The word "man" and "woman" are not based on gender, they are based on sex. There is no question as to what a man or a woman is. There are no privileges afforded a man or a woman beyond this biological difference. We can say there are stereotypical expectations of men and women's behavior and expression, and many men and women do not fit into those stereotypes. Not fitting into a stereotype doesn't change your sex, period. If a man wants to wear dresses, paint their nails, and act flighty, that's fine. They are still a male that's expressing themselves in a particular way. You can say, "I like a particular gendered idea of the way a woman acts in society, so I'll act that way." There's nothing wrong with that. But you are still a man or a woman because of your sex, not your actions or expressions. — Philosophim

Basically this sums up every single problem that both sides possess in having any sort of dialogue on this sort of discussion. Everybody gets the distinction between gender and sex. If they don't then its no difficulty in educating them on that. The issue is deciding on what matters gender should take the forefront and in what cases sex should.

Bathroom discussions revolve around this a lot where its gender that rules and whether you have the 'correct' internal/sexual anatomy or the right chromosomes isn't how people 'gain access' to such private places. Its passing that matters and not some rigorous identification.

Sports is a different matter and one in which biology takes the forefront. . . UNLESS there is some specific biological characterization (bone structure, hormonal levels, etc) as a way of leveling the playing field that is sufficient enough to allow fruitful and relatively balanced competition. That is something that would have to be argued for as impossible/possible in principle by those educated in sports science.

Social groups, cohesion, and the benefits gained from such matters are another situation of great disagreement.

The question should always be: Is gender or sex the deciding factor in some particular social/political/economic decision? Or to what degree is each characterization to be leveled?

My sense is that only a small portion of the transgender movement consists of people who will genuinely benefit from adopting the label.

A larger portion seems to consist of:
1. people who carry trauma from childhood in which their individuality was not accepted (feminine men, masculine women, homosexuals, lesbians, etc.)
2. children/young adults who had no idea what they were doing
3. sexual deviants
4. parties with ulterior motives, like pharmaceutical companies and surgery clinics (hence the movement's superb marketing) — Tzeentch

Larger by what metric? I'm not going call you bigoted but I am going to call you out on a rather, at first glance, baseless characterization of the whole movement. Did you get this from a peer reviewed study? A survey? Some purely emotional concern from years of watching your favorite forms of media?

Perhaps you should rephrase it in a different context as indicating that these kinds of people could be in the movement and leave out the guesstimation as to its size unless you do have something substantial in your back pocket. Just a note here.

If there was, then metaphysics would be complete, no more need to solve metaphysical problems, and no more metaphysics, which is the activity of trying to resolve such inconsistencies. — Metaphysician Undercover

Consistency only requires that the truth of said metaphysics does not or cannot result in falsifying the metaphysical viewpoint via experiential phenomenon. This doesn't require it to be explanatorily useful or to 'solve' all metaphysical problems.

I don't agree with this because I do not accept your initial premise. I don't think there is such a thing as a metaphysical hypothesis which is consistent with all experiential phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover

So what experiential phenomenon is solipsism inconsistent with?

You should have noticed, from what I've posted, that I'm not at all interested in the conventional interpretation of "falsifiability". I believe it tends to be way off the mark. So I really don't know why you would make this suggestion to me. If you're content to sink into the quicksand of that interpretation, then so be it. — Metaphysician Undercover

The curious issue I have is about metaphysical hypotheses that are by definition consistent with any previous, current, or future experiential phenomenon. Take idealism, forms of neutral monism, most forms of ontology on substances, the brain in a vat, the simulation/matrix hypothesis, the misleading demon, being in a dream, etc. These are unfalsifiable in that you could most definitely define the terms well enough in question to the benefit of your intuitions regarding them but yet be no where closer to falsifying or proving any of them nor would it be the case that any one of them is necessarily true. . . it is also not the case that any are necessarily false.

The only true unfalsifiable series of propositions 'S' in the way you seem to be construing 'un-falsifiability' are statements or metaphysical viewpoints that for any experiential phenomenon 'E' they would be consistent with it.

This is to distinguish this from some practical weaker sense of 'un-falsifiability' that you portray here,

I don't think it implies necessary truth. For example, the claim that there is some particular configuration of stars and planets beyond the edge of the observable universe. That's unfalsifiable, because we can never check it out, no matter how close to the speed of light we accelerate a probe. But it's certainly not necessarily true.
— bert1

I don't agree that such a claim is unfalsifiable. Just because we do not have the means to falsify it right now does not mean that we will not develop the means. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your critique of this weaker sense of 'un-falsifiability' being an appeal to a healthy skepticism to our best scientific knowledge of the world that certain experiences, such as going beyond the observable horizon of our local cosmos, are physically impossible but such knowledge could be in fact over turned. Give or take a few hundred years, a thousand, or an indefinite amount of time until it is done so.

"The good of war is it allows us to express and live the desire for war inside of us." . . . and if I never am put into such a situation or do not join the armed service to put my life on the line to fulfill this desire then as a person i'll forever regret as well as atone for this failure.

A classic islamic proof of the existence of the necessary existent is Avicenna's proof that's called the proof of the truthful, it goes as the following:

1) contingent things exist.
2) a contingent existent needs an external cause to exist and if its cause is also contingent, it will also need a cause and so on.
3) the chain of contingent things either has a starting point or it doesn't have one.
4) if the chain has a starting point, that stating point will be the contingent thing that isn't caused by another contingent thing, therefore it will need an external cause that's not a member of the chain of contingent things, or in other words, an external necessary existent has to exist in this case.
5) if the chain has no starting point, it still has to be either necessary or contingent.
6) the chain is made up of each single one of its members, in other words, the existence of members causes the chain to exist, therefore the chain is can not be necessary.
7) since every member of the chain is contingent and the chain itself is contingent, therefore the chain needs an external cause to exist and that cause is neither the chain itself nor a member of it.
8) an external necessary existent has to exist.

What's your response? — BARAA

First, what is a 'thing'? I know this seems somewhat pedantic but are there really such different or distinct 'things' in reality that have dependency on others? Is reality such a plurality or is it rather monistic?

Second, what is a 'cause'? You need to define what it means for there to be causation.

Third, all I seem to see are experiences that may happen to have related natures to previous experiences as of current or in future circumstances. They change and certain changes can be experienced or seemingly brought about by the exertion of 'will' over your sensorial parts.

Idea of "God" isn't even omnipotent, because it only creates paradoxes, and paradoxes are just meaningless arguments. — batsushi7

Depends on your definition of omnipotence or whether you happen to think that any and all definitions of omnipotence require the possibility of performing actions which are not allowable among classical forms of logic or lead to paradoxical actions. Many theists and theistic philosophers i'm willing to assume don't all just assume that such a being must be able to perform contradictory actions as they probably define omnipotence in a rather different but precise manner to avoid these paradoxical situations.

God can not be omnipotence, — batsushi7

True, because omnipotence is a concept of being intuitively all powerful or the most powerful. A god can be omnipotent however.

If "God" Was truly omnipotence, he would understand our pain and suffering, and would fix the world, cure poverty, suffer, and every problem in this world, not in afterlife! Perhaps he cant do it in this life, because he isn't omnipotent. Honestly i think God doesn't even know that Africa exists. — batsushi7

This rests on the fact that you assume that god even abides by or holds any morality at all let alone any moral duties or positions that humans likewise would hold. This is the problem of evil which ONLY applies in situations when god is considered to be capable of preventing evil and also possessing a sense of moral convictions or by nature omni-benevolence that is similar to human moral qualms such that it creates an apparent contradiction. There is evil in the world and god is capable as well as willing to rid the world of such sorrows but he does not, why?

1) I mean by possible essence is that anything that can rationally exist (Its possibility in existing in any possible world doesn't make any logical contradictions). — Mutakalem

Those are conceptual possibilities not what is actual and what is metaphysically possible. These are concepts from the actual world that you have decided to abstract from and find consistent with classical logic but whether these conceptually possible worlds can actually come about is something not exactly clear. Is it possible for any other conceptually possible world to come about other than ours?

It's not that there's failure in categorization of possible and impossible. You're using human logic to try and comprehend this particular aspect of divine omnipotence and it has led you to the conclusion that there's been a miscategorization. — TheMadFool

Is it possible under the accepted logical axiomatic structure (fuzzy logic, classical logic, para-consistent, etc) for such an action to be performed? Is this logic assumed to hold with such an entity? Then it's possible only with a certain logical structure otherwise it cannot be done with another logical structure. An entity not following nature wise classical logic can then perhaps perform an action that could not be done if said entity was by nature bound to classical logic.

No such thing has occurred. A contradiction is impossible and this makes sense, it is also possible and this too makes sense, but only to god and not to us. — TheMadFool

Is it possible for an entity to bring about a state of affairs (even one that is in classical logic to be considered contradictory) then it was never impossible in the first place. It was possible all along just that you had to have a non-classical logic for it to be the case.

It's impossible for a human being to jump thirty feet off the ground. This is implicit in the definition of a human being which would include our nomological restrictions and may include but is not limited to the inability to perform said action. Does this make jumping thirty feet impossible? Depending on your nature it may be rather hidden as a tautology that you could not so it wouldn't be possible if you desired to. So when we create a robotic entity that is able to jump thirty feet off the ground then it's rather implicit (or more explicit here) that its accompanying nomological restrictions do not force it to have a jump height of less than thirty feet so it's also possible. The key point here is that to say something is possible or not is vague as it doesn't specify the specific entity's nature or restrictions.

Good question. The law of noncontradiction is the right choice if the objective is to do something impossible. — TheMadFool

If you are able to do something that is impossible then it actually isn't impossible and rather not categorized correctly or specified. If something is impossible by definition then it CANNOT be possible if it's then clearly you do not understand your definitions enough to have changed your labeling.

If you are to abide by a non-classical logic then you can perform actions that would be consistent with the axioms of that logical structure chosen to ground the nature of such an entity. If the action is implicitly to be one that must abide by classical logic then actions which you cannot perform and would be impossible would be ones in which you aren't following classical logic.

1. If there is omnipotence then there has to be contradictions — TheMadFool

Something can only perform logically consistent actions with respect to classical logic and yet be more influential, powerful, or bring about more (perhaps infinitely many) various states of affairs than any other creature that does or could potentially (or did) exist. Thusly deserving of the label of being omnipotent. . . intuitively though you haven't really specified a PRECISE definition of omnipotence in our discussion.

It's also of suspect whether a being could exist, period, that could perform logically contradictory actions or better stated what specific axioms of logic can potentially differ (or actually are) versus those that are set in stone metaphysically.

1. If there is omnipotence then there has to be contradictions
2. If there has to be contradictions then there's only one god
3. There is omnipotence (god is defined thus)
Ergo,
4. There has to contradictions (1, 3 modus ponens)
Ergo,
5. There's only one god (2, 4 modus ponens) — TheMadFool

I wasn't disagreeing with the validity of your argument but rather its soundness. I reject premise one. . . though this would require you to precisely define what omnipotence is with no VAGUE notions.

I say this because what's truly impossible in human terms are contradictions. — TheMadFool

Technically if what a human being can understand or what actions a human being can perform metaphysically are determined/governed descriptively by the laws of classical logic then what a human being could understand or perform would remain within the classical regime. It would be impossible for a human being to understand or perform contradictory actions because by their own nature they are unable to do so.

We may one day rule the universe, create another one for all we know but we would never be able to both affirm and deny something at the same time without the whole thing morphing into nonsense. — TheMadFool

As far as you know and understand the ontological ramifications for these metaphysical descriptors that underlie many aspects of our analysis of reality which we dub classical logic.

I think it's safe to say that when we talk of god's omnipotence the gold standard for that should be the ability to defy the law of non-contradiction i.e. god is able to perform a contradiction. — TheMadFool

Why? Why defy the law of non-contradiction and not that of the law identity or hold onto any other tens of different non-classical logic? Do you know that what you could happen to derive in one may not be derivable in another so in some cases it wouldn't be considered more powerful to hold one set of axioms over another.

God, being omnipotent, would be able to do contradictions and still make complete sense. — TheMadFool

Why should he be able to do contradictions? What makes this a necessary attribute of being omnipotent. . . especially given I nor you know the extant to which reality beyond our senses is more friendly to one axiomatic system of logic than another.

Only when there's only ONE god does war and peace both emanating from the same source amount to a contradiction. — TheMadFool

I think you are playing loosely with your anthropomorphic biases here in defining god. Reality just is and while there are differences among it these could be considered merely aspects or parts of god that do not amount to the whole.

Since to be omnipotent, and god has to be omnipotent, there has to be contradictions — TheMadFool

I reject this premise as to be omnipotent you would merely need to exercise more power (not defined or specified) as an entity than any other entity in existence and perhaps in all potentialities capable that the future holds. It merely is "the most powerful entity that exists". This could entail that they do hold onto within their nature an arbitrary set of governing non-classical axioms but this could also easily mean one that is logically bound by classical logic yet can still possess more power (still ill-defined or specified) than any entity that does exist, will exist, has existed, or could potentially exist. The arbitrary logical grounding that underlies such an entity is really rather second in importance.

Omnipotent being = The most powerful being — TheMadFool

I'm sort of fine with this definition if what we mean here is that we happen to search throughout the cosmos and of all beings catalogued we happen to find one that is more powerful than any previous being. You'd need to specify how you would measure this sense of being powerful or more powerful. If you mean by powerful as can actualize more things or states of affairs then two being could in number possess the same quantity of capabilities but differ largely in the nature of what they can both bring about.

So, in what sense is the most powerful being the most powerful if it's not all-powerful? — TheMadFool

By comparison to beings with less of the capability of being powerful (not defined here). It's really childishly simple to understand that in comparison and put into a line up with some numerical understanding of how powerful each entity "x" is then the most powerful is the only entity that has no other existent entity "y" that is greater in power by comparison.

x being omnipotent can do anything. — TheMadFool

Any what? Can he do things that contradict his ability to do things? Can he do impossible things (there by making them definitionally not impossible)? What can such a being do?

The eternal observer.

As I see it, two things would matter: what we were able to observe and if what we observed could change us. It would be hell if what we could observe was too limited. It would be non-existence if what we observed couldn't change us. — praxis

Intriguing dichotomy, this seems to cover my thinking.

As human beings have the environment change us as well as have it usually bring about varied experiences, however, we are not entirely in control of all that is, only that which is limited to our physical capabilities or immediate surroundings. If there is a continuation after death how much freedom would be bestowed upon us and how much would be taken away?

Things could have been in another way. — Mutakalem

Really? How do you know this? Reality is. . . how it's and to specify that it could have been any-other way (speaking in terms of nomological/metaphysical possibilities) is to assert a tall order to be given to any one conceptual possible world or even the possibility there are other possibilities.

For example a matter that needs to be explained is something that could have been possibly in a state of affair A, but instead it was in another state of affair B. — Mutakalem

If there were the equal possibility of these states of affairs A and B. You fail to realize or consider in this case that we do not know that reality was forced to be one (necessarily) but also that no other possibilities could exist to be actuated.

By law of bivalence there exist only 3 states of existence, Rationally possible/Rationally must/Rationally Impossible. — Mutakalem

I'd preface here that you'll need to specify whether you are talking about conceptual or metaphysical/nomological possibilities. There is a stark difference between what could have been or could be and what you imagine could have been or could be. How can we know what really is the case in reality? We experience reality but cannot dictate fully nor understand fully what will or could be the case irrespective of our abstractions that we entertain.

Jesus did not simply resurrect from the dead, — Josh Vasquez

Claim among many others made in the bible with no external supporting sources.

but he was the only person to do so who not only predicted his resurrection, — Josh Vasquez

It was written and thusly claimed in the bible that he predicted his resurrection then in the same documents he was claimed to have done so.

but who made the assertion that he was (and is) God in the flesh. — Josh Vasquez

Was this really a claim made by Jesus? All we know is the bible's claims of what he said as well as other theological claims that remain unsupported but are also suggested as explanations.

CS Lewis does a great job of highlighting Jesus’ claim to be God and not just a great moral teacher because he did intend to leave us thinking of him as a great moral teacher. If Jesus claimed to be God, predicted his resurrection, and physically resurrected, then your claim that his resurrection looks a lot less impressive compared to others is false. — Josh Vasquez

Stop saying Jesus claimed that this was the case. The bible claims that Jesus claimed these things and also claims that they occurred exactly or approximately as depicted.

In fact, if these three things that I have listed are true then I would suppose there has never and will never be a more important resurrection than the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Not only because of who he claimed to be prior to his resurrection, but because of the ramifications it has on the eternity of all. His teachings are no longer only lessons on how to live a morally exceptional life, but on how to achieve life itself. I make this claim because if we are destined to live in eternity with God or apart from God our eternal life would take far more precedence over our earthly “life”. — Josh Vasquez

Emotional pleas are rather weak tools to convince others of the veracity of your claims.

The gospels are simply historical accounts or records of the life of Jesus as understood by Matthew, Mark, and Luke. — Josh Vasquez

They are a mixed bag of claims that people claim are historical and theological speculation that christians claim is to be taken seriously rather than take what is said with a grain of salt. These miracles are not only claimed to have occurred but it's then strange that even if we accepted the one or few descriptions of an event that occurred correctly described what happened exactly were also supposed to be forced into assuming the author(s) were correct in their theological explanations of the event (that he was god and this is why this miracle could occur, that he was virgin birthed, that he could resurrect).

Yes because his obituary was noted in the media. — 3017amen

What? He (lets assume it was you and you survived the crash) didn't have any waking experience of interacting with the car nor being able to do so (ergo he was focusing on a different kind of experiential input) but to be considered driving the kind of experience you must indulge in is that of what we call waking experiences (who's surface level nature is starkly different to that of the imagined or dreamed).

Consciousness exists but it's logically impossible to explain. — 3017amen

No. Logically impossible to explain. — 3017amen

Because intuitively explanation involves our ability to investigate and therefore fully understand whatever is that we are explaining I can give you this that it's logically impossible.

In the context of an attribute that transcends formal logic, — 3017amen

I have no idea whether the abstractions we use completely and indubitably reflect the reality is in terms of the true nature of our experiences. This means I cannot absolutely say anything about including whether the abstract relations or modeling of reality we get from using classical logic or a weaker form is really uncovering all there is to reality or missing something.

Jesus also had attributes that were logically impossible to explain. — 3017amen

His acclaimed miracles are only that, claims, and to further substantiate that his miracles deserve to be placed not in the real experience of seeing a fictional character on screen but in the box of experiences you have everyday with your acquaintances or the physicality of your chair you'll have to argue for that. Though, there is a difference between lacking an explanation and seeing it as logically impossible so you will have to tell why these dubious metaphysical claims of Jesus are not just to belong in the bin of fictions but also as events on there own happened for reasons no person could understand or gain any knowledge therein from.

He was driving and dreaming and unwillfully killed himself. — 3017amen

He was driving? Then he knew the proper protocol and had training to avert whatever disaster was about to transpire. He didn't do any actions, have waking experiences that is, to avert the disaster so it occurred. . . he wasn't therefore driving. To be driving you have to be aware of and fully prepared to interact with your waking experiences not do so with your inner abstractions.

He was not driving, he was on a beach, but happened to be driving. — 3017amen

You, with previous knowledge and experience, definitely know the difference (if not rather implicitly) about what is a waking experience versus one that's a dream or an inner abstraction. Imagine sitting in a chair then open your eyes (assuming you are already in a chair) and pay attention to how they appear. Both equally as real but their relationship to you as well as their surface level natures are distinct ergo imagining you are at a beach is not the same as having a waking experience of being at a beach. NO materialism or naive realism technically has to be assumed here and any form of idealism probably would tell you something similar i'm assuming.

Also, driving has to involve the waking active experiences of a person and given they were indulging in (willingly or unwillingly) in those of the imagined then they couldn't be driving.

The 'proof' lies in consciousness, the thing-in-itself, being logically impossible to explain. — 3017amen

Logically impossible to investigate fully not to explain. To assert it's not possible to describe or abstractly investigate our mental faculties via forms of logical analysis internally is one thing but this merely relays the fact that we cannot think outside ourselves. . . have you forgotten that and will correct this statement of absolute truth into one of contingency.

That's correct. It can't be explained using deduction. and so it transcends logic. Under the rules based on a priori propositional logic, it becomes logically impossible. I didn't invent the rules. — 3017amen

Experience and our thoughts exist so what is it that does and doesn't exist? What else is it that you require to constitute consciousness that isn't our readily waking experiences and our mental abstractions there from.

As far as I was concerned, I was not driving at all, yet in reality, I was in fact driving. — 3017amen

Driving needs to be defined here as I could define driving as that experience of operating a vehicle as only indulging in purely waking experiences rather than abstractions in full. So because you were dreaming you were then not in fact actually driving.

My mind tricked me because the reality of me dreaming about the beach instead of driving caused me to crash and kill myself without my knowledge and awareness of driving. — 3017amen

Yes, you were not directly aware of and performing the task of driving so therefore you were not driving. You were dreaming and not driving. . . remember a limp body un-respondent to external stimuli holding onto a steering wheel in a moving hunk of metal wouldn't be readily intuitively defined as driving a car.

It seems that your issues are more semantic than they are ontological.

Once again - for those making assumptions or claims about the nature of God, what such a being could or could not do, be or not be, etc.

Do you have a reasoned argument that we have the ability to make such claims, or assumptions. Not trying to be difficult, but it seems an important concept that we should all understand. That if we make any proposition at all about the nature of God, we have no real basis to justify that claims. — Rank Amateur

Yes, we require a meta-analysis of the meta-metaphysics that underlie the discussion of god as numerous assumptions go into prescribing a specific nature to the label "god". We, as philosophers, should be worried and constantly vigilant of whether our discussions have devolved into semantic games with adjustable boundaries of meaning to any or all terms important to the argument.

There are just so many If --- Then God arguments that propose as true the "if" and then propose as false the "then" with some kind of truth assumption on our ability of know as even close to true any of it.

This includes the argument from evil, and every God paradox you have ever heard. — Rank Amateur

Rather true as the problem of evil is only an argument that pokes holes in a particular conception of god or the Judeo-Christian one common among layman (though even this definition is vague from philosopher to theologian with regards to precisely clarifying its properties).

Please prove that human logic has anything to do with phenomena the scale of gods. Thank you. — Jake

Is the logical apparatus (classical logic) able to reflect reality model wise on those scales? Yes, then we can safely continue using it until it breaks but if not then in comes uncertainty or metaphysical vagueness inherent to reality which could forego any collisions henceforth.

GODS: Proposals about the most fundamental nature of everything everywhere.

LOGIC: The poorly developed ability of a single half insane semi-suicidal species only recently living in caves on one little planet in one of billions of galaxies. — Jake

Gods are usually proposed as a particularly anthropomorphized beings that are supposed to serve as an all encompassing reason for what is compared to others. Using the term to mean talk about fundamental structures of nature everywhere or every when is to invite a term with rather thick baggage. Logic on the other hand is an abstract model that with certain accompanying axioms (classical logic, para-consistent, fuzzy logic, etc) serve better uses technologically or in performing metaphysical overhauls of our ontology.

Metaphorically? I think literally. God loves us all, equally. — TheMadFool

Is a claim about an arbitrary definition of what moral principles a being called god (not defined) is supposed to possess.

This is what bothers me a lot. What's the problem with all things having equal value? — TheMadFool

If everything was made of the same color and shade of said color then perceptually we wouldn't be able to actually make out distinctions in our waking experiences. The same is with assigning moral value universally as we desire to know what moral actions (personally morality doesn't make much sense to me independent of the humans who currently exclusively use it) are wrong or right and your playing a language game here saying that any action period is morally permissible.

ALL are EQUAL in the EYES of the LAW. Replace LAW with God. — TheMadFool

All people deserve to be JUDGED equally under the law. This is a terrible comparison as in law despite the fact that you'll have a jury of your peers whether you violated a restraining order or killed someone clearly there are what we call consequences for performing actions that violate our laws. What laws from this god of yours are we able to violate and thusly deserve judgement on his part (if this god of yours does indulge in performing such a duty)? If all are equally valued and no action is morally wrong clearly there can be no consequences. . . are you saying that the consequence (life in jail) is just as preferable (moral) as not going to jail?

In fact i'll reword it: ALL people are to be TREATED, INVESTIGATED, and JUDGED in-accordance with the LAW. They are equal only in the respect that inquiry into sentencing is to be done or performed is the same method wise for each person. . . in the end some come off innocent. . . but they also can come off as guilty.

So what does your god deem lawful and unlawful? Nothing is unlawful! Then choose a different analogy.

Well, if one is to maintain that some form of inequality must exist for value to have meaning then be ready to be discriminated against or, far worse, prepare yourself for this inevitable event: being killed, cut to pieces, cooked, and served to the being just that much higher in value than you as you are compared to animals and plants you consume on a daily basis. — TheMadFool

Either it must exist in materiality or among our mental concepts, inequality that is, because otherwise we wouldn't understand equity. Even if slavery remains a stain on our past it will forever guide our actions.

Too, the very notion of value understood in your terms doesn't make sense. To think higher and lower values are essential for value to be meaningful sounds very much like saying slavery must exist and that misogyny and that racism must exist to give meaning to value. That doesn't sound right to me. — TheMadFool

To think concepts such as fair laws, equity, feminism, etc, are to be valued you would have to specify why and to do so you would have to contrast (either explicitly or implicitly) them with concepts we abhor.

Firstly, it is to be taken as true that an omnibenevolent god will not play favorites with his creation: maggots, bacteria, fish, beggars, the rich, birds, etc. are all equal in god's eyes. — TheMadFool

Are they? Human beings were made in the image of god according to Christian theology but no other animal, plant, or structure in the universe falls in this category. If this is to be divorced from Christian theology it's still a question of whether god wouldn't play favorites as the moral law such a being could arbitrarily possess could be anything from any change in nature is good (human being giving a present to their grandma is on the same grounds as a hurricane) to preferring a particular brand of conscious organisms (perhaps all conscious organisms period). I think you are sneaking in the assumption that to be moral is to treat all living objects as equal in terms of moral worth.

God permits natural evil not because he's not good but because he is good as evinced by his impartial attitude in what is after all nothing but a family feud. We share 99% of our DNA with chimps; work from that to the inevitable conclusion that we're all family and god, being a good parent will not intercede regarding the "arrangement" of humans required to play host to distant worm cousins and occasionaly dying in a disaster to feed yet another relative, bacteria. — TheMadFool

IF your god has a moral standard defined basically to be as such, thusly rather alien to human standards, then yes such a being could permit such a situation logically. Though, most people who would mention the omni-benevolence of god usually emphasize the many ways it overlaps with human moral standards. Our moral standards are imperfect but we sometimes get things right (not killing period, treating others with respect via the golden rule, etc). It's just that moral teaching is easily, not for no good reason, putting humanity on a pedestal so letting unnecessary harm (he is omnipotent, however it's defined) come to human beings via a hurricane is seemingly as immoral as if he came down personally to kill every person that would be claimed by such a storm.

An argument against 'divine providence', or for 'divine indifference' (and not necessarily - decisively - an argument for the nonexistence of 'the divine'):

(a) Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
(b) Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
(c) Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
(d) Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?

'The Riddle of Epicurus' (~300 BCE) — 180 Proof

I always hate it when people bring up the problem of evil as a reason to suspect god simplicter is non-existent. Rather only a particular god with particular properties is definitely ruled out and perhaps if a god exists they are not omni-benevolent because of the problem of evil, but there is good in the world so he wouldn't be omni-malevolent, so therefore he must be a mixture either (usually more good than evil, usually more evil than good, equally as good as he is evil, or perhaps entirely indifferent to what humans would call the moral).

You'll find this is how he operates. He asks questions, then ignores your answers except to pick snippets out of context and ask more (inane) questions. It never goes anywhere.

I think of it like shadow boxing. It's decent exercise, but it's no substitute for having a real opponent. — Pro Hominem

How many of these types of users are on this forum then?

In Christianity Jesus had a conscious existence. — 3017amen

Every concept does but not every concept is mean't to mean that which isn't just perceived by consciousness but is reflective of something that possesses consciousness.

That sounds like a psychological pathology that needs resolved. — 3017amen

Maybe or not. . . these are story elements that are important to how we talk about ourselves and they tell us something if not in a rather poetic or brass manner.

God on the other hand, does not correlate to the "real" world, and is not reflected in human interaction. — Pro Hominem

Somewhat correct in the sense that god could be given conceptual grounding or "reality" in the same sense that an imaginary red chair can be. There merely needs to be a linking of certain concepts readily driven out by personal experience to imagine a particular chair is red even if you have never seen that particular chair in that color. In a sense our language is largely parasitic on our experiences and are like little independent legos that could be mismatched however we see fit but whether they give rise to predictive power is a discussion that most be had in the open, not within the confines of our mind. Does this term "god" service us a useful concept to navigate our perceptual waking experiences?

Couldn't be further from the truth. In Christianity Jesus had a conscious existence. — 3017amen

If we were assuming that there was a particular person who could be loosely given the title of Jesus then it would follow that we'd assume he was "conscious".

Just an observation, you seem to be conflating politics with something... ? — 3017amen

Not politics as god has been used in the past to signify (loosely and thusly it seems to be a rather homeless word) for morality, moral duty, the human drive, consciousness, existence, or why sometimes there is rain with lightening. It's no coincidence of our language/social life or of his perspective that we as a society make metaphors/stories that chastise us for acting as if we are our own gods.

1. From the Christian Bible/history book, see John, Exodus, et.al. — 3017amen

So it is a language game being played?

2. Okay so how can you explain your consciousness (conscious existence)? — 3017amen

Something we call conscious existence exists and it has rather intriguing conceptual features that repeat. By explain here you mean describe, right? As to explain if meant to mean discover the true nature of said entity is an impossible thing to perform by you or me.

3. What's an abstract model? — 3017amen

A language or collection of terms that match directly to our experiences but also new terms that relay relations/properties that aren't readily perceptually apparent but prove useful in navigating our experiences. Think of the terms used to describe what resides within a black box even though we cannot see within it.

4. If you are an atheist, how were you able to determine no God? — 3017amen

I've followed a four square of definitions regarding the terms agnostic, gnostic, atheist, and theist in which specify not just whether you believe in god (atheist or theist) but also if you consider such an entity to be known or unknown (agnostic or gnostic) so a gnostic atheist wouldn't believe in god and consider it non existant. I can't take any of them until you specify what this "god" is so I remain ignostic.

5. What kind of experiences are you referring to? — 3017amen

Your experiences perceptual (sensory) or sudden experiences from within or thoughts.

6. What are examples of' abstract understanding of the world'? — 3017amen

Naive realism (the kind of thinking about the world your born with/learn about early on) and most every scientific model.

7. Is that a metaphysical theory of consciousness, of some sort? — 3017amen

No, merely a thought experiment regarding the fact that even a person following solipsism clearly doesn't control his reality as much as he boasts that he does.

8. Does that translate into a form of Subjectivism; subjective truth? — 3017amen

I don't know. You'll need to clarify.

I'm really at a loss. Jesus of Nazareth. Does that define it better? — 3017amen

Well you saying "Jesus = God" is at best a renaming of the biblical character Jesus calling him now god or at worst a sneaking in of unstated characteristics that aren't readily covered by a reading of the original source material. I can call jeff "bill" but whatever characteristics a "bill" has to have to be one must be satisfied by jeff without extra stuff tagged on.

But that doesn't explain the nature of consciousness, does it? I mean, how does deduction provide for such explanation? — 3017amen

Never said it did only that such methods would prove useful in predicting either our own experiences or upon reflection of our abstract models (naive realism mixed with some biological understanding of human beings) you could find that certain ideas from other models prove consistent as well as fruitful in terms of predictive success.

And so if you can't answer the question relative to your own consciousness, how can you posit no God? — 3017amen

Only if the term is defined and the assumptions clarified can we make an assessment as to whether such an entity is consistent with said experiences/abstract understanding of the world for a certain person.

Otherwise, how can the blind person describe the existence of the color red? — 3017amen

They cannot just as a person who posits the existence of only their own mind can't help but act (strangely enough) as if they aren't alone nor truly be worthy of ruling their experiences fully (can they demand when they slam into the wall when to feel pain or not feel pain).

Some people do, and some people don't. The irony is that Philosophy itself, posit concepts of God.
And of course science does as well (theoretical physicists, cognitive science). — 3017amen

Well there are theistic philosophers or god believing people who work in science/philosophical disciplines and there are those who claim that a god (undefined term) serves as a better hypothesis, explanation, or predictor of how the universe came to be or is. Usually with such a term (god) being adorned frequently with anthropomorphic idealizations such as a personality, free will, moral duties, etc.

Jesus=God, right? — 3017amen

Well you haven't ever defined god here. I'd advise you to stop dodging as you are doing to him and you have in the past done to me. Clarify what it's that you mean by the term "god" in positive terms.

If you're scared say you're scared!! — 3017amen

Stop with this dodging and please clarify the term for this person.

And, for clarification, I've answered that, in Christianity, Jesus is God. — 3017amen

God you have not defined for this person or anyone else in this thread. Remember that accepting the existence of vagueness metaphysically/ontologically does not mean you can use it in an argument when you still expect us to not see it as vague.

"Think of it this way, you cannot use objective reasoning to explain your own consciousness (conscious existence), so how does that square with your [the] concept of no God?" — 3017amen

Depends on the abstract reasoning and mental maps were talking about. Among the many learned or "inherent" mental processes/tools if we're unable to parse one concept as correctly matching our experiences as well as the abstractions beyond said appearances (already held tentative models) then it would seem such a model may be rather useless.

I'd also kind of preface here that when you say "objective reasoning" i'm aware of a sort of intuition regarding what objective is but reasoning is not so clear. Reasoning can vary from inductive to deductive as well as float among many different logical systems (para-consistent to classical) but some combination or use of these methods or some mixture does serve us considerable success in predicting events in our experiences.

and i'd recommend you both be extremely careful with the language (not talking about respect) that you use in arguing or discussing with .

Indeed, sounds like another mystery associated with time and change. — 3017amen

In my mind I find making such a distinction (between time and change) is rather dubious as I at least consider myself to be a relationist with respect to time.

Okay, Aristotle too? — 3017amen

What?

Alternatively, here's another interesting one for you: — 3017amen

While intriguing the metaphysics surrounding spacetime physics is a rather elaborate but perhaps misaligned one with respect to special/general relativity. We basically don't assume there is this nebulous external clock from which to compare to our clocks but not have them affect our clocks (even newton who held onto such a perspective admitted you couldn't experimentally measure it). Special/general relativity brings to the forefront the idea of important relative changes in clocks that is strongly influenced by the local spacetime structure. I haven't, however, seen a theory which foregoes the speed of light connection or other facts that lead to such theories being derived and focuses only on the relative changes (simpliciter) of objects themselves with respect to one another. Don't know if this would make a rather readily accessible mathematical theory though or if it would give any further foundational discoveries.

Perhaps then if you are interested in the dissolution of the Eternalist/Presentist debate you could read this.

But math itself is an objective truth, just like Platonism and abstract ideas. How does that square your circle? — 3017amen

True in the sense that it can be shown to come logically given a certain set of accepted axioms. True in that classical logic inexorable without issue or arbitrariness derives the same theorems or conclusions.

But those logical structures seem illogical once axioms are applied to them. — 3017amen

That depends on what axioms you are applying especially since many axioms of your own experience aren't exactly able to be swapped out as easily as can be done to go from classical to para-consistent logic. I cannot make myself think in a way that is not what i'm now.

Great God exists then. Or did I get that wrong? — 3017amen

Depends on how god is defined if this goes in line with yours then yes. Do not however (beyond being consistent with your definition of god) apply further aspects of your worldview without elaboration as to how they do apply to me lest a straw-man is created.

Are you reincarnated? — 3017amen

:rofl: , no i've just seen later examples of William Lane Craig in his arguments or snippets of debates along with external knowledge as to his character that haven't exactly made me appreciate him as much. Perhaps in years previous he was more appreciable.

Back when I wasn't alive and William Lane Craig didn't seem as much of a dunce.

But mathematics is an objective truth. I don't understand how they can be arbitrary? Please explain!! — 3017amen

It's arbitrary what axioms you accept and while the conclusions you draw given a previously system within which to do so is not if you choose to precisely abide by said systemic rules.

Does that mean consciousness may be explained in one person's mind, but not in another person's mind? — 3017amen

I was talking generally about the categories of our experiences, the nature of them, and the abstractions covering them in which perhaps a contradiction does reveal itself to one but not to all nor pervades an entire category. Though, it isn't too far a stretch to say that other conscious experiences could be so distinct to the point that even the logical structure of them was different (different axioms are accepted).

Well, not sure what your argument is then, or do you have one? — 3017amen

I've been more clarifying my positions rather than using it or diverging from it.

Yourself perceiving it's objectiveness. — 3017amen

What?

Ok, great! — 3017amen

Okay.

Mathematics. You know, mathematical abstracts, Platonism, etc.. — 3017amen

Yes, descriptions of our reality and further arbitrary abstractions to model its behvaior.

Great. we agree! Logic can't help us!!! Does that mean super-natural is an alternative? — 3017amen

I can't remember again what it's that you've defined super-natural as but you seem to have glossed over the distinction between our experiences, abstractions of those, and what gives rise to our experiences. In all cases IF a true paradox exists in one that may not mean that it exists in another. Further, para-consistent logic or any non-classical logic is not a complete abandonment of everything that is classical logic but an adjustment to it. . . true and false still exist within those.

Sounds like existential angst of some sort. No exceptions taken. — 3017amen

Okay.

In other words, you don't know the nature of your own existence. I gotcha. — 3017amen

Ahem, are we on repeat now?

Is that another form of a subjective truth or objective truth? — 3017amen

I state it and believe what i've stated so it's objective. . . what would make it subjective?

Okay? — 3017amen

Reality exists and if I didn't explicitly result in its existence then clearly something which isn't what I am had to.

But if what is natural is an experience that is unknown, how do you know that experiences are real? — 3017amen

Experiences are what they are. . . recall the mirage of palm trees out in the distance with a pool of water. Whether or not our abstract models makes such an experience consistent with previous ones and the meanings of the words involved the experience of said mirage is as real as you'll get. What gives rise to experiences is truly unknown but the experiences themselves and the relationships they have to each other are not. It's just as real to experience an imaginary friend as your actual friend but while they are just as "real" it would be a rather large lapse in judgement to designate them as the same experiences simpliciter.

Oh, well let's also then add to Gödel, Heisenberg (uncertainty principle). LOL — 3017amen

Yes, Heisenberg uncertainty principle from a certain abstract model of quantum phenomenon among many others. . . instrumentalism anyone.

You could read too! I said noun, not adjective. Agreed there is much that seems paradoxical in nature. But the question was to provide an example from nature of a paradox. You misread - happens to all of us. 3017, however, long ago wore out any presumption of innocence. — tim wood

Ah, yes.

Time. Do your homework Timmy!! LOL — 3017amen

I'd also preface that you do not seem to note the difference between that which is merely undecidable and that which is paradoxical with both being rather distinguished ideas.

That explanation doesn't seem to square with the laws of nature themselves, nor does it square with the existence of a conscious being known from history as Jesus. — 3017amen

What laws of nature? You mean the regularities or patterns in our experience because if that is what we value to navigate our experiences then contradictions explicitly would put a wrench in doing anything if we didn't pay attention to what predictably occurs or is.

For instance, we've already agreed that the laws of nature are paradoxical, contradictory and incomplete. And we also know that the nature of consciousness is outside the parameters of formal logic, thus also paradoxical, contradictory and incomplete (unconsciousness, consciousness and subconsciousness all working together). — 3017amen

The model would be contradictory or incomplete but to say consciousness is paradoxical or doesn't abide by formal laws of logic would be childishly over the top nearly violating the explicit wall there is between our experiences and the nature of what gives rise to them.

And so either Platonism, mathematics, or something that transcends the natural laws of existence must be considered. — 3017amen

There is nothing above the regularities in of and the experiences we have. . . period. To jump into platonism is too commit oneself to asking questions about the nature of our experiences which cannot be answered without skepticism and Descartes tearing it down to arbitrariness.

Otherwise, we are back to simple wonderment, and the physicists questions that help him discover things from asking: 'all events must have a cause' as a means to his end. Accordingly, you said that a similar sense of wonderment is in itself, from consciousness, and thus is mysteriously unknown. — 3017amen

Depends on your definition of what you would mean by consciousness or what precise concepts could describe it to the best of our semantic abilities. . . putting that aside.

What have I been saying this whole time? That our experiences are the only data we can use and speculate about the experience of the unexperienced (skeptical scenarios) will result in arbitrariness. Only that which informs us of what may happen next or what happens in the case of this collection of experiences or questions about or within our abstract models themselves are all that seems to matter here.

So why and how did we get here? Everything seems mysterious or unknown(?). And from what you are telling me, all we have are metaphysical abstracts and ideas (mathematics) which in turn are incomplete and paradoxical. — 3017amen

It seems that way but we're (especially you) asking meta-questions about our system and we can only remain within this system to ask questions with the system. Were stuck in F,

First Incompleteness Theorem: "Any consistent formal system F within which a certain amount of elementary arithmetic can be carried out is incomplete; i.e., there are statements of the language of F which can neither be proved nor disproved in F." (Raatikainen 2015)

It's pretty much as conventional as our consciousness would allow. The model would consist of the historical account of Jesus, the mystery of Love and consciousness, and inductive reasoning (the religious experience) to say the least. Most of which includes metaphysics and phenomenology. And of course all of which exists/existed. — 3017amen

Why you would add anything as such is up to you and your arbitrary/restricted preferences.

Okay, you don't know some features or attributes from your own conscious existence. Is self-awareness something that just is? What about Love and other sentient/metaphysical attributes from consciousness, how do they confer any biological advantages? — 3017amen

It's right now (however we've defined it to be) and if I didn't give rise to them ("features or attributes from your own conscious existence") then what isn't me did.

There seems to be a lot that you don't know that is seemingly natural. — 3017amen

All that gives rise to our experiences or is those experiences I consider natural.

So abstract models are natural then, from experience? — 3017amen

They have to be as at most I have come to be aware of these models or perhaps give rise to them, manipulate them, but in the end given I have not (within knowledge) given rise to myself this leads to that which gives rise to our experiences or what experiences are.

No exceptions taken, since in our context; Jesus, Platonism, etc. etc. can be abstract models about some other form of consciousness from which the ideas themselves also come from consciousness. Does that sound right? — 3017amen

The deceitful demon, the brain in a vat and many other experientially but abstractly distinguishable models of reality from the problem of skepticism are also all possible models to hold onto (no vapid exceptions right). Of course, whatever model you hold onto you most be aware of where that model ends and the experience begins. If where it ends and touches our experiences doesn't match them then it would seem that we would have to abandon it. You would have to reason from our relationship to said experiences to these sort of abstract models of it just as if you wanted to hold onto the universe coming into existence five minutes ago. . . ask yourself why hold it when it's experientially indistinguishable from any other skeptical model without much prior reason to do so. Or if your model allows for us to manipulate reality in such a manner that we ourselves or among past experiences are unaware can be done then again. . . ask yourself why hold onto this model if it contradicts it or postulates the existence of experiences not yet had (nor presently capable of being shown possible).

If you are to fudge a model to allow for your Jesus then you most be truthful about the application of said model to other similar entities while respecting core meanings. Further, it's a wonder of mine of whether what you could say ontologically/metaphysically through your christian existentialism I or anyone else could just as easily translate (language wise or theory wise) into a form of physicalism/panpsychism/objective idealism/subjective idealism/process philosophy/etc. Is metaphysics so conventional?

No exceptions. Can you translate that into Revelation in Christianity, as well as the religious experience phenomenon that uses induction? — 3017amen

If and when revelation in christianity can correctly intermix with the greater web of our naive realism as well as the regularities of our experiences (the conclusions there in) then perhaps you'll have something. . . until then.

So you really don't know how, and why, wonder exists, correct? — 3017amen

Only that it does and correlates with certain experiences (there is no reason to postulate its independency from external factors or its dependency but there are strong correlations).

Okay, so you don't know. — 3017amen

Don't know the true nature of these experiences beyond the experiential but the experiential and the regularities there in I with every other person are fairly familiar with.

And how would you define it then? What are 'abstract models' in themselves? — 3017amen

Abstract models merely are further combinations of concepts that we possess now and continue to learn formulated in such a way that they are implied to be certain aspects of our experience. Giving the three letter word red to the experience of seeing such a color.

Is that some form of Platonism? Or is it some incomplete mathematical axiom? — 3017amen

It isn't platonism and it was never meant to be deductive but inductively/abductively strong.

Is that like the mysterious/metaphysical sense of wonderment? In other words, does consciousness and self-awareness cause higher life forms of life to wonder about things? Or, as you say, does wonderment come from experience? — 3017amen

You experience wonderment but I do not have a feeling of creating it directly only one of passive interaction when the right set of experiences arise.

Okay. so something outside yourself caused your self to come into Being. Is that a form of super-natural causation, or something that just is. If it's something that just is, then we're back to where we started. — 3017amen

You'd have to define causation here (whether this concept even fully applies to our experiences) but putting that aside what I am is not clearly (at least to me) of my own doing. If it was then I'd know and the fact that I don't know means there is something beyond me that gives rise to such experiences. Doesn't mean it just is or that it always was only that it is now.

It's not back to where we started but a step forward towards better specificity.

As do physicists: ToE. — 3017amen

Okay.