Kantian epistemology — Mww
The impossibility of imagining something that cannot be imagined
Kant's proposal of a priori pure intuitions is at the core of my philosophical beliefs. Although Kant in
Critique of Pure Reason only specifically mentioned space, time and objects, in my opinion, other concepts can be included a priori. For example, the colour red, a bitter taste, an acrid smell, a velvety touch and a grating noise.
A26, A33 - "Space and time are merely the forms of our sensible intuition of objects. They are not beings that exist independently of our intuition (things in themselves), nor are they properties of, nor relations among, such beings"
A239 - "We can only cognize objects that we can, in principle, intuit. Consequently, we can only cognize objects in space and time, appearances. We cannot cognize things in themselves".
IE, such a priori pure intuitions, concepts, explains to me how the mind relates to that which is outside the mind.
I can imagine zero dimension, but not no dimensions
I can imagine a cube of 1cm sides. I can imagine a cube of 1mm sides. I can imagine a cube having sides of zero dimension. But I can only imagine this cube of zero dimensions within my ordinary everyday space of tables, chairs, etc. For the mind to be able to imagine no space would be as if the mind could imagine not existing, as the concept of space is a fundamental building block from which the mind is constructed.
Colour as a tractable example
As regards colour, my position is that of eliminativist projectivist, where we project a colour, which is purely a mental phenomena, onto objects in our environment. A post-box isn't red, but emits light at a wavelength of 700nm which the mind interprets as the colour red. Stephen Palmer wrote in 1999 "colour is a psychological property of our visual experiences when we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects and lights". In a similar fashion, the concept of space is a mental phenomena which the mind projects onto what it perceives as an outside world.
Galileo, for example, thought that physical science had shown that objects are not really coloured, but inside the mind.
For the mind to be able to imagine no space, would be as if a person born colour blind
could experience the colour red by being described it by others, even allowing for the possibility of an "inverted spectrum".
Kant postulated that the mind intuits sensory experience which it processes in the faculty of understanding in order to produce an ordered predictable world, Consequently, we must already have knowledge of what space and time are in order to recognize the intuition of time and space. Similarly, we must already have knowledge of the colour red in order to recognize the intuition of the colour red.
As with the question, do objects in the world have the property of colour that the mind perceives them to have or is the property only a mental phenomenon. Is what the mind perceives as "space" a property of what is external to the the mind or a property only of an internal mental phenomenon.
As in order to be conscious of the colour red we must have an a priori innate ability to
be conscious of the colour red, in order to be conscious of space and time we must have an a priori innate ability to be conscious of space and time.
Synergism of the brain with the world through evolution
The mind today, ie, the brain, is the product of 3.7 billion years of evolution within the world. The Synergism Hypothesis of 1983 addressed the evolution of cooperative phenomena in nature and increased complexity in living systems. I am not saying that space and time don't exist, but that the mind is not directly aware of space and time. What the mind perceives as space and time is a projection by the mind of innate concepts that have evolved over billions of years onto sense impressions it receives through sight, sound, etc. As the concepts of space and time are an innate part of the mind, it is beyond the ability of the mind to imagine their non-existence.
The mind is not separate to a priori pure intuitions, the mind "is" a priori pure intuitions
As the concept of space and time is an innate physical part of the structure of the brain, it would as impossible for the brain to imagine the non-existence of space and time as it would be for the brain to imagine the non-existence of pain when touching a hot stove.
As it would be impossible for the mind to think about what it would be like to not think, it would be impossible for the brain to contemplate the non-existence of space and time, as the concept of space and time is innate within the brain, and a part of the physical structure of the brain.
The brain is not separate to its innate a priori concepts - space, time,etc - rather, the brain "is" its innate a priori concepts, and therefore cannot contemplate the non-existence of something that makes up its very nature.