That's one way to look at it. What follows if I may ask? — Agent Smith

I'm afraid it's the blurring of fact and fiction in a Postmodern world.

people can and do use the same words or expressions for different purposes in different contexts. And after all, not existing is what distinguishes fictional characters as such. — busycuttingcrap

As you say "people can and do use the same words or expressions for different purposes in different contexts". Fictional characters exist as fictional characters, and real people exist as real people.

In one sense of "exist", fictional characters exist and in another sense of "exist", real people exist.

Compare the following 4 entities 1. Vladimir Putin 2. Santa Claus 3. Sherlock Holmes 4. Arthur Conan Doyle — Agent Smith

I could play devil's advocate and say that the mainstream media's analysis of real people often approaches that of an analysis of fictional characters.

How many "documentaries" presented as fact are in reality "imaginative speculations".

If you hesitate............You know there are no £19 notes — Cuthbert

Yes, I believe that there are no £19 notes and can justify my belief through the Bank of England web site, but I don't know that there are no £19 notes in that I cannot prove that my belief is true. I believe that my belief is true, but I don't know that my belief is true.

I can prove that £19 notes don't exist in the world — Cuthbert

A challenge.

The Bank of England web site says"There are four denominations (values) of Bank of England notes in circulation: £5, £10, £20 and £50" and "There are over 4.7 billion Bank of England notes in circulation."

One possible proof would be to inspect the 4.7 billion bank notes, but this assumes that only the Bank of England has printed £ sterling notes.

The other possible proof would be to prove true the statement "There are four denominations (values) of Bank of England notes in circulation: £5, £10, £20 and £50".

Both difficult, if not impossible.

I don't. I was taking a bet. The odds of me winning are proportional to the amount of evidence I have that the North Pole exists. The odds of me losing are proportional to the amount of evidence I have that it doesn't. I think my bet is fairly safe, but nothing is guaranteed. — Herg

The problem is that the evidence that The North Pole exists is descriptive, We may see a travel company advertising "Join us on the family adventure of a lifetime aboard the magical Journey to the North Pole". We may see the documentary "The Last Degree - North Pole Documentary", yet ultimately our evidence is descriptive, is linguistic.

Russell's Theory of Descriptions may be relevant.

As I understand it, in the sentence "The author of Waverly is Scott", the phrase "the author of Waverly" is not a reference to Scott but is a quantifier of "Scott". Similarly, in the sentence "the northernmost point on the Earth is The North Pole", the phrase " the northernmost point on the Earth" is not a reference to The North Pole but is a quantifier of "The North Pole".

Our evidence of the existence of The North Pole may be linguistic descriptions such as "the northernmost point on the Earth", yet as Russell's Theory of Descriptions points out, these descriptions are not references to The North Pole but quantifiers of "The North Pole".

Descriptive evidence therefore doesn't refer to something that may or may not exist in the world but is a reference to another word in the language and is in this sense self-referential.

Evidence that is linguistic is evidence that the language is coherent, not evidence of something that exists outside of language.

Whether you win your bet depends on the decision of the betting company. As the betting company is basing their decision on linguistic evidence, which is more about a coherent language than about what exists outside of language, your win will be based on the coherence of "The North Pole" within language rather than the actual existence of The north Pole outside language.

Is that true? I thought I had £20 in my wallet. I looked and there was £0 I think I just proved something doesn't exist. The 'something' was £20. Its non-existence was proved by inspection. — Cuthbert

The £20 note is a concept in the mind which may be instantiated in particular locations in the world. The £20 note exists as a concept in the mind, regardless of whether it exists in the world or not.

True, you can prove that a particular instantiation of a £20 note doesn't exist in your wallet by inspection.

But as you cannot prove that there are not instantiations of a £20 note other than in your wallet, you cannot prove that £20 notes don't exist in the world.

Santa Claus, alas, doesn't exist. — Agent Smith

How do you know, as it's not possible to prove that something doesn't exist. Are you inferring that the Mariana Trench, for example, doesn't exist because you haven't seen it.

Are you saying that only those things that you have seen exist, and everything you haven't seen doesn't exist?

"Concepts". The term is fraught with problems............in the place of wondering about the concept of democracy, consider the way we use the word "democracy".. — Banno

I agree with @Sam26, and also that the concept of "concept" is fraught with problems.

However, how would it be possible to use the word "democracy" in a sentence without having a concept of what the word meant ?

Without language, we wouldn't have the concept of democracy, in that our concept of democracy has come from language, yet without the concept of democracy we wouldn't be able to use "democracy" in language.

For example, thinking about a foreign language, "theluji" means "maji, waliohifadhiwa, nyeupe na ardhi". I may know how every word in a foreign language is defined, but if I have no concept of the meaning of any word, how can I meaningfully use these words in sentences.

If we had no concept behind the words we use in language, we wouldn't be able to meaningfully use them in language.

Walmart and the North Pole both really exist — Herg

Davidson's T-Sentence such as "schnee ist weiss" means snow is white uses a word in inverted commas to refer to something in language and a word not in inverted commas to refer to something in the world.

Therefore, there are two possible interpretations - i) "Walmart" and "The North Pole" both really exist and ii) Walmart and The North Pole both really exist

"Walmart" and "The North Pole" exist in language, otherwise I wouldn't be able to write this sentence.

But how do you know that The North Pole really exists? If by description, then it is knowledge by language. But if knowledge by language, then how does one know whether "The North Pole" refers to The North Pole, something that only exists outside language, or is self-referential, referring to something that only exists in language.

Clearly, I'm running in circles, and leave it to the reader to explain in what sense does Santa Claus exist? How can we instantiate his existence over the North Pole, and yet knowingly, without doubt, know he doesn't exist? — Shawn

If our knowledge is by description, then "Santa Claus" is no less nor no more fictional than "The North Pole"

Denoting phrases
For Bertrand Russell, "Santa Claus" and "The North Pole" are denoting phrases, which have no meaning in themselves. A propositional function containing a denoting phrase is neither true nor false, such as "Santa Claus brings children gifts" or "The North Pole is the northernmost point on the Earth". Only when something is added to the propositional function to turn it into a proposition does the proposition become true or false, such as "it is said that Santa Claus brings children gifts" or "many believe that The North Pole is the northernmost point on the Earth".

Knowledge by description
The vast majority of people only know The North Pole by description rather than acquaintance. We take it for granted that The North Pole exists even though we may never have seen it, yet we take it for granted that Santa Claus doesn't exist although we have never seen him. We know "The North Pole" by description as "the northernmost point on the Earth, lying antipodally to the South Pole, defining geodetic latitude 90° North, as well as the direction of true north." We know "Santa Claus" also by description as "bringing children gifts during the late evening and overnight hours on Christmas Eve of toys and candy or coal or nothing, depending on whether they are "naughty or nice."

The fact that I have never seen Santa Claus is not proof that Santa Claus doesn't exist, as is the fact that I have never seen The North Pole proof that The North Pole doesn't exist.

Our belief in the existence of things we have never seen rests on description, and description is not proof one way or another.

The question is, how do we know things without doubt that have only been described to us.

What I'm referring to is the fact that Pegasus or Santa doesn't exist in the world, maybe perhaps Meinongs jungle, but we refer to him as if he does. — Shawn

"Pegasus" and "Santa Claus" do exist in our world, which is why we refer to them as if they exist in the world, but this is a world that exists only in our minds.

As it is difficult to justify that relations ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, it would follow that
it would be difficult to justify that things such as "mountains", "factories", "apples", "universities", "governments", "tables", "Pegasus" and "Santa Claus" exist in a mind-independent world.

It would also follow that "Pegasus" and "Santa Claus" don't exist in a possible world of Lewis, they exist in the actual world of our mind. Also, "Pegasus" and "Santa Claus" are not the non-existent things of Meinong's Jungle, they are the existent things of our minds.

These things can only exist in the mind, which is our world, which is why we refer to them as existing in the world.

Fair enough. Do they say that non-actual is not necessarily contradictory to actual? — bongo fury

I doubt it. Not-A cannot be A, but an entity can be fictional.

My belief is later stated in the OP, that somehow through language we can ascribe ontological placeholders to fictional entities such as Pegasus or Santa Claus. I find this feature of instantiation of imaginary objects perplexing in language. But that's how ordinary language works to my surprise. — Shawn

I can point to any set of words within a language and give the set a name.

For example, I can point to {"creator", "universe"} and give it the name "godlike".
I can point to {"winged", "godlike", "stallion"} and give it the name "Pegasus".

Also, I can point to {"tree", "snake"} and give it the name "trake"
I can point to {"trake", "invisible", "orange"} and give it the name "trakinor"

"Trakinor" is now a placeholder to the fictional entity trakinor, an invisible orange tree-snake. "Trakinor" has instantiated the imaginary object trakinor.

Is it really the case that naming a set of words is perplexing.

Do you mean, these people deny that "fictional entity" is an oxymoron - or that they have found that reasoning with oxymorons can end well? — bongo fury

In the sense that fictional is not necessarily contradictory to entity.

I mean, I'm guessing that didn't end well, as "fictional entity" is an oxymoron? — bongo fury

Not according to the SEP article Fictional Entities, which write: "While London and Napoleon are not fictional entities, some have thought that the London of the Holmes stories and the Napoleon of War and Peace should be classed as special fictional entities."

Also not according to Alberto Voltolini in his book How Ficta Follow Fiction, A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities, where he wrote: " I present a genuinely ontological argument in favor of fictional entities. According to this argument, we have to accept fictional entities because they figure in the identity conditions of other entities that are already accepted, namely fictional works."

I find myself confused, as perhaps many young people do when contemplating the existence of fictional entities such as Santa Claus in the real world.........Now, the issue is more perplexing if we endow Santa Claus the ontological placeholder of living over at the North Pole with his reindeer. — Shawn

The North Pole, reindeer and "real" world are as "fictional" as Santa Claus if relations don't ontologically exist in a mind-independent world.

Santa Claus is said to be "fictional", yet in what way is the North Pole, reindeer and "real" world any less fictional.

Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of the Mind 1949 included an example illustrating that relations don't exist in the world but do exist in the mind, supporting the idea that relations don't have an ontological existence in the world. A visitor to Oxford upon viewing the colleges and library reportedly inquired "But where is the University ?". Ryle discussed the problem in terms of categories. There is the category 1 of "units of physical infrastructure", including those parts that are said to physically exist in the world independent of the visitor, colleges, library, etc., and there is category 2 "institution", including unseen relations between those physical parts, role in society, laws and regulations, etc. The visitor made the mistake of presuming that the "University" was part of category 1 rather than category 2.

My belief is that the North Pole, reindeer and "real" world are as "fictional" as Santa Claus, as I have yet to come across any persuasive argument that relations do ontologically exist in a mind-independent world.

If an object could actually reach the speed of light would the object become 2 dimensional from everyone else's perspective? — TiredThinker

There is a belief that we travel through time at the speed of light.
Sabine Hossenfelder: Do we travel through time at the speed of light?
If this is the case, objects travel through time at the speed of light yet remain spatially three-dimensional from everyone else's perspective.

Beyond ↪javra's quite valid criticism of that phrasing, Cantor shows that what was previously unknown can indeed be put into words; putting it into words is the act of making it known. — Banno

Although @Javra rightly points out that there is the unknowable in principle and there is the unknown in practice, I don't agree that this renders my quote "only that which is unknown cannot be put into words" invalid. It cannot be the case that something that is unknown can be put into words just because at some future date it happens to become known. If something is known then it can be put into words, regardless of whether it was known or unknown at some date in the past, and where knowing precedes saying what one knows.

"Ineffable" is defined as something too great or extreme to be described in words, such as ineffable joy.

As regards the unknown in practice, at this present moment in time, no one knows the number of sheep on the hill behind the cottage. As the number is unknown, the number cannot be put into words. But as the number is not unknowable in principle, and as no one would say such knowledge is of great or extreme significance, ineffable would not be the correct word to use. As the unknown in practice can be put into words but only after it is known, meaning that when unknown it cannot be put into words, but when known it can be put into words. One can say that the unknown cannot be put into words, but in this case, the unknown is not ineffable.

As regards the unknowable in principle, although I know my pain, I don't know the pain of others. The pain of others is unknowable in principle. In this case the unknown cannot be put into words, and because of great or extreme significance is ineffable.

Therefore, neither the unknown in practice and the unknowable in principle can be put into words, though only the unknowable in principle may be defined as ineffable.

The problem is, how does one talk about the ineffable, that which cannot be described in words. As previously set out: i) remain silent about it, ii) ignore any referent, iii) treat it as a second-order predicate, iii) describe what it isn't, iv) not talk about it but experience it, v) treat it as a metaphor or vi) ignore any possible relevance.

Perhaps we should take the example of Cantor, who discovered the concept of transfinite numbers, numbers that are infinite in the sense that they are larger than all finite numbers, yet not necessarily infinite.

i) is incorrect in that we obviously don't remain silent about infinity
ii) is incorrect in that we don't ignore the referent, which is infinity
iii) is possible, in that the second order predicate "is infinity" designates a concept rather than an object.
iv) is not correct, in that we cannot experience infinity
v) is possible, in that language is metaphorical.
vi) is incorrect, in that we don't ignore any possible relevance of infinity.

This leaves treating "infinity" either as iii) a second-order predicate or v) a metaphor.

A metaphor is the application of a predicate that is not in the appropriate category for what is being referred to, allowing a hidden essence or attribute of the predicate to be made visible by allowing a category mistake. For example, "God the Father" is a metaphor as God can neither be the father of humans or a male. By giving the object "God" the predicate "the father", we are making a clear category mistake, but enabling us to experience the character of God more clearly. We could say "God is infinite", which is a metaphor. We could say "transfinite numbers are infinite", which is a metaphor. By comparing an unknown object with something else using metaphor, we get closer to what that object is.

But second-order predicates as part of language are metaphorical. The conclusion is that we use the word "ineffable" for those situations that are unknowable in principle, are of great or extreme significance and are described metaphorically.

Do we….or do we not….still need to stipulate the criteria for determining how the unknowable isn’t a mere subterfuge? Seems like that would be the logical query to follow, “only the unknown cannot be put into words”. — Mww

Subterfuge is about deceit, in that we are being deceived in some way. Are we being deceived that the unknown is in fact known?

As @Javra writes, there is the unknowable in principle and there is the unknown in practice. The unknowable in principle cannot be put into words. The unknown in practice can be put into words but only after it is known, meaning that when unknown it cannot be put into words, but when known it can be put into words. It remains true that "only the unknown cannot be put into words"

Are we being deceived about the unknown or is the unknown just a fact of the limits of the intellect. Every animal has a natural limit to its intellectual powers, limited by the physical nature of its brain. Is the horse being deceived that allegories in The Old Man and The Sea will always be unknowable to it, no, it is just a fact. The human is an animal, and similarly, we are not being deceived that some things will always be unknowable to us, it is just a fact.

And if you are defending a physicalist view about the world, then the thesis is just untenable, unless you can explain epistemic connectivity between brains and objects in a physicalist setting with out abandoning physicalism itself. — Constance

Form and content, brains and minds

Is the mind and brain a Cartesian duality or a phenomenological unity. What is the relationship between the brain as form and the mind as content. If a Cartesian duality, how can the form access the content. If a phenomenological unity, how can the form be the content.

Protopanpsychism as the link between the form of the brain and the content of the mind
Consciousness is the hard problem of science. Whether consciousness exists outside the brain as some ethereal soul or spirit or can be explained within physicalism as an emergence from the complexity of neurons and their connections within the brain, protopanpsychism is not the belief that elemental particles are conscious, rather that they have the potential for consciousness that only emerges when elemental particles are combined in some particular way.

As an analogy with gravity, the property of movement cannot be discovered in a single object isolated from all other objects, but may only be observed when two objects or more are in proximity. In a sense, the single isolated object has the potential for movement, but doesn't have the property of movement. The property of movement emerges when two or more objects are in proximity with each other.

Similarly, the property of consciousness could never be discovered by science or any other means by observing a single neuron, yet the property of consciousness emerges when more than one neurons are combined in a particular way.

Protopanpsychism breaks Cartesian dualism by enabling both the brain and the mind to come under the single umbrella of physicalism. The content of the brain and the conscious mind emerges from the form of the physical brain.

If the mind and brain are two aspects of the same thing, and are part of a physicalist world, then this explains the epistemic connectivity between mind and brain.

Aristotle and the link between form and content
Aristotle's "four causes" were i) material cause , ie the bronze, ii) the formal cause, ie the statue of Hercules, iii) the efficient cause, ie, the sculptor and iv) the final cause , ie, the purpose of honouring Hercules. The formal cause is the form, the final cause is the content.

For man-made objects, the final cause is not problematic, in that the maker of the statue has made the decision, but for natural objects, purpose may be debated. What purpose do mountains serve, what purpose do humans serve, what is the purpose of anything.

Aristotle denied that purpose came from a divine maker, but rather that purpose was immanent in nature itself . IE, the purpose whether of mountains or humans existed within their very form, ie, content is form.

Purpose necessitates a holistic approach. As Aristotle wrote "we must think that a discussion of nature is about the composition and being as a whole, not about parts that can never occur in separation from the being they belong to". As Frege wrote in 1884, "Only in the context of sentence does a word have a meaning’. Frege's principle establishes contextualism. Individual words have no meaning or value unless they are understood within the context of a sentence, a reaction against the atomization of meaning.

Teleology is the explanation of phenomena in terms of the purpose they serve rather than of the cause by which they arise, in that the purpose of humankind has been determined by neither something in the past nor something in the future, but by the existent present. A change in form inevitably results in a change of purpose. As Jonathan Lear wrote " "real purposefulness requires that the end somehow govern the process along the way to its own realization - it is not, strictly speaking, the end specified as such that is operating from the start: it is form that directs the process of its own development from potentiality to actuality".

The purpose of something in the world, its content, may be said to be determined by the nature of its essence, in other words, its form.

Heidegger and the link between form and content
The value of a Derain is in its aesthetic of representations. The form holds both the aesthetic and the representational content.

Heidegger wrote The Origins of the Work of Art between 1935 and 1960, whereby the "origin" of an artwork is that from which and by which something is what it is and as it is, its essence. The artwork has a mode of being that it is the artwork itself. The origin of an artwork is the artwork itself. An artist may have caused the artwork, but it is the artwork that has caused the artist. The artwork determines what the artwork will be, not the artist. The artist is just a facilitator. Art as the mode of being makes both the artist and artwork ontologically possible. Art unfolds the artwork. The artwork has a life of its own, independent of any maker. Heidegger's phenomenology emphasises the artwork as "Being", as he said "back to the things themselves".

On the one hand, to appreciate art one must start with an understanding of what art is, yet on the other hand we can only appreciate art from the work itself. A paradox described by Plato as "A man cannot try to discover either what he knows or what he does not know. He would seek what he knows, for since he knows it there is no need of the inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case he does not even know what he is to look for". This is a circle only broken by an innate and a priori knowledge of Kantian pure and empirical sensible intuitions, of space, time and the categories of quantity, quality, relation, modality.

An artwork has Being and is its own Origin, yet we can understand art from our innate and a priori knowledge of aesthetics and representation that precedes ant experience of art. We can understand the aesthetic form and representational content as a single unity of apperception as a holistic synthesis of form and content.

But on the issue of ineffability, I also think there is nothing precluded in this regarding novel and extraordinary experiences in which there is an intimation of deeper, more profound insights about our Being here. — Constance

Language is metaphor
In language is the syntax of form and the semantics of content. Language is a set of words. A word is a physical object that exists in the world, as much as a mountain exists in the world.

Words refer to, represent, are linked to, corresponds with either another object in the world or a private subjective experience, such that "mountain" is linked to mountain or "pain" is linked to pain.

A metaphor directly refers to one thing by mentioning another and asserts that what are being compared are identical and clarifies similarities between two different ideas.

As mountain is being referred to by mentioning "mountain", as pain is being referred to by mentioning "pain", as it is asserted that the reference of "mountain" is identical with mountain, as it is asserted that the reference of "pain" is identical with pain, as the similarities between "mountain" and mountain, "pain" and pain are being clarified, then the linkage between a word and what it refers to fulfil all the requirements of a metaphor.

The word as an object is different to what it refers, meaning that any linkage between the word and to what it refers is metaphorical. As language is metaphorical, all our understanding through language is metaphorical: evolution by natural selection, F = ma, the wave theory of light, DNA is the code of life, the genome is the book of life, gravity, dendritic branches, Maxwell's Demon, Schrödinger’s cat, Einstein’s twins, greenhouse gas, the battle against cancer, faith in a hypothesis, the miracle of consciousness, the gift of understanding, the laws of physics, the language of mathematics, deserving an effective mathematics, etc

Words are symbols that refer metaphorically. As a metaphorical link can be created between any known object in the world and a word or any known private subjective experience and a word, any known object in the world or known private subjective experience can be expressed in language, meaning that in language, nothing that is known is ineffable.

Conclusion
As language is metaphorical, and as every known object in the world or known private subjective experience can be expressed in metaphorical terms, everything that is known can be said, whether concrete concepts such as mountain, abstract concepts such as pain, non-existents such as “The present King of France is bald.”, negative existentials such as “Unicorns don’t exist.”, identities such as “Superman is Clark Kent.” or substitutions such as “Taylor believes that Superman is 6 feet tall.”

Only that which is unknown cannot be put into words. Only that which is unknown is ineffable. If it is known, it can be put into words and is expressible.

RussellA adopts a referential theory of meaning. — Banno

In the referential theory of meaning, words mean what they refer to in the world. Words are like labels attached to things existing in the world, in that the word "mountain" refers to the object mountain.

However, as I see it, not only is a mountain an object in the world, but also the word "mountain" is an object in the world (setting aside exactly what objects are).

During (metaphorical) public performative acts establishing meaning, any set of objects in the world may be linked. For example, "mountain" may be linked to mountain, "mountain" may be linked to "awesome" and mountain may be linked to river.

As the referential theory of meaning only allows words such as "mountain" to be linked with objects such as mountain, because my theory of meaning allows not only words such as "mountain" to be linked to other words such as "awesome" but also objects such as mountain to be linked to other objects such as river, I don't adopt the referential theory of meaning.

One advantage of my theory of meaning is that it allows the word "horse" to be linked with the phrase "horn projecting from its forehead", overcoming one of Russell's and Frege's objections against the referential theory.

What are you tryin to justify? — Constance

I believe that there are limits to what language can explain about the word because of the intellectual limits of the human brain, in that language cannot transcend the mind. Language doesn't have a power that is not given to it by the mind.

You will have to turn to phenomenology, which is about the Totality of our existence, and not just an aggregate of localized arguments that is found in analytic thinking. — Constance

Perhaps neither the anti-reductionist Phenomenology nor the reductionist Cartesian method can be used by themselves. Both lead to problems. The Cartesian method suffers from treating the world as a set of objects interacting with each other. Phenomenology suffers from rejecting rationalism, relying on an intuitive grasp of knowledge, and free of intellectualising.

Taking the analogy of art, a complete understanding of a Derain requires both an intellectualism of the objects represented within the painting and an intuitive grasp of the aesthetic artistic whole. IE, a synthesis of both the Cartesian and the Phenomenologist.

Are you making a claim here? — Richard B

Yes, I was making a claim that our private subjective concepts of a particular word cannot be the same, in that it is impossible for them to be the same, although they may be similar.

I can never know my claim is true, as I cannot put myself into someone else's mind. I believe my claim is true from observations of other people's behaviour, but I can never know. It is an inference.

On the other hand, how would it be possible for anyone to know that their private subjective concept of a particular word was the same and not just similar to someone else's?

Physical limitations of the brain; what an interesting assumption — Constance

If there were no intellectual limitations to the brain, I could have understood Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth by now.

Hemmingway likely never intended any allegorical reading of his work — Constance

The Old Man and the Sea as Christian allegory

This chasm, how do you know about it? — Constance

If knowing is a justified true belief, I don't know there is a chasm. I believe there is and I can justify my belief that there is. I infer there is, but I don't know there is as I don't know whether or not my belief is true.

This is what many folk (perhaps ↪Constance?) think analytic philosophy suggests. That could not be further from the truth. From at least Russell's theory of descriptions, philosophy has whole-heartedly rejected this idea, and with good reason: If "mountain" is a label to a set of private subjective experiences in each of us, we are never, when discussing mountains, talking about the same thing. But meaning is public. Better to talk of use. — Banno

Words are public yet meaning can be private

A word is a public object
Words are public objects. They only have a use because they are public objects that enable communication between individuals. They exist as public objects in speech and text. As objects, they physically exist in the same way as apples, mountains, etc. I can observe the word mountain in the world as can everyone else. The value of language is that the words it uses are public.

The meaning of words is inferential
Public words are given public meaning in public performative acts. As noted by Davidson, T-sentences are laws of empirical theory. Someone says "snow is white" and points to snow is white. Knowledge of language is extensional to the words themselves. Someone points to a mountain and says "mountain" several times. From Hume's concept of constant conjunction, the observer may infer that "mountain" means mountain. The meaning of words must always remain inferential, in that even if someone points to a mountain and says "mountain" one hundred times, the hundredth and first time they may point to a mountain and say "hill"

Yet my concept of "mountain" cannot be the same as anyone else's. My concept has developed over a lifetime of particular personal experiences, as is true for everyone else. A Tanzanian's concept of "mountain" must be different to an Italian's concept of "mountain". My concept of "mountain" is private and subjective, inaccessible to anyone else in the same way that my experience of the colour red is private, subjective and inaccessible to anyone else.

But it is also true that society has determined that "mountain" means "an elevated portion of the Earth's crust, generally with steep sides that show significant exposed bedrock." The meaning of "mountain" has been expressed in a set of other words, all of which as words are public objects observable by different individuals.

Yet the same problem arises, in that my concept of each of these words cannot be the same as anyone else's. For example, a Tanzanian's concept of "steep" must be different to an Italians' concept of "steep". What "steep" means to me must be different to what it means to anyone else

Ultimately, I learnt the meaning of new words inferentially, which is a private and subjective experience.

It is true that most individuals within a society have similar concepts for the same public words, but then again, this is only an inference. An inference is a private and subjective belief. A belief that I can justify, but can never know to be true.

Communication uses public words
However, the fact that the meaning of any pubic word is private and subjective is no barrier to communication between people. Communication is about the public word, not the private meaning.

Taking a simpler example, assume there are five red apples on the table, publicly labelled in a prior performative act "five", "red" and "apples". My private subjective experience of "red" may be green, your private subjective experience of "red" may be blue, but our private subjective experience is irrelevant in the language game of being asked to pass over the "red" apple. Even though I experience green, I will pass over the "red" apple. Even though you experience blue, you will also pass over the "red" apple. Our private subjective experiences "drop out" of the act of passing over the "red" apples.

"Red" means the public colour of the apple, even if it privately means green to me and blue to you. Words only have meaning if they can be used to change the state of the world, ie, meaning as use.

Bertrand Russell's Theory of Descriptions

Meaning as public
Bertrand Russell wrote On Denoting, which later became the basis for Russell's "Descriptivism", whereby proper names are really "definite descriptions". Kripke described Russell's Theory of Descriptions in order to critique it, which I believe would be as follows:

1) When I hear the name "mountain", I believe that "mountain" is an elevated portion of the Earth's crust, generally with steep sides that show significant exposed bedrock.
2) I believe that this set of properties picks out "mountain" uniquely.
3) If most of the properties are satisfied by one unique object then "mountain" refers to mountain
4) If most of the properties are not satisfied by one unique object then "mountain" doesn't refer to mountain
5) I learn that "mountain" has the properties elevated portion of the Earth's crust, generally with steep sides that show significant exposed bedrock.
6) Knowing that "mountain" has these properties, when observing these properties, I know that it is a "mountain"

The word "mountain" describes the properties elevated portion of the Earth's crust, generally with steep sides that show significant exposed bedrock, similarly "steep" denotes steep, "elevated" denotes elevated etc. "Mountain" means an elevated portion of the Earth's crust, generally with steep sides that show significant exposed bedrock, "steep" means steep, "elevated" means elevated, etc

All these things exist as physical objects in the world. Words such as "mountain" physically exists, objects such as mountains physically exist. They all exist in a public space, observable by any individual. Meaning has been established in a public performative act, as Kripke says by a christening, as Davidson says by pointing. Society has determined that "mountain" means mountain. In this sense meaning is public.

Meaning as private
Yet language couldn't exist without the mind of an observer of such a public world. Neither "mountain" nor mountain have meaning independent of an observer. What "mountain" or mountain means to me is unique to me, private and subjective to me, not accessible to anyone else but me. But as can be seen with the example of the five red apples, private subjective meaning is no barrier to public communication.

Conclusion
So which is correct. Is meaning public or private. In a sense both, in that in a public performative act a mountain in being christened a "mountain" establishes that "mountain" means mountain. And yet meaning does not exist independent of any sentient observer, whereby both "mountain" and mountain mean something different to every different individual.

But this just puts the burden on the term "objectify" — Constance

Words objectify what they refer to

A word such as "mountain" is a physical thing as much as a mountain is a physical thing. The "mountain" is as much an object as the mountain. Somehow, "mountain" means mountain, is linked with mountain and corresponds with mountain. The "mountain" came after the mountain, in that "mountain" has only existed for less than 100,000 years whereas mountain has existed for at least 4 billion years.

As the "mountain" came after the mountain, as the "mountain" is an object, as the "mountain" somehow relates to the mountain, in that sense, the "mountain" has objectified the mountain.

Sartre had this concept of radical contingency: when we encounter the world, the world radically exceeds what language can — Constance

The world exceeds our ability to explain it

The limits of our concepts
I have learnt the concept of "mountain". On arriving in Zermatt for the first time, the reality of mountains far exceeds my concept, but on leaving, my concept will probably have changed, hopefully giving me a better understand of the nature of mountains. Yet no matter how much my understanding improves, my understanding of the true nature of mountains will always remain insignificant. Metaphorically, my understanding of a mountain will be that of a horse's understanding of the allegories in Hemingway's The Old Man and The Sea, not because of a lack of trying, but because of the natural limitations of its brain. I am sure that if a superintelligent and knowledgeable alien race arrived on Earth, and tried to explain the true nature of time and space, we wouldn't have the foggiest idea of what they were saying. Not because we didn't want to know, but because of the physical limitations of our brain.

Sartre and existence
If knowledge and understanding is limited by the inherent structure of our brain, and similarly our use of language, then it follows that there will be a natural limit in our understanding of the reason for our own existence. In Sartre's terms, the "for-itself" may exist without ever finding a reason for its own existence. Existing without any justification or explanation, which is, for Sartre, a tragic existence. Without an explanation for our own existence, to exist is to simply be here. One experiences a groundlessness, existing without ever knowing why. An existence that is accidental and subject to chance, We may search for meaning, but ultimately there is no meaning in "being-in-itself", as there is no meaning in the world waiting to be discovered.

The limits of language
Language is a product of the brain, and is therefore limited by the brain. If our understanding is limited by the brain, then what can be achieved by language must also be limited. Language cannot be used to escape the "for-itself". Language can only mirror our limited understanding of the world, a world that radically exceeds that which can be explained in language. The chasm between the world and what can be explained in language is insurmountable because of the limited nature of the brain

Language as a mirror of the intellect is limited in its description of the world by the limits of the intellect, which is limited by the physical structure of the brain. Consequently, our understanding of the world is more about how the world appears to us, rather than how it actually is.

Is language so inhibitive? — Constance

Words objectify what they are referring to. "Morality" identifies morality as a thing, "mountain" identifies mountain as a thing. This is how language works, and this is how we can use language to communicate

But as you say "If God were actually God, and this was intimated to you in some powerful intimation of eternity and rapture that was intuitively off the scales, would language really care at all?" No, language wouldn't care. I don't need language to have the private subjective experience of morality or a mountain. Humans experienced these things pre-language.

On the one hand, language imposes restrictions on what can be said. My understanding of a "mountain", my concept of "mountain" has grown over a lifetime of individual experiences, and is certainly different to your understanding and concept of "mountain", built up over a lifetime of very different experiences. Yet we both use the same word when using language to communicate, seemingly inhibiting what we can say.

For me, the word "mountain" is a label to a set of private subjective experiences. A single word can label a set of experiences. A single word is an object that refers to a set of experiences. When I think of a word as a label I am thinking not of a single thing but of a set of experiences linked to that word. When I think of a word I am thinking of the set of things that that word refers to

When we use the same word in conversation, we will be thinking of very different sets of experiences, but providing we have agreed beforehand with the definition that "A mountain is an elevated portion of the Earth's crust, generally with steep sides that show significant exposed bedrock.", although our language may restrict what can be said, it doesn't restrict what we can think.

A word can be a label for a complex set of objects, facts, events, feelings, etc, but when I think of a label such as "morality", "mountain" etc, I am not thinking of the label but the set of things that the label is attached to. The fact that a label can be attached to a set of things means that there is some similarity between the things, it does not mean that the things cannot also be different.

As Elizabeth Barrett Browning put it “How do I love thee? Let me count the ways”. "I love thee to the depth and breadth and height my soul can reach, when feeling out of sight for the ends of being and ideal grace. I love thee to the level of every day’s most quiet need, by sun and candle-light. I love thee freely, as men strive for right. I love thee purely, as they turn from praise. I love thee with the passion put to use in my old griefs, and with my childhood’s faith. I love thee with a love I seemed to lose with my lost saints. I love thee with the breath, smiles, tears, of all my life; and, if God choose, I shall but love thee better after death."

"Love" is a thing, but I don't think of it as one thing, I think of it as labelling the vast set of things that it encompasses. Language is not that inhibiting.

By referring to "the nature of morality" you identify it as a thing, and so are trapped into thinking of it as if is one. Why should we do that? — Ciceronianus

It is the nature of words to objectify what they are referring to, to identify as a thing, whether it be "mountain", "pain", "searching" or "wanting".

If a philosopher wanted to understand a topic, such as morality, without objectifying it, then they would have to use something other than words. Philosophers use language because there is no other way. The alternative is not even to try, and that would be a dead end.

Word use doesn’t literally mean “changing the state of the world — Joshs

Words and action

I will have to change what I previously wrote, from " A particular word may have a set of meanings. The set of meanings doesn't change with context" to "A particular word may have a set of meanings to me. The intended meaning depends on the particular context. The set of meanings may be modified after a new experience."

I can enter a new situation not knowing the meaning of a word, for example "jiwe". Within the situation I learn the meaning of the word. The key is, as Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus 4.1212 "what can be shown, cannot be said" and as @Banno said "but something is done, when we talk; some agreement or coordination is reached, and novel uses of language derive from mundane uses." I learn the meaning of "jiwe" by the merchant saying "jiwe" and pointing to a stone. To learn a word needs some kind of action.

Once I have learnt the meaning of a word, once I have a concept behind the word, the next time I enter a similar situation I will be more prepared. As you say, "It is reference (memory, expectation, anticipation) modified by context, which is another name for ‘use’ or ‘forms of life’ or ‘language games’ in Wittgenstein’s sense". Almost certainly the concept I had when I entered the situation will be modified by the new experience. I may have a concept of an "apple", but after watching a program on growing apples in the Western Cape, I will definitely modify my concept. My concept of "apple", of any word, is continually changing with new experiences. What is not possible, when entering a new situation, is to be able to dismiss presuppositions and assumptions. To have, as @Constance discusses, an "innocent eye". As Gombrich said "reading an image, like the reception of any other message, is dependent on prior knowledge of possibilities; we can only recognize what we know.’ As Goodman said, ‘The innocent eye is blind and the virgin mind empty.’ The viewer is cognitively active and can never be passive. As you rightly say " Pure reference is impossible. It is reference (memory, expectation, anticipation) modified by context, which is another name for ‘use’ or ‘forms of life’ or ‘language games’ in Wittgenstein’s sense."

Once I have learnt the meaning of words, the only purpose of my words is to change the state of the world in some way. If words didn't have an affect on the world, then language would serve no purpose, and there would be no language. I say, "one coffee please", or pass me the apple, or "where is the apple" because I want a change in the state of the world. I say "hello", or "Kant is the most important philosopher", or "I am tired" because I want to change the state of mind of the person I am talking to leading to a change in the state of the world. The only purpose of words is to lead to an action

I experience a novel situation, and new experiences inevitably modify my understanding of the meanings of words. In entering a coffee house and saying, "one coffee please" and being asked "mocha frappuccino or vanilla latte?", my concept of what coffee is changes at that moment in time. The purpose of my asking "one coffee please" hasn't changed, my goal is still to be given a coffee. My goal hasn't been changed, even though the context of my interaction with the barista has changed. The next time I enter the coffee house, having my concept of coffee modified by my past experience, I may well ask for a mocha frappuccino. Again, with a new interaction with the barista, I may well gain new knowledge and again modify my concept of coffee.

Words only have meaning if they can be used to change the state of the world, ie, meaning as use.

I would say no, if you mean arriving at all-inclusive definitions of that they are; treating them as objects which can be definitively described, objects of knowledge if you will. — Ciceronianus

It would obviously be impossible to arrive at an all-inclusive definition of morality (for example). All we can do is strive to use words to better understand the nature of morality, surely not a futile philosophical undertaking.

But there are things that we cannot express in words well, or accurately, or adequately and using words to express them (which we do all the time; which philosophers do all the time) is futile and worse "bewitching" as Wittgenstein might say — Ciceronianus

But isn't it just those things that we cannot express well in words, such as justice, ethics, morality, honour, wisdom, etc, that are exactly those things which we should strive to express well in words?

It's quite easy to talk about the fact that bees and butterflies can see ultraviolet, ie, clearly not ineffable, yet can anyone actually describe what ultraviolet looks like.

Identical form does not always have identical content. — javra

I should have explained myself better, in that a particular word may have a set of meanings. For example "blue" = {the colour blue, the emotive state blue}. I am thinking of the content of the word "blue" as the set of meanings, not that meaning used in a particular context.

all words have intersubjective meanings — javra

Yes, the word "grass" means something very different to a South African than an Icelander because of their very different life experiences, yet they can both have a sensible conversation about "grass" because of its inter-subjective meaning. They can talk about the "top level" meaning rather than any "fine-tuned" meaning.

Words don’t have meanings as context-independent categories — Joshs

I should have been clearer about distinguishing between the different meanings of a particular word and a particular meaning of a particular word.

A particular word may have a set of meanings. The set of meanings doesn't change with context, although the intended meaning of the word is dependent on context. For example, "blue" = {the colour blue, the emotive state blue }

The set of meanings of a particular word is the foundation of a language. The set remains the same, even if the context changes. If I didn't know the set of meanings of words prior to encountering a new situation, I wouldn't know which word should be used. The set is independent of context, and pre-exists a particular context.

For Wittgenstein words don’t refer to objects, they enact forms of life. — Joshs

If I walked into a Tanzanian builder's yard and said "jiwe moja tafadhali", I know that uttering this particular sound will achieve my goal of being given a stone. The sound only has meaning in enacting a form of life. It has no meaning if not able to change the state of the world in some way. Yet the sound does refer to an object, because if it didn't refer to an object, a "jiwe", the merchant wouldn't know what I wanted. Words both enact a form of life and refer to objects.

Amazing how you can share the experience of a complicated gymnastic routine just by watching. — jgill

Why do people attend gymnastic competitions in their millions to watch gymnastic routines if not to share the experience of the gymnast. The visitor may not have the same skill as the gymnast in performing a gymnastic routine, but they can share in the experience.

Why would anyone go to a gymnastic competition, read a novel, attend a pop concert, the theatre, see a movie, visit an art gallery, etc, if the experience left them cold, if they felt nothing, if they couldn't share in the experience of the artist?

And I’m with the later Wittgenstein , who argues that there is no such thing as a word outside of some particular use; for a word to be is for a word to be used, and word use is always situational, contextual and personal — Joshs

I agree as well with the later Wittgenstein, in that language is a set of language games, where the purpose of language is to do something, change the world in some way. Meaning as use. It could be standing in front of a cave and saying the magical phrase "open sesame" or it could be walking into a Tanzanian builder's yard and saying "jiwe", where saying "jiwe" will achieve my goal of being given a stone. Saying "jiwe" in a Tanzanian builder's yard is one possible language game.

It is not the case that "jiwe" achieves my goal, it is the performative act of saying "jiwe" that will achieve my goal.

As you say, the context in which a word is used is crucial, but context is independent of whatever meaning a word may have. If I walked into a Parisian cafe and said "jiwe" I may get strange looks. If I said "jiwe" in a language class I might get top marks.

Wittgenstein talked about meaning as use, but this cannot mean that the meaning of a word changes dependant upon how it is being used in a particular context, but rather, the purpose a word is being used for changes with the context.

If the meaning of a word changed with context, language would have no foundation, and there would be the problem of circularity. I wouldn't know what a word meant if I didn't know the context, and I wouldn't know the context unless I knew the meaning of the word.

A stone may be used as a hammer. A stone may be used as a door stop. The meaning of "stone" is independent of any use it is put to. A stone being used as a hammer means that the nail will be driven into the wood. A stone being used as a door stop means that the door will remain open.

The way that the word is being used has a meaning and changes with context. The meaning of the word doesn't change with context.

Quote: "It's not easy to talk about something that can't be expressed in words."

Bertrand Russell in the Introduction to the Tractatus wrote "Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit. The whole subject of ethics, for example, is placed by Mr. Wittgenstein in the mystical, inexpressible region. Nevertheless he is capable of conveying his ethical opinions."

When going to the library and seeing the number of books on religion, ethics, morality, art, etc, one can only conclude that it is in fact very easy to talk about things that cannot be expressed in words.

I cannot express my private subjective experience of the colour red in words, for example, yet have no difficulty in talking about it.

As Bertrand Russell asked, where is the loophole.

In language are three rule-governed domains, form, content and use. Form includes the rules that govern how sounds are combined, rules that govern how words are constructed and rules the govern how words are combined into sentences. Content is the meaning of words and sentences. Use is the pragmatic skill of combining form and content to create functional and socially appropriate communication.

It must be the case that identical form has identical content, such that the proposition A "the bird is blue" has the same content as proposition B "the bird is blue". Therefore, if I know the content of proposition A then I also know the content of proposition B.

Therefore, generalising, if I know forms A and B, if form A is identical to form B, if I know the content of form A then I also know the content of form B.

I am human form A and I know its contents, my private subjective experiences. I observe human form B. As human form B shares more than 99% of its DNA with me, has descended from the same woman who lived in Africa between 150,000 and 200,000 years ago, and has, to all intents and purposes, the same human form as me, I can infer with almost absolute certainty that I know their contents, their private subjective experiences.

Human form B does not need to express their private subjective experiences in words for me to have an almost absolute belief that their private subjective experiences are the same as mine.

Perhaps this is the loophole that Bertrand Russell was looking for.

We can talk about that which cannot be expressed in words, because having the same form, we have the same content.

Actions constitute much of what is ineffable. — jgill

It depends on how ineffable is defined

The Britannica Dictionary defines ineffable as "too great, powerful, beautiful, etc., to be described or expressed". The Merriam Webster Dictionary as "incapable of being expressed in words, indescribable". The Free Dictionary as " Incapable of being expressed; indescribable or unutterable".

Whilst the private subjective experience of pain cannot be described in words, it can be expressed in action, such as quickly pulling my hand away from a hot radiator.

Every use of the word stone provides us with a different sense of meaning of ‘stone’. — Joshs

A stone has an uncountable number of potential uses. It can be used to hammer in a nail, be used in a game to skip over water when thrown, be used as a paperweight, keep open a door, to build the walls of a house, to construct a foundation, as ballast in a ship, etc.

If every different use of a stone gave us a different meaning of stone, then there would be an uncountable number of definitions of "stone"

I'm with @Banno who wrote "Nowadays a property is considered essential if and only if it belongs to the individual in question in every possible world."