Doesn’t address my question. Is everything designed of human origin?

Honestly I still don't see the obsession people have with Michelle Obama, — Mr Bee

Nostalgia for Barrack.

Trump was already president for four years. He didn't put people in camps — fishfry

His policy of splitting migrant families resulted with many children being interred away from their families.

Trump is Trump, I get you don't like the guy — fishfry

My liking him or not is irrelevant. His danger to democracy is not a matter of opinion. He’s not only a terrible person, he’s a dreadful leader, his only policy is retribution. His speeches are horrific and contain nothing about policy as such, only threats and fear-mongering. How you can fall for his schtick beats me.

Biden is not ‘a husk’. He’s been an effective senator and president, but he needs to pass the torch.

//

I note today that Gavin Newsom is acting as party whip for Biden. I believe he’s totally sincere in so doing, but also that he’s ideally positioned to step up if the torch is passed.

Good and cogent post in my opinion. At risk of some crossover from Tim Wood’s post on the nature of purpose, which seems to have some convergence with this one, I would add the following question.

I’ve noted in Richard Dawkins’ polemics the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘apparent’ design. This is crucial to him, of course, because purposelessness is central to his books such as Unweaving the Rainbow and The Blind Watchmaker. According to this view, what appears to us as marvellously designed in nature, really is due to the accretion of many incremental changes that occur over immense time-scales giving rise to what he calls ‘the appearance of design’. I wonder if that is also analogous to the discussion here about the nature of purpose, and whether there is any real purpose sans an intentional agent to enact it, as the same considerations will apply here also.

Now the question I have for Dawkins (and feel free to answer on his behalf if so inclined) is that, does his view entail that the only real designs are those created by humans, as humans are, to our knowledge, the only ‘intentional designers’ that we know of? That does appear a consequence of his view.

Given that Dawkins is a committed naturalist, it seems there might be a fundamental discontinuity in positing that human intentionality, a product of natural evolution, creates 'real' design, while natural processes can only produce 'apparent' design. How do we reconcile this distinction with a naturalistic view that sees humans and their capabilities as entirely natural phenomena, while at the same time denying that nature herself displays or generates designs as such?

It might be argued that human intentionality and the ability to design are emergent properties of complex natural systems. In this sense, human design is an advanced form of the same natural processes that create the appearance of design in nature. But in that case, it is contradictory to declare that design in nature is only apparent, as it is the basis of the human ability to design, which is made manifest in us, but is at least real as a potential in many natural forms.

This is why I keep going back to the question - does the assertion of the existence of purpose (or design or intention) in nature, necessarily imply that there must be a purposeful agency other than human agency? Because it seems the inevitable entailment of such a claim. Likewise, the requirement that Dawkins has to deny the intentionality of design in nature stems from his atheist philosophy.

we also learned that some animal behaviour is "hard-wired," instinctual - I do not know if that is still a valid viewpoint - and if so, then it seems fair to ask at such times what exactly is doing the intending or what it even means. — tim wood

I agree that it’s a very murky question, but I think there’s something fishy about it too. Sorry about the mixed metaphor, but speaking of murky and fishy, but a story that’s fascinated me is the account of the long-finned eels in Sydney’s Centennial Park. They live in murky ponds in the middle of said park, which is quite a few kilometres from the ocean. But every so often, at night and when it’s very wet, they’ll begin a migratory trek through a route that takes them across open parkland into some ponds connected to Sydney’s Botany Bay (hence their preference for wet evenings). And then they’ll make their way to a deep ocean trench near New Caledonia, which is about 1,800 km from Sydney, to breed. Their larval offspring then drift around for a few years, becoming elvers, and then when reaching their adult form, will make their way back to Sydney’s Centennial Park - even though they, as individuals, have never been there. But they know. Instinct, I guess.

There are many examples of migrating animals doing things like this - Pacific Salmon (or is it Atlantic? Whatever), who make their way back to their home stream from across thousands of miles of ocean. Birds who fly from the Arctic to Tasmania to breed. Obviously they don’t consciously calculate anything in the way a human would, but it makes me wonder whether how well we really understand what ‘instinct’ is, and how much of nature depends on these ‘instinctive’ processes. They’re not intentional processes, in the sense that human agents understand it, So in some sense they’re ‘intentional’ but also unconscious. (Schopenhauer devotes a section of WWI to this.)

But to try and tie this back to some of the points I brought up earlier, I’m wondering if it suggests a sense in which intentionality (or ‘will’ in Schopenhauer’s sense) is manifested at the most basic level of organic life. I don’t want to say that it is, but I think it’s an interesting question, and that it relates to questions of purpose and intentionality on a larger scale than the intentional actions of conscious agents.

He was from another epoch with a vastly different ‘weltanschauung’. But there are elements of Plotinus’ philosophy that remain vital in my view

To return to Gerson and the passage I quoted above: what do you think he means by the remark ‘you could not think if materialism was true’? Do you see how he appeals to Aristotle’s De Anima in support of that argument? Do you think it’s a valid point?

Quite so. I understand that Aristotle's 'hyle' was originally 'lumber' or 'timber', signifying the kind of generic material substance from which any particular might be formed. Interesting etymological point: 'matter' is derived from the same Indo-european root as 'mother', signifying the passive/receptive, 'that which is acted upon'. Form, then, is what 'actualises' the potential of matter to exist, because insofar as matter is formless, it can't be said to exist. (There's actually an ancient provenance to that idea, wherein Zeus is the 'creative principle' and earth the 'mother' - something I learned from Mircea Eliade's writings. This is reflected in the religious imagery of 'God the father'.)

In any case, the outlines of the general idea, and how matter came to be accorded primacy in Western culture, is what is of interest to me.

I'll check back in later. — javra

Sorry about that, wrongly transcribed, here it is again https://www.gornahoor.net/library/ThinkingBeing.pdf

I am mainly interested in the chapter on Plato. He shows where the predominant interpretation of the nature of the ideas or forms goes wrong.

I apologize for the dismissive manner I dealt with this upthread. — Paine

No problems at all.

I think I understand what that passage is saying - again it has parallels in Eastern philosophy, for instance in the contrast between the 'upright man' represented by Confucius and civic virtue, and the 'true man of the Way' represented by the taoist sage who 'returns to the source' and often appears as a vagabond or vagrant. It is a passage about the essential and total 'otherness' of the One, beyond all conditioned distinctions and human notions of virtue. It is a recognisable principle in various forms of the perennial philosophy.

But that is quite different to the point I was trying to make, which is the immaterial nature of reason. This is a thread that I picked up first from reading Edward Feser, but then also other neo-thomists that I then read (even if only in snippets and excerpts, as there is a lot of literature.) This is the principle that only the rational human intellect (nous) is able to grasp universals (kinds, types or species) which are the basis of rational thought. And that the rejection of transcendentals is one of the underlying factors behind the ascendancy of materialism.

Feser lays it out thus:

As Aristotelians and Thomists use the term, intellect is that faculty by which we grasp abstract concepts (like the concepts man and mortal), put them together into judgments (like the judgment that all men are mortal), and reason logically from one judgment to another (as when we reason from all men are mortal and Socrates is a man to the conclusion that Socrates is mortal). It is to be distinguished from imagination, the faculty by which we form mental images (such as a visual mental image etc...); and from sensation, the faculty by which we perceive the goings on in the external material world and the internal world of the body (such as a visual experience of the computer in front of you, the auditory experience of the cars passing by on the street outside your window, the awareness you have of the position of your legs, etc.).

That intellectual activity -- thought in the strictest sense of the term -- is irreducible to sensation and imagination is a thesis that unites Platonists, Aristotelians, and rationalists of either the ancient Parmenidean sort or the modern Cartesian sort. — Edward Feser

You can see the precedent for this general train of thought in e.g. The Argument from Equals in Phaedo. But it is central to the whole Platonist tradition.

Why is it significant? Because it goes to the point of the immaterial nature of mind (thought, reason) and that it can't be reduced to sensation or imagination. I'm not wishing to argue for Cartesian dualism, but then again, neither does Aristotelian philosophy (as described in another of Feser's blog posts). But I think this is the vital point at issue in the 'debate between Platonism and naturalism' that Gerson is describing.

In that sense of the physics already being self-organising, we are half-way there with the physical potentials that a modelling organism then harnesses for it ends. — apokrisis

Yes, I suppose I can see that.

I was after clear signs of just plain intelligence — tim wood

Birds and other animals surely exhibit intentional behaviour. What they don’t exhibit is the rational, abstract and meta-cognitive awareness of h. sapiens. But the excerpt shows how intentional, purposeful acts don't necesssarily require the latter and that intentionality has a much broader scope than what we think of as conscious intentionality.

The steadfast global purpose to the evolution of life is that of life’s optimal conformity to that which is actual and, hence, real. — javra

:100: I've been reading about the ideal of the mind's conformity with actuality and the distinction between 'conforms with' and 'corresponds to'. Compare with the Platonic principle 'to be, is to be intelligible.' See Eric D Perl Thinking Being.

I was talking to Baars back in the 90s at the same time I was talking to Friston — apokrisis

Interview with Friston on Curt Jaimungul's Theories of Everything.

I'm sure most pet owners can tell many like stories, clear examples of intelligence and even a sense of humor. — tim wood

The following extended passage about the chaffinch (a small finch) comes from a 1927 description by the British ornithologist Edward Max Nicholson (quoted in E.S. Russell’s 1934 book The Behaviour of Animals):

Here the male must leave the flock, if he has belonged to one, and establish himself in a territory which may at the time be incapable of sustaining him alone, but must later in the season supply a satisfactory food-supply for himself, his mate and family, and against as many birds of other species as overlap his sphere of influence. He must then sing loudly and incessantly for several months, since, however soon he secures a mate, trespassers must be warned off the territory, or, if they ignore his warning, driven out. His mate must help with the defence of the territory when she is needed; pairing must be accomplished; a suitable site must be found for the nest; materials must be collected and put together securely enough to hold five bulky young birds; eggs must be laid in the nest and continuously brooded for a fortnight till they hatch, often in very adverse weather; the young are at first so delicate that they have to be brooded and encouraged to sleep a great part of the time, yet they must have their own weight of food in a day, and in proportion as the need of brooding them decreases their appetites grow, until in the end the parents are feeding four or five helpless birds equal to themselves in size and appetite but incapable of digesting nearly such a wide diet. Enemies must be watched for and the nest defended and kept clean. When the young scatter, often before they can fly properly, they need even greater vigilance, but within a few days of the fledging of the first brood a second nest will (in many cases) be ready and the process in full swing over again. All this has to be done in face of great practical difficulties by two creatures, with little strength and not much intelligence, both of whom may have been hatched only the season before.

Here, too, organized behavior reflects the interests and needs, the perception, and the future requirements, of agents carrying out highly effective, end-directed activity. To be sure, the bird is not consciously reflecting upon its situation. But...we make sense of what happens by interpreting it as a series of reasonable responses to the bird’s ever-changing life context — all in the light of its own ends. While we cannot view the bird as inferring, deducing, and deciding, it is nevertheless recognizing and responding to elements of significance in its environment. There is a continual and skillful adjustment to a perceived surround that is never twice the same surround. — Steve Talbott, Evolution and the Purposes of Life

And let’s not forget the Congressional Oversight Committee which spent, or rather wasted, several years trying to dig dirt on Joe Biden, only to see all their witnesses turn on them on the stand or being charged for lying to the FBI. Nothing, nada, zilch.

Then review The Whitehouse For Sale report which found Trump made $6 million in emoluments from Chinese and Arabian interests while in office.

I ask you to introspect about your sentiments regarding Biden — fishfry

I only made the remark about medical factors causing Biden to retire, because I think he ought to retire. Like a lot of people, I think the public perception of him being 'too old' is a factor which might cause him to loose. If I were an American elector, and Biden was the candidate, I'd vote for him. I'm just concerned that many others won't, and as I've already said, I believe the re-election of Donald Trump would be an unqualified disaster for the United States and the rest of the world. Nobody's been 'covering anything up' about Biden. He's never been an orator, he often had verbal stumbles and gaffes throughout his career. So what? The Washington Post kept a daily tally of Trump's lies in his first term which topped out at some number around 38,000 (correction, 30,583) so don't talk about 'deception'. Anyway Im not going to discuss it with you, if you can't see Trump's obvious malfeasance then there's obviously no point.

enabling the Democrats' fraud — fishfry

:lol:

"I just need 11,686 votes".....

You and all the other Dems who are shocked, shocked that Biden's suffering the age-related cognitive impairment that was apparent in 2019. — fishfry

And I don’t believe that for a minute. Biden was quite capable of executing his first term, and did so with distinction.

What side are YOU on? — fishfry

Whatever side represents the rule of law and upholds the constitution. The side which didn’t attempt the overthrow of the Government and the subversion of the election.

I believe Biden has lost the confidence of many in the electorate and that the Democratic party ought to have selected a younger candidate. That said, though, I’ve never believed that Trump ought to have been allowed to run, considering his obvious malfeasance.

I think the answer will be: many abstentations, and that this will favour Trump, as his voters are enthusiastic.

It seems clear that Biden can't be forced out of the race - unlike in a parliamentary democracy such as Australia's or Great Britian's, there's no provision for the 'vote of no confidence' of the kind which brought down Boris Johnson. The only two things that can change that is that he changes his mind, or is declared unfit on medical grounds (which seems not altogether impossible.)

Trump is unanimously designated 'the worst US President' by a board of academic historians. If Biden runs and looses, he will be relegated to the place just behind him on that ladder, for having paved the way for the MAGA overthrow of the constitutional order (even despite his policy achievements and accomplishments.)

What do you want and expect from philosophy? — Fooloso4

I take the term ‘philosophy’ to denote, not just the general definition as ‘love of wisdom’, but also the state ‘loving wisdom’ (akin to loving kindness). Surveying the state of humanity, generally, it is abundantly obvious that the love of wisdom, and the state of being it denotes, is rare and hardly valued. On the other hand, delusion and self-deception seem to be in abundant supply, both amongst ordinary individuals and amongst many heads of state and leaders of society. Perhaps one role of philosophy is in pointing that out.

What, in a ‘consumer society’, is valued more than material abundance, comfort and convenience, progress and novelty? What ultimate end do we entertain, beyond a long life, free of illness and disturbance? What vision of humanity’s place in the cosmos does our culture encourage, other than technocratic domination and the distant hope of escaping Earth itself? What does philosophy stand for in such a world, beyond the enculturation of the skills required for such pursuits?

Rather than this leading to nihilistic skepticism, in the absence of knowledge Socrates asks us to consider what it is that is best for us to believe as true. This not for the sake of the truth but for the sake of the soul. — Fooloso4

Might it not be the case that any kind of higher truth can only be grasped by those capable and prepared? That some form of philosophical ascent might be required? Isn’t that the meaning of ‘anagoge’? What was the aim of Plato’s Academy? It was the pursuit of knowledge, particularly in the realms of philosophy, mathematics, and science. Plato believed in the importance of rigorous intellectual inquiry to understand the underlying principles of reality and to achieve knowledge of the Forms, especially the Form of the Good.

The Academy emphasized the dialectics, seen as crucial for achieving philosophical understanding. Mathematics was a core component of the Academy’s curriculum. The entrance to the Academy is famously inscribed with “Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here.” Dianoia, mathematical and geometrical knowledge, was higher than opinion, but lower than noesis, direct intuitive insight into the ideas.

The Academy aimed to educate individuals not only in intellectual matters but also in moral virtues, aiming to cultivate wise and virtuous leaders. The Academy functioned as a community of scholars engaged in collective study and dialogue. It was not just a place for passive learning but an active intellectual community where ideas were debated and developed.

Plato saw the Academy as a place to train future statesmen and leaders. He believed that those who understood philosophical truths were best equipped to govern society justly and effectively. The principles and aims of the Academy were heavily influenced by the teachings of Socrates, Plato’s mentor. The Socratic emphasis on questioning, ethics, and the examined life shaped the educational approach of the Academy.

So - what about that curriculum might amount to an ‘edifying myth’?

Quite a few people still believe that this is attainable. — Tarskian

Quite a few straw people, I suspect.

:up:

I wonder if I might elicit a comment from you about a previous OP of mine, which I believe might be closer to the point of your criticism of positivism:

'Scientific method relies on the ability to capture the measurable attributes of objects, in such a way as to be able to make quantitative predictions about them. This has been characteristic of science since Galileo, who distinguished those characteristics of bodies that can be made subject to rigourous quantification. These are designated the 'primary attributes' of objects, and distinguished, by both Galileo and Locke, from their 'secondary attributes', which are held to be 'in the mind of the observer'. They are also, and not coincidentally, the attributes which are specifically amenable to the treatment of mathematical physics, which lies under so many of the spectacular successes of science since Galileo.

This was part of the essential discovery of the 'scientific revolution': that insofar as you can represent an object mathematically, that you can use mathematical logic to predict its behaviour. The greater the amenability of an object to mathematical description, the more accurate the prediction can be: hence the high estimation of physics as the paradigm of an 'exact science'.

Bertrand Russell said that 'physics is mathematical not because we know so much about the physical world, but because we know so little; it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover.' And within the domain of applied mathematics, the applicability of mathematical logic to all kinds of objects yields nearly all of the power of scientific method. But Russell makes a philosophically important point, that the power of mathematics in the physical world depends on a fundamental abstraction, a boiling down to its precisely-quantifiable attributes.

In other words, what can be expressed in quantitative terms can also be subordinated to mathematical analysis and, so, to logical prediction and control. It becomes computable, countable, and predictable by mathematical logic. That is of the essence of the so-called 'universal science' envisaged on the basis of Cartesian algebraic geometry.'

That is much nearer to what I think you have in your sights, rather than pure mathematics as such.

Positivists are like that. — Tarskian

Sure. I’ve always rejected positivism, although for different reasons. I see positivism as being a kind of undercurrent in modern thought. But I don't know if Hilbert fits the bill. Hilbert's work in mathematics and his foundational program, known as Hilbert's program, aimed to provide a solid foundation for all of mathematics by formalizing it and proving its consistency using finitary methods. This goal aligns more with a foundationalist approach rather than with positivism per se.

Positivism, particularly as developed by the Vienna Circle in the early 20th century, emphasizes empirical science and the idea that meaningful statements are either empirically verifiable or logically necessary.

Hilbert was more concerned with the internal consistency and formalization of mathematics rather than the empirical verification of mathematical statements. His program sought to ground mathematics on a set of axioms and prove its consistency through purely syntactic means, without reference to empirical content.

I did a unit on A J Ayer's Language Truth and Logic, which is a canonical text of positivism, and found it immensely annoying. I was pleased to learn that it had became evident not long after its publication, that Ayer's style of positivism was self-contradictory, because the kind of verificationism that he insisted on, could neither be validated nor falsified by empirical methods. So it failed its own criteria! My tutor said it was like the mythical Uroboros, the snake that eats itself. 'The hardest part', he would say with a wink 'is the last bite.'

But while there are some overlaps in the emphasis on formalism and logic, Hilbert's aims were distinct from the broader philosophical tenets of positivism.

So I agree with your rejection of positivism, but not for your reasons.

In other words, whatever is provable is true. But it's not the case that whatever is true is provable. — TonesInDeepFreeze

'Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts'

People who believe that pure reason is the only source of meaning will never accept this, no matter how often you hammer it into their heads. — Tarskian

Any examples of those people come to mind?

Can the Universe be ordered without being animated by purpose? Do you see the difference? Purpose and reason seem to suggest A purpose and A reason. — Joshs

I said before, it seems an inevitable implication, but perhaps this is because of the theistic history of Western culture which seems to force itself upon us. There’s a passage I often quote from the Catholic Encyclopedia entry on Logos, to wit:

God, according to the Stoics, "did not make the world as an artisan does his work, but it is by wholly penetrating all matter that He is the demiurge of the universe" (Galen, "De qual. incorp." in "Fr. Stoic.", ed. von Arnim, II, 6); He penetrates the world "as honey does the honeycomb" (Tertullian, "Adv. Hermogenem", 44), this God so intimately mingled with the world is fire or ignited air; inasmuch as He is the principle controlling the universe, He is called Logos; and inasmuch as He is the germ from which all else develops, He is called the seminal Logos (logos spermatikos). This Logos is at the same time a force and a law, an irresistible force which bears along the entire world and all creatures to a common end, an inevitable and holy law from which nothing can withdraw itself, and which every reasonable man should follow willingly.

The parallels with 'dharma' are striking, dharma likewise being 'a universal law', 'individual station or duty', (and (n Buddhism) an element of experience). And there are many non-theistic forms of this kind of belief in Hinduism also. As metaphors, think they're quite philosophically congenial to naturalism or the kind of emergent or extended naturalism that is beginning to appear.

Animals have their purposes, but as far as we can tell they cannot transcend their instinctive natures — Janus

Whereas, humans can. Which is one of the predicaments that popular Darwnism leaves us, as it makes no provision for this fact.

Steve Talbott, who's essays I really love, is a philosopher of biology who has a lot to say about that. There's a particular essay of his, From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning, which I think draws out this distinction in exquisite detail. (I wish I could paraphrase it, but it's a very hard topic to summarize. I found Steve Talbott's essays on The New Atlantis site, they're first rate on all of this.)

Are the attendant insights ever context-independent though? — Janus

To even express any kind of insight requires language. But then, consider the Flower Sermon, the apocryphal origin of Zen, wherein the Buddha holds up a single flower. That is intended to convey an unconditional insight. But as soon as you begin to discuss it then the point is already moot.

I believe the genuinely mystical transcends philosophy, yet philosophy orients itself with respect to it. This relationship is evident in Christian Platonism, where negative theology—often associated with Christian mysticism—is defined as 'beyond words' and thus not easily discussed in dialogical terms. However, the mystical element of that tradition remains implicit in much of the surrounding philosophical discourse. But then, it was also constantly informed by the presence of actual teachers and exemplars of the faith, who provided a living dimension to the tradition which is generally absent in modern academic philosophy.

A main point is that the focus on "peak experiences," tends to actually exclude a great deal of the people who we think of as "mystics" from the definition because they never wrote about such experiences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There's a distinction made in Buddhism between realisation and experience.

In Buddhism, we distinguish between spiritual experiences and spiritual realizations. Spiritual experiences are usually more vivid and intense than realizations because they are generally accompanied by physiological and psychological changes. Realizations, on the other hand, may be felt, but the experience is less pronounced. Realization is about acquiring insight. Therefore, while realizations arise out of our spiritual experiences, they are not identical to them. Spiritual realizations are considered vastly more important because they cannot fluctuate. — Letting Go of Spiritual Experience, Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche

Likewise in Zen training, students are generally admonished from either seeking for special experiences or becoming fixated or attached to them if they arise. Such experiences are called makyō, and can include vivid visions, strange sensations, or profound insights that may seem deeply spiritual or significant. Zen practitioners are admonished against becoming attached to these experiences or seeing them as a sign of progress, as they are considered distractions from the true path of enlightenment.

A mundane allegory I had for this distinction was, imagine you're out shopping, and you've parked some distance away from the grocery store. As you make your way back to your car with your shopping, it begins to pour with rain, so you attempt to run. But then, you realise you can't feel or hear your keys in your jeans pocket, and that you must have left them on the store counter. 'Running in the rain' is an experience. 'Realising you've forgotten your keys' is a realisation. (Perhaps this is why Plato seems to make a connection between realisation and remembering, anamnesis.)

Often, after waking up to myself from the body, that is, externalizing myself in relation to all other things, while entering into myself, I behold a beauty of wondrous quality, and believe then that I am most to be identified with my better part, that I enjoy the best quality of life, and have become united with the divine and situated within it, actualizing myself at that level, and situating myself above all else in the intelligible world. — Plotinus, Ennead 5.36

There's a chapter in Urs App's book Schopenhauer's Compass, concerning what Schopenhauer called 'better consciousness', which he also says can be found in the writings of several of Schopenhaur's near contemporaries, including Schelling and FIchte. (Rather a nice little Wikipedia on this, Higher Consciousness.) I'm sure Plotinus is describing a universal realisation in that passage, paralllels could be found in Vedanta literature as well.

Are there other ways in which perennialist thinking tries to "flatten everything out"? — Janus

The Katz-Forman debate in comparative religion revolves around the universality or context-dependence of mystical experiences. Steven Katz argued that mystical experiences are invariably expressed in terms of the cultural, religious, and linguistic contexts in which they occur. According to Katz, mystical experiences are not universal but are instead deeply influenced by the specific traditions and beliefs of the mystic, resulting in significant differences across different religious contexts.

In contrast, Robert Forman posited that there is a core, universal mystical experience that transcends cultural and religious boundaries. He suggests that, despite variations in interpretation and expression, the fundamental experience of mysticism is essentially the same across different traditions. Forman's perspective emphasizes the possibility of a common mystical core, accessible to mystics regardless of their specific cultural or religious backgrounds.

I mentioned Katz in an honours thesis I did on the topic, but overall didn't agree with his account which I found reductionist. On the other hand, it's a mistake to try and identify the so-called 'universal core' because these kinds of realisations are almost impossible to define or articulate. Which is why they are generally represented in symbolic language! We can't 'get behind' the symbolic form to discern what it 'really is' about. Another analogy - how would you find out whether 'death by drowning' is alike or different to 'death by suffocation'?

I do agree that there is a kind of 'lazy syncretism' which tries to blend different philosophies into a kind of melange. In fact I've even been guilty of that myself in the past. But I still think there's a very sound case for the universality of some forms of mystical insight.

:ok:

What do people in this thread plan to do about Biden? — fishfry

Nothing I can do about it, I’m not even an elector (although my son lives in the US and is a dual citizen.) I’m still holding out hope that Biden will see reason (and rather uncharitably wishing he’d have a mild stroke which would take the matter out of his hands.) But if he stays the candidate, I’m now convinced that Trump will win, and that it will be an unqualified disaster for America and the rest of the world (but that’s not something I’m going to debate outside the Trump thread, of which I’m steering clear.)

I sometimes think it might be that the ancients simply assumed there was a reason for existence and that the universe was animated by purpose. The meaning of ‘cosmos’ was ‘a unified whole’ and was presumed to be ordered by reason, which is why reason could get a purchase on it in the first place; it was the task of the philosopher to discern that purpose. That is one of the many meanings of ‘logos’, isn’t it? It took many centuries for the idea to emerge that that Universe might be purposeless, it is one of the realisations (if it is a realisation) that is born out of the mechanical philosophy of Galileo and Newton. I suppose the idea that the Universe is animated by reason is a thread that is common to nearly all traditional philosophy. It’s only with the advent of modernity that this is called into question.

This is not the specifically the subject of the lecture I mentioned, but it is one of the themes explored in the series Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. In that lecture, he traces the development of dynamic systems and evolutionary theory (hence Darwin in the title) but then at the end goes back to discussion of the ethical import of Aristotle’s philosophy:

So let's now take it back to Aristotle because Aristotle was interested... now, he doesn't use this (points out both diagrams on the board), he doesn't use the dynamical systems language. That's our language. But this language was directly inspired by… Aristotle so using it backwards to try and connect Aristotle to our current understanding, I do not think is anachronistic. So Aristotle is interested in our development. He's going to add something that was missing from the Socratic notion of wisdom. Remember the Socratic notion was trying to overcome self-deception. And then Plato adds a whole structural theory of the psyche to explain how we overcome self-deception - how we become wise and achieve wisdom. But what's missing, in the account of wisdom and meaning, according to Aristotle - if I can use this (board) language - is what's missing is an account of growth and development. How does wisdom develop? How does meaning develop? Well this is where we get something that we talk about and we use in our language, but we don't, I think, get the depth of what Aristotle is talking about...

https://www.meaningcrisis.co/episode-6-aristotle-kant-and-evolution/

I think maybe one interpretation is not to try and discern the meaning of ‘the entire cosmos’, as that seems a rather grandiose idea (although I think it is certainly an idea that Aristotle was prepared to entertain.) But I would hope that as we’re a part of that unfolding process, that insofar as we capable of living meaningfully, then we’re playing a part in it, and it is purposeful - which is the overall orientation of the talks he’s giving.

Notice the difference between ‘Every thing has a purpose’ and ‘Everything has a purpose’. A space that actually makes a big difference! Might be an example of one of Deacon’s absentials ;-)

Maybe, but it's all grist to the mill from a layman's point of view. I've gotten halfway through Deacon this year and it is one book I really must finish (although I do say that a lot.)

For me, nature does not count as intentional unless it is either a cognitive agent or is directed by a cognitive agent. — Janus

Apropos the debate about purpose in nature and the lack thereof. From John Vervaeke's lecture series, Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. In lecture 6, Aristotle, Kant and Darwin, Vervaeke brings in Alice Juarrero, a systems theorist and philosopher of biology who's mentioned quite a few times on this forum. Her books include Dynamics in Action and Context Changes Everything.

Where this comes in, is Vervaeke's discussion of Aristotle's hylomorphism, and how Aristotle accounts for change through time. You can review this section of the lecture <here> and also review an excerpt from the transcript below. For context, he's discussing the aftermath of Newton's discovery of the principles of motion (by A>B>C he's referring to mechanical causation), and Kant's attempt to reconcile that with the phenonenon of organic growth.

Suffice it to say that this (A->B->C) became a predominant way of trying to explain how things work (after Newton). But then Kant encountered a very significant problem. And it's not a coincidence that it has to do with the kinds of things we were talking about with Aristotle. The kinds of things that can grow. Living things. Because Kant went out and he saw a tree! And this was very problematic for him because trees don't follow this model readily. Because... He was looking at it and he was saying "okay, well what's making the tree?" Well it's the sunlight! "Well how does the sunlight get in?" Through the leaves! "So... what's making the leaves?". Well, the tree! "So, the tree makes the leaves and the leaves make the tree! So the tree is making the tree!" And he coined the term "Self-Organizing". The tree is Self-Organizing. Now the problem with that is living things make use of "Feedback Cycles". In a feedback cycle the output from the system feeds back into the system. The tree makes the leaves, that gathers energy that goes into the processes that makes the leaves. Living things are self organizing. They use feedback cycles but when I try and give an explanation of a feedback cycle, I fall into a circular explanation....So Kant came to a rather startling conclusion. He came to the conclusion that there could not be a science of living things! That biology was impossible.

This is where Juarrero's work is brought in:

This is what Alicia Juarrero takes up and she said "actually for a very long time we had no way of solving this problem". And so there was a huge gap between our biology and our physics. Now again, why are we caring about this? Because we need to... If we're going to understand Aristotle, if we're going to deeply understand what we mean when we talk about that we are living things that grow and develop and that growth and development is (also) integral to our meaning and our sense of who and what we are - our 'personal identity' - that if we cannot give an answer to this problem (points to issues / question on the board), we cannot understand, fundamentally, who and what 'we' are and what the hell we are talking about when we talk about how important growth and development are to us... Because that language will forever be separate from any kind of scientific understanding! So where's this going wrong?

...So Juarrero first of all makes a distinction between "causes" and "constraints". So to get at that distinction, let's go back to what seems so obvious. OK.... Here's the marker... I push it! Why did it move? And immediately the Newtonian grammar just comes into place: "It moved because you pushed it!" And then you might step outside of physics and say "well, I wanted to push it!", but that's not what I'm asking! Because it could also just be that some other object bumped into this and it moved! Why else did it move? Okay, so think about what has to also be true in order for this to move. There has to be empty space. Relatively empty space in front of the marker. This (the surface - table) has to have a particular shape to it. This (the pen) has to have a particular shape to it. Those aren't events. Those are conditions. Causes are events that make things happen. Constraints aren't events, they're conditions! They don't make things happen, they make things possible. There's a big difference between a condition and an event. The Newtonian way of thinking has us so fixated on this (causes -> event -> happen), so fore-grounded on this that we're not seeing this (constraints -> conditions -> possible) anymore! But Aristotle, because of his Platonic view, actually considers this (Constraints flow) more important. Why? Because when I talk about a Structural, Functional Organization, when I talk about a pattern, I'm talking about this (Constraints flow). This is where you will find form. It is sometimes called the "Formal Cause".

This ties in with Terrence Deacon's ideas in Incomplete Nature (and in fact, there was an investigation as to whether Deacon plagiarized Juarrero when he published his book after hers, but he was absolved by an academic committee), and also (I think) with a lot of what @apokrisis says about biosemiosis. I introduce it here only because I think it helps to grasp the formative role of constraints and conditions in understanding the nature of purpose - not in the sense of mechanical causation, but in the sense of 'why things are the way they are'. This is where I think it makes sense to look for the original sense of Plato's eidos, the forms - not in some fanciful ethereal 'Platonic heaven' but in the underlying patterns of causal constraint which imposes order on possibility.

I'll leave it at that, as there's a limit to what can be meaningfully conveyed in a forum post. Suffice to say, I think it's pointing in a fruitful direction.

You also have to assume that Kamala Harris would *want* to be the Presidential Nominee. And I don't know if that's gauranteed.

Reading between the lines - and there's lots of lines - it looks as if Biden agrees to transition, it might result in an 'open convention'. It's happened before, and didn't work out well for the Democrats. But this situation is different. Sure, Trumpworld has its rusted-on supporters, but many of those who don't like him really hate him, but think Biden is too old. (I mentioned before, Steve Bannon said just as he was turning himself in, the Trump Campaign is betting on beating Biden - hey nice alliteration there - if someone else is the candidate, it's a wild card, things could shift very quickly.)

I don't think she's The Candidate, but she's also not as terrible as the media tends to depict her. I said upthread, from where I sit (outside the US but with irons in the fire), a Newsom/Whitmer ticket would look pretty damned impressive.

I'm convinced he will reliquish the candidacy. That's what he must do - it can't be taken from him, he has to pass it on, and I'm sure he will. And as the electorate is crying out for an alternative to Biden-Trump (not counting Kennedy, because he doesn't count), I think it will electrify the landscape. It might instantly attract millions of undecideds and anti-Trumpers. Might.

Axelrod on Biden, CNN.

The most depressing thing about the ABC/Stephanopolous interview was indeed that final sentence.

“If you stay in, and Trump is elected, and everything you’re warning about comes to pass, how will you feel in January?” Stephanopoulos asked.

“I will feel, as long as I gave it my all, and I did the — good a job as I know I can do, that’s what this is about,” Biden replied.

Not nearly good enough. "Trying my best" and "Promise I'll go to bed early". I think it's obvious that the gig is up, let's just hope the man himself comes to realise it.

Non-dualism is a fairly difficult perspective because it involves going beyond splits, or binary divisions. — Jack Cummins

There is a strong revival of classical philosophy around right now. I’m subscribing to a couple of feeds on Medium and Substack about stoicism and other schools of ancient philosophy. All of them concern ‘the transformation of perspective’, it is fundamental to ‘philosophy as a way of life’ that they were concerned with. The required change in perspective is more than conceptual or hypothetical, which is what makes it so hard to communicate or discuss. A term I’ve learned from those sources I mentioned is ‘anagoge’. In ancient philosophy, the term "anagoge" (from the Greek "ἀναγωγή") refers to a process of spiritual or intellectual ascent. It signifies the act of rising or leading upward, often used to describe the movement from a lower, more material or literal understanding to a higher, more abstract or spiritual comprehension.

In particular, "anagoge" has been employed in various philosophical and theological contexts to indicate spiritual elevation and the soul's journey towards a higher state of knowledge or insight beyond the mundane. It also refers to an allegorical or mystical interpretation of sacred texts, where the reader is led from the literal or historical meaning to understanding a deeper perspective.

This is not so much discussed as assumed in classical schools of Indian philosophy including Advaita (non-dualism). It is understood and expected that the student (chela) will maintain high moral standards in the pursuit of philosophical insight, under the direction of a spiritual preceptor (guru).

— Apokrisis

As with a tornado, half the job of being alive and mindful is done.

:chin: Is there half of an intentional act? Tornadoes have no internal means of continuing to exist, which organisms do.

Actually, there’s a question I’ve been meaning to ask you (in particular). I was exploring the idea that a characteristic of classical physics was that it is indifferent to context. It concentrates on ideal objects - objects which have precisely measurable attributes, without taking into account environmental disturbances or other circumstances which are ‘less than ideal’. Because of this abstraction, it’s reckonings are universal - they apply to any ideal object anywhere in the universe. But, the point which forced itself on science with the advent of quantum physics, was that context actually meant something. Why? Because the outcome of the experiement depends on the way it is set up - set it up one way, the result is a wave, set it up another way, the result is a particle. So context begins to matter. And this becomes evident also in environmental science and systems science generally, because ‘the environment’ is a context. And it seems to me that is a major shift that has occured in 20th century science.

That’s all I wanted to ask.

I suspect Kant would have seen this if only he'd known something of Buddhist philosophy, . . . . . . — PeterJones

Strongly recommend a 1955 book, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, T R V Murti, which has extensive comparisons between Kant and Buddhist philosophy. Not well favoured in today’s academia, but I recommend it nevertheless.

What this shows is that even though the ideas of the East may be an appealing alternative, the dark side of religion, or human nature, shows up in Eastern as well as Western religions and spiritual movements. — Jack Cummins

For sure. But, ‘there would be no fool’s gold, were there no gold’, says Rumi.