the question of existence of a "whole" — Metaphysician Undercover

We are faced with the insolvable problem of how the mind can know things that exist independently of the existence of the mind.

Paraphrasing Kant as regards a priori pure intuitions, we can imagine the concept of empty space, but we cannot imagine the concept of there being no space.

As Kant wrote in Critique of Pure Reason, "Space and time are merely the forms of our sensible intuition of objects. They are not beings that exist independently of our intuition (things in themselves), nor are they properties of, nor relations among, such beings". (A26, A33)

solar system — Metaphysician Undercover

Taking the (solar system) as a thing, do things have an ontological existence ? There are two parts to this question, Whether it has an ontological existence in the mind and whether it has an ontological existence in the world independent of any mind.

The "solar system" in the mind
I agree that in the mind, the "solar system" is a concept, and because a concept "then it is fundamentally a unity". I also agree with "but I do not see how a concept is divisible". I think of the concept "solar system" as a "simples", a whole that cannot be divided into parts, although can be linked with other concepts, such as eight - planets - moons - orbit - around - the sun.

The solar system in the world
However, if there was no mind to observe the world, would the solar system ontologically exist in the world ? As Berkeley wrote: "to be is to be perceived" and "The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden... no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them." There is a basic conundrum in asking whether a solar system can exist independently of a mind when the concept "solar system" is dependent on the existence of the mind. The definition in the Cambridge Dictionary for "to exist" ends up being circular, but links to the following words - real - imagination - fact - proof - information - true. I continue with my pen and Eiffel Tower analogy that things don't ontologically exist in the world outside the mind because there is no information within any of the parts that links it to a whole.

The word "whole"
There is a world of matter, energy, space and time, in which there are parts and wholes. However, it is possible to refer to a whole as a set of parts without giving the word "whole" an ontological status. The status of the set is open to debate. On the one hand, Aristotle in Metaphysics wrote: “In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts, there is a cause; for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality. On the other hand, Eubulides used mathematical induction to show that a heap of sand cannot exist, in that i) A single grain of sand is not a heap. ii) If n grains do not make a heap, adding one grain doesn’t create a heap.
IE, the word "whole" does not of necessity have an ontological status.

Summary
IE, I agree that the "solar system" as a concept in the mind is a whole, a unity, and not divisible, but as regards the solar system in a world independent of any mind, the solar system is a whole (in the sense of a set or collection) that has parts that are spatially seperated.

wholes and parts — Metaphysician Undercover

metaphysician - names
I agree. When we observe, for example, a post-box, we can know two different things at the same time. We know that we are observing a particular red (700nm), and we also know that we are observing an abstract "redness" (620nm to 750nm).

metaphysician - use of "simple"
I am trying to use the word "simple" as used in mereology, where a "simple" is any thing that has no proper parts.

metaphysician - all things have an ontological status - the true identity is within the thing itself - what is referred to by "relation" does not have an ontological existence

If in the world there is a thing that has an ontological status, then the whole thing has parts that are spatially separated.

If a thing such as a "table" can be composed of parts such as a flat top and legs, then a "peffel" can be composed of the parts my pen and the Eiffel Tower and a "pegal" can be composed of my pen and the galaxy Andromeda.

If "table" has an ontological existence in the world, then there is no logical reason why not also the "peffel" and "pegal".

However, there is no information within my pen that it is linked in some way with the Eiffel Tower. There is no information within the Eiffel Tower that it is linked to my pen. There is no information within the physical space between them that there is a pen at one end and an Eiffel Tower at the other.

As I am not aware of any mechanism in the world that links my pen to the Eiffel Tower, apart from an all-knowing god, my belief is that things such as "tables", "peffels" and "pegals" don't ontologically exist in the world, but only in the mind as concepts

IE , for these reasons, although I believe that in the world are atoms and physical space, my belief is that neither things such as "tables" nor "relations" have an ontological existence in the world outside my mind.

"language games" — Banno

language games — Metaphysician Undercover

I am going out on a limb here, but hopefully sensibly reasoned.

I cannot know the meaning of a word through its use in language
Wittgenstein wrote in para 43 of Philosophical Investigations "the meaning of a word is in its use in language" and para 220 "Let the use of words teach you their meaning". If this were true, we would have known the meaning of the Ancient Egyptian in the Rosetta Stone by solely reading the text. It seems clear that we can understand a simple concrete word, such as "dog", by observation of the world, where we associate the observed picture of a dog with the public name "dog". It is also clear that it would be difficult to learn the meaning of a complex abstract word, such as Zeitgeist, through direct observation of pictures in the world.
IE, we can only learn the meaning of a new word as long as the words we use, needed in order to learn the new word, must sooner or later be simple concrete words whose meaning is clear to us by observation of pictures in the world.

Banno - we can set out parts of our use of language without having to set out the whole
As Wittgenstein wrote in para 21, language games is not just language - "Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language game. No doubt the tone of voice and the look with which they are uttered, and much else besides, will also be different." There is a difference in meaning between a part of a proposition and a simple. For example, if I say "the sun is warm" in a particular tone of voice, then there are three simples - "the sun" + a particular tone of voice + "is warm".
IE, even the simple (a particular tone of voice) has no meaning unless it is related to another simples.

Banno - "beliefs range over propositions"
There is the whole and the parts, and in mereology the parts are "simples". Consider the statement "I believe that the sun is warm", where "the sun is warm" is a proposition. I cannot have a belief in a simple, such as "the sun". Only a combination of simples has meaning. I can only have belief in a combination of simples, such as "the sun is warm", where one simple has a relation with another simple. For example, pre-langauge, a sentient being when looking at a yellow circle in the sky, the circle, being a simple held no meaning. There was only meaning to the sentient being in the combination of simples, in the combination of the simples "circle" and "warmth". With-language, there is the additional meaning, in that the simples "circle" is combined with the linguistic simples, the word "sun".
IE, within a proposition there cannot be belief in a simple but in the set of simples within the proposition

It is true that simples can be split into further simples
As a simple, "the sun" has no meaning. But the sun can be split into the further simples - the star - around which - the earth - orbits. Each of these can be split into further simples, until, in my opinion, we arrive at Kant's a priori pure intuitions.
IE, it remains true that a "simple" has no meaning.

Banno - words are connected using more than logical operators
Pre-language, there is the relation between the simples circle and warmth, where the connection is not that of a logical operator but that of empirical observation. With-language, where the circle is named "the sun", the connection between the empirical observation of a circle and the word "the sun" is not that of a logical operator, but as the word is learnt in a social environment, is also that of empirical observation.
IE, words are connected by correspondence with empirical observations.

metaphysician - relations between parts must exist independently of the observer
If this as the case, then the relation between any two things in the world has an ontological existence. For example, this would mean that the relation between the pen in my pocket and the Eiffel tower has an ontological existence, meaning that they form a unique object, which could be called a "peffel". This would mean that in the world are an almost infinite number of objects in the world of which we are aware of only a minute proportion.
IE, it would also follow that in Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit picture, it is not that different observers have different interpretations, but that both the duck picture and rabbit picture actually exist in the world independent of the observer.

Summary
1) The meaning of a proposition such as "the sun is warm" is not in any of its simples - "the sun", "warm", but the combination of its simples.
2) These simples are themselves sets of other simples, in that the simple "sun" is the set of the simples "the star", "around which", "the earth" and "orbits".
3) Eventually we arrive at foundational simples, which I describe as Kant's a priori pure intuitions, such as time, space, causation, etc.
4) As Kant wrote in Critique of Pure Reason, A239: "We can only cognize objects that we can, in principle, intuit. Consequently, we can only cognize objects in space and time, appearances. We cannot cognize things in themselves".
5) IE, those things we observe in the world are only combinations of things for which we have prior knowledge.
6) IE, the meaning of a word is not in its use in language, but in that set of a priori pure intuitions from which it is composed.

If language games were real — Metaphysician Undercover

As Wittgensein's language game is a model for ordinary language rather than a literal reproduction of it, the term "hinge proposition" has a different meaning within the language game and ordinary language. Therefore, the term "hinge proposition" as used in the language game cannot be shown to be incorrect by reference to ordinary language.

I agree with what you say as regards rules and hinge propositions within ordinary language - but Wittgenstein's "language game" is a different thing altogether.

Wittgenstein's "language game"

Whereas Bertrand Russell dismissed ordinary language as being of little philosophical significance and too confused to be able to solve metaphysical and epistemological problems, Wittgenstein proposed that philosophy was in trouble because it tried to use words in too abstract a manner. IE, outside the common usage of ordinary language within a community of language users.

The truth or falsity of the whole and its parts

If I make the statement "the apple is on the table", and there isn't an apple on the table, then the statement is false. But because the whole statement is false, it does not follow that the individual parts of the statement are false. IE, because "the apple is on the table" is false it does not logically follow that "the apple" is false

If the statement "The sun is 150 million km distance from the earth and the sun revolves around the earth" does not correspond with the world, then the statement is false. However, even if the statement is false, it does not logically follow that the "hinge proposition" "the sun revolves around the earth" is false.

If a statement is false, such as "The sun is 150 million km distance from the earth and the sun revolves around the earth", it is the relationship between the parts of the statement that is false, not the individual parts.

Do relationships of parts ontologically exist in the world or the mind

Example one. When considering the duck-rabbit in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation page 194, even though each person is looking at the same picture, the same physical object in the picture, they may arrive at different interpretations. One person may unambiguously see a duck and another may unambiguously see a rabbit. They have perceived different relationships between the same parts.
Example two. Even when looking at four objects, there are 32 possible relationships between them.

Given a statement, the meaning of the whole is a function of how the parts are combined. The parts may be combined in different ways. This means that dependent on how the parts of a statement are combined, the meaning of the whole changes. This raises the question - do these possible combinations exist independent of the observer, or only in the mind of the observer. The Platonist would say that they exist as universals in a transcendent world of pure forms. The mereological nihilist would say that relations between part and whole don't exist in the world. The conceptualist would say that these relations only exist in the mind, either as mental representations or as abstract objects.

Do different language games originate in the world or in the mind

If the relationships between the parts exist independently of the observer, and the observer unambiguously sees a rabbit, then there are several possible language games, of which the observer is only aware of one. If the relationship between the parts only exist within the mind of the observer, and the observer unambiguously sees a duck, then there is only one possible language game.

The question as to whether language games exist in the world independently of the observer or only exist within the mind of the observer depends on whether relations between parts ontologically exist in the world or only in the mind of the observer.

Summary

IE, as the language game is only a model of ordinary language, and not a literal representation, the concept of a hinge proposition exempt from doubt remains of value in the insights it gives about ordinary language.

Where? — Banno

Your post gets to the core of my continuing problem with Wittgenstein's language game, illustrated by the fact that whilst we both understand the phrase "where?" and how it is used within its context, I understood the phrase as a statement, whereas I believe you understood the phrase as a question.

If the same phrase fulfils several language games, which language game should be used

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein argues that I should know even without clues external to the text, such as tone of voice or expression of face (para 21 of Philosophical Investigations)

It is not as if I can guess, as Wittgenstein makes clear that whilst a beginner may guess (para 156), or someone coming into a strange country (para 32), one cannot guess how a word functions, one has to look at its use and learn from that (para 340)

Wittgenstein discusses ambiguity of perception as regards the duck-rabbit (page 194). He writes that when shown a picture he reports his perception that he unambiguously sees a rabbit. Yet on another occasion he may well have unambiguously seen a duck. I cannot find in PI any mechanism whereby if the same perception can be explained by more than one language game, then which language game should be used.

I find Wittgenstein's transcendental argument unpersuasive, in that as the meaning of a word is its use in the language (para 43, para 220), in order to discover the meaning of a word I must first use it in language, but I cannot use it unless I know its meaning.

Wittgenstein also offers no explanation of the process whereby one finds the right word not by judgement but through inspiration: "At last a word comes: That's it!" (page 218)

IE, similar to Grayling's problem in Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Certainty, where the foundationalism of Wittgenstein's language game is undermined by the relativism between alternate language games.

Where? — Banno

It looks as if I made an assumption that has turned out incorrect.

I took the passage from www.newworldencyclopedia.org: "Thus, Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of the term or concept is highly contextualized; two different contexts, be it a theory or a culture, can be incommensurable although they may present a loose similarity." New World Encyclopedia is an offshoot of Wikipedia for teachers and students.

The first statement
I think that the first part of what I wrote is correct: "Wittgenstein wrote that as the meaning of a term or concept is highly contextualised.............."

Context is defined as the circumstances that form the setting for an event, statement, or idea, and in terms of which it can be fully understood.

In para 21, Wittgenstein wrote "Imagine a language-game in which A asks and B reports the number of slabs or blocks in a pile, or the colours and shapes of the building-stones that are stacked in such-and-such a place.—Such a report might run: "Five slabs". Now what is the difference between the report or statement "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"?—Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language game. No doubt the tone of voice and the look with which they are uttered, and much else besides, will also be different. But we could also imagine the tone's being the same—for an order and a report can be spoken in a variety of tones of voice and with various expressions of face—the difference being only in the application."

In para 43, "For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."

IE, meaning is in use, and use is in a context.

The second statement
However - I am having difficulty justifying the word "incommensurable" within the quote.

The definition of incommensurable is - i) not able to be judged by the same standards - ii) having no common standard of measurement. For example, the beliefs of the atheist and the theist are incommensurable.

Starting with para 21, the term "five-slabs" could be being used either as a report or a statement.
Even if there are no clues in the speaker's tone of voice, the difference is only within the application. As in para 43: "the meaning of a word is its use in language". For example, if used on site, five-slabs would be a statement, whereas if used in the office it would be a report.

As regards the word incommensurability, this means that there are different standards for judging the meaning of five-slabs - one on site and one in the office. However, for Wittgenstein, there is only one standard for knowing the meaning of five-slabs, and therefore the word incommensurable is not appropriate. Perhaps a better word than "incommensurability" would have been "different".

Then how does Wittgenstein explain how one knows the correct meaning of five-slabs ?
In para 68 - "For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a
game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No."
In para 138 - "But we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp
it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!"
In para 220 - "Let the use of words teach you their meaning. (Similarly one can often say in mathematics: let the proof teach you what was being proved.)"
In para 692 - "But now the problem is: how are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such?—The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and algebra, and that he taught someone"
On page 218 - he writes - "How do I find the 'right' word? How do I choose among words?........But I do not always have to make judgments, give explanations; often I might only say: "It simply isn't right yet". I am dissatisfied, I go on looking. At last a word comes: "That's it!"

Wittgenstein seems to be using the transcendental argument, in that we don't judge the meaning of a word, the use of the word teaches us the meaning. But this seems chicken and egg - in that how can I use a word if I don't know its meaning.

Conclusion
In summary, the term "incommensurabity" seems wrong, whereas "different" may have been better.

language is not a game consisting of rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

In linguistics, syntax is the set of rules, principles, and processes that govern the structure of sentences (sentence structure) in a given language, usually including word order.

incommensurability of language games — Banno

I believe that incommensurability is in large part a mereological problem of relationships
Wittgenstein wrote that as the meaning of a term or concept is highly contextualised, two different contexts - whether a theory or culture - can be incommensurable even though they present a loose similarity.

Person A observes the world and has a strong belief that there is a god. Having a strong belief they invent the hinge proposition "there is a god", which becomes part of their language game. Person B observes the same world, and has a strong belief that there is no god. Having a strong belief they invent the hinge proposition "there is no god", which becomes part of their language game.

Persons A and B in observing the same world may have observed the same objects, but for a finite number of objects there are almost an infinite number of relationships between them. This is the mereological fact that even for 4 objects there are 32 possible relationships. Person A's belief is founded on the objects they see and a particular set of relationships between those objects. Person B's belief is founded on the same objects but a different set of relationships between those objects, as it is statistically highly unlikely that the relationships Person A chooses will be the same relationships Person B chooses.

Once Persons A and B have invented their different personal hinge propositions, these hinge propositions become part of the logical form of their private language games.

Banno wrote - (hinge propositions) "And being part of the logical form of the system (the language game) they are not subject to falsification by observation alone". Therefore , even if Person A points out to Person B those particular relationships they have based their own beliefs on, as Person B's beliefs have become part of the logical form of their private language game, it is unlikely that Person B can be persuaded by observation alone.

IE, once a person's beliefs have become part of the logical structure of their language game,
they become highly immovable to persuasion by observation alone.

literal description rather than a metaphor. — Metaphysician Undercover

Language game is a metaphor for having rules, and rules are needed in order to cope with the raging white-water confusion of the world. People literally need some kind of bedrock, some set of working assumptions, axioms, rules, hinge propositions, etc.

some hinges are not only doubted, they are rejected as false — Fooloso4

As I see it, hinge propositions are inventions and therefore knowable without reference to the world. They are true by definition and therefore exempt from doubt.

Suppose language game A including the hinge proposition "the earth existed before I was born" was replaced at a later time by language game B including the hinge proposition ""the earth did not exist before I was born". As hinge propositions are true by definition, true without reference to the world and exempt from doubt, the previous hinge proposition "the earth existed before I was born" remains true.

Propositions are only contradictory with reference to the world, and as hinge propositions are true without reference to the world, hinge propositions cannot be contradictory

IE, even if language games change, the hinge propositions within them remain true in an analytic rather than synthetic sense and therefore cannot be rejected as false.

we cannot say that the hinge propositions of any particular language game are beyond doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree - as Grayling wrote in section III "As OC stands, it stands defeated"

The proposed hinge propositions are subject matter, content, and therefore need to be doubted — Metaphysician Undercover

To my understanding, within a particular Wittgensteinian language game are beliefs, foundational beliefs and the logic that ties them together. Wittgensteinian foundational beliefs are now referred to as "hinge propositions".

When Wittgenstein writes in OC341 - "That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.", I read this as a performative statement about the nature of hinge propositions rather than an empirical discovery about the world. He is creating some propositions to be exempt from doubt, rather than in looking at the world he has discovered some propositions that are exempt from doubt.

That is, the hinge proposition "the earth existed before I was born" is not open to doubt, as it is part of the logical framework of the language game, and is a logical statement, whereas the proposition "the earth existed before I was born" is open to doubt, as it is a belief.

A hinge proposition is analytic, in the same sense as "all bachelors are unmarried" is analytic.

For Wittgenstein, a language game is internally logically coherent, and therefore is a foundationalist refutation to scepticism.

However, the problem remains that there can be any number of internally logically coherent language games, and the sceptic may rightly ask for justification why a particular language game corresponds to an external reality.

IE, "hinge propositions" are part of the logical form of the system and not part of the content.

The sceptic here takes the ideas of 'direct knowledge' and 'justification' for granted. — j0e

Grayling points out the two types of scepticism: scepticism within the foundationalism of OC1 and scepticism within the relativism of OC2

One important aspect of the difference between Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of philosophy, is their opposite attitudes towards linguistic diversity — link

When an author uses a critical word that they know can be interpreted in more than one way, then, as a general principle, they should somehow make it clear to the reader in what sense they are using it - unless they are a poet.

what is missing from their knowledge that justifies doubting it? — Fooloso4

If someone says "I see a post-box, and it exists in a world external to me", the sceptic is justified in asking the speaker, first, how they know there is an external world, and second, how they know there is a post-box in this external world. What is missing from the speaker's knowledge is evidence for their belief.

One's belief may be false, not so one's knowledge. — Banno

Introduction
The truth of the statement "One's belief may be false, not so one's knowledge" depends on the meaning of "knowledge". The nature of knowledge has been discussed since at least Plato, so I don't think I will be able to resolve the matter in this post.

Knowing and believing
I am trying to keep my use of the words "knowledge" and "belief" within a framework, whereby a sentient being pre-language knows internal consciousness , knows external observations and believes external possibilities. A sentient being with language knows internal consciousness, believes external observations and believes external possibilities.

One advantage of a sentient being with language only believing in external observations rather than knowing them is possibly an answer to Russell's problem of how to think about non-existent things - a problem approached by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus regarding possible worlds.

Different theories of knowledge
Whether knowledge can be false depends on the definition of knowledge, as there are different defintions as to what knowledge is.

For example, there is internal knowledge. There is knowledge of a skill or ability, such as "I know how to play football". There is knowledge of one's own consciousness, such as "I know pain"

There is external knowledge. There is knowledge by acquaintance, such as "I know there is a tree in the garden". There is knowledge by proposition, such as "I know the Eiffel Tower is in Paris".

I cannot doubt internal knowledge, but I can doubt external knowledge.

It is possible to have different types of knowledge at the same time. For example, when looking at a post-box, I know the proposition "red light has a wavelength of between 620nm and 750nm", I know that I am looking at a post-box and I know my conscious experience of a particular colour

Wittgenstein and knowing
Wittgenstein in On Certainty was concerned with excluding doubt in his refutation of scepticism - OC 341. "That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn."

However, in order to exclue doubt, one must also exclude knowing - OC354 "Doubting and non-doubting behaviour. There is the first only if there is the second"

As Grayling wrote - i) "The well-known, and persuasive, central tenet of OC is its view that claims to knowledge only make sense where the possibility of doubt exists." - ii) "His contribution is to insist on the internal connection between the concepts of knowing and doubting. "

For this reason, Wittgenstein argued against Moore when Moore said "Here is one hand", "How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case!"

For Wittgenstein, the word "know" is only an assurance - OC21. Moore's view really comes down to this: the concept 'know' is analogous to the concepts 'believe', 'surmise', 'doubt', 'be convinced' in that the statement "I know..." can't be a mistake.

For Wittgenstein, Moore should have argued from "here is one hand" rather than "I know that here is one hand"

IE, For Wittgenstein, it is not the case that knowledge cannot be doubted, but that knowledge is only an assurance, and as such can be doubted.

Justified true belief
Since Plato, knowledge has been defined as justified true belief. If the three conditions of justification, truth and belief are met for a given claim, then we have knowledge of that claim.

However, in 1963 Gettier argued that, by giving counter-examples, whilst an individual can have a JTB, the individual may still fail to know it because the reasons for the belief, whilst justified, turn out to be false.

There are different solutions to the Gettier problem. Some look for a fourth condition, others look to replace "justification" with something else. As yet, no definitive solution has been agreed upon.

Summary
As some kinds of knowledge may be doubted, there remains an overlap between knowledge and belief, in that the statement "I know that the post-box is red" overlaps with the statement "I believe that the post-box is red"

eventually you will positively be able to answer whether or not someone’s conscious experience of 750 nm is the same as anyone else’s. — khaled

The enclosed article may do a better job of what I am trying to say.
https://www.uh.edu/engines/epi3161.htm

So which is it? — Fooloso4

The problem with the English language is that many of its' words have several meanings, such as the word "know". Context does not always make it clear which meaning is intended. Life would a lot easier if each meaning of the word "know" had its own individual sub-word. Though that would meaning a lot more words.

Are you claiming to be unable to distinguish a hand waved by Shrek from one waived by Moore? — Banno

Whilst watching TV, I see a figure waving a hand. As the figure has a green face, I know it is more likely to be Shrek than Moore.

However, the sceptic would be justified in pointing out that my TV is old and tends to give a green tinge to everything, and ask my reasons why I think it is Shrek rather than Moore.

IE, I can distinguish between Shrek and Moore, but I may be wrong.

So, the person sees green yet knows that the post-box is red despite his sense impression not because of it. — Fooloso4

A person can know several different things at the same time.

The person can know that the publicly accepted word for the colour of the post-box is "red" - though it could have been "rouge" or "rot".

The person can also know their own conscious experience of a particular colour.

There is no way of knowing whether one person's conscious experience of the wavelength 750nm is the same as anyone else's. It could be that two people have the same conscious experience of 750nm - let us call it red. It could be that that one person's conscious experience of 750nm - let us call it red - is different to someone else's conscious experience of 750nm - let us call it green.

IE, a person could know two things. First, that the external public name of the colour of the post-box is "red" and second, that their internal private conscious experience of 750nm is green.

Does this mean that if I them to paint the box red one will do so correctly and the other will paint it green? — Fooloso4

No - they will both paint it red.

What serves as direct knowledge that a post-box is red? — Fooloso4

Light having a wavelength of 750nm travels the 10m from the post-box to our brain through our eyes.

There is no information within light having a wavelength of 750nm that is able to determine that the observer will have the sense impression of red, rather than green, say. For example, one person may see red and another person may see green.

Therefore, the colour an observer sees is a function of the observer and not of the light travelling from the object.

Therefore, it is not that the actual post-box is red, but rather we observe the post-box as being red.

When someone looks at a post-box and says "I know the post-box is red", what they really mean is that when looking at the post-box they have the sense impression red.

If they had said "I know when looking at the post-box my sense impression is red because the post-box is emitting light at a wavelength of 750nm", it is true that they don't need a reason to justify that they know their own sense impression.

If they had said "I know that the actual post-box is red, not just my sense-impression", the sceptic is justified to ask them for what reason they think they know that the actual post-box is red. If they cannot give a suitable reason, then the sceptic had justification to ask.

When someone says that they know something about which they have no direct knowledge,
the sceptic is justified in asking for a reason.

What more empirical a demonstration could there be than Moore waving his hand at you? — Banno

Whilst reading Part II of Philosophical Investigations, I see a "picture-face" on the pages, and as Wittgenstein wrote: "In some respects I stand towards it as I do towards a human face. I can study its expression, can react to it as to the expression of the human face"

Whilst watching Shrek on TV, I perceive a hand waving at me. If I had concluded that this was a empirical demonstration of an external world of dragons and talking donkeys, I would have been mistaken.

IE, perceiving a hand waving at me is not necessarily an empirical demonstration of the existence of an external world.

Davidson would certainly not agree that language isn't necessary for knowing and believing — Banno

I assume that when Davidson refers to language he is referring to human language, and not the primitive language of cats for example, who hiss and spit.

As regards knowing and believing, personally, I am certain that a cat knows it has paws and knows it sees a mouse, though I cannot prove this.

As you wrote a while ago " Lilly apparently believed that there was something objectionable out the window, and that her hissing and spitting were imperative in order to drive whatever it was away.", it seems that we are both certain that cats know and believe.

Wittgenstein is said to believe that thought is tied to language. As language is inherently social there is no inner space in which thoughts can occur. Mental states are intimately connected to a subject's environment, especially their linguistic environment.

However, Wittgenstein did also write at the start of Part II of PI - "One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And why not? A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will come the day after to-morrow?—And what can he not do here?—How do I do it?—How am I supposed to answer this? Can only those hope who can talk?"

IE, it seems that Wittgenstein's position that thought is tied to language was not absolute.

I agree, as Davidson wrote, that language can only have meaning if empirically true.

However, the cat Lilly, an example of a sentient being not having language, knows there are local strays outside the house and believes there will be an imminent invasion.

IE, language isn't necessary for knowing and believing.

The truth of Moore's "here is one hand" must be considered both as part of language and outside of language (pre-language).

Davidson's T-sentence "here is one hand" is true IFF here is one hand points out there is the linguistic aspect "here is one hand" and the non-linguistic aspect, ie, the empirical truth of here is one hand. For Davidson's T-sentence, the meaning of a sentence is equivalent to stating its truth conditions, where a theory of meaning for a natural language must be an empirical theory in that it must be empirically verifiable

Scientists have estimated that the first animals are likely to have emerged around 750 million years ago. Anatomically modern humans begin to appear in the fossil record in Ethiopia some 200,000 years ago - and if were using red ochre pigments for ritual and symbolic purposes, they probably had symbolic language as well. Therefore, language is very recent in the development of sentient animals.

Language isn't necessary for knowing and believing. As Wittgenstein wrote at the start of Part II of Philosophical Investigations "One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful ? And why not ?"

Moore wrote he knew "the existence of external things" because he knew "Here is one hand" - saying "How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case!" However, for me, when I raise my hand, although I know "Here is one hand", I only believe in the "existence of external things". Moore's argument is therefore insufficient justification for me.

I am certain that a cat knows "here is one paw" and "the existence of external things". As Moore having language and the cat not having language know these same things, I would suggest that such knowledge doesn't require language, in that is pre-linguistic. I would also suggest that my doubt about the existence of an external world is a consequence of my having language.

Without language, I would not know that Moore knew "here is one hand" and the "existence of external things". It is only through language that I know that Moore knew "here is one hand" and the "existence of external things". Language opens up my knowledge from the first to the second and third persons.

No sceptic could doubt Moore when he says he knows "here is one hand". No sceptic could doubt that Moore knows "here" is in his mind. But the sceptic can doubt that Moore knows "here" is in the external world.

I look at a picture and, having had experience of real rabbits, I see a rabbit. Knowing language I may say "here is a rabbit", which will only be true IFF here is a rabbit. Another person may look at the same picture and see a duck, and may say "here is a duck", which will only be true IFF here is a duck. IE, in order to establish the truth, language alone is insufficient.

Grayling in section I wrote that OC1 states that scepticism gets no purchase because our beliefs inhere in a system which rests upon foundational beliefs.

Grayling also wrote in section I that Wittgenstein's foundational beliefs are justified by a transcendental argument - OC248 "I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house".

The transcendental argument - i) X occurs only if Y - ii) X occurs; hence Y.

Applying Wittgenstein's transcendental argument to Moore.

Moore says that because he knows "here is one hand" (X) he therefore knows "the existence of external things" (Y ).

The argument is that the sceptic cannot doubt that "here is one hand" (X) occurs only if there is "the existence of external things" (Y ).

Moore argues that because his knowledge "here is one hand" (X) has occurred - hence his knowledge "the existence of external things" (Y ).

However, whilst true that no-one can doubt Moore knowing "here is one hand", the sceptic may rightly doubt the meaning of the word "here", in that does "here" refer to the external world or Moore's mind. If "here" refers to the external world, then the transcendental argument follows. However if "here" refers to Moore's mind, then the transcendental argument fails.

IE the argument within OC1 for foundational beliefs does not negate the sceptic.

personal subjective knowledge — magritte

I am sure that it was the same for Moore, in that Moore knew with certainty that he had one hand, which was personal subjective knowledge that he could not doubt.

As we can communicate with others the concept of blueness of objects around us, even though
we can only ever observe particular blues, it seems to me that we can communicate with others using a conceptualised public language even though each of us uses a particular private language.

Private language
As regards our private language, there is no fixed meaning to the words we use. The particular meaning of a word depends both on context and the life experiences of the person using that word.
For me, a house is a two-story brick building, for someone else a house may be a single-story timber building. What "house" means to me also changes with time. What I mean by "house" now is different to an hour ago since discovering a loose tile.

At this moment in time, if I use "house" in conversation, the word "house" can only have one single meaning to me. This particular meaning is unique to me. This is not to say that in an hours time, if I use the word "house" again, its particular meaning to me may be different again.

What does "mean" mean ? My understanding of the meaning of the concept "house" is just that set of the simpler concepts it is composed of, eventually leading to what Kant called a priori pure intuitions, such as space, time, causation, green, etc.

Even though the concept "house" is built from a set of simpler concepts, roof, door, window, etc, there is for me still a single meaning of the word "house". The fact that at one moment in time the word "house" only has as single meaning to me, and as meaning is a thought, and thoughts cannot doubt themselves, the meaning of "house" to me is beyond doubt, and therefore beyond the sceptic.

As Wittgenstein wrote in OC341 "That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn."

Public language
As regards our public language, even though the person with whom I am in discussion with will have their own particular language game, different to mine, in general we can successfully communicate because of the "family resemblances" between the words we use.

For example, even though for me I think of a house as two stories, whilst others may think of a house as single story, we both agree that a house is "a building for human habitation, especially one that consists of a ground floor and one or more upper storeys." As this is a definition it is also beyond the sceptic.

As Wittgenstein wrote OC256 "On the other hand a language game does change with time" and OC65: When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change", establishing that there may be more than one language game.

AC Grayling
In considering the foundationalism of OC1 and the relativism of OC2, as Wittgenstein wrote in OC99: "And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited", I would suggest that successful communication using language needs both a bedrock of a private language game and a public flow of family resemblances between different private language games.

Rather than agreeing with Grayling that "the exercise in OC is at best partial, at worst self-defeating, with the self-defeat stemming from acceptance of OC2", I would suggest that both themes within OC, foundationalism and relativism, are complementary in successful communication.

no comment for this thread? — Banno

Have been busy starting to replace the 80 year-old electric junction boxes in my attic,
and having to learn about lighting wiring circuits, but now underway and getting a bit more time.

Moore wrote that when he says "Here is one hand", it follows that "How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case!"

Does this mean that ontologically there is a world in which there is the object "one hand" and the object "Moore" ?

How does the object "Moore" know that in the world is another object "one hand" ? The only possible way that Moore could know there is another object in the world is through his sense impressions. Sense impressions such as the colour red, a sweet taste, a grating noise, an acrid smell or a silky touch.

But there is no information within these sense impressions as to what caused them, in that there is no information within the sense impression of the colour red as to what caused the emission of 700nm. Therefore, Moore can never know the cause of his sense impressions, although he may have a belief about what caused them, and beliefs can be doubted

But Moore said he did know that "here is one hand", which raises the question - how is it possible for Moore to know that "here is one hand".

We can say for certain that Moore knows his sense impressions, even though he cannot know what is causing them. As Moore is only getting his information about any external world through his sense impressions, and as sense impressions carry no information as to what caused them, it follows that Moore's thought that "here is one hand" cannot be knowledge of a world outside of Moore's mind, but can only be knowledge of a state of affairs within Moore's mind.

IE, when Moore says I know that "here is one hand", the true meaning of this is not that Moore knows what is in the outside world (even though he may believe what is in the outside world), but knows that within his mind is the concept ""there is a world outside me in which there is one hand".

Wittgenstein isn't saying that "here is one hand" is a fact in the world. Do you see somewhere where he says that? — Sam26

In Tractatus 1.1 Wittgenstein wrote - "The world is the totality of facts, not of things"

An explanation of what Wittgenstein meant may be found in Russell, who had similar views

Russell wrote in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism - “I want you to realize that when I speak of a fact I do not mean a particular existing thing, such as Socrates or the rain or the sun. Socrates himself does not render any statement true or false. What I call a fact is the sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name like ‘Socrates.’ . . .We express a fact, for example, when we say that a certain thing has a certain property, or that it has a certain relation to another thing; but the thing which has the property or the relation is not what I call a ‘fact.”

It seems to me that "here is one hand" fulfills what Wittgenstein meant by a fact in the world.

Wittgenstein is challenging the first premise in the above argument; more specifically, he is challenging Moore's claim that he has knowledge of his hands. — Sam26

I am trying to understand Wittgenstein's objection to Moore's use of the word "know". My current understanding is as follows, and I would be interested in your comments.

Wittgenstein found Moore's common sense approach as a reply to the sceptic interesting, as it had similarities with his own nascent thoughts about hinge propositions. However he disagreed with Moore's use of the word "know".

Moore could have said "here is one hand", meaning that ontologically in the world there is an object "one hand". For Wittgenstein, "here is one hand" is a fact in the world, it is not an interpretation, it has no truth value right or wrong, is therefore not open to doubt, is therefore not open to the sceptic and therefore a hinge proposition.

Moore saying "I know here is one hand" has a different meaning, in that in the mind of the object "Moore" are sense impressions. Moore interprets these sense impressions as ontologically there exists an external world in which there exist an object "one hand" and an object "Moore". As "I know here is one hand" is an interpretation, it has a truth value right or wrong, and therefore is open to doubt, and therefore open to the sceptic and therefore not a hinge proposition.

IE - for Wittgenstein, Moore, in adding "I know", is therefore opening his statement "here is one hand" to the sceptic.

language game — Banno

I think that coherence and correspondence are useful concepts when discussing Wittgenstein's language games, in that it would be relatively easy to invent a language game based on bedrock hinge propositions that was internally logically coherent whilst ignoring the greater problem of ensuring that such a language game corresponded to external reality.

I am using terminology borrowed from AC Grayling's Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Certainty. That of foundationalism, OC 248 "I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions" and relativism, OC 65 "When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change". I used the link www.acgrayling.com/wittgenstein-on-scepticism-and-certainty

As Grayling concluded, "As OC stands, it stands defeated in just this way, for it only deals with scepticism at the lower, less threatening level, and fails to recognise that scepticism in its strongest form is, precisely, relativism"

Though it may be that Wittgenstein included passages on relativism in order to play devil's advocate whilst allowing him to work out his own foundationalist ideas.

On Certainty was intended to answer the sceptic. But did Wittgenstein succeed in his ambition ?

If Wittgenstein's position was that of a foundationalist - OC 88 "It may be for example that all enquiry on our part is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt, if they were ever formulated. They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry" - the sceptic may validly ask why "certain propositions must be excluded from doubt"

If Wittgenstein's position was that of relativism - OC 256 "On the other hand a language-game does change with time" - the sceptic may also validly ask where is the justification that one language game corresponds more to external reality than another.

Although On Certainty is an incomplete work, could he have used more persuasive arguments ?

He could have proposed that "here is one hand" is a performative rather than constative statement, an idea Austin later developed more fully, partly based on Wittgenstein's writings.

He could have proposed that "here is one hand" is a Kantian synthetic a priori statement, where objects exist not in the world but in the mind of the observer. Wittgenstein was aware of Husserlian phenomenology, of which Kant's synthetic a priori was an important part. But as Wittgenstein seemingly was not a great reader of other philosophers, he tended to reinvent the wheel and seemingly did not take Kant's synthetic a priori as seriously as he should have.

Truth needs both coherence within a language and correspondence with the external world. On Certainty may be insightful about coherence, but could be more developed as regards correspondence.

Did he? — Banno

I agree that in On Certainty Wittgenstein did not use the words "the language game corresponds to a reality", but it seems to me that the inference within his writing is so strong that it would be difficult to argue that for Wittgenstein "the language game does not correspond to a reality"

Whilst Wittgenstein in his early philosophy did propose an isomorphism between language and reality, in his late philosophy, on the contrary, he was not explicit that language, being made up from language games, was isomorphic with reality.

I can only read On Certainty with the strong inference that Wittgenstein assumed a reality that language corresponded to.

Taking one example, passage 411, "If I say "we assume that the earth has existed for many years past" (or something similar), then of course it sounds strange that we should assume such a thing. But in the entire system of our language-games it belongs to the foundations. The assumption, one might say, forms the basis of action, and therefore, naturally, of thought."

On the one hand, the proposition "we assume that the earth has existed for many years"
belongs to the foundation of the speaker's language game. On the other hand, the speaker is assuming the reality of an earth existing for many years. It must logically follow that the speaker's language game must correspond with the speaker's reality.

In On Certainty, whilst Wittgenstein did not specifically say that "the language game corresponds to a reality", I would find it difficult to argue that Wittgenstein believed otherwise.

The radical skeptic (I'm referring to a specific kind of skepticism, not all skepticism) is not playing the game correctly. — Sam26

The radical sceptic makes a valid point in pointing out that whilst Wittgenstein argues that each language game has its own set of hinge propositions, he did not justify why one set of propositional hinges should be more exempt from doubt than others.

I agree that in a sense my choice of language game is objective, in that some language games are more useful to me than others, which I why I chose the language game of 21st century western society rather than the language game of the Japanese Imperial Court during the Heian period.

AC Grayling discusses Wittgenstein in his Wittgenstein On Scepticism and Certainty, and refers to two main themes within OC - which he names OC1 and OC2.
OC 1 is a foundationalist refutation of scepticism, where beliefs are inherent within a system
and beliefs rest on foundations, such as passage 248 "I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions".
OC 2 is relativistic, where truth and knowledge are not absolute but vary with viewpoint and time, such as passage 65 "when language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change."

I agree with your reply, which I would classify as being within OC 1, where language games resist local scepticism by being founded on propositional hinges, but I would also agree with Grayling that the biggest philsophical problem with On Certainty is OC 2, in that the framework within which propositional hinges operate are themselves relative, and hard to resist against radical scepticism.

Wittgenstein's proposal of the hinge proposition may close down one route for the sceptic, but opens another.

Wittgenstein said that language has meaning within the context of its language game, meaning is determined by use, and the language game corresponds to a reality. A game such as chess has rules, but different games have different rules. A language game may be internally logically coherent and correspond to a reality, but each language game will correspond to a different reality. I look at the optical illusion "Rabbit and Duck" and see a rabbit, my reality is the rabbit. Another person looks and sees a duck, their reality is the duck. We may have the same perception but arrive at different interpretations. The sceptic may rightly ask for what reason should one interpretation have precedence over another.

Wittgenstein is correct that there is no room for a sceptic within a particular language game, but as the reality of each language game is relative, the sceptic may still ask for justification as to which language game is nearer to the absolute reality.

Yes, even a sceptic needs something, such as a set of rules, about which they can be sceptical.

Moore said that these rules are the rules of common sense, and has been criticised for not justifying to the sceptic why common sense should be the basis for the rules.

Wittgenstein said that once the proposition "here is one hand" is placed within the context of language, within a language game, as language is founded on logical propositions, and as logical propositions are beyond knowledge or doubt (being norms that are neither true nor false), scepticism is not able to function within language.

It is true that once the proposition "here is one hand" becomes part of a particular language game, both internally coherent and logical, then it becomes necessarily free from the sceptic.

However, the proposition "here is one hand" may be included within any number of internally coherent and logical language games, and the sceptic may rightly ask how Wittgenstein explained the basis on how to decide from the many possible language games the one that corresponds to reality.

In considering the proposition "here is one hand", Moore's common sense approach of Direct Realism does not stand a chance against the sceptics, in that even though I perceive a hand in front of me , I may be mistaken, because from my perception knowledge of the world does not necessarily follow.

For Wittgenstein in On Certainty the proposition "here is one hand" is more a performative speech act than constative, where "here is one hand" is a naming by the observer of what the observer perceives rather than a description of what the observer believes to be in the world.

Wittgenstein's unaltering bank of a river within which the river of language constantly flows are these performative acts immune to the sceptic, an idea as later developed by Austin. When a dignitary performatively names a new aircraft carrier "HMS Albion", the sceptic cannot question that this is the true name of the vessel, as evidence is held in newspaper articles.

Wittgenstein's approach to the proposition "here is one hand " as performative rather than constative becomes the first step in a theory of language where public communication becomes possible potentially free of sceptical doubt.

Subsequent steps in a theory of of language would be in expanding the meaning of "here is one hand " by placing it within a coherent linguistic context and then discovering correspondences between language and the world.

According to the Wikipedia article on Qualia, qualia are defined as individual instances of subjective conscious experiences, where an example of a qualia would be the perceived sensation of the pain of a headache.

According to the SEP article on qualia, philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia.

According to the IEP article on qualia, qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences.

I could say that "I have sensation S", meaning that I have the sensation of an individual instance of subjective conscious experience, eg, the perceived sensation of the pain of a headache

I could also have said that "I have the sensation of a qualia".

In answering the OP, as I know that individual instances of subjective conscious experiences exist, then according to the Wikipedia, SEP and IEP definitions of qualia, qualia exist.