The color red as a relevant factor in making the distinction between memory and imagination is, hence, null and void. — TheMadFool

There are two different situations. First, having a complex thought such as "woman in red" and second, having a simple impression such as "colour red", where a complex thought is a set of simple impressions.

As regards the complex thought "woman in red", I agree that person X may not be able to directly distinguish between memory and imagination (though they may be able to distinguish using indirect means such as reason and logic)

However, as regards the simple impression "colour red", person X can distinguish memory from imagination as they know that their memory of the colour red must have come from a real experience, and therefore they cannot have imagined it. It is true that person X may not be able to accurately remember the circumstance in which they experienced the colour red, but this doesn't affect the fact that they know their memory of the experience of the colour red was not imagined.

IE, is it possible to give one example of a memory of a simple impression - a particular sight (eg, red) , sound (eg, loud) , smell (eg, acrid), taste (eg, bitter) or touch (eg, hot) - that has never been experienced through the senses but invented in the mind. If not, then, in this situation, memory can be distinguished from imagination as none of these memories can have been imagined.

memory is indistinguishable from imagination — TheMadFool

Can memory be distinguished from imagination ?

John Locke (1632-1704) and David Hume (1711-1776) have made the argument that the basic building blocks of all thought are simple ideas, or more precisely, in Hume’s terminology, simple impressions – single colours, single shapes, single smells and so on.

When we have a memory of an object or we imagine an object, we have to make the distinction as to whether the object we are thinking about is a complex thought or a simple impression, in that a complex whole is built from a set of simple parts.

Complex thoughts such as unicorns, government, justice, buildings, ie, the whole object. Simple impressions such as red, square, bitter, loud, ie, the parts of the object.

Therefore, we have two types of memories - memories of complex thoughts and memories of simple impressions.

It may be difficult to distinguish whether our memories of complex thoughts, such as unicorns and mountains, are real or fictive. However, our memories of simple impressions, such as the colour red, must be real. IE, all our memories of simple impressions must have been experienced through our senses, in that it is not possible for the mind to invent simple impressions. For example, someone who is colour blind and unable to experience through their senses the simple impression of the colour red will not be able to invent the experience of redness in their minds. Therefore, all our memories of simple impressions, such as the colour red, must be based on real experiences.

A memory of a complex thought may be real or fictive. However, when having a memory of a simple impression I know that I cannot have imagined it, and the remembered experience must have been real.

Therefore, it is possible to distinguish some memories from imagination.

Does this mean that our imaginations could actually be memories — TheMadFool

It may help to add in the distinction between the whole and its parts. The relationship between the whole and its parts has been discussed since at least Plato, and GE Moore wrote that “ a thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent concepts”.

IE, I would suggest that we can only imagine a whole object if we already have a memory of the parts of the object. This whole object may or not exist in the world. For example, I can only imagine the whole object "unicorn" because I have the memory of its parts - the tusk of a narwhal and the body of a horse. I cannot think of an example at the moment whereby I can imagine a whole object without having a memory of its real parts, in that I am not able to imagine a part for which I don't have a pre-existing memory.

As regards the question "is our imagination memories", I would say that our imagination of a whole object is our memory of its parts.

Science, if it's going to offer explanations, needs something to explain. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree that I may not have used the standard philosophical structure of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, and not made clear the difference between my understanding of Kant's transcendental idealism, and what I believe to be a sensible extrapolation of Kant's transcendental idealism.

I agree that Kant did not consider language, but rather space, time and objects. However, once Kant had established the principle of innate a priori concepts, the number of examples can be increased. I am sure it is commonly accepted that children don't need to be taught the difference between the touch of smooth and rough, the taste of sweet and sour, the sight of red and blue, the hearing of loud and quiet, the smell of acrid and sweet, in that these must be innate a priori concepts. Our understanding of the world can then be built up from these common-sense core concepts of body, person, space, time and causation.

The mechanism by which any innate a priori concept became part of the brain is a matter of belief. For an Evolutionist, they have evolved over millions of years through the continuous interaction between life and its surroundings. For a Creationist, they arrived through a supernatural act of divine creation.

The downside of innate a priori concepts is that any profound understanding of the truth of the world is inherently limited. We can understand three dimensional space because we have evolved within it , but this is not the case when we try to understand the expansion of the universe from the Big Bang. We may use the analogy of blowing up a balloon, but this is no more than glimpsing one of Plato's Forms, no more than a deaf person being able to experience the sound of a bell.

Whether language is innate a priori is debated. On the one side, Chomsky in Reflections on Language 1975 argued that the development of language is in large part predetermined by genetic factors, innate rather than being a blank slate upon which psychological and social forces act. But even those who argue against him, such as Philip Lieberman, proposed that our ancestors invented modes of communication that were already compatible with the brain’s natural abilities.

IE, Kant's transcendental idealism gives a solid foundation on which we can base our understanding of the world.

Doesn't the theory of evolution require undetermined mutations? — Metaphysician Undercover

From the viewpoint of the machine - internally it is determined - but external forces acting upon it that possibly cause internal change are undetermined.

who decides how the machine is to be programmed? — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world where all events are completely determined by previously existing causes, the question is whether a simple machine can self-evolve into a complex machine without the help from any external intelligence. A machine is defined as an apparatus using mechanical power and having several parts, each with a definite function and together performing a particular task. Such machines would be deterministic, without free-will and without consciousness.

One example of such a machine would be the bacteria, in that it can self-evolve free of any external intelligence, and without either free-will or consciousness (even accepting panpsychism).
IE, as there is at least one example of a machine that can self-evolve (the bacteria), this shows that in principle machines can self-evolve, meaning self-program.

The word "red" could only come to describe both of these objects if there is freedom of choice in usage. If there was no choice, "red" could only be used to refer to one or the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world where all events are completely determined by previously existing causes, when light anywhere between 640nm and 680nm is shone on a receptor of a machine, the machine can respond with the single output "red".
IE, a machine is able to give a single response covering a range of observations.

a non-free willing being probably wouldn't even know how to relate to words. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interactive voice response (IVR) is a technology that allows humans to interact with a computer-operated phone system through the use of voice.
IE, a machine can relate to words.

There couldn't even be any creating of new words because that would require choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world where all events are completely determined by previously existing causes, when light is shone on a receptor of a machine, and the frequency of the light is different to what has been observed by the machine before, the machine gives it a name - such as Frequency660
IE, a machine can create new words.

A non-free willing being would be so much different from a free willing being, that if one of them created words, the other would not even know how to relate to a word. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world where all events are completely determined by previously existing causes, when light is shone on a receptor of machine A, and the frequency of the light is different to what has been observed by the machine before, the machine gives it a name - such as Frequency660, where the second part of the name is the frequency of the light in nm. When this name, Frequency660, is passed to machine B, machine B emits light of the same frequency contained within the second part of the name.
IE, if one machine creates a name, a different machine will be able to relate to that name.

Seth's work at Sussex on perception — Isaac

My post was based on Kant's concept of transcendental idealism as described in his Critique of Pure Reason 1781. Kant wrote, "Since, then, the receptivity of the subject, its capacity to be affected by objects, must necessarily precede all intuitions of these objects, it can readily be understood how the form of all appearances can be given prior to all actual perceptions, and so exist in the mind a priori"

That is, when I look at an object emitting a wavelength of 700nm, because of my innate a priori knowledge of red, I project back onto the world my concept of the colour red. That is, when I look at an object, I perceive the colour red, not the wavelength 700nm.

Professor Seth in his 5 Oct 2018 Ted talk said - "So since Newton, it's been pretty clear that colours - red, yellow, green, et cetera - colours are not objective properties of objects in the world. They are attributes of reflected light. And the brain - the visual system will make inferences based on wavelengths of light about what colour something is. So something as basic as colour is not something that we just passively receive from the world. We actively attribute it to things out there in the world."

It initially seems that Professor Seth's approach to perception is similar to Kant's, although my only knowledge of Professor Seth's work is from his Ted talks

Could we have evolved otherwise, maybe with no concept of space? — Srap Tasmaner

I am with Kant when he wrote in The Critique of Reason "Since, then, the receptivity of the subject, its capacity to be affected by objects, must necessarily precede all intuitions of these objects, it can readily be understood how the form of all appearances can be given prior to all actual perceptions, and so exist in the mind a priori"

The problem is, if we didn't have a priori evolutionary knowledge of time, space, causation, etc, then how could we enable someone born without the ability to see the colour red to have the experience of seeing the colour red ?

"two aspects of language" — Srap Tasmaner

I believe that Kant's "synthetic a priori" judgements gives an insight into the apparent circular problem of the fact that I am only able to recognize a wrench if I already know the concept of wrenchhood, yet I can only learn the concept of wrenchhood if I am able to recognize wrenches.

In a "synthetic a priori" judgement, some important knowledge, such as causation, is neither given through the senses empirically nor known through rational reasoning, but rather is a priori. Therefore, it is only possible to have experience of an object if the object conforms to what can already be experienced. Objects of knowledge can only ever be things as they appear, not as they are in themselves.

Kant's insight is valid even if the terminology doesn't seem right. Synthetic is a linguistic term, yet a priori is an ontological term. Synthetic and a priori are of two different kinds, it is as if one asked "which is better, justice or cats". Perhaps it should be called an "a posteriori a priori" judgement.

We are born with certain basic innate a priori concepts such as time, space, causation, colour, sound, etc . During our lives, through regular observation and reasoning, we can combine these basic concepts into more complex concepts such as justice, buildings, tables, horses, etc.

Our innate a priori concepts are part of the physical structure of the brain. They have evolved over a period of 4.5 billion years in the development of complex modern organisms from ancient simple ancestors, being subject to the continual interaction between life and its surroundings.

Any physical system can only undertake that which it is physically capable of undertaking, ie, a blind person cannot see colour, a deaf person cannot hear sounds, a cat cannot judge the morality of its actions and a toaster cannot broadcast a television program. Similarly, the range of complex concepts about the world a person will be able to develop will ultimately be limited by their given, innate a priori concepts.

When looking at a set of shapes in the world, we are only able to recognize those parts of an object for which we already have innate a priori concepts. Through a regularity of observation and reasoning, we combine these parts to create an understanding of more complex objects, such as a wrench, and more complex concepts, such as wrenchhood.

Language must follow the same principle, in that we are born with a basic innate a priori linguistic knowledge. .Chomsky has argued that children are born in possession of an innate ability to comprehend language structures, where language acquisition occurs as a consequence of a child's capacity to recognize the underlying structure at the root of any language, as all human languages are built upon a common structural basis.

IE, as regards which takes priority, language as communication or language as representing the world. As the basic concepts of language as representing the world is already innate a priori within the brain (having evolved over over millions of years), this allows language as communication the ability to operate free of restrictions from the immediate external world whilst still being grounded in the enduring external world.

We can always manage somehow to be exactly as determinate as we need to. — Srap Tasmaner

What is language for ? There are two aspects to our need for language. The first aspect is about our survival within the world. The second aspect is about our understanding of the world, though the more we understand the world the better our chances will be of surviving within it.

As regards the first aspect, we need language to communicate our needs to others, and we need to communicate the difference between one thing and another. It seems that this requires both the Pragmatic Theory of Truth, in that truth is verified and conformed by the results of putting one's concepts into practice, as well as the Coherence Theory of Truth, where truth is primarily a property of whole systems of propositions, and can be ascribed to individual propositions only according to their coherence with the whole

As regards the second aspect, what is the truth of the world and how do we gain knowledge of the truth of the world. The main theory is the Correspondence Theory of Truth, stretching back to Plato and Aristotle, where the truth or falsity of a representation is determined entirely by how it relates to "things" and whether it accurately describes those "things".

Aspect one of having a pragmatic and coherent language allows me to determine the difference between a wrench and a hammer sufficient for my needs, and I agree that "So it does come down to our needs and words can be perfectly determinate for one need and not good enough for another". However, I can only distinguish between a wrench and a hammer if I first have the concepts of wrenchhood and hammerhood.

Considering aspect two of using language to understand the world through my rational reasoning of an empirical experience, I may observe a particular instance of a wrench, but I can only understand a particular instance through my understanding the concept of wrenchhood. There has to be a correspondence between language and "things" in the world, and such correspondence is ultimately semantically indeterminate.

IE, I agree that a coherent language can be perfectly determinate for one's needs in pragmatically distinguishing between wrenches and hammers. However, the recognition of a wrench requires the knowledge of wrenchhood, which requires having established a correspondence between language and things in the world, which is ultimately semantically indeterminate

what we mean when we say that two people have the same idea, — Srap Tasmaner

Perhaps this can be related back to the original question.

For those who believe in a Universal Mind, Alice and Bob are two parts of the same being.
When Alice/Bob looks at a particular wrench their idea has a single ontological spatial existence for both the particular wrench and the concept wrenchhood.

For those who believe in Platonic Forms, both Alive and Bob when looking at the same wrench have a glimpse of the same Platonic Form of Wrenchhood. Their ideas will be ontologically spatially separate. Their ideas of the particular wrench will be the same, and their concepts of wrenchhood will be the same.

For those who believe in Nominalism, for Alice and Bob when looking at the same wrench, their ideas will be ontologically spatially separate. Their idea of the particular wrench will be the same, but their concepts of wrenchhood will be different.

to show why any language produced by free willing beings will be indeterminate. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that a language using analytic propositions might be semantically determinate, though I would argue that any language using synthetic propositions based on how their meaning relates to the world will inherently be semantically indeterminate.

Argument one
I see an object emitting a wavelength of 640nm, and say "I see a red object". I see an object emitting a wavelength of 680nm, and say "I see a red object". Whether "I" have free will or not, my statement "I see a red object" is necessarily semantically indeterminate, in that I could be referring to any wavelength between 640 and 680nm. I could invent 40 new words to describe each wavelength in changes of 1nm wavelength, such as red650 meaning red of a wavelength of 650 nm. But I would still have the problem of describing each wavelength in changes of 0.1nm.
IE, the word "red" is inherently semantically indeterminate

Argument two
Any person, with or without free-will, would fail in any attempt to discover an absolute and fixed meaning of any word using the dictionary, for example , in searching for the meaning of "object" .

Object = a material thing that can be seen and touched.
Material = the matter from which a thing is or can be made.
Matter = physical substance in general, as distinct from mind and spirit; (in physics) that which occupies space and possesses rest mass, especially as distinct from energy.
Physical = relating to the body as opposed to the mind.
IE, the links are endless

Argument three
There are fewer words in the dictionary than mereologically possible objects in the world.
IE, language is inherently indeterminate.

Argument four
Consider a group of people with or without free-will trying to create a semantically determinate language. Suppose they create a new word "xyz". The question is how to give this new word a fixed meaning within the whole group. The word as description falls into the same problem as using a dictionary. The word as reference falls into a different problem. I could point to something and say, this is xyz, but there will always be uncertainty in the others as to what exactly I am pointing at.
IE, any group of people with or without free-will will fail at trying to create a determinate language.

Where does he claim the telos as the source of or navigator to truth — Gary M Washburn

As I understand it, for Plato, telos isn't the source of truth, "being" is the source of truth.

Plato in Phaedo argues that while materials that compose a body are necessary for its acting in a certain way, they cannot be sufficient. Telos is the inherent purpose of a person or thing, in that the telos of warfare is victory and the telos of business is the creation of wealth. What is sufficent is found within the Form itself, in that the Forms themselves are the source of the telos.

For Plato, truth is the way the world is. Truth depends on what "is" in the world, and is not defined in terms of any correspondence between statements and reality. Statements may be true in virtue of the world being a certain way, in that "Theaetetus is sitting is true if and only if the form sitting has being in the case of Theaetetus". These forms in the world are only shadows of the Forms, which we can recognize by using our mind and reason.

IE, by looking at forms in the world, which are the truths in the world, by using our mind and reason we can sense the Forms themselves. It is the Forms themselves that incorporate their own purpose, their own telos.

The abstract perfection of language — Gary M Washburn

George Orwell 1946 Politics and the English Language - "Political language... is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. "

The reason why it is impossible to create a determinate language is that language is inherently something created by free willing beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

Premise 1 - language is created by humans
Premise 2 - humans have free will
Conclusion - humans cannot create a determinate language
IE, I agree with the conclusion - but it doesn't follow from its premises as given.

The problem though, is that many axioms are accepted on the basis of utility (pragmatism), not on the basis of being self-evident. This relates to Plato's "the good". This makes the belief itself the cause , as in teleology, but many do not believe that beliefs are causes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps this is along the lines of the different teleological approaches of Plato and Aristotle

For Plato, an extrinsic teleology, where the materials composing a body whilst necessary may not be sufficient for the body to act in a certain way. What is needed is an external Form of the Good in order to give the body purpose and reason (ie, the self-evident)

For Aristotle, an intrinsic teleology, rejecting an external intelligence or god, where nature itself is the principle cause of change (ie, the pragmatic)

It is written that the Correspondence Theory of Truth can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, though what they believed is only a muted version of it.

The axiomatic theory of truth has the advantage over the correspondence theory in that it does not presuppose that truth can be defined. Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of the truth predicate shows that the definition of a truth predicate requires resources that go beyond those of the formal language for which truth is going to be defined, in these cases definitional approaches to truth have to fail.

IE, it is a question of whether one believes the cause originates as described by the Absolutism of Plato or the Relativism of Aristotle.

In theory, machines can be made at least as semantically intelligent as a standard dumb human. — magritte

I agree that today in theory this is so. Today the typical English speaker will have acquired a vocabulary of up to 48,000 words. Perhaps in the future will arrive a new Lieutenant Commander Data, having a positronic brain both able to achieve 60 trillion operations per second and store a larger vocabulary, enabling them to better cope with our boundlessly unpredictable real world.

The issue is that what causes language to be semantically indeterminate is that the creators of language have freewill — Metaphysician Undercover

Language (syntax and semantics) as a human creation is inherently indeterminate, in that it is not possible to create a determinate language, as illustrated by Gödel's incompleteness theorems in mathematics and Bertrand Russell's failed project of Logism which attempted to create an analytic framework for language.
IE, any language is indeterminate, regardless of whether its creators have free will or not.

If it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated, doesn't this mean that there is no cause? — Metaphysician Undercover

As some people might believe in axiom one, and other people might believe in axiom two, it is true that different people's beliefs will be contradictory.
IE, for someone who believes in axiom one (defined as a statement so evident or well-established that it is assumed to be true ), it follows that they accept that it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated, meaning that the fact that it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated does not affect their belief in a cause.

Isn't semantic indeterminism dependent on free will? — Metaphysician Undercover

A similar problem to the one experienced by Captain Kirk in the episode The Liar Paradox. Being trapped by machines on a planet, Captain Kirk tells the humanoid "everything that Harry Mudd tells you is a lie", at which point Harry Mudd says "I am lying", causing the humanoid to say "illogical" followed by a breakdown with smoke escaping from its head. The moral of the story is that deterministic machines without human free will cannot cope with semantic indeterminism.

However, the humanoids learn from their encounter. They add another line of software to their programs, such that if a calculation takes longer than a fixed time, the program stops and moves on to the next problem.

Years later, on being visited by the Battlestar Galactica, who are similarly trapped on the planet, Admiral Adama tells the humanoid "everything that Col. Tigh tells you is a lie", at which Col. Tigh says "I am lying".The humanoid, with its updated program, successfully avoids any logical problems, and the crew of the Battlestar Galactica remain imprisoned without chance of release.

IE, a metaphysically deterministic humanoid without free will can be programmed to avoid any logical problem of semantic indeterminism.

If it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated, doesn't this mean that there is no cause? — Metaphysician Undercover

Our system of knowledge is based on axioms. Axiom One could be that we live in a deterministic world where all events, including moral choices, are completely determined by previously existing causes. Axiom Two could be that we live in an indeterministic world where no event is certain and the entire outcome of anything is probabilistic. Being axioms, no relationship between an earlier event and a later event needs to be logically proved.

IE, the fact that it is impossible for a logical relationship to be proved, does not exclude axiom one, ie, that there are causes.

Aristotle actually defines "soul", as "the primary actuality of a body having life potentially in it" — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps Kant can be thought of as continuing Aristotle's philosophy in that one could draw a comparison between Aristotle's Forms and forms with with Kant's "a priori" and "synthetic", whilst, as a modern Enlightenment thinker, moving away from Aristotle's incorporeal and eternal soul to a more sceptical view about ever being able to know the true nature of the mind.

not if it allows Platonism — Srap Tasmaner

I agree that neither of us want to allow Platonic Forms back.

But the answer to the question "do two people have the same idea" also depends on one's definition of "person", which, at the end of the day is semantically indeterminate, even allowing that there is a consensus amongst most people as to its meaning. As I picture it, as there is no one fixed definition of "person", and no two people's definition of "person" will be the same, the meaning of "person" can be illustrated by the bell curve of normal distribution, a probability distribution symmetric about the mean.

There will be a consensus at the mean of the bell curve. However, at one extreme end of the bell curve will be those who define a person as their mind, in that being in an accident and losing one's leg doesn't take away a person's individuality. At the other extreme of the bell curve will be those who believe in telepathy, in Platonic Forms, in a collective consciousness (Emile Durkheim 1893 The Division of Labour in Society) or in a universal consciousness (Loken and Bendriss 2013 The Shift in Consciousness)

Therefore, the answer to the question "do two people have the same idea", will also depend on a person's particular definition of "person". Those at one extreme of the bell curve, those believing in telepathy, Platonic Forms, collective and universal consciousness, would argue that "the idea" is a token, whereas everyone else would argue that it is a type.

IE, neither opinion is right or wrong, as it depends on one's personal beliefs.

The more pertinent indeterminism — Gary M Washburn

There can be syntactic ambiguity, "He ate the cookies on the couch" and there can be semantic ambiguity, "We saw her duck"

When asking what does ""two people have the same idea" mean, I would say that this is an example of semantic ambiguity rather than syntactic ambiguity, in that "same" is ambiguous in meaning. IE, is "same" meant as a type (the same type of idea) or a token (the same instance of an idea).

Isn't at least part of the world indeterminate? — Metaphysician Undercover

I should have distinguished between the two types of indeterminism, semantic indeterminism (SI) and metaphysical indeterminism (MI).

The clause "two people have the same idea" is an example of SI, in that the phrase "same idea" has two different meanings. MI allows the possibility of free will. Many, including myself, believe that indeterminism is nothing but a semantic problem about the meanings of words. However, others believe, such as Professor David Taylor, that if indeterminism is semantic then one falls into an infinite regress, meaning that SI requires MI, in that there is something indeterminate about the world itself.

However, metaphysical determinism and semantic indeterminism are linked by the arrow of time, in that one can have both metaphysical determinism, a cause necessarily determines an effect, and semantic indeterminism, given an effect the cause cannot necessarily be determined.

Socrates and Plato were more like skeptics — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. Plato and I are both septics as regards the Theory of Forms. However, the Theory of Forms, as with teleology, is a pragmatically useful concept, even if not true.

logic is not grounded in spatial-temporal existence — Metaphysician Undercover

From my reading, although Plato was interested in logic, and did discuss sentence analysis, truth and fallacies, logical puzzles in Euthydemus and the difference between valid and invalid arguments, logic as a fully systemized discipline only began with Aristotle. Plato approached the World of Forms not through logic but through intuition, where knowledge of the Forms cannot be gained through sensory experience but through the mind. Forms transcend time and space, timeless and unchanging. Plato was a Dualist, where the soul before being localised by the body was directly connected to the World of Forms. After the soul had been confined by the body, it retained a dim recollection of the Forms. IE, for Plato, the mind approaches the World of Forms not through logic but through a dim memory of them.

There is the question as to whether the mind can use logic to go outside of time and space.
Along the same lines, Mathematical Platonism suggests that mathematical entities have no spatio-temporal properties. As Plato would have said, I'm sceptical. My belief is that numbers are definitions, in the performative rather than than descriptive sense, and we find our defined numbers useful because we have discovered that they often correspond to the world around us. Things defined do exist, in a sense, through all time and all space, but only within it, not outside it.

Wouldn't any attempt to create a language with determinate meaning just produce another indeterminate language — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly so. That is the problem as I see it. As Gödel proved for mathematics the impossibility of finding a complete and consistent set of axioms, perhaps we need another Gödel to prove whether or not language can be determinate.

So I assume that this ideal, deterministic world, which you believe yourself to be in, despite all the evidence otherwise, would support this ideal, deterministic language which you believe in — Metaphysician Undercover

In answer to the question, "can a deterministic world support a deterministic language ?", I don't believe so, as it seems that linguistic meaning is always indeterminate. The problem remains that language is part of the mind, and the mind is part of the world, not separate to it. Ultimately, bearing in mind Russell's paradox about sets being members of themselves, something can never know itself, meaning that language can never be determinate

In Plato's terms, language may be included with justice, truth, equality, beauty as being derived by reasoning from the Form of the Good, where the Good is a perfect, eternal and changeless Form, existing outside space and time and superior to every material instantiation of it. The perfect Form - a deterministic language - may be strived for, but never achieved. This raises a problem with Plato's Theory of Forms in that if the Form is outside of time and space and superior to every material instantiation of it, how can Plato argue for the existence of something that he has already argued is beyond his ability to discover.

— Metaphysician Undercover

As an aside, I intuitively believe that we live in a deterministic world, even allowing for apparent free-will, chaotic systems (still deterministic yet making predictions difficult) and quantum indeterminacy (not ruling out the possibility of a deeper determinism underneath quantum mechanics).

It seems that linguistic meaning is ultimately indeterminate for several reasons, including the problem of definition, the Russell paradox about sets not being members of themselves and Gödel's incompleteness theorems.

Perhaps, as it is therefore beyond the ability of current language to fully explain the reality of the world we live in, then another movement with the same goals as the Logical Positivists of the 1920's and 30's would be beneficial, ie, to create a new language whose meaning was determinate.

two people have the same idea — Srap Tasmaner

The meaning is ultimately indeterminate.

When Alice and Bob look at the same object, such as a square, they think about 1) a particular shape, 2) the universal concept of squareness and 3) their life experiences of squareness, such as the squareness of boxes, etc.

Do Alice and Bob have the "same idea" when looking at this object.

As regards terminology, a thought is fleeting, whilst an idea has a more permanence. Immediately upon seeing the object they will have a fleeting thought about the object's particular shape, whilst on reflection the fleeting thought becomes an idea. The term "same" has more than one meaning. If Alice picks an apple of a tree and gives it to Bob, it is the "same" ontological apple. If Alice and Bob have both taken their own apples off a tree, as the apples have the same description, linguistically, it is the "same" apple.

As regards item 1), there are two questions. Either Q1, is the idea in Alice's mind the same ontological idea that is in Bob's mind or Q2, is the idea in Alice's mind linguistically the same as the idea in Bob's mind, as both Alice's idea and Bob's idea describe the same object.

Whether or not Alice and Bob share the same (ontological) idea depends on the definition of Alice and Bob, which is a linguistic problem.

Definition one = If Alice was defined as a set of parts that included an ontological entity that expressed the idea of squareness - and Bob was defined as a set of parts that included the same ontological entity - then Alice and Bob would have the same (ontological) idea. IE, if a bowling club and a gardening club both had Claire as a member, then both the bowling club and gardening club would have the same (ontological) part, ie, Claire.

Definition two = if Alice and Bob were each defined as only that set of parts contained within a specific spatial volume - ie, commonly known as a person - then Alice and Bob wouldn't share the same (ontological) idea.

Both are valid definitions. But how is the truth or falsity of a definition determined ? The dictionary definition of "person" ends up circular. I could ask 100 people their definition - but then again I could have asked 100 people pre-Galileo whether the Earth was round or flat.

IE, the answer to the question "do two people have the same idea" reduces to a linguistic problem, ie, the definition of a person, and linguistic definition is ultimately indeterminate - becoming a problem of mereology

true belief — creativesoul

Truth within language
A bear hunts for salmon in the coastal waters of Alaska. The bear believes that there are fish in the water and as there are fish in the water the bear has, what we call, a "true belief".

Truth is the accordance between fact A, the bear's belief that there are fish in the water and fact B, there are fish in the water.

As truth is an accordance between two facts, and as neither fact A has any knowledge of being in accordance with fact B nor fact B has any knowledge of being in accordance with fact A, any truth must be external to facts A and B.

IE, truth is not an internal quality of a set of facts. Truth can only be a quality external to a set of facts, such as within language.

Truth outside language
As regards the bear, after successfully catching the fish

C - the bear believed there were fish in the water
D - the bear knows there are fish in the water

For the bear to know a truth, the bear has to know an accordance between C and D

IE, the bear has to know not only i) that it believed there were fish in the water but also
ii) that it knows there are fish in the water.

IE, for the bear to know a truth, the bear has to have thoughts about its thoughts, which becomes a problem of infinite regression.

truth claims seem to require sentences/clauses — Dawnstorm

As regards Davidson's semantic theory, Wikipedia's article on "Truth-Conditional Semantics" describes meaning as the same as, or reducible to, its truth condition. But truth is a concept that only exists within language, from which it follows that "a proposition has meaning IFF a proposition is true", agreeing with Scott Soames that this has become circular.

Also, most readers of Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, for example, will not know the truth condition of most of the propositions in the book, and many of the propositions will be untrue anyway, and thereby, in Davidson's terms, find the novel meaningless. But this is to define "meaning" in a way totally contrary to conventional use.

Malapropisms break the rules of conventional language use — creativesoul

It seems that, in his article "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs"

1) Davidson doesn't define what he means by "conventions", but infers a particular definition of "conventions".
2) He concludes by inferring that because his particular definition of "conventions" is not illuminative - then no definition of "conventions" will be illuminative.

So you are saying that intentional states are not directed at things in the world, but at Aristotelian universals that are mental objects? — Banno

First part - yes
As an Indirect Realist, I don't believe that I perceive the external world as it really is, what I perceive are mental objects. I have intentionality about my mental objects, things which exist in my mind rather than the world.

Second part - partly
My view is that a mental objects have three properties: particular perception, universal concept and linguistic naming. All mental objects include particular perception, of these, some but not all of these include universal concept, and of these, some but not all include linguistic naming.

Particular perception relates to Frege's "referent" and Wittgenstein's "picture theory". The referent of a mental object is simply a particular entity that has been perceived in an assumed world. A mental object is a picture of a set of particular sensations through our five senses. However, particular perception by itself is insufficient for sentience, as a picture by itself cannot resolve the mereological problem of establishing the importance of relationships between the pictured parts.

Universal concept relates to Frege's "sense" and Aristotle's "Theory of Universals". The sense is the thought that it expresses, whether or not it has a referent, in that Odysseus has a sense but no reference. In Aristotle's view, universals only exist when they are instantiated in the mind, where such universals are concepts. Sentience needs both particular perceptions and universal concepts.

Linguistic naming relates to Kant's Theory of Judgement, where naming is a complex cognitive judgement about the usefulness of a concept. Whilst the mental objects of sentient life for the first 99% of its time of its existence on Earth has included particular perception and universal concepts, it is only in the recent 1% that the mental objects of sentient life have also included linguistic naming. IE, only some of our concepts have words attached, in that I have a word for the concept "chair", I have a word for the concept "Eiffel Tower", but I don't have a word for the concept of an object part chair and part Eiffel Tower.

IE, my understanding is that intentional states are not directed at things in the world, but at mental objects, which have the three properties of particular perception, universal concept and linguistic naming.

What's an "instantiated mental act" — Banno

As I see it :

Definition
An instantiated mental act is the act of mentally making an instance of, or representing, something perceived.

Instantiated mental acts precede intentionality
In our consciousness, we are conscious about something, we think about something. This is called intentionality. Intentionality has to be directed at something. Intentionality has to do with the directedness, aboutness, or the reference of mental states. Intentionality allows us to represent the world using mental representations. But, something has had to been instantiated before being able to have intentionality about it, in that instantiation and intentionality are linked concepts.

Instantiated mental acts are concepts
A concept, whether abstract or concrete, is an internal cognitive symbol that can represent an external reality, things that have never been experienced, or things that don't exist. Within my mind, my cognition is not directed to the world but to the concept I have in my mind.

Concepts are relevant whether a Direct Realist, an Indirect Realist or an Idealist.
It may be that the Direct Realist is correct and my concepts are accurate copies of the world. It may be that the Indirect Realist is correct in that my concepts are only representations of the world. It may be that the Idealist is correct in that my concepts don't originate other than in my mind.

Instantiated mental acts and universals
Aristotle said that universals only exist when they are instantiated in a particular thing, where chairness is instantiated by a chair, in that there is not a Platonic Form of chairness. Knowledge of universals does not derive from a supernatural source but is obtained by means of the intellect.

Instantiated mental acts are complete
When observing the world through my senses and creating a model of the world, my sense perceptions necessarily only give me part of the full information about the world. Although my knowledge of the world is necessarily incomplete, my model is necessarily complete. My mental instantiation has made something complete out of something incomplete.

Instantiated mental acts and causation
In the problem of the causation of physical effects by mental causes, the mental event of my desire to eat cake plays a causal role in a physical event of raising my arm. A mental desire has been instantiated by a physical action.

Instantiated mental acts and semantics
I observe in the world the object "house" and I observe in the world the attached label "this is a house". I perceive both the "house" and its label as objects. Both these objects are instantiated in my mind as concepts, the concept "house" and the associated concept "this is a house". IE, whether referring to the concrete or abstract, linguistic semantic entities are not of a different kind to non-linguistic physical entities, they are expressions of the same thing.

(I know I will be nearing a profound truth when you ask a 500 word question and I am able to give a 5 word answer.)

Without words, what is it that you're referring to the meaning of — Isaac

Even with the first human interaction with fire, perhaps 1.5 million years ago, fire would have had a meaning. Fire would have meant light and fire at night, protection against predatory animals and the smoke would have meant relief from insects. Even without words, the object fire would have had a meaning to these early humans.

psychological meaning which seems in opposition to semantic meaning — Isaac

Perhaps my distinction is along the lines of Frege's attack on Locke. For Locke, ideas exist independently of words, where words just serve as vehicles to ideas, whilst for Frege, meaning is in the structure of a sentence rather than any psychological state of the speaker or hearer.

For most of its existence, as sentient life has not had language, meaning cannot have come from semantics, but from the psychological state of mind.

He (Wittgenstein) everywhere undermines the notion of the meaning of a word, of a sentence — Banno

There are perhaps two aspects to meaning: the semantic abstraction and the psychological instantiation. Frege and Husserl insisted on a clear distinction between the semantic and the psychological, but semantic entities can only exist within instantiated mental acts.

Sentient life has existed on Earth for about 500 millions years, whereas language only developed about 200,000 years ago, meaning that sentient life has depended on psychological meaning for more than 99% of its existence, and has only used semantic meaning for less than 1% of its existence.

One pertinent question is whether semantic meaning grew out of psychological meaning, or is semantic meaning of a different kind to psychological meaning.

Because Wittgenstein has the position that meaning cannot be found in a semantic analysis of propositions independent of any user, but rather can only be discovered in how the user makes use of the propositions as part of an activity, this infers that for Wittgenstein, semantic meaning is no more than an expression of psychological meaning.

It follows that the semantic meaning of a word such as "house" is just an expression of the user's psychological meaning of the concept "house". IE, for the user, a semantic "house" is a psychological "house", where "is " is being used as equality rather than a copula

As sentient life has successful survived and evolved for more than 99% of its time on Earth
where meaning is psychological, and following Wittgenstein that semantic meaning is no more than an expression of psychological meaning, we might agree with Wittgenstein that meaning can be understood purely in psychological terms.

Do you have to name a rock to know about rocks? — Harry Hindu

Naming
I was thinking of "naming" more of an act of defining something rather than describing something - more "I name this ship Queen Elizabeth" than the name of this object is a rock.

Parts and the whole
A table is the relationship between a table top and four legs. Mereologically speaking, an object composed of a table top and the Eiffel Tower is as ontologically real as an object composed of a table top and four legs.

Objects
I observe the world. I observe the parts within the world, and observe that there is an almost infinite number of relationships between these parts. Each possible relationship will create a unique ontological object.

Names
Through observation, I discover a particular object. If the object is useful to me, I invent a name to give to the object in order to label that the object is useful. I don't need to name the object to know the object, as I know the object in discovering the relationship between its parts. IE, names in my language signify that the object they are attached to are useful to me in some way.

how could you show that you know a language without using it? — Banno

Language and use
If I had lived amongst the Neanderthals, I could looked around me and named every object I saw - rock, water, gazelle, etc. This would be my language, albeit simple. I could remain an observer of the objects and never use my knowledge of their names, in which case I could have had a language without ever using it. It may be that after a while that I realized that having given names to objects around me would be of practical use, in that I may want someone to bring me water. IE, I had learnt a language before I had any use for it

Language, meaning and use
Wittgenstein said in sect. 43 of Philosophical Investigations that “For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”
Wittgenstein also denied there was such a thing as identity - i) to say two things are identical is nonsense - ii) to say one thing is identical with itself is to say nothing.
I have a language consisting of the words rock, water, gazelle, etc. As Wittgenstein says, the word "water" has no meaning in itself, it only has meaning for me if I have a use for it, in that water means the abeyance of thirst, the presence of fish, etc. IE - i) I can have a language without it meaning anything - ii) a language only has meaning if it is useful.

Language and meaning
A Neanderthal may not have had a brain with the level of complexity required for modern speech, even though the Neanderthal had had the the physical apparatus for speech. But even without any words to describe their feelings, the sight of a woolly mammoth bearing down on them would certainly have meant something. IE, there can be meaning without language.

"first meaning" — Dawnstorm

I don't find Davidson's sentences the clearest.

Basic linguistic competence
It seems that principles 1, 2 and 3 set out the "basic linguistic competence", meaning a basic knowledge of linguistic conventions. (p. 254)

What does Davidson mean by "first meaning" ?
Consider the malapropism "we're all cremated equal". Initially, Davidson's "first meaning" could mean either - i) what the speaker intended to say "we're all created equal" or - ii) what the words literally mean - "we're all cremated equal". However, Davidson's principle 1 says that a competent interpreter will be able to interpret words independent of the speaker's meaning, meaning that "first meaning" reduces down to what the words literally mean, their normal or standard dictionary definition, ie, cremated means cremated.

Ambiguities and principles 1, 2 and 3
Consider the ambiguity "I saw the chair", where chair could refer to a piece of furniture or a person heading a committee. Davidson says that ambiguities can be resolved within principles 1, 2 and 3 within a "basic linguistic competence". IE, we can consider the full linguistic context using linguistic conventions, "I saw the chair, and he spoke to me"and conclude that here "chair" means a person heading a committee.

Malapropisms and principles 1, 2 and 3
Davidson says that malapropisms such as "we're all cremated equal" cannot be resolved within the conventions of "basic linguistic competence", in that there are no sets of words, that can determine whether "cremated" in "we're all cremated equal" means cremated or created. May or may not be true, however, to resolve the meaning of "we're all cremated equal" we need to look outside of linguistic conventions. Outside of linguistic conventions are social conventions, in that if the speaker of the sentence "we're all cremated equal" is wearing a black suit and black top hat then we can reasonably determine that cremated means cremated and resolve the malapropism.

Conclusion
Davidson does not seem to be distinguishing between linguistic conventions that are internal to the utterance and social conventions that are external to the utterance. As Davidson seems to be equating "convention" with linguistic convention, his conclusion on page 265 may be read as saying - "as we cannot understand language using linguistic convention alone, we should ignore linguistic convention" - which I don't think is a reasonable approach.

Basically, with Gricean non-natural meanings, you need conventions to fix truth values, or else you have just unstructured conflict. — Dawnstorm

Yes, when I hear someone say something like "I dance the flamingo", in order to understand what they mean I need some knowledge of social context, some knowledge of the social conventions that have to do with language. Accepting also that in practice social conventions aren't absolute but dependent on lasting consensus and without conventions to fix truth values you have just unstructured conflict.

Following on from this, I don't agree with Davidson's conclusion that "we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions" (p. 265), as although he may illustrate why conventions cannot give absolute interpretations, he doesn't show that conventions are not able to illuminate communication.

codification would be inadequate — Banno

Whilst conventions internal and external to an utterance have the potential to be studied and codified, I agree that any codification of such conventions would be inadequate to result in single and fixed interpretations, but, however, would be adequate to result in reasonable interpretations.

Therefore, I still disagree with Davidson's conclusion that "we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions" (p. 265), as even conventions
that may only enable reasonable interpretations are better than no conventions at all.

RussellA - The main difference as I see it is that both conventions internal and external to an utterance have the potential to be studied and codified, whereas prior and passing theories haven't.

The present article seeks to show that theories based on convention are doomed to be incomplete, because they will necessarily be unable to deal with novel and eccentric uses — Banno

It is true that theories based on convention are doomed to be incomplete, but, pragmatically, no-one needs conventions to be 100% complete. I probably only understand less than 10% of the conventions around me, but that is more than enough for me to have managed to have got through life. Most of what people experience in the world is novel to them, the trick is to keep those conventions that allow one to cope with novel situations and discard those conventions that cannot. In life, conventions are always being undermined to be replaced by new ones, but as long as one group of people follow the same convention at the same time, then conventions serve their purpose. Conventions are more guidelines than algorithms.

I take it that you think convention can be saved — Banno

As regards internal conventions, syntax and semantics, they are saved in books and articles on linguistics. As regards external conventions, that Goodman Ace was a humourist, people smile whan making a joke, they are saved in society - in personal memories, books, magazines, television shows, films, stories, etc

Are internal and external conventions immune to malapropisms? — Banno

It is not so much that internal conventions are immune to malapropisms, as internal conventions include within its framework the possibility of an expression being a malapropism. Internal conventions of syntax and semantics establishes a framework within which an expression, such as "cross my eyes and hope to die" (p. 251) has a set of possible meanings - malapropism, irony, pun, hyperbole, lie, etc. To know which particular meaning, one then has to consider the external conventions.

It is not so much that external conventions are immune to malapropisms, as external conventions include the knowledge within its framework that humourists use malapropisms. External conventions within society establishes a framework within which we know that humourists such as Goodman Ace use a wide variety of linguistic tools, including malapropisms, irony, etc. Using our Shelockian proficiency of observation, deduction, forensic science, and logical reasoning, we investigate the physical context around Goodman Ace's utterance, such as prior sentences, speed of pronunciation, tone of voice, pitch of voice, audience reaction, etc and determine from our knowledge of the conventions of the world that he has most likely used a malapropism rather than a pun, for example.

Russell A - "However, we should perhaps consider two types of conventions, those internal to the utterance and those external to the utterance"

Isn't that the same as the distinction between prior and passing theory? — Banno

The main difference as I see it is that both conventions internal and external to an utterance have the potential to be studied and codified, whereas prior and passing theories haven't. As Davidson says "Neither the prior theory nor the passing theory describes what we would call the language a person knows" (262)

Internal conventions is the study of rules , principles, and processes, ie, a knowledge of syntax and sematic possibilities.
Whereas for the prior theory, as Davidson says "An interpreter must be expected to have quite different prior theories for different speakers" (p. 262)

External conventions are about physicalities in the world external to language that can be objectively observed and studied across a wide range of speakers, in that the speaker's tone of voice, for example, has a measurable objective existence.
Whereas for the passing theory, as Davidson says "For there are no rules for arriving at passing theories" (p. 265)

Because in interpreting the meaning of the utterance I have relied on many extra-linguistic facts — Srap Tasmaner

This 'what cannot be said' is precisely the 'non-linguistic' element inherent in all use of language, and as such, co-extensive of it. Hence Davidson's conclusion: "we should realize that we have abandoned not only the ordinary notion of a language, but we have erased the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally" — StreetlightX

This might be sufficient to reinstate the relevance of malapropisms — Banno

It may be that malapropisms are part of the problem, but they could also be part of the solution.

Davidson concludes his article by saying that "we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions" (p. 265)

However - we should perhaps consider two types of conventions - those internal to the utterance and those external to the utterance

When we hear an expression - "A nice derangement of epitaphs" - it is true that there are initially many possible interpretations - it could be a malapropism, it could be ironic, a pun, a hyperbole, a lie, a reference or an attribution or simply explained by a standard dictionary definition. It is true there are no conventions internal to the expression that gives us any information as to which of these it is.

However - we need to consider conventions external to the expression in order to discover a reasonable interpretation. For example, our prior knowledge of the speaker, the speaker's tone of voice, the speaker's state of mind, the location of the utterance, whether in a bus station or comedy club, etc.

Yes, as Davidson said "but we have erased the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally" (p 265)

The argument seems at first blush to be that malapropisms cannot, by their very nature, be subsumed and accounted for by such conventions of language. Is that the whole of Davidson's argument, and is it cogent? — Banno

I agree with the concept of Wittgenstein's family resemblance, and I agree with Davidson's conclusion "We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases", but I don't agree with Davidson's use of the malapropism to argue his case.

Consider the malapropism "I dance the flamingo", which is linked with "I dance the flamenco"

The quality of malapropism isn't exhibited in a single word or phrase, such as "flamingo"

The quality of malapropism isn't exhibited in a single sentence, as a sentence such as "I dance the flamingo" is just as meaningful as the sentence "I dance the flamenco"

Malapropism is exhibited in the relationship between two sentences, in that a sentence exhibits malapropism if it is different to the sentence the interpreter was expecting.

When Davidson says "malapropisms introduce expressions not covered by prior learning", it is true the relationship between the two sentences hasn't been covered by prior learning, but it isn't true that a malapropism introduces an expression (defined as a word or phrase used to convey an idea) not covered by prior learning

As the quality of a malapropism is in the relationship between two sentences, malapropism is included within Principle (1), as Principle (1) is about relationships. "Principle 1) requires a competent interpreter to be prepared to interpret utterances of sentences he or she has never heard uttered before", and "there is no clear upper limit to the number of sentences utterances of which can be interpreted"

Davidson is therefore incorrect when he says, in discussing Principles 1), 2) and 3), "malapropisms fall into a different category".

In summary, malapropism isn't relevant to the case he is arguing.