None of it explains the difference between direct and indirect, which is what I expressed confusion about..On the surface, it seems to ask if I am a realist about mind dependent experiences..................Unlike red and pain, the brick has a potential of being a thing in itself, not just an ideal. So not so similarly.................... whether the pain of another is in the same world as you...........................To say something (apple) is red is seemingly to say that the apple (ding an sich) is experience, quite the idealistic assertion, and realism only of experience, not of actual apples. — noAxioms

From Wikipedia - Direct and indirect realism

Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework. Conversely, direct realism postulates that conscious subjects view the world directly, treating concepts as a 1:1 correspondence.

Suppose someone sees a red, rectangular brick. Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist would agree that there is a thing-in-itself in a mind-independent world that is causing that person to see a red, rectangular brick (ignoring the special cases of dreams and hallucinations).

However, the Direct Realist would say that the thing-in-itself is red, rectangular and a brick, as the colour red, the shape rectangular and the object brick exist in a mind-independent world. The Indirect Realist would say that they don't know the true nature of the thing-in-itself, as all they know are their subjective experiences.

I put my hand in a fire and feel pain. As an Indirect Realist, I say that the pain only exists in my mind and not in any thing-in-itself. I look at a brick and see the colour red. As an Indirect Realist, I also say that the colour red only exists in my mind and not in any thing-in-itself.

Suppose you have the subjective experiences of pain and the colour red. Presumably you believe that pain only exists in a mind and not a mind-independent world.

What argument would a Direct Realist make to justify that the colour red exists in a mind-independent world, when their only experience of the colour red is in their mind as a subjective experience?

When I see someone in pain, are they and their pain not in this same shared world my mind exists in? — Harry Hindu

We directly see the consequence of pain, such as someone grimacing. We don't directly see the pain.

Suppose I see the colour red. If I were a Direct Realist, I think that I would say that the colour red exists in a mind-independent world. As an Indirect Realist, I say that something in the world caused me to see the colour red, but whatever that something is, there is no reason to believe that it was the colour red.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication......................Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa — noAxioms

For Meinong, existence is a property. For the EPP, existence is prior to properties. It seems that two senses of "exist" are being used.

Meining seems to be naming something "exist", "subsist" and "absist" rather than describing something that is "existing", "subsisting" or "absisting".

For Meinong, within the mind are intentional acts towards objects.

Sense one of exist
The name "horse" can be given to objects having the properties hoofed, a mammal and long mane. "A horse" may be defined as "hoofed, a mammal and has a long mane".

Meinong gives the name "existing" to objects of intention such as a horse. Therefore, an object of intention such as a horse may be defined as "existing" as well as having the property existing.

He also gives the name "subsist" to those objects such as Sherlock Holmes, and the name "absist" to those objects such as the round square.

Because Meinong gives the name "existing" to objects of intention such as a horse, it becomes both a property of and a definition of objects of intention such as a horse.

In this sense of "exist", exist is a property.

Sense two of exist
However, there is another sense of exist, that of the Existential Generalization, whereby Fa → ∃x (Fx). If a is F then there exists something that is F.

For example, if something is hoofed, a mammal and has a long mane, then there exists something that is hoofed, a mammal and has a long mane.

Similarly, if something is existing (sense one), then there exists (sense two) something that is existing (sense one)

In conclusion, it seems that two senses of existing are being used.

Meinong's Theory

As for the three classifications, subsist and absist seem identical except for the whole 'logically possible' distinction — noAxioms

That objects that subsist, such as numbers and Sherlock Holmes, are logically possible and objects that absist, such as a square circle or A being not-A, are not logically possible, makes subsist and absist very different.
===============================================================================

What is "has a negation"? — noAxioms

See Russell's Theory of Descriptions 2 - Frege & Meinong

For "exist", a horse may exist or not exist in the field.
For "subsist", Sherlock Holmes may subsist or not subsist at 221B Baker Street
For "absist", as everything absists, there can be no negation.
===============================================================================

Where does combustion fit in? — noAxioms

See Mehrdad Jazayeri

A thought can be a physical process or a physical part. A car can be a physical process, such as turning the wheel, going from A to B, and doesn't have mass. A car can be a physical part, such as wheels and an engine, which does have mass.

Then combustion as a physical part would "exist" and combustion as a physical process would "subsist"
===============================================================================

The target may or may not be an object (doing arithmetic is not an object target) — noAxioms

For Meinong, as I understand it, numbers are objects that subsist, rather than exist or absist. This is just how Meinong is defining the meaning of "object"
===============================================================================

An object to instantiate the thought. Kind of presumptuous, but I'll accept it. The wording above suggests that the thought itself is an object and is not simply implemented by one. — noAxioms

For Meinong, the target of a mental act, such as a thought, is an object, even if that object is a number. This is how Meinong is using the term "object".

From SEP - Alexius Meinong

Whatever can be experienced in some way, i.e., be the target of a mental act, Meinong calls an object [Gegenstand or Objekt].

The target of a mental act is an object. As the target of a mental act cannot be itself, a mental act cannot be an object.

I never really got the distinction between direct and indirect realism. Sure, I know what the words mean, but 'direct' makes it sound like there's not a causal chain between the apple and your experience of it. — noAxioms

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist believe that there is a direct causal chain between the thing-in-itself in the world and the experience of it in your mind.

You see the colour red. Assume that this is not a dream or hallucination, but that there is a thing-in-itself in the world that directly caused you to experience the colour red. Would you say that because you experience the colour red, the colour red must exist in the world?

Similarly, because you experience pain, would you also say that pain exists in the world?

Similarly, because you experience the appearance of a brick, would you say that bricks exist in the world?

Existence

By what definition of 'exist' does the horse exist?......................Does an absisting thing need to be contradictory? If not, then why not pick a less contradictory example such as Tom Sawyer?...............................More to the point, he also says that there are things not in reality that nevertheless have properties. A square circle is round for instance.....................Meinong seems to confine the usage of the word to things designated as 'objects' that have a property (among others) of location. — noAxioms

I thought I knew what was happening until I started to read www.ontology.co/meinonga.htm

For Meinong, Tom Sawyer would be an example of "subsist".

I assume that "reality" is being used to refer to a mind-independent world, even though thoughts can be described as real and take place only in the mind.

As I see it, for Meinong, an object either exists, subsist or absists. All objects have properties.

This division seems sensible to me, yet generally attacked, which makes me think I don't understand Meinong's Theory. For example, Bertrand Russell attacked Meinong's Theory by saying that an object being both round and square would break the law of Non-contradiction. Yet Meinong never said that a round square exists, he said that a round square absists, and there is no reason why a round square cannot absist. It all depends on what "absists" means.

Sense 1 - exist.
i) such as a horse, ii) has a negation, iii) temporal and spatial, iv) Meinong must be using the word "exist" to refer to objects in the world. I would say that "thoughts exist", but Meinong is using the word "exist" in a particular way.

Sense 2 - subsist
i) aka as being, ii) such as Sherlock Holmes, numbers, iii) non-existent, iv) has a negation, v) non-temporal and non-spatial, vi) "subsist" must refer to objects in the mind, such as Sherlock Holmes. Objects that don't exist in the world, but objects that are logically possible in the world.

Sense 3 - absist
i) such as the round square, ii) non-existent, iii) as every possible object absists, there can be no negation, iv) non-temporal and non-spatial, v) "absist" must also refer to objects in the mind, such as the round square. Objects that don't exist in the world, because logically impossible in the world.

Meinong said that existence is a property. However, this leads to a contradiction in sense 2 of subsist. As Bertrand Russell pointed out, an object that subsists doesn't exist, but it still has properties, and if existence is a property, then this means that an object that doesn't exist must exist.

Meinong is using the word "exist" in a particular way, as something that obtains in the world rather than mind.

Knowledge

It originates from our experiences, which in turn originate from what has caused them. This wording presumes that our experiences are caused, already a bias. — noAxioms

As an Indirect Realist, I don't know that some mind-independent thing-in-itself caused my (EDIT) experiences, but I believe that they did. This is my working hypothesis until proved wrong.

Yes, I want a definition consistent with a model, and not based on the knowledge that led to the model. — noAxioms

Are you saying that on the one hand you want a definition of "existence" consistent with your knowledge of what you experience yet on the other hand you want a definition of "existence" not based on your knowledge about your experiences.

This breaks the Law of Non Contradiction.

The "brick" is a total mental abstraction. The brick isn't, and the abstraction lets us know something about the latter, but hardly all of it. — noAxioms

In your mind the "brick" is a mental abstraction, a concept. When you see a brick, you are directly observing an appearance. You are not directly observing the thing-in-itself that caused the appearance. You are directly observing one particular instantiation of your concept of a "brick".

Properties

You brought up 'thoughts', a good example. They're not objects, nor are they distinct. They do have properties. — noAxioms

For Meinong, the target of a mental act, an intentional act, is an "object" (Wikipedia - Alexius Meinong)

Suppose I thought about the object the Giza Pyramid. The Giza Pyramid has the property of being heavy. Does that mean my thought about the Giza Pyramid must also be heavy?

That the object of thought has a property doesn't mean that my thought has a property.

Good, We agree on that. — noAxioms

It depends on whether we are talking about Meinong or everyday life.

In the context of Meinong, all our mental intentions are of objects, meaning that there cannot be any absence of objects.

In the context of everyday life, one can imagine a space in which there are no objects. It seems to me that space has the property of extension and time has the property of duration, meaning that even in the absence of objects there will still be properties

It depends on the definition of "object"

Properties can be assigned to nonexistent objects such as Santa, God and time. — Corvus

It seems to me that, when discussing Meinong, the word "exist" is only used when referring to the world, not the mind. I would say that thoughts exist, but this doesn't seem how the word "exist" is being used.

Therefore, for Meinong, as regards the world, although Santa is non-existent, Santa does have "being". Properties can be assigned to objects that have being, such as Santa.

Can there be existence of properties where there is absence of object? For instance, time? — Corvus

For Meinong, in the world an object may exist, such as a horse, may subsist, such as a number or absist, such as a round square. Objects have properties. Therefore, there is no instance in the world where there is not an object, where there is an absence of objects, an absence of properties.

Otherwise, one can imagine a space empty of objects, where this space passes through time. Space has the property of being extended. Time has the property of duration. Therefore, in the absence of objects there will still be properties.

The impossibility of knowing the thing-in-itself

It is said that reality is stranger than can be conceived, and I get that. I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich. — noAxioms

Everything we know about the "world" comes from our experiences. From these experiences we can make a consistent model of the "world". But this model originates from our experiences, not from what has caused our experiences.

I agree when you say "I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich" but this is at odds when you say "Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition."

We can only ever know our experiences, never the thing-in-itself independent of our experiences.

As the consistent model exists in our minds, any understanding we have of existence must also exist in our minds. This makes it impossible to be able to understand the nature of existence independently of how we understand the nature of existence in our minds.

1) a brick hits me in the head. The brick does not depend on our mental abstractions, yet I know about the brick (presuming I'm not knocked out cold). — noAxioms

Through your visual experiences you experience on a number of different occasions a rectangular shape that is red. Because of the consistency in your visual observations, a rectangular shape that is red has the name "a brick".

On one particular occasion you see one particular instantiation of "a brick" and feel a pain in your head. You know the concept "a brick" and you know the relation between a pain in your head and seeing one particular instantiation of "a brick".

All these exist in your mind. The "brick" is a concept, a mental abstraction.

Does Meinong's "being" mean anything?

Subsist: Seems mostly abstract: Numbers, mathematics, and such. Meinong seems to give them a sort of being of their own, mind-independent, so the word isn't idealistic in nature. Still, is subsistence prior to mathematical truths? What would he say?.................................He allows predication on nonexistent 'objects' such as Santa. — noAxioms

For Meinong there are three kinds of objects. Those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist. All these objects have properties.

Those objects that subsist, such as numbers and Santa have non-existence and being.

There is a problem with Meinong's meaning of "existence". Presumably the word "existence" is being used to describe things in a world independent of the mind rather than being used to describe things in the mind. However, I would say that "thoughts exist", and I have always used the word" exist" to refer to things that exist not only in the mind but also in the world. However, it seems that in any discussion about Meinong, the word "exist" is being restricted to things in the world.

For me, it seems clear that Santa exists in the mind and doesn't exist in the world. But Meinong says that although Santa doesn't exist in the world, has a non-existence in the world, Santa has "being" in the world. This makes no sense to me. Just because I say "the moon is made of blue cheese" doesn't mean that the moon is made of blue cheese. Just because Meinong might say "Santa has being in the world" doesn't mean that Santa has being in the world.

Anyone can say anything, Sometimes they say true things and sometimes they say false things. Perhaps this is the case for Santa's being in the world.

Is a lack of properties a property?

Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that...self-referencing properties have always had the potential for paradox — noAxioms

The statement "a lack of properties is itself a property" breaks the Law of Non-contradiction. From the Law of Non-contradiction, A cannot be not A. Let A be the presence of a property.

Then the absence of a property cannot be the presence of a property.

This presumes EPP. — noAxioms

For Meinong there are three types of objects. Objects that exist, such as horses. Objects that subsist such as numbers. Objects that absist such as the round square.

Therefore, for Meinong, everything in reality is a kind of object. There is nothing in reality that is not an object. All these objects have properties. Therefore there is nothing in reality that doesn't have a property.

Therefore, for Meinong, in reality there cannot be an absence of properties.

But in UK, the public and the law seem to regard them as just usual perks of the job. Would it be the case? — Corvus

In case a moderator is reading this, the OP needs an understanding of what is true and what is false, what is better and what is worse. The OP is about the morality of man's behaviour. The following is an example of morality.

The politicians always argue that these perks are within the "law" which may well be the case, but I am sure that the public find such behaviour disgraceful.

Who would not buy their own glasses!

The issue that has emerged with these particular glasses in recent days is that they were not bought out of Starmer’s own pocket. He received a donation in May — while still in opposition — to the tune of £2,485 from Waheed Alli, a businessman and Labour peer, for “multiple pairs of glasses”.

That being legal doesn't make it moral.

Genuine practice of democracy is rare. Due to the fact, most preachers of democracy give impressions of false pretense and their ignorance. — Corvus

Yes, on the one hand Keir Starmer said 4 January 2024 that he would clean up politics.

No. I say to all my fellow politicians – Labour and Tory – to change Britain, we must change ourselves. We need to clean up politics. No more VIP fast lanes. No more kickbacks for colleagues. No more revolving doors between government and the companies they regulate. I will restore standards in public life with a total crackdown on cronyism.

On the other hand, he accepted gifts from Labour peer Lord Alli.

Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer received an additional £16,000 worth of clothes from Labour peer Lord Alli, it has emerged. The donations, first reported by the Guardian, external, were initially declared as money for his private office as leader of the opposition. The gifts - of £10,000 in October 2023 and £6,000 in February this year - were declared on time, but will now be re-categorised as donations in kind of clothing.

Hence the reason why you should keep distance from the fallacy of authority or majority — Corvus

The will of the majority is the worst form of government there is apart from for all the other systems of government which have been tried.

"Democracy Is the Worst Form of Government Except For All Others Which Have Been Tried"

Winston Churchill 1947:

Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time; but there is the broad feeling in our country that the people should rule, continuously rule, and that public opinion, expressed by all constitutional means, should shape, guide, and control the actions of Ministers who are their servants and not their masters.

The contents and states of one's subjective and private mental experience cannot be presented as the basis of the objective evidence in the arguments — Corvus

If in a room of 100 people, 1 person says that they see the ghost of Napoleon, but the other 99 say that they don't, then this is objective evidence that that 1 person is suffering an hallucination.

I agree that the subjective mental experience of a single person cannot be presented as objective evidence, but the subjective mental experience of 99 people in agreement can be presented as objective evidence.

The more people in agreement, the less subjective the evidence and the more objective.

A thing having a property is an entirely different subject than something's knowledge of a property. Whether the property is conceived of or not seems off topic. — noAxioms

But how can you know about the properties of a thing-in-itself if you have no knowledge of the thing-in-itself?

Going down this path is once again why the disclaimer is there in the OP. I see no productivity to it. — noAxioms

Our only knowledge comes from mental abstractions.

Metaphysically speaking, how can we know something that doesn't depend on our mental abstractions? If metaphysically impossible, the disclaimer in the OP makes the OP unanswerable.

So, it is not bad thing to have the strict legal system in some aspect, would you not agree? — Corvus

I agree, as long as society thinks that a strict legal system is moral.

Hallucination is not extreme case. It is a subjective case. — Corvus

The Argument from Hallucination against Direct Realism is making an objective case against Direct Realism.

Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that. — noAxioms

I don't think that it is grammatically correct to say that a lack of properties is itself a property.

Both the EPP and Meinong accept that properties are attributed to objects. A property is any member of a class of entities that are capable of being attributed to objects (Wikipedia - Property (philosophy). The EPP means that the existence of an object is prior to the object's predication. Meinong said that there are three types of objects, those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist.

Objects have properties. In the absence of properties there must be an absence of an object. In the absence of an object there must be an absence of properties. Therefore, in the absence of properties there must be the absence of any property

For the EPP, the lack of properties means the lack of any property. For Meinong, the lack of properties means the lack of any object, which means the lack of any property. Therefore, the lack of properties cannot be a property.

It wouldn't be accepted as valid or meaningful arguments on the basis of either non relevant or highly unlikely example. — Corvus

Hardly highly unlikely. "In the 21st century, hudud, including amputation of limbs, is part of the legal systems of Brunei, Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen" (www.studycountry.com)

Again, the other party can reject the arguments on the basis of highly unlikely example or irrelevant example for the main point. — Corvus

Direct Realists may reject the Argument from Hallucination, but many Indirect Realists accept it as a valid argument.

Appealing to Extremes is a formal fallacy. — Corvus

Being an extreme case doesn't in itself make a logical fallacy.

I agree that an extreme case, where an argument is exaggerated to such a hyperbolic degree that it distorts the argument, would be a logical fallacy.

However, an extreme case, where an argument is not exaggerated to such a hyperbolic degree that it distorts the argument, would not be a logical fallacy.

The Argument from hallucination deals with an extreme case and is used as an argument against Direct Realism. That it is an extreme case does not mean that it is not a valid argument.

Isn't the law formally accepted legal system by the people of the society? — Corvus

I don't think that society would willingly accept a legal system that was immoral. I have no evidence, but I am sure that this is the case.

Isn't this an appeal to extreme case fallacy? — Corvus

Being an extreme case doesn't make it a fallacy.

Good point, so long as 'properties' isn't confined to your experience. — noAxioms

The problem is that it is impossible to talk about properties independent of our experiences of them.

The question is about the relationship between existence and properties. But what do we mean by "properties". You raise the problem as to how we can know something that is outside our experiences.

However, you present an impossible task when you say "Good point, as long as "properties isn't confined to your experience", in that how can we discuss something that we have never experienced. We can only talk about things we have experienced. We cannot talk about things we haven't experienced. We can only talk about those aspects of properties that we have experienced. We cannot talk about those aspect of properties that we haven't experienced

Kant made the point when he said that we cannot discuss things-in-themselves, as they are the other side of anything we experience. Something outside our experiences is an unknown, and if unknown, we cannot talk about it. It is impossible to know about something about which we have no experience. It is impossible to know how those aspects of properties we have experienced relate to those aspects of properties we haven't experienced.

When we do discuss properties, we can only discuss those aspects of the property that we know about, and we can only know something by experiencing it. There may well be aspects of the property that we haven't experienced, but these aspects must remain unknown to us. Being unknown, we cannot talk about them. Everything we know about our experiences we can describe in words as part of language. The properties we describe in language only includes those aspects of properties that we have experienced.

We only know about properties because of our experiences. Because we have experienced the colour red, we are able to talk about the property of redness. We are only able to describe the properties we have experienced in words, within language, and this surely is the distinguishing feature of what we know about properties. Everything we know about properties can be described in words. For us, a property is a description. We can only describe what we have experienced.

A property is a description in language of something we have experienced. A property is not something that exists independently of the human mind in the mind-independent world. Such a thing would be a thing-in-itself, an unknown unknown.

What we mean by "properties" is of necessity confined to our experiences, and exist as propositions within language.

Morality only judges the moral actions of the folks. Legality judges the acts and also hand down the punishments according the law, hence legality precedes morality. — Corvus

The law could state that the punishment for stealing anything valued up to £50 was the amputation of the right hand.

You are right that the law judges the act and hands down a punishment according to the law.

Are you arguing that a particular law must be followed by a society even if that society believes that that particular law is morally wrong?

Isn't it itself an act of moral wrongness to break the law, revolt and overthrow the system? — Corvus

No, as only moral laws are valid. It is not morally wrong to break a law that itself is not moral.

I agree that it is the moral thing to do to follow the laws of the country.

However, the assumption is that laws are founded on moral principles. Only laws founded on moral principles are valid laws. If a law is not founded on moral principles then it is an invalid law. Therefore, the moral thing to do is to follow valid laws, and valid laws are founded on principles of morality. It is not immoral to not follow invalid laws, those laws that are not based on principles of morality.

Breaking a law not founded on moral principles is not morally wrong.

You have options to get adjusted to the system whatever system you live in, and flourish under the system knowing it and abiding by it — Corvus

Even if the system is morally wrong? In abiding by a system that is morally wrong, then one is condoning it, meaning that abiding to a morally wrong system is in itself an immoral act.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat — noAxioms

What does prior in "existence is prior to predication" mean?

From SEP - Existence

There are two sets of reasons for denying that existence is a property of individuals. The first is Hume and Kant's puzzlement over what existence would add to an object. What is the difference between a red apple and a red existing apple? To be red (or even to be an apple) it must already exist, as only existing things instantiate properties

The thing's existence is prior to any predication to it and so it is incoherent to think of existence as a property had by the thing. This thought is behind Aristotle's thesis that existence is not a further feature of a thing beyond its essence.

Hume argued (in A Treatise of Human Nature 1.2.6) that there is no impression of existence distinct from the impression of an object, which is ultimately on Hume's view a bundle of qualities.

From Merriam Webster, "prior" may mean i) earlier in time or order ii) taking precedence (as in importance).

For an apple to be red, the apple must exist.

It cannot be the case that an apple exists and at a later time the property "is red" is added, so meaning i) is not relevant.

In Hume's view, existence is no more than a bundle of properties. Therefore for Hume, ii) is not relevant.

We can only know about the existence of something in the world by observing its properties. If we never observed the property red we could never know about the existence of an apple in the world.

In what way does the existence of something take precedence over its properties, when that something cannot exist without properties?

Looking at it the other way round, in what way do the properties of something take precedence over the existence of that something, when there would be no properties if that something didn't exist?

It seems, that the word "prior" is not the correct word in relating the existence of something with the properties it has. Perhaps the phrase should be "existence requires predication"?

Humans are more important. — Patterner

For humans, humans are more important than cats.
For cats, cats are more important than mice.
For mice, mice are more important than cockroaches
For cockroaches, cockroaches are more important than bed bugs.

Philosophically, is it right that one part of nature is more important than another part of nature?

Why do you think that is the case? Does morality precede legality? Or vice versa? — Corvus

It is the moral thing that morality precedes legality, even if that is not always the case.

I don't think the public would accept a legal system that was not fundamentally moral. Sooner or later they would revolt and overthrow the system.

If you are a citizen of a country, then would you have choice not to accept the legal system? — Corvus

True. I have no choice, regardless of whether I believe the system to be immoral or not. Though I could emigrate.

That's why the difference between being able to judge and not being able to judge is more philosophically important than the difference between the electron and the Higgs Boson. — Patterner

That means that philosophical questions about the nature of time, space and the Universe are less important than philosophical questions about the human mind.

Is it right that humans consider themselves more important than the world in which they live?

But that's completely groundless speculation. — Wayfarer

Perhaps, but as you correctly wrote:

The capacity to grasp what could be, might be, or should be, is what distinguishes humans from other species — Wayfarer

As to why the ability to judge should be argued to be of special importance—it very obviously is — Janus

Why is the ability to judge of "special" importance? I agree that it is an important philosophical question, but why more important than other philosophical questions, such as those of space, time, existence, consciousness, the quantum theory, knowledge, the origin of the Universe, etc?

Is there a philosophical difference between the electron and the Higgs Boson? — Patterner

A very good philosophical question. The philosophy of particle physics is an academic topic.

For example, the Cambridge University press has a series about elements in the philosophy of physics.

From Philosophy of Particle Physics

This Element offers an introduction to selected philosophical issues that arise in contemporary particle physics, aimed at philosophers who have limited prior exposure to quantum field theory. One the one hand, it critically surveys philosophical work on the representation of particles in quantum field theory, the formal machinery and conceptual implications of renormalization and renormalization group methods, and ontological and methodological questions raised by the use of effective field theory techniques in particle physics. On the other, it identifies topics in particle physics that have not yet received philosophical attention and sketches avenues for philosophical analysis of those topics.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

I believe that for Bertrand Russell, there is something that is an apple and is red.

Being an apple is a predication in the same way that being red is a predication.

Should one say existence is prior to predication or existence is contemporaneous with its predication?

It is not as if something exists and then at a future date a predication is attached.

Certainly, mortality is relative. But I'm suggesting there's a common reason for all morality.........................Perhaps moral codes are all rooted in what gives the individual the best chance of continued life and prosperity. — Patterner

Moral absolutism is a meta ethical view that some or even all actions are intrinsically right or wrong, regardless of context or consequence (Wikipedia - Moral absolutism)

Is it possible for a moral code to be intrinsically right, even though it may not give the individual the best chance of continued life and prosperity?

That process is nothing to do with morality. — Corvus

I agree that once the criminal laws have been established, it then becomes a legal rather than moral judgment.

But the criminal justice system will only work if the criminal laws are moral.

Would you accept as a citizen of a country criminal laws that were not moral?

The punishment is a legal judgement. It has nothing to do with morality. — Corvus

Yes, legal judgments are different to moral judgements. But as bread is different to wheat, bread is made from wheat. Legal judgements are founded in moral judgments. Any law not judged to be moral would be unacceptable

From Law vs. Ethics: The Debate Over What’s Legal and What’s Right

While the law functions as a system of rules backed by political authority to maintain order, ethics is a broader concept grounded in personal, cultural, and societal values.

Law is a formal system of rules enforced by governmental institutions. The law’s objective is to maintain social order, protect rights, and promote justice.

Justice, after all, is a product of moral values.

The protection of rights is a moral duty.

Social order is the moral thing to achieve.

If Legal judgment is not founded on moral judgment, where does legal judgment get its authority?

Perhaps moral codes are all rooted in what gives the individual the best chance of continued life and prosperity. — Patterner

Moral Relativism rather than Moral Absolutism.

Moral normativity is effective for the time period and the societies we live in...................That would be a fallacy of anachronism. — Corvus

OK, lets consider 2025 and avoid anachronism.

Stoning to death is a legal punishment for adultery in Iran, and therefore normative within Iran today (Wikipedia - Capital punishment in Iran).

Some within Iran may disagree with this law. That some disagree with the moral normativity of the society that they live in, does it follow that this makes them necessarily morally corrupt or morally insensitive?

Of course there would be folks who don't agree, or understand the maxim...In that case, they would be treated as morally corrupt or morally insensitive......................Morality is also based on what is called "normativity" — Corvus

Slavery was normative in Ancient Rome and played an important role in its society and economy (Wikipedia - Slavery in ancient Rome)

It may well be that the minority who did not agree with slavery were treated as morally corrupt or morally insensitive by the majority

But does that mean that they were in fact either morally corrupt or morally insensitive?