Is that because you are an advocate of a materialist viewpoint?( Just curious) — Joshs

No, I'm not an advocate. I picked it because I thought it would be the easiest to discuss and also because I think it matches most people's, including scientist's, understandings of how science works.

The metaphysical universe is extremely consistent, albeit unproven. — Bird-Up

Are you saying that the universe is homogeneous? I think that's probably true. It is my understanding that matter is well distributed within the observable universe and the cosmic microwave background radiation is uniform in all directions. I think that is a scientific finding, not an underlying assumption.

Did you not mean to call the propositions in that list APs? — Mww

I am proposing the items in my list as the underlying assumptions, i.e. absolute presuppositions, of materialist/physicalist/realist physics. As I noted in the OP:

Collingwood wrote that absolute presuppositions are neither true nor false, but we won’t get into that argument here. — Clarky

Does that mean we can’t critique materialism — Joshs

The purpose of this thread is not to discuss the validity of a materialist viewpoint.

I am unsure about 5. — Tom Storm

Item 5 on my list - "The same scientific laws apply throughout the universe and at all times"

If by "unsure" you mean you're not sure it's true, of course you're not. There's no way you could be. But if it's not true, and if we can't at least act as if it were, we can't do science.

Not sure if this helps but generally the physicalists I know call themselves methodological naturalists as opposed to philosophical naturalists. — Tom Storm

From Wikipedia:

• Methodological naturalism - Naturalism that holds that science is to be done without reference to supernatural causes; also refers to a methodological assumption in the philosophy of religion that observable events are fully explainable by natural causes without reference to the supernatural.
• Metaphysical naturalism - form of naturalism that holds that the cosmos consists only of objects studied by the natural sciences, and does not include any immaterial or intentional realities

It seems like either one of these would be consistent with the absolute presuppositions I listed. Or was that your point?

I beg to differ. I've written dumber things. — Bitter Crank

If you need testimony to that effect, I'd be happy to help.

They are not internally blocking or hindering their own thought. They are reacting in a socially appropriate way to a situation that that might lead to conflict and trying to decide the best way to handle it. They have been asked a question that is polarizing and divisive and they don't know who their audience is or how their answer might be used for or against them. Their views on "what is a woman" might be very well formed and thought out, but they refrain from responding simply because they don't care to have that debate or advertise their position. — Hanover

Oh, good. Now I don't have to respond. Thanks.

Doing my best here to ferret out a locus of concurrence. — ZzzoneiroCosm

[irony]No need for concurrence. Just knowing I'm right is enough.[/irony]

Pragmatism (Peirce) already eliminated metaphysics, quite a long time ago I might add, by asking a simple question "does a metaphysical propositions's truth/falsity matter to us in any real, tangible way?" The answer was "no, it doesn't!"[ — Rocco Rosano

As R.G. Collingwood wrote long after Peirce, and as I quoted earlier in this thread:

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.

Prop. 5. Absolute presuppositions are not propositions.

This is because they are never answers to questions; whereas a proposition is that which is stated, and whatever is stated is stated in answer to a question. The point I am trying to make clear goes beyond what I have just been saying, viz. that the logical efficacy of an absolute presupposition is independent of its being true: it is that the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that distinction being peculiar to propositions...

...Hence any question involving the presupposition that an absolute presupposition is a proposition, such as the questions ‘Is it true?’ ‘What evidence is there for it?’ ‘How can it be demonstrated?’ ‘What right have we to presuppose it if it can’t?’, is a nonsense question. — Clarky

Not, as a whole, an "exemplar," if you like. But it's defensible to hold that the Tao Te Ching has ontological, and therefore metaphysical, content. — ZzzoneiroCosm

For me, the Tao Te Ching is primarily, not incidentally, a metaphysical document. It is fundamentally about the nature of reality. Ontology. Metaphysics. Yes, I know I said I was done, but, like Popeye, that's all I can stands and I can't stands no more. Now I'm going to sleep.

Nuff said.

Ad hominem. — Wayfarer

Yes. I know I was bad. But I stand by my position that they both have mixed up their physics and their metaphysics.

it's mistaken to take the Tao Te Ching as an exemplar of the subject of metaphysics — Wayfarer

Here's a link to the SEP article on Chinese Metaphysics.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-metaphysics/

"Dao" is mentioned 43 times. Here's the first instance:

As far as we know, explicit metaphysical discussions began in China in the mid to late 4th century BCE with the Laozi (Daodejing) and associated texts.

I'll take them at their word. — Wayfarer

They're physicists, not philosophers. Most physicists don't take metaphysics seriously.

As the Tao Te Ching is amenable to vastly divergent interpretations, it makes sense that some folks call it metaphysics, others not so much. — ZzzoneiroCosm

It's a notoriously difficult word to define. I grant there's a vernacular definition of metaphysics which denotes a wide range of ideas from many different traditions and cultures, but I try to keep in mind the definition specific to European culture (e.g. here.) — Wayfarer

What could the Tao Te Ching be if it's not metaphysics? A literal description of the Ancient Chinese understanding of astronomy? A pretty poem I guess. As I said, I think this is too big a disagreement to be addressed here.

Tao Te Ching is not metaphysics per se. — Wayfarer

Of course it is. The whole theme of this thread is about whether it is possible to reason without metaphysics. It is clear to me it is not possible.

This is too big a disagreement to fit into this thread. We can take it up some other time.

It never happened in China — Wayfarer

Are you saying the Ancient Chinese didn't have metaphysics? If so, I'm surprised to hear you say it. The Tao Te Ching is pure metaphysics. The fact that it's poetic in form is not relevant.

There was nothing of the kind in the Tao Te Ching. — Wayfarer

Of course there was.

All things are born of being.
Being is born of non-being.

Therefore, by the Everlasting Non-Being,
We desire to observe its hidden mystery;
By the Everlasting Being,
We desire to observe the manifestations

So as these presuppositions evolve , so does scientific theory. — Joshs

Maybe the other way around or maybe they evolve together.

You mean, like a scientific theory?( except less conventionalized) — Joshs

I really don't want to get into a discussion about what "metaphysics" is. I'm already in one in another thread. As I see it, metaphysics is the set of underlying assumptions, Collingwood called them "absolute presuppositions," people use when they try to understand the world.

A scientific paradigm is nothing but a conventionalized instantiation of a metaphysical worldview. — Joshs

I see it the other way around. Metaphysics is a tool, a set of tools, people use when they want to figure stuff out.

Contemporary philosophers debate whether there is progress in philosophy. My first answer is no, because there does not need to be progress. — Jackson

As I've noted, philosophy for me is personal, so any "progress" is also personal. I don't know whether philosophy as a discipline progresses or should progress.

Richard Conn Henry, The Mental Universe — Wayfarer

Insufferably smug baloney. Mr. Henry doesn't understand the difference between metaphysics and physics either.

and Bernard D'Espagnat. — Wayfarer

Mr. D'Espagnat is also confused about metaphysics.

I'm here for my own reasons - to learn things about myself. To become more self-aware. It's not the mysteries of existence that are interesting, it's how I figure them out. Just because Kant might have thought it through 300 years ago, that doesn't mean I don't have to walk the path too.

https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/does-macro-object-get-entangled.884133/

but I don't think we will ever show entangled planets or people. — universeness

If I understand correctly, it is well established that quantum mechanics only applies at the subatomic, atomic, and small molecule scale.

I wonder why, then, the great Albert Einstein was compelled to ask, rhetorically, 'doesn't the moon continue to exist when we're not looking at it?' — Wayfarer

That's a question that was asked thousands of years before Einstein. When Lao Tzu asked that kind of question, it was metaphysics. When Einstein asked it, it was... I'm not sure. Probably physics.

I think that is a metaphysical question, and that it grew directly out of the discoveries of Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli. — Wayfarer

In situations like this, I apply the Clarky/Collingwood rule. (He's dead. I get top billing.) If it's true, it ain't metaphysics.

It's all the same world. — Wayfarer

Yes, I've said that many times. But different rules apply at different scales. At a subatomic scale, gravity is so weak it can be ignored. It's still there. It's the same world. But but it does not contribute significantly to phenomenal. Ditto for relativistic effects at human scale speeds. Ditto for quantum effects at human size scale.

the philosophical implications of that are still far from settled. — Wayfarer

I think that's true.

There's a specialist who writes on the metaphysics of physics - Tim Maudlin, from memory. Jim Baggott and Philip Ball are two others who say sensible things about it from within a fairly mainstream POV. But my favoured intepretations all tend towards the 'idealistic physicists', of whom there are a few (for instance, Richard Conn Henry, The Mental Universe - note the publication - and Bernard D'Espagnat.) — Wayfarer

I'll take a look.

More precisely, IME: Epistemology concerns criteria for deciding how to formulate theoretical models and perform experiments which test theoretical models whereas Metaphysics concerns the ontological commitments, or interpretation – e.g. realism or antirealism – presupposed by theoretical models. — 180 Proof

This is terrible!!! You and I keep agreeing. Something must be wrong.

I agree. Classical mechanics and quantum mechanics just 'mathematically describe' different scales of 'relational events' which entail different epistemic conditions (e.g. deterministic-causal and stochastic-correlational), respectively, about reality? experimental apparatus? the observer? etc. — 180 Proof

That's where I stand right now. As I wrote, I have some more thinking to do about it.

I do not think it is. And quantum mechanics shows why it is false. — Jackson

How the metaphysics of classical vs. quantum mechanics differ is something I'm struggling with. My interim answer is that quantum mechanics is physics, not metaphysics.

Yes, deterministic science. Never proven, just believed. — Jackson

Collingwood and I would not say "believed," we'd say "presumed." I think he and I would agree it is a reasonable presumption.

I think, it only reflects on ("the nature" of) theoretical practices and experimental findings. What more is possible for metaphysics to do with respect to natural science? — 180 Proof

I've always considered metaphysics and epistemology to be two aspects of the same subject. Recently I've come to see that, even though I still think that's true, talking about them in those terms confuses people. So I've decided to try to try to keep them separate them in my discussions. In that regard I think "the nature of theoretical practices and experimental findings" is epistemology. I guess the metaphysical aspects of science include that reality behaves lawfully and is consistent across time and space.

Does the self have a core that remains self-identical over time , or is it always a slightly new and different self that come back to itself minute to minute , day to day? — Joshs

I think both are good ways of looking at things, depending on the situation. When I'm dealing with people on a day to day basis, of course it makes sense for me to think of them as having a consistent identity. On the other hand, as @Angelo Cannata and others have noted, in some situations it may make sense to think of the self as changeable or even non-existent.

Philosophy, instead, either from a metaphysical point of view, or from what I think is like the current scientific drift of philosophy, needs definitions, clarity, evidence, logic, consistency. Even nihilists or postmodern thinkers need some kind of clear context where to put questions. — Angelo Cannata

As I noted, I think selfhood has sufficient definition, clarity, evidence, logic, and consistency to be considered real, existent.

Deconstruction was not Critical Theory. It was a way to read and interpret texts. — Jackson

Critical theory is a neo-marxist approach in philosophy, a form of structuralism and dialectic. . Derridean deconstruction places into the dialectical and structuralist basis of marxism and neo-marxism. — Joshs

Thanks for the education. I guess I always equate deconstruction, critical theory, and post-modernism as philosophical approaches that disparage traditional, conventional ways of seeing things.

Another evaluation of deconstruction. Thought others might find it worth discussing. I liked reading Derrida, but after a while, it just seemed like skepticism. — Jackson

I've read part of the article and will read the rest later. Here I'll show my ignorance - I thought deconstruction was a technique of Critical Theory. The article acts as if deconstruction has been widely abandoned, but Critical Theory, as in Critical Race Theory, is clearly going strong.

This is an interesting way of looking at things.

If Chalmer’s hard problem of consciousness does not exist, then there is no difference between a living human body suffering and a computer built to imitate all happenings and behaviours of suffering. — Angelo Cannata

Saying that the hard problem doesn't exist isn't the same as saying consciousness, in the sense that suffering is an aspect of consciousness, doesn't exist.

On a separate note, there is a case to be made that a computer built to imitate human conscious behavior seamlessly and completely is conscious. Not sure where I come down on that. This brings us into the land of P-zombies, which drives me crazy.

if you say that something like the “I”, the subject, the self, does not exist, — Angelo Cannata

I think I understand what eastern philosophies mean when they say that the self is an illusion. It's a useful way of looking at things. There are times when I can even experience things that way. On the other hand, most of the time it's me sitting here typing. Doing things the good old fashioned Amurican, western way. As the Beatles sang - "All I can hear, I me mine, I me mine, I me mine. Even those tears, I me mine, I me mine, I me mine."

then you are saying that we need to agree that something, that science is absolutely unable to prove, exists and, as a consequence, needs to be explored, studied, cultivated, discussed. — Angelo Cannata

Science doesn't prove things exist, it shows they can be measured in a rigorous, repeatable way. If we call that "existence," which is not unreasonable, then the self exists as much as gravity, electrons, and popcorn.

The problem is that, for these discussions, studies and explorations, we won’t have any evidence, any objective material to work on, so that the whole matter is highly exposed to a lot of discretion; I mean: everybody will be able to say anything about it and we will have no serious material to work on. — Angelo Cannata

Of course we have evidence. I can report my personal experience of my self - suffering, thinking, awareness, happiness - everything that people experience. I can get similar reports from lots of different people. I can't use my eyes to see a self directly, but that's true of many things - electrons, x-rays, gravity... Maybe you don't think the evidence for selfhood is very good. I disagree.

Nobody would say that we should protect computers from violence; why should we protect humans from violence, if nobody is suffering inside a suffering body? A suffering human body can be interpreted just like the frog’s legs in Galvani’s experiment. — Angelo Cannata

Maybe, logically, we shouldn't care about other people's suffering for the reason you've given. Fact is, though, we do. For most of us empathy is part of our standard equipment. It's built in. For most of us, caring about other people is important. That's a value. Values are not generally rational or logical, not to say they are irrational or illogical. If this computer you're discussing can perfectly simulate suffering and perfectly simulate empathy, then we're really talking.

Probably people mirror their own emotions onto others. — M777

This is probably true.

A weak person, who is afraid of all kinds of suffering or violence, will be overly protective of others. Same a person who is ok with suffering himself as an inevitable part of life, doesn't have an urge to rid the world of suffering at any cost, as they understand that some degree of suffering is needed for one's growth and without it people would become weak and pathetic. — M777

I think this is probably not true.

The idea of looking at 'how we see' may be part of this way of thinking because the thoughts which a person has are based on consciousness itself, so cannot be separated from the meanings, even if they are shared by many. — Jack Cummins

I think one of the purposes of philosophy is to separate how we see from what we see. Although it's not too hard to be aware of what we see, doing the same for how we see is much more difficult.

Metaphysics, on the other hand with respect to natural science, only reflectively conceptualizes natural science's presuppositions and principles (including – or implying – a 'natural-supernatural distinction'), which, of course, is categorical (analytic or hermeneutical) and not hypothetical (scientific or factual) – re: how we must look at 'whatever we can see', not what we can see. — 180 Proof

You and I see metaphysics in a similar way, although I might object to the "only" in "...natural science, only reflectively conceptualizes natural science's presuppositions and principles..."

So I also, as much as I can, examine rationally and seek confirmation of validity before I act or speak or type. — universeness

My writing comes directly from... somewhere inside and directly onto the page. That's the first time it shows up in words. The Tao Te Ching and other Taoist writings talk about "wu wei," acting without acting, without intention. That's how writing is for me. The words write themselves. I sometimes say that the best class I took in high school was typing. I rarely used it till word processors came along. Now it allows me to put my words down almost as fast as I could say them.

Before I post, I generally reread what I've written, but that's mostly to fix they're, their, there and make sure it makes sense. Most thinking, for me and many others, takes place in a place that is not conscious. I guess It's preconscious.

I disagree with you that experienced intuitive responses are mainly irrational and illogical. — universeness

I wrote "...in my experience it and it's contents are not rational or logical." I didn't say my intuition is irrational and illogical. There's another choice - non-rational and non-logical.

This distinction divorces human aggression from animal aggression, in opposition to the widely accepted myth that 'malignant' human aggression has its roots in an animal past. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Don't know much about Fromm, but his distinction between types of aggression doesn't make sense to me. Many social animals have hierarchal communities with structures of dominance enforced by aggression and submission. In people, that drive for dominance may take on odd and dangerous permutations because of how complex our society has become in order to handle all these dozens and hundreds and thousands and millions of people.