly knew that some things came in small pieces rather than continuous substances. I always assumed this was talking at a more fundamental level. That space and time are continuous. This was one of the presuppositions that Kant identified. I wonder if it was a reaction to Newton's and Leibnitz's invention of calculus, which depend on things being infinitely divisible.

I've read about some scientists today who are speculating that space itself might be quantized. But that's a different discussion.

I can handle tough, I think. — Manuel

Then go for it. She is a wonderful writer. I keep wanting to read more of her books, but I can't bring myself to do it. I have two on my shelf my traitorous daughter gave me.

But not boring — Manuel

Not boring, but intricate. Probably the best police procedural I've read. The interrogations are tough too. I don't know if it's accurate, but it has what my 11th grade English teacher called verisimilitude. It seems very real.

Also, the description of the Irish location and culture are absorbing and convincing.

Dublin Murder Squad — Manuel

French is a tough writer. Hard to read. Here is an Amazon review I wrote for her book "The Secret Place."

"The Secret Place" is about two Dublin detectives, Stephen Moran and Antoinette Conway, investigating the murder of a student at an upper-class boarding school. The focus of the story is on the friendship of four 16-year-old girls. Here is the message I left for the author, Tana French, on her webpage:

Ms. French:

Your books are wonderful, but you are ruthless – to your characters and your readers. I’ve just finished “The Secret Place,” and I am heartbroken. I called my daughter and cursed her for recommending your books and swore I will never read another one. She laughed, not unkindly, and told me she will accidentally leave “The Witch Elm” on my table next time she comes home.

I am grateful to you for sending Stephan Moran to lead me into the lives of those four girls. He and I are kindred spirits; grown men - I’m almost 70 – who still know, have always known, that girls are magic. He would understand my grief.

Thank you.

A line by line response. My responses in italics.

1 - to some degree. As written it sounds like we know we can figure it all out. I guess it probably does, at least at some level, but it doesn't mean we ever will. It seems like a good presupposition to me - We can't show it's true, but we have to pretend it is.

2 - what is a physical substance and does this mean if we discover 'something' that is real but has qualities different from what we considered physical before we would drop physicalism? I ask because this has already happened. What is considered physical has opened up over time. IOW it sounds like physicalism is making a substance claim, but I don't think it is. I tried to keep this simple by putting limitations on us as described in the OP. One limitation is that we look at things from a materialist /physicalist point of view. Another is that we look only at classical physics.

5 - I disagree with what you said elsewhere. I think we could do science without this assumption. If other galaxies have different laws, we can still use science to figure out this galaxies rules and then theirs. If the laws change over time, and there is some evidence this is the case, we can still try to keep up. And if the laws are changing slowly, well, then the research results are relevant for significant periods of time. Yes, it is possible we will someday find things going on far away and long ago that are inconsistent with how we currently see things. But the only way we'll be able to figure that out is by assuming that the rest of the universe operates on the same rules we have here until we run into a contradiction.

8 - I didn't think there was consensus on quantized vs continuous. I think in a classical universe there would be. That's why I included that limitation in the OP.

Mostly murder-mysteries, with some exceptions. — Manuel

I like books that take place in other cultures. I just finished the "Night Watch" books by Sergei Lukyanenko translated from Russian. I have also really liked the Dublin Murder Squad books by Tana French and the Hamish MacBeth mysteries in Scotland.

This has been a very useful thread. — Tom Storm

Yes. I'm having a really good time. In particular these last few posts about which of the items on the list are presuppositions and which might be facts have brought some of my own doubts into focus.

[1] We live in an ordered universe that can be understood by humans.
— Clarky

well, at least 4% of it, anyway. — Wayfarer

And that's why Collingwood says it's an absolute presupposition. We can't prove it's true, but we have to act as if it were in order to do science.

I think science is an extension of ordinary everyday lived understanding. The world is intelligible, "makes sense", to us, and to animals; if it weren't we could not survive. I think science is the endeavor to extend that basic comprehensibility. — Janus

I agree. I just went back to look at what lead up to this comment. A few posts back I misunderstood something you wrote. I thought you said the universe was not comprehensible. What I think you really said was that it is comprehensible, we know that because of our experience, and because of that it's not an assumption. That's a good point, and it's something I've thought about.

Let's go through the listed candidates for absolute presuppositions. I've added a couple at the end.

[1] We live in an ordered universe that can be understood by humans.
[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy.
[3] These substances behave in accordance with scientific principles, laws.
[4] Scientific laws are mathematical in nature.
[5] The same scientific laws apply throughout the universe and at all times.
[6] The behaviors of substances are caused.
[7] Substances are indestructible, although they can change to something else.
[8] The universe is continuous. Between any two points there is at least one other point.
[9] Space and time are separate and absolute. This from @Manuel.
[10] Something can not be created from nothing. I added this, but I'm not sure it's different from 6.

I've bolded four items we might be able to say we know from experience. I guess, based on that, you could say they are not absolute presuppositions. I'm pretty sure Collingwood would disagree. I want to come down with Collingwood, but the argument seems nitpicky - "Well, you haven't seen all of the universe. You don't know what you'll find." That's in conflict with one of my favorite quotes from my favorite scientist, Stephen Jay Gould - In science, “fact” can only mean “confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.

I suppose we could ban Clarky just to meet quotas and so on. — Baden

The Kimono Tattoo — Manuel

I checked on Amazon. Turns out the book was praised by the International Pulpwood Queen and Timber Guy Book Club. No, I'm not joking.

The book sounds interesting though.

T Clark was banned? — DingoJones

Sorry, it was a joke. I am the Philosopher Formerly Known as T Clark.

Philosophers like Nietzsche , Foucault ,Heidegger , Derrida , Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty argue that the notion of the nothing as lack is the result of grounding difference and negation on identity and Sameness. They instead ground concepts like identity and sameness , which are the basis of the notion of the empirical object , in difference. Identity is an effect of difference. From this vantage , talking about the ‘nothing’ as a lack of identity is incoherent. — Joshs

Yes, I took the concrete path to the goal. You and those philosophers took the abstract path. We all seem to agree there can't be nothing.

It seems instead to me that materialism is an idea which can never be verified... — Hello Human

This is true. Materialism is a way of looking at things, a point of view. It isn't true or false, it's useful or not useful. The same is true for all the other isms.

Philosophers like Nietzsche , Foucault ,Heidegger , Derrida , Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty — Joshs

Are those guys outside the universe or do you have a point?

I was just reading through the "Does Nothingness Exist" thread. It got me thinking maybe we should add this to our list of absolute presuppositions - Something can not be created from nothing.

Or is that the same as "Everything has a cause?"

In my experience, the subject of nothingness comes up most often when someone asks whether or not something can be created out of nothing. I think the consensus is that it can not. I'd argue with that, except the argument always becomes circular when I say "what about" and the other guy says "that's not nothing."

So, here I am in space, as far from anything as I can possibly be. Let's designate a cubic meter as our volume of interest. Now, even way out here there are particles and radiation, even if at very low levels. So I build a box around my volume. The walls are made of material that blocks all radiation and particles. The inside of the box is lined with material that absorbs all radiation and particles. So now we have a box full of nothing. Ok, ok, we'll get a waiver for neutrinos. So... nothing. But what about gravity waves, what about the curvature of space. And even if I could argue my way out of that, then there'd be the quantum field and virtual particles.

So, I guess that means there can't be nothing inside the limits of our universe. What about outside?

What a jerk that guy was — Changeling

Agreed.

6 months without a banning is pretty good going... — Changeling

You forgot about all the secret bannings. They banned T Clark and he had to sneak back on.

But reality has the characteristic of consistency. — Bird-Up

I agree, at least, that materialists in 1905 believed that.

Those seem like rephrasings of the original point; an elaboration of how humans go about understanding, not new characteristics on their own. — Bird-Up

I don't think saying that the universe is comprehensible is the same as saying there are universal laws or that it behaves in a mathematical way.

Isn't there supposed to be an infinite number of points between any two points? Why would you state it as "at least one"? It seems like the incoherency of this idea, demonstrates the falsity of the proposition "The universe is continuous". A number of your stated "absolute presuppositions" can be demonstrated to be false. — Metaphysician Undercover

The way I said it was awkward and potentially misleading. Your formulation is probably better. Kant himself wrote "All phenomena, then, are continuous quantities" which is probably even better.

So I wondered why it is included. Again, it seems to me that given obedience to physical laws, causation is unnecessary; a hangover from Aristotle. — Banno

I think the point of Russell's essay was that, even though there are scientific laws, the idea of causation is unnecessary. I guess great minds think alike, because I agree with that.

As I acknowledge, we have only observed a very limited part of the universe, but I disagree in that we have (so far) found the universe to be comprehensible to us, so I don't see that as an assumption. — Janus

Isn't science people trying to understand the universe? Why would we do that if we didn't think the universe is comprehendible? Even if it might not be, I think we have to act as if it is just to proceed. I think that's a lot of what an absolute presupposition is - acting as if something is true even though it isn't proven and can't be proven.

Maybe; I'm not sure. If we can't think of any other serious possibilities, maybe not, so I guess it comes down to whether we consider god and/or universal mind to be serious possibilities. — Janus

I'll fall back on my premise of a materialistic/physicalist point of view. That would exclude God or a universal mind.

Right, but the fact is we know we can express the laws mathematically and make very precise predictions which always seem to be observed, so whatever the explanation is, I think we can safely say that we know that we can express (at least some) of the laws (I would prefer to say invariances) of nature mathematically. — Janus

Agreed.

ME: I think this is more speculative, but it is bolstered by the apparent consistency and universality (within our science and regarding what we have actually observed) of the Laws of Thermodynamics.YOU: Are you saying it is an absolute presupposition or is not?
— Clarky

I'd say it's universal applicability is an assumption based on what we have observed so far. I'm not sure if that would count as 'absolute'. Again, the caveat would be that we only know it applies to what we have observed, and any assertion beyond that would be an assumption, if not a presupposition. — Janus

For me, and I think for Collingwood, this all comes back to the fact that we have and can only observe a very limited portion of the universe.

From proconsul heseloni to homo sapiens, as a species, we have brought about nothing but destruction and catastrophe on this planet. From torturing animals on a daily basis in slaughterhouses for our luxurious meals to making entire species go extinct to waging wars and killing fellow species to slavery, we have done nothing good. Say a circumstance were to come bestowing upon you the final choice, the decision that ends us all, the choice to let humankind as a whole perish (painlessly and instantaneously), should you choose to let it happen? — TheSoundConspirator

Sure, I'll kill my children; my wife; my brothers and sister and their children; my step mother; my friends; people I respect and admire; and then eight billion more. All so I can be sure to finally kill Dr. Phil and make sure anti-natalists and depressive eco-dorks won't have to feel guilty and alienated any more.

See Causality, Determination and such stuff. I think Anscombe's differentiation between causation and determination would serve your purposes well, in that you might avoid the incessant arguments about first causes and such. So if one has a scientific law in mathematical form that provides a satisfactory description of some event, including being predictive, then notions of cause are inconsequential. — Banno

I have argued before that the idea of causation is not very useful. Didn't you and I discuss that previously? In 1912, Bertrand Russell wrote "On the Notion of Cause" which endorsed that view. On the other hand, I think scientists in 1905 in general assumed that all events are caused.

We come up to the point raised in the title of the thread: the metaphysics of materialism. If you say that studying the universe as was done in 1905 is metaphysics - that's fine. Though I doubt scientists then thought they were doing metaphysics.

They were doing physics. They study what we still call "matter", but beyond that name, I don't see a metaphysics. They studied the universe, call it whatever you like. The results won't vary if you call matter, "immaterial" or "mental", as you seem to agree. — Manuel

Scientists don't do metaphysics. As Collingwood wrote, metaphysics describes the underlying assumptions that scientists follow while doing science. They are often not explicitly aware of those assumptions.

But if by understand you mean "theoretical understanding" - then we do not disagree — Manuel

I didn't say the universe is understood, I said it can be understood. It is understandable.

Pretty good OP Clark. — Manuel

I forgot to say thank you. Thank you.

No problem. I will just ignore you from now on. — Jackson

Oh, @Jackson, you're just so cranky and cute. I want to give you a big hug.

Given (3), why do we need (6)? — Banno

As I noted in the OP, there may be some overlap, but I think 3 and 6 are different.

If as proposed scientific law is found to work in one situation and not in another, then it needs modification. A generalisation that accounts for both instances would suffice. — Banno

That's true.

And no one who disputes you is allowed? — Jackson

I am not a materialist, although I think most scientists are and were in 1905. As I noted in the OP, I want to keep this focused on absolute presuppositions and not on the validity of a materialist position.

Kind of but that also that philosophical naturalism is too extreme and a lot of folk think all scientists presuppose this too. — Tom Storm

How does philosophical naturalism differ substantially from materialism and physicalism?

Well it depends upon what you mean by all times, and what you mean by universe. I'm not a big science guy, but I guess my point would be if you mean 'in the known universe and since what we call the 'big bang'' then yes. I don't know what might be true outside of the known universe or outside of time as we know it. — Tom Storm

Yes, I thought of that but didn't address it. I think I'm saved by the fact I specified before 1905.

My line by line response. My response in italics:

[1] is not true: the universe cannot be understood by human beings, at least not metaphysically (which is the purpose of this thread) - the ultimate grounds of reality are sealed out for us. I disagree. If the universe can not be understood, science is pointless.

[2] Is more terminological than anything else. Yes, there is a universe out there - it can be called "physical", "neutral", "material", "immaterial", it does not have consequences for our inquires- for whatever the universe is made of, whatever word is used - this is what we study. I don't necessarily disagree with you, but many people do. I guess the question is whether or not most physicists have this as a presupposition.

[3] Yes, sure. We could substitute "laws" for "habits", but it is fine. Ok

[4] Yes. Or at least, we can best describe its behavior through applied mathematics. Ok

[5] Given the time period, perhaps this was assumed to be true. There may be exceptions, but, fine. Again, I think most physicists probably assume this.

[6] Yes.

[7] So far as was known, correct.

[8] And assumed to be infinite too. I'm not sure about that.

[9] Space and time are considered absolute and not the same thing, as is now the case. I think that's a good one. We can add it to the list.

Or, thoughts in the mind of God. Another forum of idealism. — Jackson

As noted in the OP, this discussion is about a materialist view of reality.

Here's a line by line response in italics. I am mostly responding how I think Collingwood would respond:

[1] I don't think this is an absolute presupposition, insofar as we have found that the universe is fairly coherently and consistently understandable to us in scientific terms. You are making an assumption based on having observed a very limited part of the universe.

[2] There does not seem to be any other serious candidate for basic substance, unless God or Universal Mind is posited. Does that mean you agree it is a good example of an absolute presupposition?

[3] Laws are formulated post hoc to codify the behavior of observed invariances. We know that the substances and parts of the universe that we have observed seem to behave invariantly. Again, we have observed a very limited amount of the universe.

[4] I think the fact that the so-called Laws of Nature can be expressed mathematically is something we have discovered, so not an absolute presupposition.There is a long debate about whether the mathematical behavior of the universe is discovered or projected by observers. I come down on the side of projection.

[5] This is an assumption based on us never having observed a counterexample. Of course we cannot observe anything but the most vanishingly tiny fraction of all places and times. Agreed.

[6] Again this is based on the expectation that comes with habit and/or the fact that we are constituted such that we cannot comprehend events without thinking in terms of causation. Agreed

[7] I think this is more speculative, but it is bolstered by the apparent consistency and universality (within our science and regarding what we have actually observed) of the Laws of Thermodynamics. Are you saying it is an absolute presupposition or is not?

[8]. This certainly seems to hold in an abstract, logical kind of sense. It is hard to know what it could even mean beyond that context. I'm not sure if I have an answer. We can ask Kant. It was one of his.

Firstly, are humans substances? — karl stone

This is my interpretation - humans are made up of substances.

Are our thoughts, feelings, actions - caused? You wish to stick to physics, but have immediately invoked the question of consciousness/free will. — karl stone

As I noted in the OP, we are discussing the absolute presuppositions of a materialist approach to science. It is not the purpose of the thread to discuss whether materialism is valid.

I don't see how free will/determinism, Godels incompleteness theorem, or chaos theory are relevant to the issue raised in the OP.

That’s fine. It’s your thread, you can do with it as you please. But you referenced Collingwood, so it hardly seems fair to call something an AP that conflicts with the predicates of that reference. — Mww

Here are examples that Collingwood, in "An Essay on Metaphysics" identified as Kant's absolute presuppositions:

[*] ...between any two terms in a series, however close together they are, there is always a third term.
[*] ...mathematics can be applied to the world of nature; in other words that natural science is essentially an applied mathematics.
[*] Here the presupposition which makes him think about them in this way is stated by saying that he believes in the permanence or indestructibility of substance.

Of course the absolute presupposition of materialism is that matter - nowadays, matter/energy - are the only real substances. — Wayfarer

Agreed, but it's not the only absolute presupposition of a materialist approach to science.

It's not a mistake, so much as a very pervasive confusion in philosophy, in particular.

The everyday meaning of substance is 'a material with uniform properties'. Examples might be gases, plastics, metals, radioactive substances, etc. The difficulty is, 'substance' in philosophy has a different meaning, namely, 'the bearer of attributes'. — Wayfarer

I thought I was being clear. I hope I didn't confuse things. Thanks.

[1] We live in an ordered universe that can be understood by humans.
[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy.
— Clarky

(1) is of greater antiquity than (2). The idea of an ordered universe was one of the motivating beliefs of the Greek philosophers and indeed of science wherever it was found. But (2) was until recently one view among others, proposed by the ancient atomists and other materialist philosophies. — Wayfarer

The issue, for the purposes of this discussion, is whether or not these two presuppositions are absolute presuppositions of a materialist point of view.

[7] Substances are indestructible, although they can change to something else.
— Clarky

What do you think is the meaning of 'substance' in this context? I ask this, because I think there is considerable confusion about the philosophical, as distinct from everyday, sense of the word 'substance'. It is related to Cartesian dualism as mentioned above. — Wayfarer

When I said "substance" I meant matter and energy. If the word is ambiguous in this context, that's my mistake.