Perhaps it would have better to say something like "In the early 20th century a split in methods and interests occurred within philosophy, and Husserl was a bellwether." — J

Have a look at How the premature death of Collingwood changed philosophy

Paul Kneirem had a rather good little essay on the topic on the old forum which I think I saved somewhere. Also God does not exist, although you’ll say you knew that already.

It sounds like, then, you believe that numbers are real a priori? Either way, they exist and are real. That's confused and muddied language to make a distinction between what is real and what exists. — Bob Ross

I can understand why you would say that, as it seems a strange distinction to make, but the distinction between what is real and what exists is nevertheless a valid one. But I won't take it further at this point.

Do you agree that his statement is contradictory? He stated that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe yet he claims that computer is not conscious. — MoK

Read up on Bernardo Kastrup. I can’t break it down for you in a forum post. Try this https://besharamagazine.org/science-technology/mind-over-matter/

Intelligence can be defined — Carlo Roosen

Well, go ahead, define it. You say human level intelligence ‘can be achieved’ and superhuman intelligence some time after that. Show some evidence you’re not just making it up.

Do some research - google Bernardo Kastrup and read or listen. I’m not going to try and explain what he says but happy to answer any questions that throws up if I’m able.

Do you equate human-level intelligence with consciousness? — Carlo Roosen

Of course human-level intelligence is an aspect of human consciousness. Where else can it be found? What else could it be?

To me, the path is clear: superhuman intelligence is where we're headed. — Carlo Roosen

But not associated with consciousness?

What do you mean by 'human level intelligence' and 'superhuman inteligence'?

now you mention that, I have noticed it, although haven't looked at it. I've just bought the Kindle edition of his The World is Full of Gods, which I quite like, although as I basically agree with every word in it, am finding it hard to actually enjoy. :rofl:

The parts of the universe that become aware of themselves and other parts only do so by distinguishing themselves and other parts from everything else. — Janus

Indeed. That is one of the unique attributes of living beings. The hallmark of organic life is that it has to maintain itself rather than being subsumed into whatever chemical or energetic process is going on around it, as non-organic matter does. This is one of the distinctions that Evan Thompson makes in Mind in Life. But humans go a step beyond that. They're aware that they're aware.

Yes, well for little Cara, the world is indeed a vast enchanted garden.

https://www.theguardian.com/books/article/2024/sep/11/the-happiness-of-dogs-by-mark-rowlands-review-a-masterclass-in-canine-philosophy

The last few weeks I've been looking after a poodle-spaniel cross ('cavoodle') about a year old. She's never been neglected or hit, and as a consequence she has a kind of child-like innocence about her - everything is new, everything is a fun game, other dogs and people are all potentially friends. So she has that kind of quality of innocence, in a dog kind of way.

So I guess the attraction is that innocence represents purity, unspoildness, and spontaneity. I think that's why many modern societies express reverence for nature and the environment. It's the opposite of jadedness, of cynicism, of remembered or forgotten pain and guilt.

What you call consciousness is not fundamental since any mechanical device is equally capable of gleaning the workings of the world through such means, and many refuse to call that consciousness — noAxioms

If 'gleaning' means 'understanding', then AI systems glean nothing. In fact a computer system knows nothing.

I put that to gemini too, which responded:

I agree with your provocative claim that LLMs don't actually know anything. While they can process information and generate text that may seem intelligent, they do not possess true understanding or consciousness.

Here's why:

1. Lack of subjective experience: LLMs do not have personal experiences or feelings. They cannot understand the world in the same way that a human does, as they lack subjective consciousness.

2. Pattern recognition: LLMs are essentially pattern recognition machines. They identify patterns in vast amounts of data and use those patterns to generate text. However, they do not comprehend the meaning behind the information they process.

3. Manipulation of language: LLMs can manipulate language in impressive ways, but this does not equate to true understanding. They can generate text that is coherent and informative, but they do not have a deep understanding of the concepts they discuss.

In essence, LLMs are powerful tools that can be used for various purposes, but they should not be mistaken for sentient beings. They are simply machines that can process and generate information based on the data they are trained on. — gemini.google.com

OK, I don't understand Kastrup's argument, since all I had was that one summary not even written by him. — noAxioms

I provided it in the context of the Carlo Roosen's claim that AI will soon give rise to 'superhuman intelligence', by pointing out the objections of Kastrup and Faggin, both computer scientists and philosophers. It was meant as a suggestion for looking into the philosophical issues concerning AI, not as a complete wrap of Kastrup's philosophy. As for Kastrup's books, here's a list if you're interested (and he also has many hours of youtube media).

If you disagree with an argument it follows that you must not understand it. QED — Janus

Perhaps then you can parse this sentence for me:

a human body is nowt but a complex physical system, and if that physical system can interact with this non-physical fundamental property of the universe, — noAxioms

(I take it 'nowt' means 'nothing but'.) So, the objection appears to be, that body is wholly phyhsical, and mind a non-physical fundamental property - which is something very close to Cartesian dualism. But Kastrup's argument is not based on such a model. Hence my remark.

You don't say how long you've been following AI, but the breathless hype has been going since the 1960s. Just a few years ago we were told that radiologists would become obsolete as AI would read x-rays. Hasn't happened. Back in the 1980s it was "expert systems." The idea was to teach computers about the world. Failed. The story of AI is one breathless hype cycle after another, followed by failure. — fishfry

The story is well-told by now [written 2005 about the 70's] how the cocksure dreams of AI researchers crashed during the subsequent years — crashed above all against the solid rock of common sense. Computers could outstrip any philosopher or mathematician in marching mechanically through a programmed set of logical maneuvers, but this was only because philosophers and mathematicians — and the smallest child — were too smart for their intelligence to be invested in such maneuvers. The same goes for a dog. “It is much easier,” observed AI pioneer Terry Winograd, “to write a program to carry out abstruse formal operations than to capture the common sense of a dog.”

A dog knows, through its own sort of common sense, that it cannot leap over a house in order to reach its master. It presumably knows this as the directly given meaning of houses and leaps — a meaning it experiences all the way down into its muscles and bones. As for you and me, we know, perhaps without ever having thought about it, that a person cannot be in two places at once. We know (to extract a few examples from the literature of cognitive science) that there is no football stadium on the train to Seattle, that giraffes do not wear hats and underwear, and that a book can aid us in propping up a slide projector but a sirloin steak probably isn’t appropriate. — Steve Talbott, Logic, DNA and Poetry

But a human body is nowt but a complex physical system, and if that physical system can interact with this non-physical fundamental property of the universe, then so can some other complex physical system such as say an AI. — noAxioms

But it is the inability to describe, explain or account for how physically describable systems are related to the mind, that is what is described in 'facing up to the problem of consciousness'. Our understanding of 'the physical world' is itself reliant on and conditioned by our conscious experience. We perceive and interpret physical phenomena through an experiential lens, which means that consciousness, in that sense, is prior to any understanding of the physical. Trying to explain consciousness in terms of physical processes ultimately involves using concepts that are themselves products of consciousness. Of course it is true that physicalism on the whole won't recognise that, precisely because it supposes that it has excluded the subject from its reckonings, so as to concentrate on what is really there. But that only works up to a point, and that point is well short of explaining the nature of mind. So it's not true that the human body is a 'complex physical system', that is lumpen materialism.

That argument wasn't a very good one, — noAxioms

I don't think you demonstrate an understanding of it.

But one day, I’m certain, we’ll realize there's more to learn from the human mind than just neurons. We can gain insights from observing our minds—how we remember, reason, and use language. Essentially, the kinds of discussions we have here on the forum. — Carlo Roosen

That is meta-cognitive awareness - knowing about knowing, understanding through insight how the mind operates. That might seem obvious but since 20th century psychology came along with the understanding of the sub- and unconscious aspects of the mind, it clear that this not at all simple.

But overall I find the casual way in which you assume that human-level and then super-human intelligence can or will be achieved is hubristic. Many are saying that AI systems will reach the threshhold of consciousness or sentience if they haven't already. ChatGPT and other LLMs obviously display human-like conversational and knowledgement management abilities and can sail through the Turing Test. But I agree with those who say they are not conscious beings, and never will be, in principle.

I asked Google Gemini to summarize why Bernardo Kastrup says that the idea of 'conscious AI' is an illusion:

Bernardo Kastrup's argument against conscious AI is rooted in his philosophical perspective on consciousness and the nature of reality. He primarily argues that:

1. Consciousness is fundamental: Kastrup believes that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe, not a product of complex physical systems like the human brain. This means that AI, which is a product of human design and operates on physical principles, cannot inherently possess consciousness.

2. AI as a simulation: He views AI as a simulation of consciousness, rather than a genuine manifestation of it. While AI can exhibit intelligent behavior and even mimic certain aspects of human consciousness, it does so based on programmed rules and algorithms, not on subjective experience.
 
3. The hard problem of consciousness: Kastrup emphasizes the "hard problem" of consciousness, which is the question of how physical processes can give rise to subjective experience. He argues that current scientific understanding cannot adequately explain this phenomenon, and therefore, it's unlikely that AI, which operates on known physical principles, can achieve it.  

Essentially, Kastrup's position is that while AI can be incredibly sophisticated and capable, it is fundamentally limited by its physical nature and cannot truly possess the subjective experience that we associate with consciousness.

See also this blog post.

I don't submit this just as an appeal to authority, but because Kastrup is a well-known critic of the idea of conscious AI, and because he has doctorates in both philosophy and computer science and created and sold an IT company in the early stages of his career. He has summarized and articulated the reasons why he says AI consciousness is not on the horizon from an informed perspective.

It might also be of interest that he's nowadays associated with Federico Faggin, an Italian-American computer scientist who has the claim to fame of having built the first commercially-produced microprocessor. Fagin's autobiography was published a couple of years ago as Silicon (website here.) He also described an epiphany about consciousness that he underwent which eventually caused him to retire from IT and concentrate full-time on 'consciousness studies', subject of his later book, Irreducible.

Noteworthy that both Kastrup and Faggin came to forms of idealist metaphysics because of the realisation that there was an essential quality of consciousness that could never be replicated in silicon.

There's a lot of philosophical background to this which is often overlooked in the understandable excitement about LLMs. And I've been using ChatGPT every single day since it launched in November 2022, mainly for questions about philosophy and science, but also for all kinds of other things (see this Medium article it helped me draft). So I'm not an AI sceptic in any sense, but I am pretty adamant that AI is not and won't ever be conscious in the sense that living beings are. Which is not to say it isn't a major factor in life and technology going forward.

For me, I would say concepts exist in minds; and those concept reference existent things when those things really exist. I don’t see anything problematic here nor puzzling. — Bob Ross

Odd, then, that you’ve created a long OP, and engaged in a multi page discussion, about just this fact, with no resolution apparent. Perhaps you're taking too much for granted!

If you take a platonic account (like you did in your quote here), then numbers, e.g., exist in a supersensible realm. For plato, numbers are real and exist; and specifically are real and exist in the sense that they are abstract objects in a supersensible realm. I think trying to separate ‘real’ from ‘existent’ adds unnecessary confusion: I think you could easily convey your point by noting that these abstract objects would not exist in the universe. — Bob Ross

No confusion. A moderately well-educated person will understand that there is the 'domain of natural numbers' yet this is not an 'supersensible realm' in any sense other than the metaphorical. It is not some ethereal ghostly realm. Numbers and logical principles are not physically existent and yet our reason appeals to them at practically every moment to navigate and understand the world.

:100: :ok: :pray:

I can only say that I agree with Bergson, yet I can't find proper words to endorse that effectively we are the ones who measure time, and not the clocks. — javi2541997

Because the clock itself has no awareness of the duration between two points on its face. The measuring device comprises a machine that advances a pointer at a specified interval but the observer is the one who comprehends the time between those two points as 'an interval'.

Also note that Thompson takes pains to explain the sense in which Bergson's analysis was incorrect with respect to the 'twin paradox', however, the basic point still remains, which is, in the last sentence of the article, that 'Bergson continues to remind us of something forgotten in our scientific worldview: experience is the ineliminable source of physics'.

Italics added.

The plant pot appears broken in the picture — javi2541997

I believe 'cracked' is the word you're looking for, but then, a joke explained is a joke lost.

Incidentally, for interested readers, a substantial article by Evan Thompson on the debate between Henri Bergson and Albert Einstein on the nature of time in April 1922. I've just listened to the corresponding chapter of Thompson's co-authored book on this topic. Says something philosophically important, in my view.

Bergson insisted that duration proper cannot be measured. To measure something – such as volume, length, pressure, weight, speed or temperature – we need to stipulate the unit of measurement in terms of a standard. For example, the standard metre was once stipulated to be the length of a particular 100-centimetre-long platinum bar kept in Paris. It is now defined by an atomic clock measuring the length of a path of light travelling in a vacuum over an extremely short time interval. In both cases, the standard metre is a measurement of length that itself has a length. The standard unit exemplifies the property it measures.

In Time and Free Will, Bergson argued that this procedure would not work for duration. For duration to be measured by a clock, the clock itself must have duration. It must exemplify the property it is supposed to measure. To examine the measurements involved in clock time, Bergson considers an oscillating pendulum, moving back and forth. At each moment, the pendulum occupies a different position in space, like the points on a line or the moving hands on a clockface. In the case of a clock, the current state – the current time – is what we call ‘now’. Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct. But this is not how we experience time. Instead, we hold these separate moments together in our memory. We unify them. A physical clock measures a succession of moments, but only experiencing duration allows us to recognise these seemingly separate moments as a succession. Clocks don’t measure time; we do. This is why Bergson believed that clock time presupposes lived time. — Clock Time Contra Lived Time, Evan Thompson

I concur. I also believe this is concordant with Kant's description of time as a 'primary intuition'.

I have to say, this is entirely intelligible to me and (linguistically) solves a problem I've had for some time - there are clearly non-physical objects of experience. They are real, but do not exist. Thank you for clearing this up for me so succinctly. — AmadeusD

The single most important thing one can learn from philosophy in my view.

Objective Time is the underlying, universal flow that synchronizes all events across the entire universe. — Echogem222

Do you have any grounds for saying that there is such a thing?

These effects have been measured and confirmed through experiments like atomic clocks on airplanes and GPS satellites in orbit. — Echogem222

So then how can that be only ‘subjective’ as you seem to say?

That's one of the reasons I appreciate Nagel so much -- he refuses to be doctrinaire about the type of philosophy he was trained in. — J

The thing that draws me to Nagel is that while he's a professed atheist, he's critical of philosophical and scientific materialism on the grounds of reason alone, because he sees that it doesn't make sense. Which is enough for many of his professional peers to excorciate him.

Traditionally, as far as I can tell, the term ‘real’ refers to the same thing as ‘existent’. If it is real, then it exists; and if it exists, then it is real. This clearly does not hold in your schema. — Bob Ross

Does the first law of motion exist? Do numbers exist? Does the law of the excluded middle exist? Point to any of those, and you're indicating a set of symbols - f=ma, 2x2=4, etc. But the symbol is only a representation of a concept. And in what sense do concepts exist? Why, in the mind, you might say. Yet they seem to give a great deal of traction over the world at large, they seem to straddle the relationship of mind and world. I say that that such 'intelligible objects' as they are called (although the term 'object' is a little misleading) are real, but they're not existent qua phenomena. They're real as objects of thought - which is the original (as distinct from Kantian) meaning of noumenal.

Platonic Ideas and Forms are noumena, and phenomena are things displaying themselves to the senses... This dichotomy is the most characteristic feature of Plato's dualism; that noumena and the noumenal world are objects of the highest knowledge, truths, and values is Plato's principal legacy to philosophy ¹.

Which is what Kant picked up on, but then he altered the meaning of it to conform better to his schema.

Nevertheless, the basic point remains: if concepts such as number and logical laws are included, then the scope of 'what is real' far exceeds the scope of 'what exists'. That this idea is no longer intelligible to us, is due to the cultural impact of empiricism, which generally identifies what is real with what is existent, to its detriment. (See also Augustine on Intelligible Objects.)

the hippies got some of this right, yet veered off into hedonism, as a virtue. It then sabotaged anything they had to say to take this route. — Shawn

Don't I know. Not that I was ever really full-blown counter-culture, but it definitely was a major influence, and not all for the good.

But then, as you will know, at least some of the counter-culture went East and found roshis and rinpoches to practice under. And at least of those were not corrupted or led astray by the same acid bath of modernity (although some were, as I also know from experience.) But the point was, Buddhism and Vedanta, at least, and some of the Chinese religious philosophies, seem able to have carried forward elements of their culture into the modern world, in a way that Christian culture generally did not.

Rather, the historical approach found in IEP is the only option. — Banno

I thought the IEP article was pretty good, actually. One paragraph that jumped out at me was this:

Even in its earlier phases, analytic philosophy was difficult to define in terms of its intrinsic features or fundamental philosophical commitments. Consequently, it has always relied on contrasts with other approaches to philosophy—especially approaches to which it found itself fundamentally opposed—to help clarify its own nature. Initially, it was opposed to British Idealism, and then to “traditional philosophy” at large. Later, it found itself opposed both to classical Phenomenology (for example, Husserl) and its offspring, such as Existentialism (Sartre, Camus, and so forth) and also “Continental”’ or “Postmodern” philosophy (Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida).

In other words, defined by what it is opposed to. The Brits, in particular, had many very clever fellows - oh, and some gals - who's logical skills were forensic. (Didn't Ayer and Austin work for British Intelligence during the war?) So they're forensic experts in slicing and dicing substantive philosophical ideas. Withering blights. That article I once linked to, by Ray Monk, about how Gilbert Ryle took over Oxford philosophy after Collingwood's early death, and the ripple effect from that - 'no ear for tunes'. I found at UniSyd that kind of Oxbridge positivist mentality reigned supreme under D M Armstrong. Which is why I absconded to the Comparative Religion department (a.k.a. the Depatment of Mysticism and Heresy.)

(Acually, Putnam I've begun to warm to a bit. He's one of the names I've become familiar with since joining forums.)

But seriously, is there any end to consumption? Can one draw a line hard and fast over how illustrious wants can be detrimental to a person? — Shawn

Hey I’m also wrestling with all this. I often feel - actually I know - I’ve been corrupted by the society I’ve been born into. It’s a constant battle - the original meaning of jihad was spiritual struggle, although that’s been corrupted too.

One thing I do know. In my late 20's I discovered the joy of running. I never became a competitive runner or joined races or anything of the kind, but I discovered that I could run 5 or 10km regularly, and that it produced a fantastic feeling of like having had your whole body taken apart and re-assembled. I guess that was an endorphin thing, 'runner's high'. It was hugely effective as a mood stabiliser. Those days are long gone, but I still work out at gym.

Anyway, there's definitely a link between modern society and mental well-being. Hence the appeal of stoicism, paleo food, and all the other 'return to the ancients' kinds of movements, but it takes more than reading about it.

Yeah, true that, might have been a little hyperbolic on my part. Nevertheless I'm sure that it was a major element in actual Stoicism, as distinct from today's armchair versions.

I would say that on the whole the (best) Continentals are slightly more skilled at performing the necessary self-reflection involved. — J

Have you read Nagel's essay Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament? He makes a similar comment in that essay. I know you're interested in his writings, you can find a copy here.

There's only one way our brain works — Christoffer

Is that so? Got a manual?

I don't think that self-torture is a beneficial way to practice stoicism. — praxis

Interesting that the suggestion of physical fitness is immediately interpreted as 'self-torture' ;-)

What has been your experience with stoicism, or what do you think is the issue here? — Shawn

Do you practice any sport or fitness regimen? I suspect that is a factor. The root of 'asceticism' is actually 'askesis' meaning 'training', and I'm sure many of the classical Stoics were fighting fit. Indifference to heat and cold and to physical discomfort is not something that is acquired by thinking about it. That's one reason that modern culture is inimical to stoicism - it has accustomed us to previously unheard-of levels of pleasure and comfort and encourages only the pursuit of consumption.

(Note to self: follow your own advice! :rage: )

When I did a unit in Indian philosophy as an undergraduate, the lecturer remarked one day that in the West, when someone dies, it is said 'he gave up the ghost'. In India, it is more common to say 'he gave up the body'.

I'm not even clear what it means to say that the universe is comprehending itself. — Ludwig V

As a result of a thousand million years of evolution, the universe is becoming conscious of itself, able to understand something of its past history and its possible future. This cosmic self-‐awareness is being realized in one tiny fragment of the universe—in a few of us human beings. — Julian Huxley

(Although, mind you, we’re only ‘tiny fragments’ looked at from the outside.)

Nevertheless if one refers to ‘analytic and continental philosophy’ it is a well-understood division even if as noted above, no longer hard and fast.

I take it as analytic philosophers recognizing that the mind-body problem is not one which philosophy should grapple with anymore, and is best left to the scientist to elucidate such matters in terms of what can be said intelligibly. — Shawn

that is truly, unintentionally, hilarious. As regards Hadot, I agree that it seems challenging, but I'm a subscriber to both Medium and Substack, and they're teeming with threads dedicated to revivifying ancient philosophy in the modern world. Some of them are also really good scholars as well. My interpretation is that something about modern culture is intrinsically antagonistic to what was traditionally understood as philosophy, for various deep and intertwined reasons.

The analytic school of philosophy is the dominant way of doing philosophy, nowadays. — Shawn

Analytic method is all too prone to mistake oversimplification for clarification, banality for exactitude, and imaginative narrowness for intellectual rigor; moreover, its typical modus operandi is as often as not an unhappy combination of speculative timidity and methodological overconfidence. I do not know whether all of this is just an accident of philosophical history, and therefore corrigible within analytic tradition itself; I know only that Anglophone philosophy has produced at once the most copious and most frequently fruitless literature on the so-called mind-body problem. — Hart, David Bentley. All Things Are Full of Gods: The Mysteries of Mind and Life (pp. 18-19). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

Contrast with:

Pierre Hadot, classical philosopher and historian of philosophy, is best known for his conception of ancient philosophy as a bios or way of life (manière de vivre). ... According to Hadot, twentieth- and twenty-first-century academic philosophy has largely lost sight of its ancient origin in a set of spiritual practices that range from forms of dialogue, via species of meditative reflection, to theoretical contemplation. These philosophical practices, as well as the philosophical discourses the different ancient schools developed in conjunction with them, aimed primarily to form, rather than only to inform, the philosophical student. The goal of the ancient philosophies, Hadot argued, was to cultivate a specific, constant attitude toward existence, by way of the rational comprehension of the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos. This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing. — Pierre Hadot, IEP

I am not a soul, and I am not my brain. I am a whole, conscious, physical unit. — Kurt Keefner

I think the etymology of 'soul' is relevant. Originally in Greek it was 'psuche', roughly equivalent to our 'psyche' but with a broader set of meanings. It really meant something like an animating principle, or 'breath of life', and indeed was translated into Latin as 'anima' (root of 'animal' and 'animation'.)

Over history, of course, these terms changed their meaning, especially because of the religious appropriation of the term via the rubric of the immortal soul, meaning that in today's secular culture the term is considered archaic or problematic. But I take 'soul' to mean precisely 'the whole being'. Not 'person', as such, because 'person' is derived from 'persona' which were the masks worn by actors in Greek drama. It corresponds to 'ego', which is, we can say, the self's idea of itself, and refers to what we are consciously aware of as ourselves, who we ourselves think that we are.

But as depth psychology has pointed out, we also comprise sub- and un-conscious aspects which are often not available to conscious introspection, but which are also vital aspects of the whole being. It is really impossible to delimit exactly the extent of that, as a sage once said, 'The mind is a vast abyss (profunda abyssus est homo), and no man knows its depths.' Added to which there's the 'collective unconscious' which imbues us with a cultural memory and sense of identity, carrying forward memories which have been formed through many generations. Then also there are inborn proclivities, talents, dispositions, and so on, not all of which are beneficial, but which appear strongly ingrained in people. (Whence musical prodigies, for instance? Or those with other uncanny talents?)

So I take 'soul' to mean precisely 'the whole being' in that sense, comprising, but not limited to, the conscious mind. Which I think is conveyed in the popular description of shallow or merciless or mercenary types as being 'soul-less' (even if we don't nowadays believe in the soul.)

I will add, I think the phenomenological attitude is one of avoiding theoretical explanations of these factors, but exploring them through awareness of how they appear in actual life. Not trying to create a kind of theoretical superstructure to account for them.

There’s an essay pinned to the OP. Recommend a read. Also check out the level of vituperation in the early replies. Obviously hit a button.

Rather I take the flow of the argument here to be that there are a multiplicity of logics, to be applied in many and various cases — Banno

Kinda like Sliding Doors, right? Multiverse stuff? That kind of thing? Am I warm?

What is difficult for me to accept is that this means we are more than merely another kind of animal or that we are more important in any absolute sense than other animals. — Janus

I didn't say 'important', although in the sense that we hold sway over the fate of millions of species, then we are. But that is not the point I've been labouring to make, which is that we're of a different kind, due to what we're able to know.

This intuition is not, by the way, unique to Christianity. In Buddhist lore, being born in human form is an opportunity to realise liberation (a term which has no conceptual equivalent in the Western lexicon.) Buddhists are generally humane to animals, and many orders of Mahāyāna Buddhism are strictly vegetarian. But they understand that animals lack the intelligence to learn 'the way' (see David Loy, Are Humans Special? (.pdf)):

Steven Weinberg, a Nobel laureate in physics, famously claimed that “The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless.” But to examine the universe objectively and conclude that it is pointless misses the point. Who is comprehending that the universe is pointless? Someone separate from it, or someone who is an inextricable part of it? If cosmologists themselves are a manifestation of the same universe that cosmologists study, with them the universe is comprehending itself. Does that change the universe? When we come to see the universe in a new way, it’s the universe that is coming to see itself in a new way. — David Loy

That leaves open other forms of ratiocination. If, as they argue, for every given logical law a counterexample can be presented, then one might induce that there are no logical laws. — Banno

It might also indicate that logic has limits, which is not the same as to say that it isn't universally applicable within those limits. Graham Priest's diathetheism comes to mind although that too I interpret as an exploration of the limitations of logic.