Typically, we don't each play our own individual language-games. It isn't that I have my own concept of slab and you have yours. — Luke

How can you know my concept of Slab? How do you know that our concepts of a "slab" are the same? My Form of Life has been unique to me, the jobs I have had, the countries I have visited. This is the point of Wittgenstein's family resemblances, in that there is no one standard example of a "slab" sitting in a Government Building ready for inspection.

We can agree to the dictionary definition of a slab as i) a large, thick, flat piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape ii) a large, thick slice or piece of cake, bread, chocolate, etc, iii) an outer piece of timber sawn from a log, but many don't see the value in definitions. Definitions can end up circular and change with time.

You wouldn't get very far in the builder's language-game if you repeatedly fetched a hammer in response to the command "Slab!". — Luke

I feel the same in the philosopher's language game.

You are talking about us each having our own private language. Wittgenstein took issue with that idea. — Luke

If concepts didn't exist in the mind, but only in a community, such a community would be a community of zombies, none having a private concept or private sensation.

Cavell in The Later Wittgenstein makes the point that Wittgenstein never denied that we have private thoughts and feelings

Other philosophers, I believe, are under the impression that Wittgenstein denies that we can know what we think and feel, and even that we can know ourselves. This extraordinary idea comes, no doubt, from such remarks of Wittgenstein's as: "I can know what 70 * MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking" (II, p. 222); "It cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain" (§5!46). But the "can" and "cannot" in these remarks are grammatical; they mean "it makes no sense to say these things" (in the way we think it does); it would, therefore, equally make no sense to say of me that I do not know what I am thinking, or that I do not know I am in pain. The implication is not that I cannot know myself, but that knowing oneself-though radically different from the way we know others--is not a matter of cognizing (classically, "intuiting") mental acts and particular sensations.

Having private thoughts and feelings is not the same as having what is called "a private language".

As the analogy of the beetle in PI 293 illustrates, private sensations do drop out of consideration within the language game, not that private sensations drop out of consideration.

Perhaps your idea of Linguistic Idealism doesn't work in various cases.. You can imagine Witt presenting you with a host of language games that breakdown when applied to his theory where it doesn't apply, etc. That is I guess part of his point. So yeah, you can try to pin his theory down in a grand theory of epistemology and ontology, but he would probably say it's a lost cause or something like that. — schopenhauer1

Yes, it may be that Wittgenstein was opposed to theories as any theory can later be shown to be either wrong or incorrect. But if that advice was followed, humans would still be living in caves.

Notwithstanding, PI 43 does set out the distinct theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language. Even if this theory is shown to be either wrong or incomplete, it is still invaluable in being able to be used as a foundation to develop something better. Because that is how theories work, a gradual improvement with time.

The next step in improving the theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language is to begin to incorporate the principles of Linguistic Idealism, and to clarify the consequences to language of the distinction between Indirect and Direct Realism.

I think there is abundant evidence in PI that Wittgenstein situates language use within the world among a community of speakers, and so there is definitely "a world outside language". For example, he refers to language use as "part of an activity". — Luke

I agree that the Investigations refers to a world of board games, athletic games, ordinary life, civic life, teachers, pupils, communities and other forms of life.

In the Investigations, within the sentence "bring me a slab", I agree that the word "slab" is naming an object in the world. The question is, does this world exist only in language or both inside and outside of language.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

The meaning of the word "slab" derives from its context in the language game being used by the speaker.

When I say "bring me the slab", my concept of "slab" is part of from my language game. When you say "bring me the slab", your concept of "slab" is part of your language game.

But because we have had different forms of life, perhaps you are an engineer in South Africa and perhaps I am a chemist in Ghana , as our language games must inevitably be different, our concepts of "slab" must also inevitably be different.

It cannot be the case that the word "slab" names an object in a world outside language, because, if that were the case, this object in the world outside of language would have to be existing in two different forms at the same time. One form determined by my use of the word "slab" and a different form determined by your use of the word "slab".

I am sure we agree that the object in the world outside language can only have one form. But if that were the case, and my word "slab" names this object, and your word "slab" names the same object, then our concepts and language games must be the same

In fact, everyone who used "slab" in their language must be using the same language game, with the result that within a community there can only be one language game. This would mean that everyone using the word "slab" had the same exact concept of "slab", which is clearly not the case

If Wittgenstein is interpreted as saying that the world of board games, etc did exist not only in the world in language but also in the world outside language, then one consequence would be that everyone's concept of "slab" would be exactly the same, which is clearly not the case.

Wittgenstein is using a method other than what we would "usually call reasoning"; that does not mean it "lacks rationality"; plus that is not a characterization of "ordinary language", so not ambiguous or conflicting with skepticism of our ordinary criteria (not language), which does not come from the desire for self-knowledge, but, if examined, leads to self-knowledge. — Antony Nickles

Cavell in The Later Wittgenstein writes that self-knowledge and ordinary language are two major themes in the Investigations.

p 68 - for the nature of self-knowledge-and therewith the nature of the self is one of the great subjects of the Investigations as a whole.
PI 132 - We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order.

Self-knowledge naturally leads to scepticism, and the rational justifications of philosophy. But Wittgenstein is not a fan of philosophy.

p 60 - Their method is uniformly what Hume describes as "profound and intense reflection" from which, he says, "sceptical doubt arises naturally"
PI 116 - What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use

However, Wittgenstein does find personal change important, which can only be a result of self-knowledge.

p 72 - Both thought of their negative soundings as revolutionary extensions of our knowledge, and both were obsessed by the idea, or fact, that they would be misunderstood, partly, doubtless, because they knew the taste of self-knowledge, that it is bitter.

I am unclear whether Cavell is making the point that Wittgenstein does or doesn't support self-knowledge. On the one hand it leads to philosophy, which he doesn't approve of, and on the other hand it leads to personal change, which he does approve of.

In other words, your “own understanding” is philosophy’s classic freakout to uncertainty and doubt. — Antony Nickles

As Cavell wrote in The Later Wittgenstein, for Wittgenstein, knowledge starts with self-knowledge, not just simply adopting a method and then blindly accepting its results. Self-knowledge is one of the great subjects of the Investigations.
If the little I have said makes plausible the idea that the question "How do we know what we say (intended to say, wish to say)?" is one aspect of the general question "What is the nature of self-knowledge?" then we will realize that Wittgenstein ·has not first "accepted" or "adopted" a method and then accepted its results, for the nature of self-knowledge-and therewith the nature of the self is one of the great subjects of the Investigations as a whole.

Skepticism doesn’t come up because of something wrong with ordinary language (and we don’t “believe” in it, or have certain “beliefs” because of it). — Antony Nickles

The Indirect Realist is surely sceptical of the ordinary language of the Direct Realist who, when they say "I see a slab", believes they are directly seeing a slab in the world as it really is.

It's quite isolating though. You are left with your private sensation of pain, and the word pain just becomes this epiphenomenal construction. Also a problem I see here, is that it's hard to see if there is any criteria for anything here. I would normally say the closest epistemology for criteria of meaning would be pragmaticism. In other words, did the usage "get something done in a particular way", but I don't think Witt is saying that either because that has sort of a telos to it (did this usage get this thing accomplished). I don't think he is saying that either necessarily. — schopenhauer1

According to Wittgenstein's PI, what is the purpose of language? Wittgenstein may intend it to have other purposes than as described in the PI, but if we are to take the PI at face value, there seems to be no more purpose for language than to be coherent within itself.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

PI 43 states that the meaning of a word is its use in language. It doesn't continue to say that the use of language is in the world outside language.

Even the phrase "And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer." as expanded upon in PI 40 can be read as the meaning of a word is its use in language.

It seems easy to read the PI as Linguistic Idealism, whereby language is the ultimate reality, and if this is the case, then language cannot be said to have any pragmatic use outside of language.

It is true that within the PI is the expression "bring me a slab", but what does this word "slab" refer to. It seems to refer to its use within the world of language, not its use in a world outside of language.

Language then becomes an incredibly intricate machine, where one lever hits another cog, which open s a valve which moves a spindle. All meticulously controlled to create an intricate piece of work, such as a Rowland Emett construction. Beautiful in its integrity but having no practical use in a word outside of itself. Each Emett machine is its own language game, each wonderfully coherent but none corresponding to a world outside of themselves.



This may not be the case with the PI, but if so, out of interest, where in the PI is the textual evidence that this is not the case.

PI 293 in giving the analogy of the beetle describes how my private sensation of pain drops out of consideration in the language game. But this is not what I want. I want my pain to have a real world effect outside of language, but this is not something the PI seems to go into.

First, it is a realization so only you can come to it on your own; understanding is not possible without inner change. — Antony Nickles

True, whether I agree or not with the PI is in a sense secondary, as I am using it to help me develop my own understanding of the relationship between the mind and the world using language.

Did you read the Cavell I suggested (attached above starting at p 56?) — Antony Nickles

The two major topics in the PI, self-knowledge and ordinary language, appear to lead into two different directions. Self-knowledge leads into scepticism and Indirect Realism, in that I see a red postbox but this only exists as a representation in my mind, and ordinary language leads into the absence of rationalism and Direct Realism, in that as I see a red postbox there must be a red postbox in the world.

Cavell writes about self-knowledge and ordinary language
p 68 - for the nature of self-knowledge-and therewith the nature of the self is one of the great subjects of the Investigations as a whole.
p 56 - Pole says, or implies, that Wittgenstein regards ordinary language as "sacrosanct"

Self-knowledge comes from self-reflection, from which sceptical doubt arises naturally about the beliefs inherent within ordinary language
p 60 - Their method is uniformly what Hume describes as "profound and intense reflection" from which, he says, "sceptical doubt arises naturally"

Ordinary language is criticised as lacking rational justification and is founded on what the observer believes to be obvious.
p 58 - "We know that there are material objects," "We directly see them," "We know that other persons are sentient," all of which are believed by the vulgar, have been discovered by philosophers to lack rational justification
p 71 - And that is why there is virtually nothing in the Investigations which we should ordinarily call reasoning; Wittgenstein asserts nothing which could be proved, for what he asserts is either obvious (§ 126)-whether true or false-or else concerned with what conviction, whether by proof or evidence or authority, would consist in

From my reading of Cavell, there appears to be a fundamental ambiguity in the PI. On the one hand the lack of rationalism in ordinary language, yet on the other hand a desire for self-knowledge which inevitably leads to scepticism about things such as ordinary language.

As I mentioned, Wittgenstein cites examples of different uses of language at PI 23. He is not saying "the use of a word is meaning is use", as you seem to think. He offers some examples of the different types of uses of language. To quote one of these several examples, a word or sentence could be used for "Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting," to name just a few. These alternative uses of language alone falsify the assertion that language is only used to refer to objects. — Luke

What textual evidence in the PI is there that the PI is not taking the position of Linguistic Idealism?

Linguistic Idealism is the position that language is the ultimate reality. GEM Anscombe in her paper The Question of Linguistic Idealism considered the question whether Wittgenstein was a linguistic idealist.

For the PI , the meaning of a word is its use in language. Within language, a word can be used to describe the appearance of an object, give an order, obey an order, etc as set out in PI 23. But all these things happen within the world of language, not in a world outside language.

It is true that within the PI is the expression "bring me a slab", but what does this word "slab" refer to. It seems to refer to its use within the world of language, not its use in a world outside of language.

It may seem obvious that language must have a use outside of language, but that does not seem to be the position of the PI. If that were the case, then where in the PI is there any connection between the world in language and the world outside language.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

PI 43 states that the meaning of a word is its use in language. It doesn't continue to say that the use of language is in the world outside language. It doesn't continue to say that language has any use in a world outside language.

Even the phrase "And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer." as expanded upon in PI 40 can be read as the meaning of a word is its use in language.

If the PI is taking the position of Linguistic Idealsim, then there is the problem of circularity. As you said "this word is being used to get its meaning from its use".

As I wrote before: "If meaning as use means use in language, then this is unworkable because of the circularity problem. If meaning as use means use in the world, then this is workable, as the only use of language is to change facts in the world. Language gets its meaning from being able to change facts in the world."

If the PI is not taking the position of Linguistic Idealism, with its inherent problem of circularity, then where in the PI is the textual evidence that this is not the case.

The word "unicorn" refers to the definition of the word "unicorn"? Why don't all words do this? — Luke

As @Banno wrote a while ago: I haven't paid this thread much attention, because definitions are not all that helpful, but further, any definition of art will immediately encourage any sensible artist to produce something that does not meet that definition.

If that were true then we could no longer speak about any extinct animal for the names of those animals would no longer exist. — Luke

We only know the "unicorn" by description, not acquaintance. Apart from a few people who have directly seen the fossil of a Tyrannosaurus Rex, most people only know about dinosaurs by description, not acquaintance, as "one of the most ferocious predators to ever walk the Earth. With a massive body, sharp teeth, and jaws so powerful they could crush a car, this famous carnivore dominated the forested river valleys in western North America during the late Cretaceous period, 68 million years ago."

What you have said is similar to: "this word is being used to get its meaning from its use", which is circular. — Luke

Totally agree. I have been trying to get across the idea for weeks that Wittgenstein's theory that meaning is use in language is circular, as I wrote before:
If meaning as use means use in language, then this is unworkable because of the circularity problem. If meaning as use means use in the world, then this is workable, as the only use of language is to change facts in the world. Language gets its meaning from being able to change facts in the world.

To repeat, Wittgenstein opposes Referentialism because it views reference as the only use that words can have. His opposition does not imply that words cannot be used to refer; only that they have more uses than this. — Luke

His theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language requires that words cannot refer to objects in the world.

If I asked you to show me the video game and you constantly referred me back to how you used the code to create the game OR you showed me how you interact with the game using a controller and where people sit in relation to the game, BUT YOU FAIL TO SHOW ME THE GAME ITSELF, something is missing. — schopenhauer1

In Philosophy, some questions are more important than others

Yes, it's as if I asked Wittgenstein how to get to Paris and rather than say that he didn't know, responded with innumerable questions, such as: Is my Paris better than your Lyon? Why does Paris exist? Why is it that Paris is north of Lyon? When did you first want to go to Paris? Who is the Parisian most influential in ballet? Which Parisian can make the best fruitcake?

All well and good, but what one really wants is "take the Eurostar leaving St Pancras at 10.31 tomorrow".

Bertrand Russell in The Problems of Philosophy did wrote that the role of Philosophy is to ask questions, not for any definite answer, but for the sake of the questions themselves as they open the mind to possibilities greater than we previously imagined.

Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy; Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.

Yes, the role of Philosophy is to ask questions, but not asking questions for the sake of asking questions without any underlying direction. But rather it is broader than that, as in questioning theories developed by such questions. For example: What value does the theory of Referentialism have? Does Wittgenstein's theory that the meaning of words is their use in language help our understanding of the nature of language?

There is a quantitative difference between asking questions for their own sake and questioning theories.

There are similarities between Indirect Realism and the meaning of a word is its use in language

I wrote "Yes, as private sensations such as pain drop out of consideration in the language game, as with the beetle in PI 293, objects in the world also drop out of consideration in the language game, as it is the use of objects we are interested in, not the object in itself."

When someone says "bring me a slab", what is the meaning of the word "slab"? Referentialism is initially easier to understand, in that the "word "slab" corresponds with a slab in the world, and someone can literally point the slab out to you. The theory is problematic, however, with words such as unicorn or pain.

Then how does Wittgenstein's alternative theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language work?

In PI 293 is the analogy of the beetle that drops out of consideration in language. This allows us to talk about "pain" without either me knowing your pain or you knowing my pain. The word "pain" in language doesn't refer to any private sensation of pain, but does refer to pain behaviour, in that we never attribute pain to a rock because rocks never exhibit pain behaviour. If a rock did start to exhibit pain behaviour, then we would probably start to attribute pain to them.

Similarly, when we talk about "slabs" in language, the slab in the world has dropped out of consideration in the language game. This is the position of the Indirect Realist, which, according to the Wikipedia article on Direct and Indirect Realism is the view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework. We can only ever perceive a picture of a slab, we can never directly perceive the slab itself.

As in language, the word "pain" directly refers to pain behaviour and only indirectly to the cause of the pain behaviour, the word "slab" directly refers to the representation of a slab and only indirectly to the cause of the representation of a slab

There are other examples of cause being conflated with effect. As regards the senses, if I see the colour green, I name its cause as being green. If I hear a grating noise, I name its cause as being grating. If I smell an acrid smell, I name its cause as being acrid. If I feel something silky, I name is cause as being silky. If I taste something bitter, I name its cause as being bitter. As regards objects and their use, a hammer hammers. A pincer pinces. Rain rains. Water waters.

It is the case that in cognition the unknown cause is named after the known effect. Rather than saying "I see your pain behaviour", this is replaced by the figure of speech "I see your pain", conflating the unknown cause "pain" with the known effect "pain behaviour". Similarly, rather than saying "I see a representation of a slab", this is replaced by the figure of speech "I see a slab", conflating the unknown cause slab with the known effect of a representation of a slab.

We directly perceive representations, which have been caused by unknown things in the world. We can give a particular perception a name, such as "slab". By conflating cause with effect, we can then say that the unknown cause in the world is also a slab. The word "slab" gets its meaning from naming a particular perception in the mind, not from naming an unknown thing in the world.

In this sense, the meaning of a word does not come from naming an object in the world, but does come from naming our perception of an unknown something in the world.

This is not “vagueness”. It is a realization that there is no general explanation of “meaning” or “solution” to skepticism. He comes at it from multiple angles to understand how the desire for purity affects different areas of our lives. — Antony Nickles

He does test hypotheses, but you may be confusing the role of the “interlocutor” who represents and expresses the embodiment of the desire for purity (what motivated the Tractatus and the picture of the world that created). — Antony Nickles

I don’t say this to imply there isn’t something clear, specific, rigorous, etc. But just that narrowing it down to positions and statements that we can tell someone misses the point that he is doing something by a certain method which you must participate in to have it become meaningful to you. — Antony Nickles

Taking a few references at random, it does not seem to be the case that it is the reader's problem that they have difficulty in understanding Wittgenstein's writings, but rather the responsibility lies with Wittgenstein himself.

As Wittgenstein himself wrote in the Preface to PI
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination

SEP - Ludwig Wittgenstein
Furthermore, a central factor in investigating Wittgenstein’s works is the multifarious nature of the project of interpreting them; this leads to untold difficulties in the ascertainment of his philosophical substance and method.

Philip Cartright's article on Philosophical Investigations
All I can say is that I’ve been studying Wittgenstein on and off for over twenty years and I still sometimes find myself falling into the same old traps. It is a comfort, however, to realise that Wittgenstein himself seems to have had a similar problem. Again and again in his later works he complains about how hard it is “to keep our heads above water” (§106) and only days before his death he commented “I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and having to look for it again; now her spectacles, now her keys” (On Certainty, §532).

IEP - Ludwig Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein is thus a doubly key figure in the development and history of analytic philosophy, but he has become rather unfashionable because of his anti-theoretical, anti-scientism stance, because of the difficulty of his work, and perhaps also because he has been little understood.

Masahiro Oku Osaka University, Japan
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is notoriously difficult to understand.

Try the same with the word "unicorn". If the word "unicorn" did refer to something in the world, then, if there was no unicorn in the world then there would be no word "unicorn" in language. Since there is the word "unicorn" in language, then there must be a unicorn in the world. This is the absurd consequence of your argument. — Luke

The word "unicorn" in language cannot refer to something in the world, as no unicorns exist in the world. But rather, the word "unicorn" refers to other words in the language, as in "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead"

It remains a fact that if the word "unicorn " in language depends on its existence on the fact of there being a unicorn in the world, then the word "unicorn" would not exist. However, this is not the case, as the word "unicorn" in language depends on its existence on other words within the language.

Wittgenstein opposes Augustine's theory of Referentialism, which he describes in in PI 2. He sets out his theory that meaning is use in language in PI 43. He proposes that Referentialism is an incomplete theory, in that whilst it may be able to explain the meaning of a word such as "slab" it is not able to explain the meaning of a word such as "slab!". His theory that meaning is use in language, he believes, can, however, explain the meaning of both "slab" and "slab!"

Within his theory that meaning is use in language, in the sentence "bring me the slab", the word "slab" is not being used, as it would be in Referentialism, in naming a slab in the world, but is being used in the sense of meaning is use in language

It would not make sense for Wittgenstein to be in opposition to Referentialism, but then use the word "slab" to name a slab in the world. His own theory that meaning is use in language is more than adequate, he believes (using "believes" as a figure of speech, as who knows what Wittgenstein really believed), to explain that the meaning of "slab" is its use in language, not as naming a slab in the world.

Yes, this accords more or less with what I said here — schopenhauer1

Yes, as private sensations such as pain drop out of consideration in the language game, as with the beetle in PI 293, objects in the world also drop out of consideration in the language game, as it is the use of objects we are interested in, not the object in itself.

Can’t it mean physically pointing to an object? — schopenhauer1

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

Philip Cartright in a blog on PI makes the case that although Wittgenstein appears to write that the word "slab" gets its meaning from pointing at a slab, this is not promoting an Augustinian Referentialism.

The word "slab" has a use in the language game because the object slab has a use in the world. If there was no use for an object such as a slab in the world, then it wouldn't be given a name in language. Even if an object doesn't have a actual present use, it will be named as long as it has a potential future use.

I can learn the names of objects that have no actual present use, on the proviso that there is an understanding that they have a potential future use.

In a sense, the word "slab" is not pointing to a slab, as in Referentionalism, rather it is pointing to either an actual or potential use that is borne by the slab, as in "meaning is use".

If you are trying to get ontological commitments from PI, you won't find any as far as I see. Besides that meaning of words comes from language games, you won't find much ontologically-speaking — schopenhauer1

Yes, it is very difficult to make sense of the PI when we don't even know whether the objects he refers to, such as slabs, are those of the Nominalist or the Platonic Realist.

So ostensive pointing to an object is simply one mechanism of teaching use, it doesn't replace use. — schopenhauer1

PI 40 reads that a word such as "slab" doesn't get its meaning from corresponding with a slab in the world, as the word "Mr N N" doesn't get its meaning from corresponding with a Mr N N in the world.

PI 40 Let us first discuss this point of the argument: that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it.—It is important to note that the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning; of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say "Mr. N. N. is dead."

For the word "slab" to correspond with the object slab, then the word is "pointing" at the object.

As this is at odds with the last sentence in PI 43, I assume the last sentence of PI 43 about pointing is that of the interlocutor. The last sentence of PI 43 about "pointing" seems something a supporter of Augustine's Referentialism would say.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

The meaning of the word 'slab' in the builder's language depends on two things: 1. The existence of these objects. 2. What the assistant is to do with them. — Fooloso4

As the meaning of "unicorn" in language doesn't depend on the existence of a unicorn in the world, then why should the meaning of "slab" in language depend on the existence of a slab in the world?

Even assuming "bring me slab" is referring to an object in the world, what kind of object is being referred to in the Philosophical Investigations. An object as determined by Nominalism or an object as determined by Platonic Realism?

The meaning is not the name of the object. — Fooloso4

That's how I understand Wittgenstein in the PI, whereby meaning is use in language, in opposition to Augustine's Referentialism.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

comic — schopenhauer1

If only PI 43 subsection A had been "For that reason, I call this thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it".

There would then have been no hesitancy within society in calling the emperor "naked", in seeing one particular example of nakedness in front of them.

I said that the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, just as the meaning of the word "unicorn" does not depend on the existence of unicorns. However, regardless of this fact about meaning, slabs do exist in the world. — Luke

1) "the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs"
2) "slabs do exist in the world"

Sentence 1)
As the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs in the world, there can be the word "slab" in language whether or not there are slabs in the world. Therefore, the word "slab" in language cannot be referring to something in the world. If the word "slab" did refer to something in the world, then, if there was no slab in the world then there would be no word "slab" in language, but that is not the case.

Sentence 2)
There are two logical parts to the sentence "slabs do exist in the world". Part i) there are things that are named "slabs" and part ii) these things exist in the world. Within the sentence, the things named "slabs" refer to the things that exist in the world.

Sentences 1) and 2) are contradictory, in that in sentence 1) the word "slab" doesn't refer to a thing in the world but in sentence 2) the word "slab" does refer to a thing in the world.

Sentence 1) encapsulates the core of the PI in that the meaning of a word is its use in language.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

Sentence 2) is the position of Referentialism that Wittgenstein is opposing.
PI 2 . That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours. Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with buildingstones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out;—B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.——Conceive this as a complete primitive language

In the case of physical objects, there are many underlying activities and contexts that we skip over...........................e.g., an ottoman is not a table but can be used for that purpose, or, part of or judgment of a “table” is where we gather with others to eat, so, even if it is around a rock, we would still say we are sitting around the “table”........................This is not empirical or about the about, but is still normative, “real”, not “subjective”. — Antony Nickles

As Wittgenstein writes in the Preface, a vagueness in the PI is inevitable, as he admits himself that he was unable to weld his results together.
Preface: After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination

Wittgenstein in PI asks lots of questions, often without trying to answer them. For some of these questions it is also unclear whether he considers them valid or not, and I agree when you say "Anybody that thinks they can tell you what it “means” is wrong".

What status does a "table" have for me. It is an inseparable fusion of the concept "table" in the mind and a momentary set of atoms existing in the world in time and space. Both aspects are necessary. My position is that of Nominalism rather than Platonic Realism.

I wrote: "For that reason, I call this particular thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it".

As regards the empirical, our concept of "table" has originated from states of affairs in the world, an empirical discovery.

As regards the normative, the only standards placed on the meaning of the word have originated from the users of the language living within a community. IE, we do the ethical thing, not because it is required by the table, but because of the use we put the table to within the community within which we live.

As regards the real, our concepts are real in our mind and the atoms are real in the world.

As regards the subjective, only concepts in the mind can be subjective, in that tables cannot have concepts. Atoms (thought of as logical entities rather than existant things) in the world can only be objective, in that they would exist independent of any sentient observer.

There is nothing wrong with asking questions, whether "is my pain the same as yours" or "how far is it from the Earth to the Moon", but humans can only learn when they try to answer these questions. Only by theorising can we make progress, as science has clearly shown.

The meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, as PI 40 indicates. Nevertheless, slabs exist in the world. — Luke

You write that "slabs exist in the world", and also write that there can be the word "slab" in language even if there is no slab in the world.

So what you are really saying is that "slabs exist in the world even if there is no slab in the world"

Language users. — Luke

I agree, it is the human who judges that the something in the world is an object, not that the something in the world has a Platonic Form.

Replace the word "game" with the word "table" in the above section. We don't need to draw any strict boundary for the concept to be usable (in language). But we can and might do so for a special purpose. — Luke

Yes, the meaning of a word such as "table" has no definite boundary, whereas some words such as 1 metre can be defined as being 100 centimetres.

But a child can be taught how to use the word correctly. — Luke

There cannot be a correct use of a word such as "table". Within different contexts there are different sets of family resemblances. Is it correct to say that this is a "table"?



PI 217 - "How am I able to obey a rule?"—if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."

Witty is an interesting and significant philosopher, because the issues he had raised were compelling and important. — Corvus

I agree. I feel I have clarified my own ideas about language and the relationship between the mind and world by studying Wittgenstein. He did raise important issues. I'm not saying my interpretation is necessarily correct, but I feel I can justify it. One has to start somewhere.

As Nietzsche wrote in 1888: “Aus der Kriegsschule des Lebens, was mich nicht umbringt, macht mich stärker,” - “Out of life’s school of war, what doesn’t kill me, makes me stronger.”

The point of PI 40 is that the users of the name give the name meaning, not the object or person to which the name refers. The meaning of the name does not cease to exist when the object or person ceases to exist — Luke

Yes, that is Wittgenstein's position, in that the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on there being a slab in the world.

You also seem to have the impression that Wittgenstein's rejection of this view implies that words cannot refer to objects, but we obviously can and do sometimes use words to refer to objects — Luke

It depends what you mean by "object". For the Nominalist, universal and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels. For the Platonic Realist, objects, entities and events exist in space and time in the world (Wikipedia - Nominalism).

If you are a Platonic Realist, then how to answer the following:

1) In the mind, the parts of objects, entities and events are connected within concepts.
2) In the world, what connects the parts of an object, entity or event into a whole? What in the world has judged that an apple sitting on a table is a different object to the table it is sitting upon?
3) If within the world, there is nothing that is able to judge which parts are connected and which aren't, then objects, entities and events cannot exist in the world.

Are you saying that there is no way to determine whether the parents or the child is correct?......................Wittgenstein does not endorse this sort of relativism................There are rules for the correct use of the word "table". — Luke

Can you show me the rule for the correct use of the word "table"?

Wittgenstein is not for you. — Banno

In the words of Sun Tzu from The Art of War: “Know thy self, know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories.”

But that doesn't answer the metaphysical question of "what" is this concept apple. It is obviously a mental thing. What is that? Witt doesn't have an answer — schopenhauer1

Yes, Wittgenstein makes no attempt at coming up with an answer to the questions he raises. As he wrote in the Preface "After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed."

My understanding of a concept is as follows:

Suppose someone says "bring me an apple", and I have the concept of "apple". They are not asking to be brought the concept of an "apple", they are asking to be brought one particular physical instantiation of the concept "apple". They want to be brought one particular set of atoms existing in space and time.

After being shown many examples of things in the world that have been given the name "apple" by my community, I develop the concept of "apple". In part because between the many examples there has been some kind of family resemblance. All different, but also similar in some undefinable, intuitive way.

It is true that the term family resemblance doesn't explain anything substantive apart from the fact that the examples were all different but have some similarities, similarities that I cannot define but can only intuitively perceive

It seems to me that there are two types of concepts: compound and elementary.

Compound concepts are equivalent to knowledge by description, such as the concept "unicorn", which can only be known by description as "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead". Compound concepts are sets of elementary concepts.

Elementary concepts are equivalent to knowledge by acquaintance, such as the colour red, a sweet taste, an acrid smell, a painful touch or a grating noise. Primitive sensations that have been directly caused by things in the world.

Compound concepts exist as sets of elementary concepts within language, whereas elementary concepts depend on information passing through the senses from the world into the mind.

The particular elementary concepts we happen to have is a function of 3.5 billion years of evolution of life in synergy with the word, as described by Enactivism. The particular compound concepts we have is a function of their use within our community and the world in general.

But if you are moving towards the continental philosophy, then Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Sartre or even Deleuze are all great philosophers. — Corvus

:up: :up:

Unfortunately, 20th century philosophy bifurcated philosophy into linguistic/logic/mathematical approaches which took discrete propositions and tried to answer them on one side and phenomenological approaches on the other (existentialism for example). — schopenhauer1

The great analytic philosophy vs continental philosophy divide.

My favourite city is Paris, and we always stay near the Left Bank, so perhaps I should be moving away from Wittgenstein and towards Sartre.

In that case, would you not feel that referentialism and logical positivism are blind system? I mean, the world is not just material, but there are also mental sides too. — Corvus

Yes. They ignored causation. If I see someone wince, I know that something has caused such pain behaviour, whether pain or acting. I may never know what, but I know that whatever caused the pain behaviour was real. I know rather than believe because of the principle of Innatism.

You talked about five apples and gave me a slab scenario in the posts.  Before you and I sit down facing in between the apples and slabs, they are just mental objects whilst we talking about them.  I have no clue what apples and which slab you are referring to. — Corvus

I have learnt the concept of "apple" after seeing numerous examples of things in the world that have been named "apple" by my community. No two apples were the same, but they all shared a family resemblance.

On the table in front of me is a particular thing in space and time that shares a family resemblance with all the previous things I have seen in the world that have been named "apple" by my community.

For that reason, I call this particular thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it.

The observation that a particular use governs the meaning of a word does not cancel the fact that language is referring to entities and events we encounter in the world. — Paine

Objects, entities and events exist in space and time in the world.

In the mind, the parts of objects, entities and events are connected within concepts.

In the world, what connects the parts of an object, entity or event into a whole? What in the world has judged that an apple sitting on a table is a different object to the table it is sitting upon?

If within the world, there is nothing that is able to judge which parts are connected and which aren't, then objects, entities and events cannot exist in the world.

Right, but then where did the internal states "go"? "What" were they for them? Why didn't they care? — schopenhauer1

Logical Positivism stated in the 1920's. Their central thesis was the verification principle, whereby only statements verifiable through direct observation or logical proof are meaningful in terms of conveying truth value, information or factual content (Wikipedia Logical Positivism).

It is probably not surprising that the movement came to an end in the 1960's, though they had a good run.

Does the "object" also include mental objects such as fear, anger, pain, joy and hope ...etc? Or does it just mean material objects in the external world? — Corvus

In Referentialism, the objects in the world are observable material things, including things such as mountains, trees, crying, wincing and other behaviours, but not internal sensations such as fear, anger, etc.

This is why the Logical Positivists liked Referentialism, in that it aimed at creating a "perfectly descriptive language purified from ambiguities and confusions" (Wikipedia, Direct Reference Theory).

Referentialism says that pointing out an object in the world is the only use a word can have. Wittgenstein says that words can also have other uses. As we pointed out to you earlier, Wittgenstein does not deny that words can be used to refer to objects. What he rejects is that words are only used to refer to objects. — Luke

The key paragraph is PI 43 which says that the meaning of a word is its use in language. But what about the second part "And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.". Is this Wittgenstein accepting Referentialism - not at all.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

PI 40 makes the point that the meaning of a word doesn't disappear if the object it is referring to disappears. IE, the meaning of a word doesn't depend on there being an object in the world. If the object Mr N N disappears, the word "Mr N N" still has meaning.

PI 40 Let us first discuss this point of the argument: that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it.—It is important to note that the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning; of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say "Mr. N. N. is dead."

Within the PI are sentences such as "bring me a slab". Wittgenstein is making the point in the PI that the word "slab" doesn't have meaning because it is referring to an object in the world, ie Referentialism, but in fact gets its meaning from how it used in language, which is a completely different thing.

As I see it, the whole point of the PI is in denying that any word gets its meaning from referring to objects in the world.

This implies that it is impossible for the child to be wrong; that the child must always point to a table, no matter what they point to, as long as it aligns with the child’s concept of “table”. — Luke

The child has a concept of "table", as only having four legs, and points to an example in the world of what it believes to be a table. Its parent may believe that the child's concept is wrong, as for the parent a "table" may have either three or four legs .

However, as far as the child is concerned, they are not wrong, in that they have pointed to an example of what they believe to be a "table".

This is the point of PI 246, in that if I have a pain, then I have a pain. There is no knowing that I have a pain. If I have concept, then I have a concept, right or wrong.

It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

The either/or expressed by moving from "meaning as representation to a view which looks to use as the crux of the investigation", assumes that the challenge W is making to treating words as pointing to essences should be replaced by a competing explanation of essence. — Paine

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

The PI is opposed to Referentialism, whereby words refer to objects in the world. To be an object existing in the world in space and time it must have some kind of essence.

The PI proposes that the meaning of a word is its use in language, for example in the sentence "bring me a table". In this case, what is the essence of the word "table"? One possibility is that the essence of a word such as "table" is as a concept, something that only exists in the mind of the speaker of the language.

This is how he learns what a table is - it is what the toy is on — Fooloso4

As you say "A child learns the word 'table' in the context of her life."

The child asks "where is my toy". Its parent says "your toy is on the table". The child sees the toy and knows that it is on something. But from a single example, the child cannot know what "table" is referring to. Is it referring to a tablecloth, a table, something made of wood, something with four legs, etc.

Only by experiencing many examples will the child be able to discover a family resemblance in the examples and narrow down the meaning of "table" to what we know as the concept "table".

He gets defenders. — schopenhauer1

For example, the Decision Lab writes of Wittgenstein as one of the most important philosophers of the 20th C:
Ludwig Wittgenstein was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. There were few philosophical fields left untouched by the British-Austrian genius; he worked with logic, mathematics, ethics, the mind, and most notably, revolutionized the way that we understand language.

The article writes that part of his importance was in moving philosophy from trying to discoverer the truth of the world to find explanations that allowed people to picture the world.
He believed that in the 1900s, philosophers had become too concerned with trying to discover a magical doctrine that explained the ‘truth’ of the world.................Instead, he believed the purpose of philosophy was to find explanations that allowed people to picture the world.

Perhaps he can be seen as starting to lay the foundation for today's Postmodernism, which, according to Britannica is characterized by scepticism, subjectivism and relativism.
Postmodernism, also spelled post-modernism, in Western philosophy, a late 20th-century movement characterized by broad scepticism, subjectivism, or relativism; a general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power.

The PI, in opposing Referentialism in favour of Relativism, whereby words can only be understood within the context in which they appear, has perhaps contributed to the situation today whereby in one context I can think of myself as an Italian, male engineer, but in another context I can think of myself as an Indian, female shot putter. Today, perhaps partly in thanks to Wittgenstein, it is my truth that is important now, not facts in the world.

No one goes around pointing to various things in the child's world and naming them — Fooloso4

If things in the child's world are not named, how does the child learn the names of things.

Pointing to objects is not how we use words. We know she understands the word 'table' not because she points to it but because when we tell her the toy is on the table she knows were to look. — Fooloso4

The child must already know what a table is if the child knows the toy is on top of it.

For the child what exists are not examples or instantiations of concepts. What exists are the things she encounters and uses, the things she learns to call 'table' and 'chair'. She does not begin at the level of concepts. — Fooloso4

Every table in the world is different in some way. Some are brown in colour and some grey, some with four legs and some with three, some pristine and new and some old and scratched, etc. The child couldn't learn a different name for every different table, all they can do is learn the concept of "table", a single word incorporating family resemblances.

Mustn't the child point to a table, i.e. "an object in the world", in order to "successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling"? — Luke

The Philosophical Investigations rejects Referentialism. In Referentialism, the child would point to an object in the world. If the child is not pointing to an object in the world, according to the PI, then what exactly is the child doing.

From Wikipedia Direct Reference Theory, the PI opposed Referentialism.
A direct reference theory (also called referentialism or referential realism) is a theory of language that claims that the meaning of a word or expression lies in what it points out in the world. The object denoted by a word is called its referent. Criticisms of this position are often associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein. In 1953, with his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argued against referentialism, famously saying that "the meaning of a word is its use."

As the SEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein writes, as regards the PI, one should forget about meaning as representation and look to use.
“For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’—though not for all—this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI 43). This basic statement is what underlies the change of perspective most typical of the later phase of Wittgenstein’s thought: a change from a conception of meaning as representation to a view which looks to use as the crux of the investigation"

What is an object? The SEP article Object discusses the nature of objects. Is it really the case that the child is pointing at a table as an object, or is the child pointing at a set of atoms that have a momentary location in time and space, and have taken the form of one particular example of the general concept "table". To say that the child is looking at an object is to say that what exists in the mind of the child as a concept also happens to ontologically exist in the world.
Hawthorne and Cortens (1995) speak for the nihilist thus: “the concept of an object has no place in a perspicuous characterization of reality” (p. 143). They suggest three theories on which there are no objects. The first that there are just stuffs everywhere, but no objects. The second that there is just one big mass of stuff.[14] The third is that there just isn’t anything at all. This last option is what Hawthorne and Cortens defend. They do so using what they (following Strawson) call a “feature-placing language”. They model a potential nihilist program on sentences like “it is raining”, “it is snowing now”, and “it is cold here”. Such sentences do not quantify over anything and have no logical subject (‘it’ functions as a dummy pronoun), and so do not ontologically commit one to anything. The nihilist may then paraphrase sentences that apparently require objects (such as “there is a computer here”) with those that do not (such as “it is computering here”). In short, the nihilist turns every putative noun into an adverb, making judicious use of spatial, temporal, and numerical adverbs too.

Perhaps the PI is following what Strawson calls a feature-placing language, where such sentences as "it is a table" don't quantify over anything, and therefore don't commit the speaker to having to refer to any ontologically existent object.

No table as such exists in the world. What exists in the world are examples of tables, some grey in colour and some brown in colour, some with four legs and some with three legs, some new and some old, some made of plastic and some made of wood. No one can point to The Table about which all other tables are copies. No one table takes precedence over any other. Only the concept table can exist as a singular thing, and that exists in the mind and not the world.

The child points at a table, but a moment later the thing being pointed at it has lost a few atoms, gained a scratch or two and has warped slightly. Is it the same table? Can one argue that something can physically change yet remain the same object.

When one says "the child points at a table", this is a figure of speech for "the child points at an example of its concept of "table""

However, Wittgenstein does not deny that some words do name objects, or can refer to things in the world. — Luke

He does not deny that some words refer to objects. What he rejects is that EVERY word functions in this way — Fooloso4

After a bit of pondering, I will stick my neck on the line and say that, at the core of Philosophical Investigations, with its language games, family resemblances and Forms of Life, no word names an object in the world. IE, the PI rejects a referential theory of meaning (aka Direct Reference Theory, Referentialism, Referential Realism).

How does a child learn a new word, such as "table". They are shown many examples of things, similar in some way, but all different, and as Wittgenstein says, having family resemblances. Each particular thing is a token of a general type.

We know when the child understands the meaning of the word "table", when we ask the child to point to a "table" and they successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling. They know how to use the word.

But as each child has had different life experiences, has had a unique Form of Life, and has been shown a unique set of examples, each child's concept of a "table" must be unique to them. My concept of "table" must be different to your concept of "table", as my concept of pain must be different to yours. Similar in many ways but different in others.

The concept "table" only exists in the mind and not the world. What exists in the world are particular examples, particular instantiations, of our concept of the word "table".

But as Wittgenstein pointed out in PI 293, our private experiences, whether that of pain or the concept of a "table", drop out of consideration in the language game. In the language game we can talk about "pains" and "tables", even though I don't know your pain or concept of "table" and you don't know my pain or my concept of "table".

Therefore, when I hear "bring me a table", this in fact a figure of speech, and replaces the sentence "bring me something in the world that is an example of your concept of a "table"".

In the sentence "bring me a table", the word "table" is not referring to either my or your concept of "table", because, as with the beetle, it has dropped out of consideration in the language game.

As I have in my mind my own concept of "table", having learn the concept from seeing in the world many examples of things that have been named "table" by a community, when I hear someone say "bring me a table", I can reverse the process and find a thing in the world that is a particular example of my own concept.

The word "table" in the sentence "bring me a table" is not referring to a table in the world, to an object in the world, but is referring to the many examples of things in the world experienced over decades and multiple locations as having a family resemblance and been named "table" by a community, of which the thing in front of me is just one particular example.

In short, because all use - including the use of a word in a sentence - is a use in the world. — Luke

The example of the shopkeeper and the apples is in response to the picture of language as words naming objects. — Fooloso4

As you say, Wittgenstein is responding to Augustine.

I agree with Wittgenstein that Augustine's position, as Wittgenstein presents it, is too simplistic. It seems sensible to say that language only has meaning if it has a use in the world.
PI 1: In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands

Words can name objects in the world, but they have other uses as well. They can name properties, such as the colour red, they can be definitions, such as "a unicorn a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead", they can be metaphors, poetic, exclamations, feelings such as pain, etc.

As words only exist in language, then it logically follows that everything a word is depends on it being part of language, including its meaning. It is hard to argue against the idea that the meaning of a word is its use in language
PI 43 - For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer

What Wittgenstein doesn't mention in PI 43 is the next necessary step in our understanding of the meaning of words, and that is that the meaning of language is its use in the world.

Wittgenstein does talk about things in the world, such as slabs, for example PI 20:"Hand me a slab", "Bring him a slab", "Bring two slabs", but this can be understood in two ways.

1) As with Augustine, the word "slab" gets its meaning from referring to a slab in the world.
2) The word "slab" doesn't get its meaning from referring to a slab in the world, but instead gets its meaning from being read in context within the other words used in the text.

I can understand 1), in that language is grounded within the world, but I cannot understand 2), where language becomes self-referential without any possibility of being grounded in the world .

I agree with Wittgenstein that not all words refer to objects in the world, but I am unclear as to his position. Does he believe that no word gets its meaning from referring to an object in the world ?

At 43, he tells us that for a large class of cases, "the meaning of a word is its use in the language". — Luke

When Wittgenstein talks about "use", I am unclear whether he is referring to the word having a use in a sentence or the sentence having a use in the world.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

I can read the sentence "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" in two ways:

1) The word "five" has a meaning because it has a use within a sentence, such as "I want five apples". Even before I use the sentence "I want five apples" in the world, the word "five" has a meaning because it has a use within a sentence.

2) The word "five" has a meaning because the sentence it is within has a use in the world. For example, my saying "I want five apples", the shopkeeper hearing me, who then starts to count out five apples. If the shopkeeper doesn't hear me, and doesn't count out five apples, then as the sentence has no use in the world, the word "five" has no meaning.

Which reading is correct. Or is there another reading?