If you are trying to get ontological commitments from PI, you won't find any as far as I see. Besides that meaning of words comes from language games, you won't find much ontologically-speaking — schopenhauer1

Yes, it is very difficult to make sense of the PI when we don't even know whether the objects he refers to, such as slabs, are those of the Nominalist or the Platonic Realist.

So ostensive pointing to an object is simply one mechanism of teaching use, it doesn't replace use. — schopenhauer1

PI 40 reads that a word such as "slab" doesn't get its meaning from corresponding with a slab in the world, as the word "Mr N N" doesn't get its meaning from corresponding with a Mr N N in the world.

PI 40 Let us first discuss this point of the argument: that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it.—It is important to note that the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning; of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say "Mr. N. N. is dead."

For the word "slab" to correspond with the object slab, then the word is "pointing" at the object.

As this is at odds with the last sentence in PI 43, I assume the last sentence of PI 43 about pointing is that of the interlocutor. The last sentence of PI 43 about "pointing" seems something a supporter of Augustine's Referentialism would say.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

The meaning of the word 'slab' in the builder's language depends on two things: 1. The existence of these objects. 2. What the assistant is to do with them. — Fooloso4

As the meaning of "unicorn" in language doesn't depend on the existence of a unicorn in the world, then why should the meaning of "slab" in language depend on the existence of a slab in the world?

Even assuming "bring me slab" is referring to an object in the world, what kind of object is being referred to in the Philosophical Investigations. An object as determined by Nominalism or an object as determined by Platonic Realism?

The meaning is not the name of the object. — Fooloso4

That's how I understand Wittgenstein in the PI, whereby meaning is use in language, in opposition to Augustine's Referentialism.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

comic — schopenhauer1

If only PI 43 subsection A had been "For that reason, I call this thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it".

There would then have been no hesitancy within society in calling the emperor "naked", in seeing one particular example of nakedness in front of them.

I said that the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, just as the meaning of the word "unicorn" does not depend on the existence of unicorns. However, regardless of this fact about meaning, slabs do exist in the world. — Luke

1) "the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs"
2) "slabs do exist in the world"

Sentence 1)
As the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs in the world, there can be the word "slab" in language whether or not there are slabs in the world. Therefore, the word "slab" in language cannot be referring to something in the world. If the word "slab" did refer to something in the world, then, if there was no slab in the world then there would be no word "slab" in language, but that is not the case.

Sentence 2)
There are two logical parts to the sentence "slabs do exist in the world". Part i) there are things that are named "slabs" and part ii) these things exist in the world. Within the sentence, the things named "slabs" refer to the things that exist in the world.

Sentences 1) and 2) are contradictory, in that in sentence 1) the word "slab" doesn't refer to a thing in the world but in sentence 2) the word "slab" does refer to a thing in the world.

Sentence 1) encapsulates the core of the PI in that the meaning of a word is its use in language.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

Sentence 2) is the position of Referentialism that Wittgenstein is opposing.
PI 2 . That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours. Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with buildingstones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out;—B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.——Conceive this as a complete primitive language

In the case of physical objects, there are many underlying activities and contexts that we skip over...........................e.g., an ottoman is not a table but can be used for that purpose, or, part of or judgment of a “table” is where we gather with others to eat, so, even if it is around a rock, we would still say we are sitting around the “table”........................This is not empirical or about the about, but is still normative, “real”, not “subjective”. — Antony Nickles

As Wittgenstein writes in the Preface, a vagueness in the PI is inevitable, as he admits himself that he was unable to weld his results together.
Preface: After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination

Wittgenstein in PI asks lots of questions, often without trying to answer them. For some of these questions it is also unclear whether he considers them valid or not, and I agree when you say "Anybody that thinks they can tell you what it “means” is wrong".

What status does a "table" have for me. It is an inseparable fusion of the concept "table" in the mind and a momentary set of atoms existing in the world in time and space. Both aspects are necessary. My position is that of Nominalism rather than Platonic Realism.

I wrote: "For that reason, I call this particular thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it".

As regards the empirical, our concept of "table" has originated from states of affairs in the world, an empirical discovery.

As regards the normative, the only standards placed on the meaning of the word have originated from the users of the language living within a community. IE, we do the ethical thing, not because it is required by the table, but because of the use we put the table to within the community within which we live.

As regards the real, our concepts are real in our mind and the atoms are real in the world.

As regards the subjective, only concepts in the mind can be subjective, in that tables cannot have concepts. Atoms (thought of as logical entities rather than existant things) in the world can only be objective, in that they would exist independent of any sentient observer.

There is nothing wrong with asking questions, whether "is my pain the same as yours" or "how far is it from the Earth to the Moon", but humans can only learn when they try to answer these questions. Only by theorising can we make progress, as science has clearly shown.

The meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, as PI 40 indicates. Nevertheless, slabs exist in the world. — Luke

You write that "slabs exist in the world", and also write that there can be the word "slab" in language even if there is no slab in the world.

So what you are really saying is that "slabs exist in the world even if there is no slab in the world"

Language users. — Luke

I agree, it is the human who judges that the something in the world is an object, not that the something in the world has a Platonic Form.

Replace the word "game" with the word "table" in the above section. We don't need to draw any strict boundary for the concept to be usable (in language). But we can and might do so for a special purpose. — Luke

Yes, the meaning of a word such as "table" has no definite boundary, whereas some words such as 1 metre can be defined as being 100 centimetres.

But a child can be taught how to use the word correctly. — Luke

There cannot be a correct use of a word such as "table". Within different contexts there are different sets of family resemblances. Is it correct to say that this is a "table"?



PI 217 - "How am I able to obey a rule?"—if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."

Witty is an interesting and significant philosopher, because the issues he had raised were compelling and important. — Corvus

I agree. I feel I have clarified my own ideas about language and the relationship between the mind and world by studying Wittgenstein. He did raise important issues. I'm not saying my interpretation is necessarily correct, but I feel I can justify it. One has to start somewhere.

As Nietzsche wrote in 1888: “Aus der Kriegsschule des Lebens, was mich nicht umbringt, macht mich stärker,” - “Out of life’s school of war, what doesn’t kill me, makes me stronger.”

The point of PI 40 is that the users of the name give the name meaning, not the object or person to which the name refers. The meaning of the name does not cease to exist when the object or person ceases to exist — Luke

Yes, that is Wittgenstein's position, in that the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on there being a slab in the world.

You also seem to have the impression that Wittgenstein's rejection of this view implies that words cannot refer to objects, but we obviously can and do sometimes use words to refer to objects — Luke

It depends what you mean by "object". For the Nominalist, universal and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels. For the Platonic Realist, objects, entities and events exist in space and time in the world (Wikipedia - Nominalism).

If you are a Platonic Realist, then how to answer the following:

1) In the mind, the parts of objects, entities and events are connected within concepts.
2) In the world, what connects the parts of an object, entity or event into a whole? What in the world has judged that an apple sitting on a table is a different object to the table it is sitting upon?
3) If within the world, there is nothing that is able to judge which parts are connected and which aren't, then objects, entities and events cannot exist in the world.

Are you saying that there is no way to determine whether the parents or the child is correct?......................Wittgenstein does not endorse this sort of relativism................There are rules for the correct use of the word "table". — Luke

Can you show me the rule for the correct use of the word "table"?

Wittgenstein is not for you. — Banno

In the words of Sun Tzu from The Art of War: “Know thy self, know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories.”

But that doesn't answer the metaphysical question of "what" is this concept apple. It is obviously a mental thing. What is that? Witt doesn't have an answer — schopenhauer1

Yes, Wittgenstein makes no attempt at coming up with an answer to the questions he raises. As he wrote in the Preface "After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed."

My understanding of a concept is as follows:

Suppose someone says "bring me an apple", and I have the concept of "apple". They are not asking to be brought the concept of an "apple", they are asking to be brought one particular physical instantiation of the concept "apple". They want to be brought one particular set of atoms existing in space and time.

After being shown many examples of things in the world that have been given the name "apple" by my community, I develop the concept of "apple". In part because between the many examples there has been some kind of family resemblance. All different, but also similar in some undefinable, intuitive way.

It is true that the term family resemblance doesn't explain anything substantive apart from the fact that the examples were all different but have some similarities, similarities that I cannot define but can only intuitively perceive

It seems to me that there are two types of concepts: compound and elementary.

Compound concepts are equivalent to knowledge by description, such as the concept "unicorn", which can only be known by description as "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead". Compound concepts are sets of elementary concepts.

Elementary concepts are equivalent to knowledge by acquaintance, such as the colour red, a sweet taste, an acrid smell, a painful touch or a grating noise. Primitive sensations that have been directly caused by things in the world.

Compound concepts exist as sets of elementary concepts within language, whereas elementary concepts depend on information passing through the senses from the world into the mind.

The particular elementary concepts we happen to have is a function of 3.5 billion years of evolution of life in synergy with the word, as described by Enactivism. The particular compound concepts we have is a function of their use within our community and the world in general.

But if you are moving towards the continental philosophy, then Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Sartre or even Deleuze are all great philosophers. — Corvus

:up: :up:

Unfortunately, 20th century philosophy bifurcated philosophy into linguistic/logic/mathematical approaches which took discrete propositions and tried to answer them on one side and phenomenological approaches on the other (existentialism for example). — schopenhauer1

The great analytic philosophy vs continental philosophy divide.

My favourite city is Paris, and we always stay near the Left Bank, so perhaps I should be moving away from Wittgenstein and towards Sartre.

In that case, would you not feel that referentialism and logical positivism are blind system? I mean, the world is not just material, but there are also mental sides too. — Corvus

Yes. They ignored causation. If I see someone wince, I know that something has caused such pain behaviour, whether pain or acting. I may never know what, but I know that whatever caused the pain behaviour was real. I know rather than believe because of the principle of Innatism.

You talked about five apples and gave me a slab scenario in the posts.  Before you and I sit down facing in between the apples and slabs, they are just mental objects whilst we talking about them.  I have no clue what apples and which slab you are referring to. — Corvus

I have learnt the concept of "apple" after seeing numerous examples of things in the world that have been named "apple" by my community. No two apples were the same, but they all shared a family resemblance.

On the table in front of me is a particular thing in space and time that shares a family resemblance with all the previous things I have seen in the world that have been named "apple" by my community.

For that reason, I call this particular thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it.

The observation that a particular use governs the meaning of a word does not cancel the fact that language is referring to entities and events we encounter in the world. — Paine

Objects, entities and events exist in space and time in the world.

In the mind, the parts of objects, entities and events are connected within concepts.

In the world, what connects the parts of an object, entity or event into a whole? What in the world has judged that an apple sitting on a table is a different object to the table it is sitting upon?

If within the world, there is nothing that is able to judge which parts are connected and which aren't, then objects, entities and events cannot exist in the world.

Right, but then where did the internal states "go"? "What" were they for them? Why didn't they care? — schopenhauer1

Logical Positivism stated in the 1920's. Their central thesis was the verification principle, whereby only statements verifiable through direct observation or logical proof are meaningful in terms of conveying truth value, information or factual content (Wikipedia Logical Positivism).

It is probably not surprising that the movement came to an end in the 1960's, though they had a good run.

Does the "object" also include mental objects such as fear, anger, pain, joy and hope ...etc? Or does it just mean material objects in the external world? — Corvus

In Referentialism, the objects in the world are observable material things, including things such as mountains, trees, crying, wincing and other behaviours, but not internal sensations such as fear, anger, etc.

This is why the Logical Positivists liked Referentialism, in that it aimed at creating a "perfectly descriptive language purified from ambiguities and confusions" (Wikipedia, Direct Reference Theory).

Referentialism says that pointing out an object in the world is the only use a word can have. Wittgenstein says that words can also have other uses. As we pointed out to you earlier, Wittgenstein does not deny that words can be used to refer to objects. What he rejects is that words are only used to refer to objects. — Luke

The key paragraph is PI 43 which says that the meaning of a word is its use in language. But what about the second part "And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.". Is this Wittgenstein accepting Referentialism - not at all.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

PI 40 makes the point that the meaning of a word doesn't disappear if the object it is referring to disappears. IE, the meaning of a word doesn't depend on there being an object in the world. If the object Mr N N disappears, the word "Mr N N" still has meaning.

PI 40 Let us first discuss this point of the argument: that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it.—It is important to note that the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning; of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say "Mr. N. N. is dead."

Within the PI are sentences such as "bring me a slab". Wittgenstein is making the point in the PI that the word "slab" doesn't have meaning because it is referring to an object in the world, ie Referentialism, but in fact gets its meaning from how it used in language, which is a completely different thing.

As I see it, the whole point of the PI is in denying that any word gets its meaning from referring to objects in the world.

This implies that it is impossible for the child to be wrong; that the child must always point to a table, no matter what they point to, as long as it aligns with the child’s concept of “table”. — Luke

The child has a concept of "table", as only having four legs, and points to an example in the world of what it believes to be a table. Its parent may believe that the child's concept is wrong, as for the parent a "table" may have either three or four legs .

However, as far as the child is concerned, they are not wrong, in that they have pointed to an example of what they believe to be a "table".

This is the point of PI 246, in that if I have a pain, then I have a pain. There is no knowing that I have a pain. If I have concept, then I have a concept, right or wrong.

It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

The either/or expressed by moving from "meaning as representation to a view which looks to use as the crux of the investigation", assumes that the challenge W is making to treating words as pointing to essences should be replaced by a competing explanation of essence. — Paine

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

The PI is opposed to Referentialism, whereby words refer to objects in the world. To be an object existing in the world in space and time it must have some kind of essence.

The PI proposes that the meaning of a word is its use in language, for example in the sentence "bring me a table". In this case, what is the essence of the word "table"? One possibility is that the essence of a word such as "table" is as a concept, something that only exists in the mind of the speaker of the language.

This is how he learns what a table is - it is what the toy is on — Fooloso4

As you say "A child learns the word 'table' in the context of her life."

The child asks "where is my toy". Its parent says "your toy is on the table". The child sees the toy and knows that it is on something. But from a single example, the child cannot know what "table" is referring to. Is it referring to a tablecloth, a table, something made of wood, something with four legs, etc.

Only by experiencing many examples will the child be able to discover a family resemblance in the examples and narrow down the meaning of "table" to what we know as the concept "table".

He gets defenders. — schopenhauer1

For example, the Decision Lab writes of Wittgenstein as one of the most important philosophers of the 20th C:
Ludwig Wittgenstein was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. There were few philosophical fields left untouched by the British-Austrian genius; he worked with logic, mathematics, ethics, the mind, and most notably, revolutionized the way that we understand language.

The article writes that part of his importance was in moving philosophy from trying to discoverer the truth of the world to find explanations that allowed people to picture the world.
He believed that in the 1900s, philosophers had become too concerned with trying to discover a magical doctrine that explained the ‘truth’ of the world.................Instead, he believed the purpose of philosophy was to find explanations that allowed people to picture the world.

Perhaps he can be seen as starting to lay the foundation for today's Postmodernism, which, according to Britannica is characterized by scepticism, subjectivism and relativism.
Postmodernism, also spelled post-modernism, in Western philosophy, a late 20th-century movement characterized by broad scepticism, subjectivism, or relativism; a general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power.

The PI, in opposing Referentialism in favour of Relativism, whereby words can only be understood within the context in which they appear, has perhaps contributed to the situation today whereby in one context I can think of myself as an Italian, male engineer, but in another context I can think of myself as an Indian, female shot putter. Today, perhaps partly in thanks to Wittgenstein, it is my truth that is important now, not facts in the world.

No one goes around pointing to various things in the child's world and naming them — Fooloso4

If things in the child's world are not named, how does the child learn the names of things.

Pointing to objects is not how we use words. We know she understands the word 'table' not because she points to it but because when we tell her the toy is on the table she knows were to look. — Fooloso4

The child must already know what a table is if the child knows the toy is on top of it.

For the child what exists are not examples or instantiations of concepts. What exists are the things she encounters and uses, the things she learns to call 'table' and 'chair'. She does not begin at the level of concepts. — Fooloso4

Every table in the world is different in some way. Some are brown in colour and some grey, some with four legs and some with three, some pristine and new and some old and scratched, etc. The child couldn't learn a different name for every different table, all they can do is learn the concept of "table", a single word incorporating family resemblances.

Mustn't the child point to a table, i.e. "an object in the world", in order to "successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling"? — Luke

The Philosophical Investigations rejects Referentialism. In Referentialism, the child would point to an object in the world. If the child is not pointing to an object in the world, according to the PI, then what exactly is the child doing.

From Wikipedia Direct Reference Theory, the PI opposed Referentialism.
A direct reference theory (also called referentialism or referential realism) is a theory of language that claims that the meaning of a word or expression lies in what it points out in the world. The object denoted by a word is called its referent. Criticisms of this position are often associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein. In 1953, with his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argued against referentialism, famously saying that "the meaning of a word is its use."

As the SEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein writes, as regards the PI, one should forget about meaning as representation and look to use.
“For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’—though not for all—this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI 43). This basic statement is what underlies the change of perspective most typical of the later phase of Wittgenstein’s thought: a change from a conception of meaning as representation to a view which looks to use as the crux of the investigation"

What is an object? The SEP article Object discusses the nature of objects. Is it really the case that the child is pointing at a table as an object, or is the child pointing at a set of atoms that have a momentary location in time and space, and have taken the form of one particular example of the general concept "table". To say that the child is looking at an object is to say that what exists in the mind of the child as a concept also happens to ontologically exist in the world.
Hawthorne and Cortens (1995) speak for the nihilist thus: “the concept of an object has no place in a perspicuous characterization of reality” (p. 143). They suggest three theories on which there are no objects. The first that there are just stuffs everywhere, but no objects. The second that there is just one big mass of stuff.[14] The third is that there just isn’t anything at all. This last option is what Hawthorne and Cortens defend. They do so using what they (following Strawson) call a “feature-placing language”. They model a potential nihilist program on sentences like “it is raining”, “it is snowing now”, and “it is cold here”. Such sentences do not quantify over anything and have no logical subject (‘it’ functions as a dummy pronoun), and so do not ontologically commit one to anything. The nihilist may then paraphrase sentences that apparently require objects (such as “there is a computer here”) with those that do not (such as “it is computering here”). In short, the nihilist turns every putative noun into an adverb, making judicious use of spatial, temporal, and numerical adverbs too.

Perhaps the PI is following what Strawson calls a feature-placing language, where such sentences as "it is a table" don't quantify over anything, and therefore don't commit the speaker to having to refer to any ontologically existent object.

No table as such exists in the world. What exists in the world are examples of tables, some grey in colour and some brown in colour, some with four legs and some with three legs, some new and some old, some made of plastic and some made of wood. No one can point to The Table about which all other tables are copies. No one table takes precedence over any other. Only the concept table can exist as a singular thing, and that exists in the mind and not the world.

The child points at a table, but a moment later the thing being pointed at it has lost a few atoms, gained a scratch or two and has warped slightly. Is it the same table? Can one argue that something can physically change yet remain the same object.

When one says "the child points at a table", this is a figure of speech for "the child points at an example of its concept of "table""

However, Wittgenstein does not deny that some words do name objects, or can refer to things in the world. — Luke

He does not deny that some words refer to objects. What he rejects is that EVERY word functions in this way — Fooloso4

After a bit of pondering, I will stick my neck on the line and say that, at the core of Philosophical Investigations, with its language games, family resemblances and Forms of Life, no word names an object in the world. IE, the PI rejects a referential theory of meaning (aka Direct Reference Theory, Referentialism, Referential Realism).

How does a child learn a new word, such as "table". They are shown many examples of things, similar in some way, but all different, and as Wittgenstein says, having family resemblances. Each particular thing is a token of a general type.

We know when the child understands the meaning of the word "table", when we ask the child to point to a "table" and they successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling. They know how to use the word.

But as each child has had different life experiences, has had a unique Form of Life, and has been shown a unique set of examples, each child's concept of a "table" must be unique to them. My concept of "table" must be different to your concept of "table", as my concept of pain must be different to yours. Similar in many ways but different in others.

The concept "table" only exists in the mind and not the world. What exists in the world are particular examples, particular instantiations, of our concept of the word "table".

But as Wittgenstein pointed out in PI 293, our private experiences, whether that of pain or the concept of a "table", drop out of consideration in the language game. In the language game we can talk about "pains" and "tables", even though I don't know your pain or concept of "table" and you don't know my pain or my concept of "table".

Therefore, when I hear "bring me a table", this in fact a figure of speech, and replaces the sentence "bring me something in the world that is an example of your concept of a "table"".

In the sentence "bring me a table", the word "table" is not referring to either my or your concept of "table", because, as with the beetle, it has dropped out of consideration in the language game.

As I have in my mind my own concept of "table", having learn the concept from seeing in the world many examples of things that have been named "table" by a community, when I hear someone say "bring me a table", I can reverse the process and find a thing in the world that is a particular example of my own concept.

The word "table" in the sentence "bring me a table" is not referring to a table in the world, to an object in the world, but is referring to the many examples of things in the world experienced over decades and multiple locations as having a family resemblance and been named "table" by a community, of which the thing in front of me is just one particular example.

In short, because all use - including the use of a word in a sentence - is a use in the world. — Luke

The example of the shopkeeper and the apples is in response to the picture of language as words naming objects. — Fooloso4

As you say, Wittgenstein is responding to Augustine.

I agree with Wittgenstein that Augustine's position, as Wittgenstein presents it, is too simplistic. It seems sensible to say that language only has meaning if it has a use in the world.
PI 1: In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands

Words can name objects in the world, but they have other uses as well. They can name properties, such as the colour red, they can be definitions, such as "a unicorn a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead", they can be metaphors, poetic, exclamations, feelings such as pain, etc.

As words only exist in language, then it logically follows that everything a word is depends on it being part of language, including its meaning. It is hard to argue against the idea that the meaning of a word is its use in language
PI 43 - For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer

What Wittgenstein doesn't mention in PI 43 is the next necessary step in our understanding of the meaning of words, and that is that the meaning of language is its use in the world.

Wittgenstein does talk about things in the world, such as slabs, for example PI 20:"Hand me a slab", "Bring him a slab", "Bring two slabs", but this can be understood in two ways.

1) As with Augustine, the word "slab" gets its meaning from referring to a slab in the world.
2) The word "slab" doesn't get its meaning from referring to a slab in the world, but instead gets its meaning from being read in context within the other words used in the text.

I can understand 1), in that language is grounded within the world, but I cannot understand 2), where language becomes self-referential without any possibility of being grounded in the world .

I agree with Wittgenstein that not all words refer to objects in the world, but I am unclear as to his position. Does he believe that no word gets its meaning from referring to an object in the world ?

At 43, he tells us that for a large class of cases, "the meaning of a word is its use in the language". — Luke

When Wittgenstein talks about "use", I am unclear whether he is referring to the word having a use in a sentence or the sentence having a use in the world.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

I can read the sentence "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" in two ways:

1) The word "five" has a meaning because it has a use within a sentence, such as "I want five apples". Even before I use the sentence "I want five apples" in the world, the word "five" has a meaning because it has a use within a sentence.

2) The word "five" has a meaning because the sentence it is within has a use in the world. For example, my saying "I want five apples", the shopkeeper hearing me, who then starts to count out five apples. If the shopkeeper doesn't hear me, and doesn't count out five apples, then as the sentence has no use in the world, the word "five" has no meaning.

Which reading is correct. Or is there another reading?

That is precisely incorrect. Consider the following: — Paine

PI 182. The criteria which we accept for 'fitting', 'being able to', 'understanding', are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their employment in the linguistic intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved—the role of these words in our language other—than we are tempted to think.

Does this cylinder C fit into this cylinder H ?

An engineer would say "Of course, I fitted it yesterday". A Professor of Linguistics would say "depends what you mean by "fit", it's a complicated question, the proper use of words, I am sure there's a definition, but we cannot depend on that, as definitions change"

PI 182 sounds more like the anti-realist linguist than the realist engineer.

To which Wittgenstein's first comment upon was: — Paine

PI 1 - Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked "five red apples". He takes the slip to the shopkeeper.................But what is the meaning of the word "five"?—No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used.

The customer walks into the shop and presents a piece of paper with the word "apple" written on it to the shopkeeper.

The word is meaningless to both the customer and shopkeeper, unless both the customer and shopkeeper are aware of a priori agreed rule that if someone walks into a shop with a slip of paper with a word written on it, then the shopkeeper must then go to a particular drawer that has the same word stencilled on the front of it, open the drawer, and then give to the customer whatever object there is in the drawer.

By itself, a single word has a meaning but no use. For example, if I walked into a room and said "apple", I would be looked at as if I were mad. The listeners would know that "apple" meant a round, edible fruit produced by an apple tree, but they would see no use in my having said it.

Similarly the word "apple" written on the slip would have a meaning but no use. It would only have a use if a priori agreed rule was in place.

The use of the word "apple" on the slip of paper is to activate a prior agreed rule. The content of the rule is independent of the word. The rule could be to open a particular drawer, or it could equally be to make an apple pie.

The interlocutor asks of Wittgenstein, "what is the meaning of the word "apple"", and Wittgenstein replies that the word has no meaning, it only has a use.

But what is the word's use?

Its use is not for the customer to be given an apple. Its use is to initiate a prior agreed rule, regardless of the consequences of the rule.

When Wittgenstein writes that words don't have meaning but only a use, this can only be interpreted as saying that the use of words is to initiate prior agreed rules regardless of the consequences of such rules.

Sure, but what is considered "real" here? Objects only or abstracted entities (like "justice" or "compassion")? These don't exist "in the world" except as notion in people's internal cognitive understanding. — schopenhauer1

Simplifying, as I understand it, words have meaning in two ways. First, meaning by description, in the sense of Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning and second, meaning by acquaintance, in the sense of Augustine's correlation of word with object.

As regards meaning by description, it is true that there are some words in language that don't refer to the world but do refer to other words in the same language. For example the word "unicorn" describes neither something existing in the world nor is described by its definition "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead", but rather replaces the words "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead".

If every word in language gained its meaning by description, language would be self-referential and unworkable. At lest some of the words in language need to gain their meaning from a correspondence or correlation with objects or events in the world, typified by the word table and the expression pain behaviour

What is real? The unicorn exists as a combination of words. As the words are real, does this mean that the unicorn is also real. Is a table real? The Indirect Realist would say that tables don't exist in the world, and the Direct Realist would say that tables do exist in the world. Both would agree that tables exist as concepts in the mind, but then again, are concepts real?

One can also make the case that ChatGPT is an extension of one's own intent. — schopenhauer1

I don't know how ChatGPT works exactly, but it seems to use statistical mapping. The parts may be copied from existing authored sources, and thereby have intentional content, but the parts may be combined statistically using historical data, which has no intentional content.

For example, Harry Guinness in the article How Does ChatGPT work?, gives his own example
Harry Guinness is a freelance writer and journalist based in Ireland. He has written for a variety of publications, including The New York Times, The Guardian, The Huffington Post, and Popular Mechanics. He covers topics ranging from technology and photography to travel and culture.
He notes that parts have been copied verbatim from his previous web sites, but the list of publications has been basically made up. As the New York Times and Guardian have been historically grouped together, ChatGPT had assumed because he had written for the New York Times, he had also written for the Guardian

As the statistical nature of ChatGPT breaks any intentionality on the part of ChatGPT, it can only be the reader who can bring intentionality to the text.

I think that the article I posited from Tomasello et al, can elucidate more on how "intentionality" and its evolution into a communal "intentionality" can help solve this — schopenhauer1

Michael Tomasello makes the point that human culture has developed from collaboration and shared intentionality rather than individual learning alone. As a believer in Enactivism, this seems highly plausible. For example, sand dunes take their form not from the wind alone, not from the sand alone, but from a dynamic interaction between the two.

The idea that Wittgenstein ignores how language-games have a use in the world seems way off the mark — Sam26

He does not ignore the fact that a language game has a use in the world. — Fooloso4

I agree 100% that Wittgenstein does not ignore the fact that the language game has a use in the world, such as teachers, pain, slabs, roses, shopkeepers, pupils, pillars, etc.

Perhaps a better wording would have been: "It seems that Wittgenstein's position is that i) words have a meaning because of their use in the language game, ii) the language game has a use in the world. He seems to ignore the fact that words also have meaning because of their use in the world".

From Wikipedia Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein is criticizing the view that the meaning of language derives from pointing out objects in the world, but rather the meaning of a word is its use in language.
Section 43 in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations reads: "For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning," it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language." Wittgenstein begins Philosophical Investigations with a quote from Augustine's Confessions, which represents the view that language serves to point out objects in the world and the view that he will be criticizing. The individual words in a language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names. In this picture of language, we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

From the IEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein has been described as a Linguistic Idealist, where language is the ultimate reality and as an Anti-Realist, someone who cannot get outside their own language in order to compare what is in their language with what is in the world.

Given the two sentences "the house is on the hill" and "the hill is on the house", each having a different meaning, what determines the correct sequence of words?

I can understand Augustine's position that we can discover the correct sequence of words by observing the world, and finding a correspondence between the words and objects in the world. We observe that the house is on the hill, and therefore the proposition "the house is on the hill" is true and the proposition "the hill is on the house" is false.

But I cannot understand the position that the meaning of a word derives from its context within the language game. How can a sentence determine the correct sequence of words within itself ?

The same was and is said of Socrates. — Fooloso4

Perhaps one advantage of science is that it does try to answer the questions it has raised.

Wittgenstein's work shows the poverty of what is here being called "theorising". There's something oddly obtuse in denouncing him for not doing something that he has shown to be an error. — Banno

If Wittgenstein is against theorising, then why did he write that the meaning of a word can be either i) its use in language or ii) what it points to.

PI 43 - For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

Or is PI 43 the interlocutor's opinion rather than Wittgenstein's?

It gets more complicated when the Wikipedia article on Philosophical Investigations writes that in the use theory of meaning, words are not defined by reference to the objects they designate. If that is the case, then PI 43 is contradictory!
Wittgenstein claims that the meaning of a word is based on how the word is understood within the language-game. A common summary of his argument is that meaning is used. According to the use theory of meaning, the words are not defined by reference to the objects they designate or by the mental representations one might associate with them, but by how they are used.

It seems strange that PI 43 would be famous, yet not something that Wittgenstein actually believed in.

In his debate with Jacques Derrida, Searle argued against Derrida's purported view that a statement can be disjoined from the original intentionality of its author, for example when no longer connected to the original author, while still being able to produce meaning. — schopenhauer1

Words have a use in the language game, and the language game has a use in the world.

Wittgenstein asks questions, but avoids trying to answer them
There are two parts to my understanding of language: i) words have a use in the language game and ii) the language game has a use in the world. Wittgenstein deals with the first part, but ignores the second. Wittgenstein is like a mountaineer who buys all the ropes, crampons, thermal weatherproof clothes and tents but then never goes to the mountain, justifying himself by saying that the actual climbing of the mountain is a meaningless pursuit. He asks endless questions without trying to draw these together into a comprehensive answer. In fact, he seems proud that he makes no attempt at theorising. Perhaps it is no surprise there is so much misunderstanding surrounding his works

As Stanley Cavell in his article The Later Wittgenstein concludes:
Both (Freud and Wittgenstein) thought of their negative soundings as revolutionary extensions of our knowledge, and both were obsessed by the idea, or fact, that they would be misunderstood -partly, doubtless, because they knew the taste of self-knowledge, that it is bitter. It will be time to blame them for taking misunderstanding by their disciples as personal betrayal when we know that the ignorance of oneself is a refusal to know.

Wittgenstein tackles the first part
As Mark Olssen describes in Wittgenstein and Foucault: The Limits and possibilities of constructivism, Wittgenstein does have a position of Relativism, an Anti-Realism, and even a Linguistic Idealism, where language is the ultimate reality. He explains events not in terms of the individual, but rather in the social constructivist terms of social, historical and cultural "forms of life".

Wittgenstein hints at the second part
Kristof Nyiri points out in Wittgenstein as a common sense Realist that Wittgenstein cannot, at the end of the day, rely on language as a justification for his actions, but rather, does what he does because of the reality of the world in which he exists. When obeying rules, as Wittgenstein writes, sometimes there can be no rational justification expressible in language, it is just what is done in the world. Such is a position of philosophical realism, where people learn about, handle and refer to physical objects within a physical world.
PI 217 If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."

Single words have no use, only sentences
A single word such as "slab" has no use, in that If I walked into a room and said "slab" people would look at me with bemusement. Only sentences can have a use, such as "Bring me a slab" or "slab!". Sentences have a meaning when they have a use, and they have a use when they result in an action, such as someone bringing me a slab or people moving out of the way of a falling slab.

Language only has a use when it changes facts in the world
Language only has a use when it changes facts in the world, such as someone bringing me a slab. When it has a use, it means something. If I say "bring me a slab", for language to have any use at all, this means that I want a slab rather than an apple. Therefore, the word "slab" must be able to differentiate between a slab in the world and an apple in the world, meaning that the word "slab" must be able to refer to a slab rather than an apple. The meaning of of the word "slab" must be able to correlate with one particular object in the world. In other words, the word "slab" must name the object slab in the world, a position of Realism. This is Realism regardless of whether the realism of that of the Direct Realist, who perceives the slab in the world, or the Indirect Realist, who perceives a picture of the slab in the world

The meaning of a text and the intentionality of the author
Derrida proposes that a sentence such as "bring me a slab" can still have meaning even if disjoined from the original intentionality of its author, the author's intention when originating the sentence. But this raises the question, does the text of a ChatGPT have meaning if the ChatGPT zombie machine had no conscious intentionality when preparing the text. One could argue that that part of the text which has been directly copied from other authors, who did have a conscious intentionality, does have meaning. However, the act of combining these parts together using rule-based algorithms cannot of itself give meaning to the whole.

As it seems that readers do find meaning in ChatGPT texts, one can only conclude that it is possible for texts disjoined from the original author to have meaning, as Derrida proposed. The meaning has come not from the writer of the text but from the reader.

That words have a use in the language game is necessary but not sufficient
Wittgenstein's meaning is use suffers from the problem of circularity. From the SEP article Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of a word is based on how the word is understood within the language game, ie, the use theory of meaning, in that words are not defined by reference to the objects they designate.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

He proposes that the meaning of a word does not come from the thing that it is naming, in that the meaning of the word "slab" does not come from a slab in the world. He suggests that we don't need a prior definition of a word in order to be able to successfully use it within the language game of the society within which we are living, but rather, the word is defined through use from "forms of life".

It seems that in the expression "meaning is use", the word "use" refers to use in the language game and not use in the world. It is here that the problem problem of circularity arises. If the meaning of a particular word is determined by its relationship with the other words within a holistic whole, yet the same is true of every other word, in that their meaning has also been determined by their relationship with the other words within a holistic whole. Within a language, if every part is relative to every other part, nothing is fixed, everything is arbitrary, and it becomes impossible to establish any meaning at all.

Conclusion
If meaning as use means use in language, then this is unworkable because of the circularity problem. If meaning as use means use in the world, then this is workable, as the only use of language is to change facts in the world. Language gets its meaning from being able to change facts in the world.

Your conclusion does not quite follow. "it would not be used as the name of a thing" – you conclude that the thing in the box doesn't have a name, when the conclusion ought be that there is no thing in the box to be named.Again, pain is not a thing! You repeatedly read the text as if it were. — Banno

Pain is not a thing
Perhaps I am missing what you are saying, but I don't understand when you say that the correct conclusion is that there is no thing in the box to be named, whether a beetle or a pain.

PI 293:Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

PI 304 "Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!"

Are you saying that Wittgenstein should be treated as a zombie having no conscious experiences, no inner sensations of pain, no beetles in his box?

The circularity of "meaning is use"
You didn't explain how to overcome the problem of circularity with "meaning is use", where the meaning of a particular word is determined by its relationship with the other words within a holistic whole. Yet the same is true of every other word, in that their meaning has also been determined by their relationship with the other words within a holistic whole.

If within a language, every part is relative to every other part, it becomes impossible to establish any meaning at all.

My belief is that the meaning of language is fixed by reference to the world, ie Realism. But if you disagree, then what does fix the meaning of language?

You might re-visit this. The remainder of the section is a rejection of that suggestion. — Banno

Words which have a use in the language game don't name the thing in the box.
PI 293 - But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all.

The meaning of a word is its use in the language game.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language

Wittgenstein writes that sentences such as "my pain is the same as his pain" make sense.
PI 253: "In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain.

There is the sentence "my X is the same as his X" and I want to find the meaning of X. I am told that the meaning of X is its use in language. If that is true, as I know how the word X has been used within the sentence, I should be able to find its meaning.

What does X mean?

You embrace a more conservative, realist-oriented reading — Joshs

Yes, Wittgenstein's proposition that the meaning of words in a language is in their use refers to their use in a world, not just their use in the language itself.

From the SEP article on Realism, there are two general aspects to Realism. First, that objects and their properties exist in the world, such as tables and squareness, Second, that such objects and properties are independent of any observer. For Realism, a world exists that is independent of any language used to describe it. For the Realist, there is a world external to the mind. However, within Realism there are different opinions as to how we perceive this world. For the Indirect Realist, we perceive a picture of a table. For the Direct Realist, we directly perceive the table.

As Hutchinson and Read write "For a word to be is for a word to be used. Language does not exist external to its use by us in the world", which is supporting the Realist position, in that they are saying that language can only exist as use in the world. If there was no world, there would be no use for language

As Joseph Rouse writes "Practices should instead be understood as comprising performances that are mutually interactive in partially shared circumstances", again supporting the Realist position, in that as the rules of language can only function in shared circumstances, which is by its nature external to the users of such a rule based language. External to the users of the language is a world .

PI 6 makes this point. Wittgenstein writes that a teacher points to an object and utters a word, such as "slab", thereby establishing an association between a word and a thing. In the mind of a child, the next time the child hears the word "slab", it may imagine a picture of a slab. But Wittgenstein is making the point that the purpose of language is not to evoke images, although this may be useful, the purpose of language is to cause someone to act in a certain way. He describes in PI 2 that in a primitive language, A calls out "slab" and B brings a slab.

What is not explained in PI 6, is how someone can learn a concept, such as the word "slab" from a single picture of a particular slab. However this does not negate the fact that Wittgenstein is specifically associating words in language with things in the world. He is not associating words in language with other words in language.

PI 6 is founded on the assumption that there is a world of objects and things, and builds on the idea that within this world, words in the language game get their meaning from how they are used in the world.

It is true that there are some words in language that don't refer to the world but do refer to other words in the same language. For example the word "unicorn" describes neither something existing in the world nor is described by its definition "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead", but rather replaces the words "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead".

It is possible to imagine a coherent language game where none of its words referred to objects or things in a world, and was totally self-referential. Within such a language game, its propositions would be objective and its truth criteria unambiguous. In Donald Davidson's words, such truth would would be "relative to a scheme". However, what would guarantee the rationality of the scheme as a whole? There would be an uncountable number of such possible language games: the language game of the non-religious atheist, the language game of the non-believer atheist, the language game of the agnostic atheist, the language game of the catholic Christian , the language game of the protestant Christian, the language game of the Eastern Orthodox Christian, etc, etc. A language game with no link to objects and things in a world would be arbitrary and meaningless.

Only the existence of a world would give a meaning to a language game, where the meaning of a word is its use in language, and the meaning of a language is its use in a world.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language

The act of “expression” (rather than “observable behavior”) is necessary as it implies that it is of me (reveals me)you can know I am in pain by inference from the context) — Antony Nickles

I could say "ouch!" or I could wince, both serve the same function in indicating to others that I am in pain. They cannot know that I am in pain, they can only believe that I am in pain.
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And, again, expression is not a “name”. — Antony Nickles

From the Wikipedia article Name, a name identifies something, a referent. A proper name identifies a specific individual human. A common name identifies a person, place or thing.

Wincing is an instinctive behaviour. Saying the word "ouch!" is a cognitive act, and as a cognitive act refers to something. As a part of language that is identifying something, it is a name.
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the interlocutor has the impulsive desire for certainty........... Wittgenstein cannot tell you an answer — Antony Nickles

In PI 281 the interlocutor asks "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?"

Yes, this is a simplistic thing to say, in that: i) There can be pain and no pain behaviour, ii) there can be pain with pain behaviour, iii) there can be no pain and no pain behaviour and iv) there can be no pain and pain behaviour

However, Wittgenstein does make the specific statement in PI 304 "Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!". Even though pain may drop out of consideration in the language game, the pain can still exist within the individual.
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We want science to solve philosophy, but they are like two separate worlds, and what Wittgenstein is doing (his method) is not empiricism or statistics or an experiment. The result is not facts or theories, its to change you...(He is more often asking you to imagine something or being cryptic to force you to see something for yourself—he is not arguing for a conclusion.) — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein is doing what any scientist would start by doing, he starts by asking questions:
PI 281 "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?"
PI 282 - "But in a fairy tale the pot too can see and hear!" (Certainly; but it can also talk.)
PI 283 - What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel?
PI 284 - Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations.—One says to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing?

The scientist would also start by asking:
What is the universe made of?
How did life begin? ...
Are we alone in the universe? ...
What makes us human? ...

But what Wittgenstein doesn't do is the harder part, trying to discover a theory that gives a coherent answer to all these questions. He is not trying to discover that e = mc2.

Anyone can ask questions, what is more difficult is coming up with answers.
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Taking out the focus on my difference is to show that the owning is the important part about pain. Part of this process would be to ask yourself why you are fixated on our singularity? — Antony Nickles

As Wittgenstein writes in PI 253 "Another person can't have my pains."The word "pain" is a singular thing, having the four letters p, a, i and n. But the concept that it refers to is not a singular thing. My concept of pain is different to yours, my pain is different to yours, my pain yesterday is different to my pain today, and my concept of pain yesterday is different to my concept of pain today. Only as the word "pain" is it a singular thing.
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One realization of its failure is that our lives are essentially shared; that, yes, it is possible to have a personal even ineffable experience (alone with a sunset) — Antony Nickles

Yes, humans are individuals and generally live in a community of others. However, humans can equally live as individuals independent of any surrounding community, and can also live as part of the surrounding community. The one doesn't preclude the other.
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So yes, pain is not a “thing” (like color is not), but what he is saying is that it nevertheless is important (thus, not “nothing”); it just matters in different ways; we care (or not) about the pain being “had” by this person; it is that pain is expressed by a person, that it expresses them, that they matter. It is not a matter of knowledge, but interest. — Antony Nickles

My sensation, my beetle, can be different to your sensation, your beetle. My sensation is something, it is not a nothing. Your sensation is something, it is not a nothing.

PI 293 —Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

As my something is different to your something, it is true to say that there is not one something but many. It is also true to say that our somethings are not a nothing either, which is why he writes

“PI 304 Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!”
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It is not that they are “joking”; it only makes sense as a “joke” (you are to imagine the context in which it is a joke)—we would never otherwise say “I know I am in pain” because pain is not known (other than in the sense of knowing as being sure, as in “I am certain I am in pain and that it’s not indigestion”) — Antony Nickles

PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?
I translate this as "only as a joke would I say that I know I am in pain".

If this sentence is referring to my thoughts, then this is true, as the thought I know I am in pain means no more than I am in pain'. As you say"we would never otherwise say “I know I am in pain” because pain is not known"

If the sentence is referring to my words, then this is false, as the words "I know I am in pain" does have a different meaning to "I am in pain". As you say “I am certain I am in pain and that it’s not indigestion”.

Therefore, as the only way that this would be a joke is if I am referring to my thoughts, then PI 246 is referring to my thoughts, not my words.
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Wittgenstein is not “countering” solipsism, but getting at the desire for it, and the desire to “solve” it. — Antony Nickles

In forcing us to better understand the language we use, and misuse, although he may not have been deliberately intending it, Wittgenstein did come up with a new Theory of Language, the Language Game. In the sense that a theory is, according the Oxford Languages, "a supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain something, especially one based on general principles independent of the thing to be explained", in his desire to solve the problem of solipsism, he did come up with a theory countering solipsism.
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Language does not follow rules................Wittgenstein is not looking at rule-following to explain language — Antony Nickles

From the John Searle & Bryan Magee conversation 1987, language is rule governed. As for Wittgenstein, rules cannot be private, language must be public. Language is not bounded by rules, as rules can be interpreted in different ways. There are no rules for the rules. Forms of life determine meaning. Use determines meaning. We act in a primitive way, not from some great theory.

From Wikipedia Language Game (Philosophy), Wittgenstein argued that the meaning in language depends on rules.
A language-game (German: Sprachspiel) is a philosophical concept developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, referring to simple examples of language use and the actions into which the language is woven. Wittgenstein argued that a word or even a sentence has meaning only as a result of the "rule" of the "game" being played. Depending on the context, for example, the utterance "Water!" could be an order, the answer to a question, or some other form of communication.

Oxford Languages defines a rule as "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity." To say that the language game is rule-governed is not to say that such rules are rigid, known and unchanging
PI 102 The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background—hidden in the medium of the understanding. I already see them (even though through a medium)

Wittgenstein says that the rules of language are like the rules of chess, in that the rules of chess don't describe the physical properties of the chess pieces, but rather describe what the pieces do. Similarly, in language, the rules don't describe the words but do describe how the words are used.
PI 108 - But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties. The question "What is a word really?" is analogous to "What is a piece in chess?"

I agree in the main with what you are saying about Wittgenstein, and only on a few points could I quibble.

Again, Ouch! is not a name for a thing (an object—“something inside us”), it is an expression of my being in pain (an externalization). — Antony Nickles

Agree. "Ouch!" is a name for an observable behaviour. As pain is not observable, if there was no observable pain behaviour, then there could be no word "pain" in the language game.
PI 304 - "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it?

And to say pain is “caused by something inside us” is just a physiological fact..........................that is philosophically unimportant and confusing because it appears to bring up issues of causation and determinism, etc. — Antony Nickles

With this, I disagree. The issues of causation and determinism are important philosophical topics. In the present, there are certain facts in the world. In the past there were different facts in the world. It is a philosophical question to ask why are the facts in the world today are as they are rather than different to what they are. The concepts of causation, determination as well as the Principle of Sufficient Reason may be used to tackle this metaphysical problem.
PI 169: But why do you say that we felt a causal connexion? Causation is surely something established by experiments, by observing a regular concomitance of events for example. So how could I say that I felt something which is established by experiment?

It is the interlocutor (not Wittgenstein) that is asking a question based on their desire to separate pain and the expression of pain (see #245). They are trying to force Wittgenstein into admitting a behavioral conclusion that without expression there is no pain — Antony Nickles

It is clear in PI 281 that it is the interlocutor that is asking"But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?", but after all, the interlocutor is part of Wittgenstein's imagination, and is putting forward ideas that Wittgenstein considers important. Wittgenstein does conclude that there is a difference between pain and pain behaviour, where he describes that even though the private sensation of pain may drop out of consideration in the language game, pain does not drop out as a private sensation.
PI 304 Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!

But the way pain works is not in my knowing my pain, it is in my having my pain — Antony Nickles

There are two aspects, the private and the public. As regards the private aspect, the thought "know" in "I know I am in pain" is redundant, as this means no more than the thought "I am in pain". As regards the public aspect, the word "know" in "I know I am in pain" isn't redundant, as the expression "I know I am in pain" does have a different meaning to "I am in pain"
PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

His point is that the word (a description, etc.) are expressions, just like a cry is an expression, different entirely from a referent to an object (“reality”). — Antony Nickles

Yes, as in PI 293, the Beetle in the Box analogy, the object, the pain, drops out of consideration in the language game.
PI 293: That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

But as Wittgenstein points out, the way our lives work, we don’t know another’s pain...but the points Wittgenstein makes are that our language and ability to express ourselves have a shared depth and so possibility of reaching all the way into each other — Antony Nickles

Yes, we can talk about pain in the language game, even though no one else can know my pain and I cannot know theirs. Wittgenstein is trying to find a means of countering Cartesian solipsism, the separation of mind from world, through language. In part successful, in that the beetle does drop out of consideration in the language game, but in part unsuccessful, in that there still remains the problem that I can still not know another's beetle and they can still not know mine
PI 293 Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

All that to say that traditional philosophy wants to place “intention” before action, or tie “meaning” to speaking — Antony Nickles

Yes, you are on the road to answering my previous question. As the tortoise said to Achilles,
where is the rule that we must follow a rule. A child learns the rules of the language game, but how does the child know that there are rules to follow. In Wittgenstein's terms, the answer is in the "primitive", in Chomsky's terms, the answer is in the innate, and in Kant's terms, the answer is in the a priori. Wittgenstein bases his argument against a Private Language in part of the impossibility of developing private language rules, yet the same problem attaches to a language game based on rules. Where is the rule that there are rules.
PI 5: A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training.

You are pissing upwind, my friend. — Banno

A sentence full of metaphorical meaning. Yet the problem is, how do I actually use such knowledge. I know what you mean, but making practical use of such advice is a lot more difficult. :grin:

It is the exclamation itself that is a noun, as an event, not as a name for (referent for) “the pain” (some object inside us) — Antony Nickles

I agree that the exclamation "ouch!" is not a name for the pain inside us, but rather, is the name for an observable pain-behaviour that has been caused by something inside us.

Wittgenstein refers to the difference between pain and pain-behaviour:
PI 281 - "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?"

And the word is not a replacement for a “picture” (whatever we would imagine when we hear it I suppose you to mean); it is a replacement for the wordless expression, the wince, the cry, the clear attempt at repression, etc. — Antony Nickles

An Indirect Realist would say that the word is a replacement for a picture of the wince or cry. A Direct Realist would say that the word is a replacement for the wince or cry.

This way of looking at pain as word-object is created to avoid the real way pain matters between me and to you (how it works)—that it is I that is in pain (I am the one; I don’t know pain, I have it) and you either acknowledge me (say, come to my aid) or ignore me, reject me (say I’m faking). — Antony Nickles

Yes, how does an observer know whether when someone is exhibiting pain-behaviour, that they are actually in pain. An actor on the stage may exhibit pain-behaviour without actually experiencing pain.

PI 304 - "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it.

but isn't it the case that a single word may have a meaning but no use? — RussellA

"Ouch!"; "Hello"; "Fire!". No. — Banno

"Ouch!" and "fire!" are not single words. As exclamations, they are complete sentences. "Ouch" and "fire" are single words.

If I walked into a room and said "ouch" or "fire", people would look at me with bemusement. If I walked into a room and said" ouch!" or "fire!, people would act, either commiserate with me or start running.

"Ouch" and "fire" as single words have meaning but no use in the language game. "Ouch!" and "fire!" as complete sentences have both meaning and use in the language game.

If I walked into a room and said "no", people would again look at me with bemusement, as the word has meaning but no use.

When walking into a room, the word "hello" is being used as an exclamation, where the exclamation mark is assumed, and as an exclamation is not a single word.

What I disagree with is your assertion that "ouch" is a noun and/or the name of a behaviour — Luke

I am sure that "ouch!" is a noun and/or the name of a behaviour. If somewhere along the line I wrote "ouch", without the exclamation mark, this was a mistyping.