With man's insatiable need to make nature conform to his needs and even wants, what are your opinions about our current relationship with nature? Is it becoming better or worse? — Shawn

As mankind is a part of nature, not separate to it, mankind's relationship with nature is outside any judgment of better or worse.

Mankind is part of nature, not separate to it. Mankind is not separate to the surrounding world, but is an intrinsic part of the world. Mankind lives inside a world, and this world is what is called nature. Mankind is as much a part of nature as the surrounding world is part of nature.

Mankind's relationship with its surrounding world is the same relationship as one part of nature's relationship with another part of nature. When mankind tries to change its surroundings, this is no different to one part of nature trying to change another part of nature. The wind, being one part of nature, blows down a tree, being another part of nature. Mankind, being one part of nature, knocks down a tree, being another part of nature.

Mankind's relationship with its surrounding world is outside any judgment of morality, any judgement of better or worse. One part of nature trying to change another part of nature is part of the natural process, and therefore outside any judgment of morality. If the wind blows over a tree, is not relevant to ask if this is for the better or worse, as this is part of the natural process. It follows that mankind, as one part of nature, in trying to change another part of nature, the surrounding world, is also outside any judgement of morality, any judgment of better or worse.

Therefore, as mankind is a part of nature, not separate to it, mankind's relationship with nature is outside any judgment of better or worse.

Somethimg which you alone can provide, hence the point of the exercise! — Wayfarer

True. Perhaps this is the search. The search for how to transcend one's own innate and inherent abilities.

My advice would be to start with a concise paragraph expressing the point of the essay. — Wayfarer

:up:

I'm going through various sources, including Dr Matt Williams' breakdown of how an essay may be graded, which I found useful.

However, I feel that even though an amateur cook and Michelin chef both follow the same New York Cheesecake recipe, the cheesecakes they end up making are more than likely to be significantly different.

Therefore, there must be something over and above the recipe itself that accounts for the difference, and that is what I am looking for.

....but...do you have something in mind already? — Amity

I have a content in mind, but I want to learn how to express this content within the format of a formal philosophical essay.

The content is one thing, but the form of of a philosophical essay is another thing, and it is the formal structure of a philosophical essay that interests me at the moment. The Philosophical Writing Challenge is a perfect opportunity to try to work out how to structure a philosophical essay.

As Peter Horban wrote in Writing a Philosophy Paper, a philosophical essay is not an exercise in literary self-expression, a report of of what various scholars have said about a topic or a presentation of one's personal beliefs, but is a reasoned defence of a thesis.

But how exactly does one give a reasoned defence of a thesis?

How does one structure a reasoned defence?

As you indicated, this in part requires working out where exactly is the boundary between presenting one's personal belief in the validity of a thesis and giving a reasoned defence of one's personal belief in the validity of a thesis.

Hello and welcome to the Philosophy Writing Challenge - June 2025. — Moliere

Really great to see this challenge up and running. — Amity

I appreciate your initiative and the opportunity to take part.

You say that your favorite version of "truth" is one where you can never know what the "truth" is — Harry Hindu

Thank you for your replies, but am now off on holiday.

Perhaps deflationary towards truth. As the SEP article on Truth writes

One long-standing trend in the discussion of truth is to insist that truth really does not carry metaphysical significance at all. It does not, as it has no significance on its own. A number of different ideas have been advanced along these lines, under the general heading of deflationism.

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How is your version independent of us if it is a correspondence between something that exist in the world and something that exists in the mind? — Harry Hindu

In my vision there is a postbox, which I know because it exists in my mind. I believe that there is something outside my mind that caused me to see a postbox in my mind, but I don't know what that something is.

The correspondence theory of truth doesn't apply, as there is no correspondence between a known thing in my mind and an unknown thing in the world.

I judge p is true = refers to a proposition that can be judged true
I judge "p" is true = refers to any proposition whatsoever
You're saying that only the former can be "recognized as true." What I don't understand is how this recognition differs from judging that it is true. Do you mean "recognition" to refer to a pre-linguistic or pre-propositional experience? — J

Thankyou for the fun thread, but several days of sunshine abroad beckon.

Recognition and Judgement
Frege says force is separate to content. I take this to mean that the content p in "I judge p is true" is separate to the force "I judge _is true".

My belief is that proposition p must be truth apt prior to being able to be judged. A proposition is truth apt if it corresponds with the world. This means that a proposition must be recognized to be truth apt before being able to be judged.

Therefore, before judging a proposition, we must recognize that the proposition ""The oak tree is shedding its leaves" is truth apt and the proposition "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus" isn't.

The problem with Frege's belief that force is separate to content
However, we can only recognize a proposition such as "a b c d e" as being truth apt if we know the meaning of a,b, c , d and e. IE, we know the content of the proposition.

This begins to support Rodl's point that the content cannot be separate to the force, as we are already making a judgment that the proposition is truth apt even before we start to judge whether the contents of the proposition are true or not.

It is interesting that all the examples of propositions I have come across have been truth apt, whether on this thread, such as "That oak tree is shedding its leaves", "the grass is green", "the Earth is round" or Frege's "the accused was in Rome".

IE, the content cannot be separate to force, as the content must be known prior to judging that the content is suitable to be judged.

The problem if the proposition is not truth apt
But suppose proposition p does not need to be truth apt before we can try to judge it.

Consider an example of a proposition that is not truth apt, such as "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus". On what grounds can we judge the content when the content is meaningless.

A judgment about a content can only be made when the content has meaning, and as content cannot give itself meaning, any meaning must be external to the content itself, such as the world.

For Rodl, force is inside content
If force is inside the content, and the content doesn't correspond with the world, then what is the content to be judged against. It can only be judged against itself, which leads into an infinite regress.

If force is inside the content, and the content corresponds with a world external to it, then any judgment is founded within the world, and there is something for the judgment to be made against

Therefore, for Rodl also, where force is inside content, judgment is only possible if the content has a meaning external to itself, such as the world.
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When Frege and Fregeans talk about truth-aptness, they're not referring to facts on the ground about what is the case. They're talking about the kinds of propositions to which assent could be given. — J

But this means that a judgement must be made about what kind of proposition can be assented to even before a judgment can be made about the content of that proposition.

A judgement about what kind of proposition can be assented to can only be made if the contents are known. For example, a judgment cannot be made giving assent to the proposition "a b c d e" without knowing what a, b, c, d and e mean. But what a, b, c, d and e mean is the content of the proposition.

The contents of the proposition must be known before being judged. This means that the contents of the proposition are already known before being judged. If the contents are known in order for a judgment to be made, the contents cannot be separate to the judgment

Hegel was idealist — Wayfarer

True, and he also believed in the existence of an external world.
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Berkeley denies the existence of matter as an independently real substance, but he does not deny the reality of the external world. — Wayfarer

As you say, Berkeley believed in the existence of an external world.
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His book is titled ‘an introduction to absolute idealism.’ If he was an indirect realist perhaps he wouldn’t have used that description. — Wayfarer

I presume that you haven't found a quote by Rodl in his book An Introduction to Absolute Idealism where he says that a mind-independent world doesn't exist.

but the "content" that Frege is upholding isn't the apples, it's the proposition "There are apples in that tree". — J

Frege's "content" surely does not mean any possible proposition, but only those propositions that are capable of being judged true, which means only those propositions that are able to correspond with the world.

Frege said force is separate to content.

Frege's position is that there can be propositions having content independent of being judged or asserted. Such that "p" is independent of "I judge p is true" or "I assert p is true".

There is a difference between "I judge p is true" and "I judge "p" is true". The thread is titled p and "I think p" not p and "I think "p"",

Suppose Frege means by content the proposition, such that "I judge "p" is true""

Then "p" can be anything. For example, "p" could be "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus", in which case "I judge "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus" is true".

But "p" can be any one of an almost infinite number of possibilities, an almost infinite number of possible propositions, an almost infinite number of possible contents.

But Frege wrote in 1915 - ‘‘My basic logical insights’’: ‘‘When something is judged to be the case we can always cull out the thought that is recognized as true; the act of judgment forms no part of this’’

The thought must be recognized as true, and the thought "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus" can never be recognized as true.

It makes more sense that what is being discussed is "I judge p is true", where p is not just any possible proposition but only those propositions that can be judged to be true.

This is why Frege himself gave the example of "the accused was in Rome" rather than "the accused dressed only in a hat flew over the rooftops of Rome" and why this thread gives the example of "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" rather than "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus".

Frege says that the content is separate to the force, where p in "I judge p is true" is separate to "I judge_is true"

The content cannot be any possible proposition, but only those propositions that are capable of being judged true.

And those propositions that are capable of being true correspond with the world. Hence a foundation of Realism.
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Hence "absolute idealism." — J

As a cat is an animal, an Absolute Idealist is an Indirect Realist. Absolute Idealism is a type of Indirect Realism.

But how is it different after many repetitions from the initial time, when, upon seeing the word, you heard it in your mind? What has changed after the many repetitions? — Patterner

I was thinking about how we learn the meaning of a word. When we see something that is named "apple", this has to be repeated several times before we are able to associate the name "apple" with our concept of "apple".

But what forms do they take in your mind? — Harry Hindu

"Think" exists in my mind as an imagined sound.
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How do you know they exist in your mind? — Harry Hindu

When I hear the sound "think", real or imagined, I know that the sound must exist somewhere. If I know the sound hasn't come from outside my mind, then I know that it must have come from inside my mind.
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Are "I", "think" and "p" just scribbles and that is the form they take in your mind, or do the scribbles refer to other things that are not scribbles and those are what exist in your mind? — Harry Hindu

"Think" exists in my mind in its own right, and doesn't refer to anything else.

If "think" in my mind didn't exist in its own right, and referred to something else, such as "A", then this "A" must refer to something else, such as "B", ending up as the infinite regress homunculus problem. As I see it, I am my thoughts rather than I have thoughts.

Therefore things in my mind must exist in the own right without referring to anything else.
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In seeing these scribbles on the screen, are the same as what is in your mind? — Harry Hindu

When I see the word "think" on the screen I hear the sound "think" in my mind. After many repetitions, in Hume's terms, this sets up a constant conjunction between seeing the word "think" and hearing the word "think". Thereafter, when I see the word "think" I instinctively hear the word "think", and when I hear the word "think" I instinctively see the word "think".

The sound "think" doesn't refer to the image "think", but corresponds with it.

I'm trying to redefine "truth" in a way that is meaningful in that maybe truth is not a relation between some state of the world and our ideas of the world. Instead "truth" can be thought of as a relation between some idea and the success or failure of some goal. — Harry Hindu

There are many definitions of "truth" (SEP - Truth)

My favourite is a correspondence between something that exists in the mind and something that exists in the world, such that "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is true IFF the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Unfortunately, being an Indirect Realist, I don't think we can ever know what exists in the world, meaning that we can never know "the truth".

What you want seems to be similar to the Anti-Realist approach to truth, such as Dummett's, where truth is not a fully objective matter independent of us, but is something that can be verified or asserted by us. (SEP - Truth - 4.2).

Separate in what sense? You would at least have to agree that they are both held by the one mind. — Wayfarer

I agree that all these exist in the mind "I", "think" and "p".

But I can hold in my mind two separate thoughts, "I need to buy some bread" and "Paris is in France". Just because these two thoughts are in my mind doesn't mean that they aren't separate thoughts.

In my mind is the thought "I like apples", where "I" is separate to "like apples". If "I" wasn't separate to its predicate "like apples" then "I" would be no more than any contingent predicate. In other words, if "I" wasn't separate to its predicate, then for example, "I" would be "like apples", "I" would be "visited the Eiffel Tower", etc.

The "I" is self-conscious regardless of any contingent predicate.
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His book is titled ‘an introduction to absolute idealism.’ If he was an indirect realist perhaps he wouldn’t have used that description. — Wayfarer

Absolute Idealism and Indirect Realism are not incompatible.

Kant was a Realist even though his theory was called Transcendental Idealism.

I have read that 80% of phd philosophers are Realists. In fact, I challenge you to find a quote by Rodl in his book An Introduction to Absolute Idealism where he says that a mind-independent world does not exist. This would of course lead to the situation that the Universe began when Humans first appeared, which I am sure even Rodl does not believe.

Rodl's main influence was Hegel, and he sees himself re-introducing Hegel's Absolute Idealism. (Wikipedia - Sebastain Rodl)

According to Hegel, in order for the thinking subject to be able to know its object, there must be in some sense an identity of thought and being (Wikipedia - Absolute Idealism)

Hegel is not an Idealist in the sense of Berkeley, for whom the world does not exist outside the mind.

For example, I am both an Absolute Idealist and an Indirect Realist.

the force/content distinction allows us to say things we want to say about both logic and thinking. — J

To my understanding:

In my terms, Frege is a Direct Realist in that he believes that force is separate to content. For example, in the world apples exist independent of any observer.

In my terms, Rodl is an Indirect Realist in that he believes that force is inside content. For example, when we see a red object, as the colour red only exists in the mind and not the world, not only our thought about the colour red but also the content of the thought, the colour red, exist in the mind. However, it may not be the case as Rodl says that force is internal to content, but rather force is content

In my opinion, Rodl's argument that self-awareness can be used to show that force must be inside content is a non-starter, as the self-consciousness of the "I" is separate to not only to any thought but also to what is being thought about. This means that self-consciousness has nothing to say about the relation between a thought and what is being thought about, in other words between the force and content.

However, there are other arguments that may be made to show that force cannot be separate to content.

If we link the truth to our goals does that resolve the problem? The information we use to accomplish some goal is true. The information we use that causes us to fail in our goals is false. — Harry Hindu

Are you saying that if we start with a preconceived notion of the truth, and this is supported by observations, then this shows that our preconceived notion of the truth was correct.

The problem becomes when we only use those observations that agree with our preconceived notion of the truth and reject any observation that doesn't.

It is both multiple observations and the logical categorization and interpretation of those observations that constitutes knowledge. — Harry Hindu

I agree, observations and reasoning are important.

Plato’s explanation of knowledge as justified true belief has stood for thousands of years.

The question is, which justified beliefs are true.

Problem one is that there is no one definition of truth, and problem two is that, even if there was, how would we know what the truth was.

Remember, that distinction suggests that thought can be objective only if it is detached from the subject who thinks it. However, first-person thought (I have pain) challenges this by showing that the act of judgment is self-conscious and cannot be isolated from what is judged. — Wayfarer

Self-consciousness is inside the "I" not the "I think"

Consider "I think p". Where exactly is the self-conscious part?

It is the "I" that is self-conscious, the subject that is self-conscious. Neither the act of judgement nor the "I think" are self-conscious.

"I think" is no more self-conscious than "I run" is self-conscious, or "I talk" is self-conscious.

As running and talking are outside the subject's self-consciousness, thinking is outside the subject's self-consciousness.

It is not the act of judgement "I think" that is self-conscious, it is the subject, the "I", that is self-conscious.

Therefore, this particular argument that a thought cannot be objective because it is inside the subject's self-consciousness is not a valid argument, because a subject's thoughts are outside the subject's self-consciousness.
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Rödl then goes on to argue against the possibility of first-person propositions as such, suggesting instead that the first-person pronoun is not a form of reference but an expression of self-consciousness. — Wayfarer

First and third-person propositions both refer to something outside the subject's self-consciousness

I agree that the first-person pronoun "I" is an expression of self-consciousness, because it is the "I" that is self-conscious.

In the first person "I know my hand hurts" and in the third person "I believe the oak tree is shedding its leaves"

As my thoughts are outside my self-consciousness, my knowing is also outside my self-consciousness.

In the expression "I know my hand hurts", "knowing my hand hurts" is outside the subject's self-consciousness.

Therefore, the first-person proposition "my hand hurts" is not an expression of self-consciousness, but refers to a hand that is hurting. In the same way, "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" refers to an oak tree that is shedding its leaves.

Frege did indeed believe that force is separable from content, but he probably wouldn't agree that therefore you have to separate "I think" from "p" — J

To my understanding:

For Frege, perhaps it is more the case that force is separate to content, rather than force is separable from content.

As I see it, for Frege, force is always separate to content. For Rodl, force is always part of content.

For Frege, given that force is separate to content, doesn't this mean that "I think" must be separate to "p"?

I am using "p" as "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", for example.

What is a force of judgement? = "I think that _ is true", "I judge that _ is true", "I believe that _ is true", "I doubt that _ is true", "I am certain that _ is true", "I hope that _ is true", etc.

What is the content? = "p", "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", "Pat is reading a book", etc.

Frege believed that the content can exist independently of any judgement about it. For example, he might believe that an oak tree shedding its leaves can exist independently of anyone observing it.

What does "I think p" mean. It does not mean "I think "p"". It means "I judge that p is true". For example, "I judge that the oak tree is shedding its leaves is true", which means that in my judgment, in the world is an oak tree that is shedding its leaves.

For Frege, the content is separate to the force. The content "p" is separate to the force "I judge that _ "

Therefore, for Frege, one has to separate "I think" from "p" as "I think" is separate to "p"

The OP was examining a common but still controversial claim -- that when we think, there is some accompanying "I think" that characterizes the act of thinking, and which according to some is also a type of self-awareness or self-consciousness. — J

As I see it:

Every act of thinking requires an object being thought about and a subject doing the thinking.

In every act of thinking, the "think" is accompanied by both "I" and "p".

Frege and Rodl

Frege and Rodl would agree that i) "I" requires "think" and "p" - ii) "think" requires "I" and "p".

Frege believes that force is outside content, such that "I think" is outside "p". This means that "p" doesn't require "I think".

Rodl believes that force is inside content, such that "I think" is inside "p", meaning that "p" is "I think".

Self-awareness
In every act of thinking, I am aware that it is "I" that is doing the thinking, not someone else, such as Pat

This self-awareness precedes the act of thinking

It could equally be the case that "I run", "I eat", "I laugh" or "I think"

The expression is "I think p", not "I "I think p"", which would lead into the infinite regress homunculus problem.

Re-wording
When I think p, accompanying "think" are both "I" and "p", where the "I" is self-aware.

Do you still believe that the person you saw when you were young is Santa Claus? Why or why not? It seems that you can only ever change your knowledge is by making more observations that you seem to be saying that you cannot trust, so how can you ever say that you learn anything? What does it mean to you to learn something, or to learn from a mistake? — Harry Hindu

Zero-knowledge proof
In general, the more observations the better one's conclusion ought to be. However, in practice, most people are entrenched in their positions, regardless of how many new observations they make.

Even so, this does not take away from the fact that observations cannot be guaranteed to be trustworthy, as anyone reading mainstream media would testify.

However, this doesn't mean that certainty cannot be discovered from uncertainty. Zero-knowledge proof is an interesting concept, and not only in computer sciences.

Wikipedia - Zero-knowledge proof

In cryptography, a zero-knowledge proof is a protocol in which one party (the prover) can convince another party (the verifier) that some given statement is true, without conveying to the verifier any information beyond the mere fact of that statement's truth.

The YouTube video Zero Knowledge Proofs I found interesting.

Santa Claus
I see an oak tree in France shedding its leaves, and someone else sees an oak tree in Brazil shedding its leaves.

An oak tree can exist in different locations at the same time because the oak tree is a concept that can be instantiated in different locations at the same time.

Santa Claus as a concept can also be instantiated in different locations, and can exist in Regent Street, Times Square and Greenland at the same time.

It depends what you mean by Santa Claus.

For telling about the world, inductive logic is good enough.  It is not about the absolute truth, but it is about the probability of the truth — Corvus

:up:

Is pain a suitable subject for the analysis of propositional content? — Wayfarer

Why not?

A propositional attitude is a mental state towards a proposition (Wikipedia - Propositional attitude). I know is a mental state towards the proposition "my hand hurts".

What I'm wondering is, do you think this challenges the thought1/thought2 distinction as such, or is this a special case involving what used to be called "incorrigible knowledge"? — J

I don't think it challenges the think1/think2 distinction, but only extends it.

As I see it, I have knowledge about things inside my mind, and have beliefs about things outside my mind.

Inside my mind

Think1 = I know "my hand hurts" means I know the proposition "my hand hurts". This seems reasonable because the proposition is inside my mind.

Think2 = I know my hand hurts. This is valid.

Think1 = I think "my hand hurts" means I am thinking about the proposition "my hand hurts". This is not a propositional attitude. This seems reasonable as I do think about things.

Think2 = I think my hand hurts. This is invalid.

Outside my mind

Think1 = I know "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" means that I know the proposition "the oak tree is shedding its leaves". This seems reasonable as propositions exist in my mind.

Think2 = I know the oak tree is shedding its leaves. This is invalid, as I cannot know things that exist outside my mind.

Think1 = I believe "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" means I believe the proposition "the oak tree is shedding its leaves". This is invalid, because it is not a propositional attitude, and I can only have a belief in a propositional attitude.

Think2 = I believe the oak tree is shedding its leaves. This is valid, as I can have a belief in things that exist outside my mind.

But formal logic cannot tell you truth about the world...................For analysing truth of the world, you need to use material logic — Corvus

The problem is that Material Logic is an inductive logic, where the conclusion may be likely but not certain

Premise 1: The sun has risen every day for the past thousand years.
Conclusion: The sun will rise tomorrow.

Formal vs. Material Logic: A Comparative Analysis

Even Material Logic cannot tell us the truth about the world.

But what do we do about "To know something means consciously knowing something"? Which sense(s) of "thought" is being appealed to here? — J

No sense of thought is being appealed to.

I can only have knowledge of things inside my mind, such as pain. Everything outside my mind can only be a belief.

If my hand hurts, then I know my hand hurts. If I know my hand hurts, then I consciously know that my hand hurts. To know something means to consciously know something.

Present time

Let Think1 = I think "my hand hurts"
Let Think2 = I think my hand hurts

Think1 means that I am thinking about the proposition "my hand hurts". I can think about the proposition regardless of whether my hand is hurting or not. I can know that my hand hurts and think about the proposition "my hand hurts" at the same time, but my hand hurting does not require Think1. I have no propositional attitude towards the proposition.

In Think2, "I think" means "I believe". Therefore Think2 means "I believe my hand hurts". But this is not a valid expression, in that if my hand hurts, this is not a belief, it is knowledge.

If I know my hand hurts, no sense of thought is being appealed to.

Future time

At a future time, I can reflect on my past experience.

Let Think1 = I think "my hand hurt"
Let Think2 = I think my hand hurt

Think1 means that I am thinking about the proposition "my hand hurt". I can think about the proposition regardless of whether my hand hurt or not. I can know that my hand hurt and think about the proposition "my hand hurt" at the same time, but my hand hurting does not require Think1. I have no propositional attitude towards the proposition.

In Think2, "I think" means "I believe". Therefore Think2 means "I believe my hand hurt". But this is not a valid expression, in that if my hand hurt, this is not a belief, it is knowledge.

If I know my hand hurt, no sense of thought is being appealed to.

Whereas "I think p" sounds less clearer than "p", and has some points to clarify. — Corvus

Yes. If I said "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" I would sound more uncertain than if I had said "the oak tree is shedding its leaves".
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When you say "I think I think p", it sounds something is wrong and deeply wrong in grammar and its meaning, and will be rejected for its clarity. — Corvus

In ordinary language when chatting at the bus stop, I agree. But perhaps not on a philosophy forum.
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When you say, "I know p", you will be expected to prove that you know p. — Corvus

Agree
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"I know I think p" is a psychological statement with no objective meaning to deliver apart from to yourself. — Corvus

And hopefully to others on this thread about "p and "I think p""

I know my thoughts, as my thoughts are inside my mind.
I have the thought that the moon exists.
Therefore, I know my thought that the moon exists

I believe that the moon exists.
I can justify my belief that the moon exists.

A belief is true if it corresponds with what exists in a mind-independent world.
The insurmountable problem is how can the mind know about a world that is independent of the mind.
Therefore, truth about a mind-independent world is unknowable
Therefore, knowledge about a mind-independent world is impossible.

However, this is why we have axioms in logic, science and mathematics and hypotheses in general life.

For instance, do the statements, "Santa Claus exists." and "Barak Obama exists." hold the same level of uncertainty? — Harry Hindu

On the one hand I saw Santa Claus in person at Hamley's Regent Street store when I was very young, yet have never seen Barak Obama. On the other hand, many people have told me that Santa Claus is not real.

Do I believe what I have seen with my own eyes, or what people tell me?
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The world is all there is, included the ideas in your mind, and the book on the table that represent those ideas in Tolkien's mind that you can have knowledge of by reading the scribbles therein. — Harry Hindu

The Direct Realist believes that there is a book on the table. However, the Indirect Realist would disagree.
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I don't know what Kant means by unknowable things-in-themselves. — Harry Hindu

The problem is, how is it possible to know about something that exists in a mind-independent world when all we have is our minds.

From Wikipedia Thing-in-itself

In Kantian philosophy, the thing-in-itself (German: Ding an sich) is the status of objects as they are, independent of representation and observation.

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You can also depend on the process of causation in a deterministic universe as providing another level of certainty. — Harry Hindu

The same effect can have many different possible causes. I see a broken window, and even if I know that something caused the window to break, one particular effect can have many different causes. There is no certain means of knowing what the cause was, a stone the previous day, a rock the previous week, a seagull the previous week, a crow within the hour, a window cleaner, etc.

The cause may determine the effect, but the affect could have been determined by many different possible causes.
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You're contradicting yourself again. First you define knowledge as "justified true belief". You then say that you can justify your belief, but then say you cannot know things-in-themselves. — Harry Hindu

From SEP The analysis of knowledge

The tripartite analysis of knowledge is often abbreviated as the “JTB” analysis, for “justified true belief”.Much of the twentieth-century literature on the analysis of knowledge took the JTB analysis as its starting-point.

From Wikipedia Thing-in-itself

In Kantian philosophy, the thing-in-itself (German: Ding an sich) is the status of objects as they are, independent of representation and observation.

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All knowledge stems from both observation and reason. — Harry Hindu

A Direct Realist believes that they directly observe things in a mind-independent world. The Indirect Realist disagrees.
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Are our senses and reason useful? — Harry Hindu

That is my point. What is important are our senses and our reason. What exists the other side of our sense is open to debate.
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Now how is it that you can get to the thing-in-itself - other people's ideas - by seeing scribbles on your computer screen if not by taking what you know from prior experiences and using that to predict how the scribbles appeared on your screen and what they refer to? — Harry Hindu

How to get from what we experience in our senses to what exists the other side of our senses, and whether it is even possible, has no agreed solution.

From Wikipedia Phenomenology (philosophy)

Phenomenology is a philosophical study and movement largely associated with the early 20th century that seeks to objectively investigate the nature of subjective, conscious experience. It attempts to describe the universal features of consciousness while avoiding assumptions about the external world, aiming to describe phenomena as they appear to the subject, and to explore the meaning and significance of the lived experiences.

The “mental event” sense of “think” could be shown as “I think: ‛p’ ”. The propositional sense could be shown as “I think that p” or just “I think p”. Or we can just attach numbers to discriminate them: thought1 vs. thought2, think1 vs. think2. — J

"I think" and "p"
If we want to distinguish between the mental event and the propositional sense, between the act of thinking and the something being thought about, perhaps what is being distinguished is "I think" and "p".

In which case thought1 = "I think" and thought2 = "p".

Let p = the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Frege and Rodl agree that thought1 cannot exist in the absence of thought2

Frege argues that thought2 can exist in the absence of thought1. The content of a thought can be objective, independent and accessible to any rational being.

Rodl argues that thought2 cannot exist in the absence of thought1. In opposition to Frege's anti-psychologism, this leaves no space for the psychological concept of judgement.

"I think "p"" and "I think p"
I think "p" = I think "the oak tree is shedding its leaves". I am not making any judgement about p. I have no propositional attitude towards p.

I think p = I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves. I am making a judgement about p. I have a propositional attitude towards p.

Mental events
For Frege, a thought is truth apt, which seems sensible. (The force and content of judgement by Rodl)

I know my hand hurts is not truth apt, therefore a mental event need not be a thought.

Knowing and consciousness
When I know that my hand hurts, I am conscious that my hand hurts.

When I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves, I know that this is my thought rather than Pat's thought, for example. I am conscious that this is my thought.

To know something means consciously knowing something

1st person and 3rd person
In the 1st person, I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves
In the 3rd person, I think about my thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

See The force and content of judgement by Sebastian Rodl 2020 referring to van der Schaar.

In the 1st person, I am conscious that my hand hurts
In the 3rd person, I am conscious that I am conscious that my hand hurts.

In the 1st person, I think about something external to me.
In the 3rd person, I think about myself as if I was external to myself.

Being conscious about myself as if I were external to myself is easier to understand than self-consciousness.

That would be a simple task in proof. — Corvus

I could prove "the moon exists", as the moon exists external to me, but I couldn't prove that "I know I think the moon exists", as my knowing that I think exists internal to me.

If you know p, then you must be able to prove or verify you know p. How do you prove and verify that you know you think p? — Corvus

I know my hand hurts. In the absence of telepathy, it is impossible for me to either prove or verify to you that my hand hurts.

I know my hand hurts regardless of whether I can prove or verify it to someone else.

I know that I think the moon exists regardless of whether I can prove or verify that I know that I think the moon exists.

Is someone expressing an opinion or fact when stating, "The oak tree is shedding its leaves"? — Harry Hindu

If I hear someone saying "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", as it is impossible to know what is in someone else's mind, I cannot know whether they believe in what they are saying, are lying, are certain in what they say or uncertain in what they say.

Even if they said "I am certain that the oak tree is shedding its leaves", they could be lying.
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Just because it wasn't about the world doesn't mean it isn't part of the world. Does the Lord of the Rings book not exist in the world even though it isn't about the world?.............................You misinterpreting a sound causes you to behave a certain way in the world. How can there be a causal relation between some thought you have and an action in the world if those thoughts are not in the world? — Harry Hindu

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that the Lord of the Rings exists in the world, but this world exist in my mind. What exist in a mind-independent world is, as Kant said, unknowable things-in-themselves.

A Direct Realist would have a different opinion to mine.

I believe that there is something in this mind-independent world that caused me to perceive a sound, caused me to have a thought, but I can never know what that something outside my mind is.

I hear a sound that I perceive as thundering, but I cannot know what in the a mind-independent world caused me to hear this sound. For convenience, I name the unknown cause "thundering". I name the unknown cause after the known effect, such that when I perceive something as thundering I imagine the cause as thundering.

I can imagine a mind-independent world, but such a world has derived from the world inside my mind.
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What is the difference between a "belief", "think", and "knowledge" for you? — Harry Hindu

For me, knowledge is justified true belief.

Truth is the relation between the mind and a mind-independent world.

As a 1st person experience, I hear a thundering sound. As a 3rd person experience, I can think about this thundering sound.

My belief is that it was caused by a motor bike and I can justify my belief.

However, as I can never know whether my belief is true, because as Kant said, in a mind-independent world are unknowable things-in-themselves.
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Ok, would you say that the structure of your thoughts is more like watching the movie or reading the book? If scribbles in the book invoke the images from the movie, would you say that the scribbles in the book refer to the actions and things in the movie? Could it ever be the other way around? If so, provide an example. — Harry Hindu

If I recognise a word, I imagine an image. Some images I recognise as words. In Hume's terms, there is a constant conjunction between some words and some images.

You had a previous question about meaning.



The pictogram of a plough has no meaning in itself. It must refer to something else to have meaning, such as a plough. The plough has no meaning in itself. It must must refer to something else in order to have meaning, such as the ability to grow food. Even the physical plough is a symbol for something else.

The “I think” accompanies all our thoughts, says Kant. Sebastian Rödl, in Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, agrees with this but points out that “this cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p.” — J

Tree has water and wood fibre in the content. Tree itself dies without water and the nutrients fed from the root. — Corvus

Photograph of a tree
I see a photograph. I see particular shapes and colours which I recognise as a tree. There is the form of a particular tree that exists in the photograph and there is the content of the form, which exists in my mind as the concept of a tree.

For Frege there is a separation between force and content, where the assertoric force is a propositional attitude towards a content. In this instance, that I judge that the particular shapes and colours represent a tree.

Rodl rejects Frege's separation between force and content. For Rodl the original form of judgment is the opposition of p and non-p, and it is not possible to make any judgment whether particular shapes and colours represent p or non-p in the absence of any content p. In other words, I cannot judge whether these particular shapes represent a tree or not without having prior knowledge of a tree.

Thinking of the tree
I see a photograph of an oak tree, which is a representation of an oak tree. When I think of an oak tree, I am not thinking about a representation of an oak tree, as this would lead into the infinite regress homunculus problem. It would mean that I was thinking of a representation of a representation.

As Kant wrote in CPR B132

The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me.

As Kant wrote, in order for me to think about an oak tree, accompanying my thought must be a representation of an oak tree, otherwise there would be nothing for me to think about. The "I think that there is an oak tree" cannot be external to the representation of an oak tree, otherwise the oak tree could not be thought about at all. The representation of the oak tree must be internal to the "I think that there is an oak tree".

Rodl, for a similar reason, in The Force and the content of judgement, rejected Frege's distinction between force and content. If content was external to force, any propositional attitude towards the content would be impossible, and there could be no judgement that the oak tree is shedding its leaves. Content must be internal to the force, where the judgement that the oak tree is shedding its leaves is no more than the articulation that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Knowing is not thinking
When I think of an oak tree, as a 1st person experience, I know that the thought is mine, rather than Pat's for example. I don't need to think about my thought in order to know that it is my thought. Therefore in every act of thinking there are two aspects, I think about the oak tree and I know that it is me who is thinking about the oak tree.

However, perhaps later, as a 3rd person experience, I may consciously think about my thought of an oak tree.

Knowing is not the same as thinking, in that I can know a pain in my hand without needing to think that I have a pain in my hand. For Frege a thought is either true or false. That I know a pain in my hand is not truth apt.

Rodl said "This cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p."

Therefore, in every act of thinking there are two aspects, I think p and I know I think p.

The mind is part of the physical brain? Exactly which part in the brain? — Corvus

If your brain moves from the living room to the kitchen, does your mind remain in the living room?

A tree has the form of a tree. What is the content of a tree? It can only be the tree itself.

As with the tree example, the brain as form and mind as content cannot be separated.
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So when you say that you are the thought of p, you seem to be reducing yourself to only one aspect of the mind leaving out the rest of the mind and physical body. — Corvus

If "I" was not thought p, how could "I" ever know about thought p?
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I understand mind as a function of the brain and sensory organs of the body. You sound like a dualist i.e. mind and body as separate entities - mind residing in the brain somewhere. Would it be the case? — Corvus

No. As I think of "I" as my thoughts, I think of my mind as my brain.

So "I believe" wouldn't be a separate fact that could appear in a predication? Just asking . . . I think this is pretty close to Rödl, yes. — J

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that both "I believe" and "the postbox is red" only exist in the mind.

For someone who believes that "I have thought x", where "I" and "thought x" are separate, then "thought x" is predicated of "I". For example, a table may be made of wood, meaning that "wood" can be predicated of "a table".

For someone who believes that "I am thought x", where "I" is "thought x", then "thought x" cannot be predicated of "I". For example, a wooden table is made of wood, meaning that "wood" cannot be predicated of "a wooden table".

Saying "I am the thought p." sounds even more unclear, mysterious and even spooky. — Corvus

A thought of a tree
There is the physical body of which the physical brain is a part. The mind is somehow part of the physical brain.

One aspect is what the mind is, such as the self, consciousness, the "I". Another aspect is what the mind does, such as has thoughts, ideas, feelings and emotions.

How are these two aspects connected?

A photograph of a tree
What is the connection between a photograph representing a tree and the representation of a tree.

Take away the photograph that represents a tree, and there will be no representation of a tree. Take away the representation of a tree and there will be no photograph that represents the tree.

Rather than the photograph representing a tree, perhaps the photograph IS the representation of a tree.

Rather than "I" thinking of a tree, perhaps the "I" IS the thought of a tree.

Are you not more capable of learning about friendship by having friends in reality? — Harry Hindu

Yes, but they may have have the same sophistication of thought about friendship as Tolkein.
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Yes, but you are saying that thinking is expressing uncertainty. — Harry Hindu

If someone told me that they knew without doubt that something was true, I would be very doubtful about their opinion.
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I need to understand why you think that thoughts are not part of the world when they are about the world like language is...If you thinking something is exhibiting some form of uncertainty doesn't that mean that you have a sense that your thoughts might be false? — Harry Hindu

I hear a sound and immediately think that the sound came from a motor car, but in fact it actually came from a motor bike.

I have the sense that my thought may be false, so am uncertain about it

Being a thought that was false, my thought was not about the world. It was not a part of the world.
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The question now is, what form does knowledge take in your mind? — Harry Hindu

As an Indirect Realist, I only have knowledge of what I perceive in my five senses. If I hear a sound, I have the knowledge that I have heard a sound. I may believe that the sound was caused by a motor bike, and I can find reasons to justify my belief that the sound was caused by a motor bike, but I can never know that the sound was not caused by a motor car.
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For instance, when reading the Lord of the Rings and reading a description of the characters, does the visual of Frodo and Gandalf take the shape of more scribbles and sounds, or a visual of what these characters look like? — Harry Hindu

When I read the word "Gandalf", I picture in my mind "Gandalf" from the movie.

Would you say that the sentence "I think P", is actually two sentences? — Corvus

Yes, "I think p" has several different meanings.

For Frege, "I think" is the force of judgement and "p" is the content judged.

Sebastian Rodl rejects Frege's distinction between force and content.

My personal belief is that rather than it being the case that "I have the thought p", it is more the case that "I am the thought p".

The problem with "I have the thought p" is that this leads into the infinite regress homuncules problem.

If it is the case that "I am the thought p", then this agrees with Rodl's rejection of Frege's distinction between force and content.

I would add 5) I think and I am p.

He's really saying judgment shouldn't be called a propositional attitude, despite what all the traditional sources maintain. The entire separation of force (judgment, attitude) and content is off base, according to him. That's why it's kind of an outrageous viewpoint on the face of it. — J

As an Indirect Realist, I would probably agree with Rodl.

Consider the sentence "I believe that the postbox is red". This illustrates a propositional attitude, a mental state towards a proposition, namely, my mental state of believing that the postbox is red.

Frege distinguishes the force of the judgement, I believe, from the content judged, the postbox is red.

However, for Bertrand Russell, it is not the case that redness is predicated of the postbox, but rather there is something that is both a postbox and red, where the postbox is predicated of something and redness is predicated of the same something.

For Russell, existence is a second order concept, such that the existence of being a postbox and the existence of being red are concepts that exist in the mind rather than the world.

For Kant, the something in the world is an unknown thing-in-itself that we only know through the phenomenological predicates "being a postbox" and being red", which are concepts which exist in the mind.

Speaking as an Indirect Realist, the content of the sentence "I believe that the postbox is red" is "the postbox is red". However, "the postbox is red", as Russell shows, means that there is something that is a postbox and is red, where the predicates "is a postbox" and "is" red are second order concepts that exist in the mind. As Kant showed, the something is an unknowable thing-in-itself.

Therefore, the content of the sentence "I believe that the postbox is red" is an unknowable something in the world that can only be known as predicated concepts that exist in the mind as phenomenological experiences.

The content of the sentence is not knowable in the world but is only knowable in the mind as a belief.

In other words, the content of the sentence "is" the force of judgement by the thinker, where "is" is used to signify identity.

As Rodl says, for me as an Indirect Realist, there is no separation of force from content.

Therefore adding "I think" to a statement seems to contribute in making the statement obscure in its exact meaning. — Corvus

Yes, which is the problem when Pat says:

When I look out the window and say to myself, ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ I am not aware of also, and simultaneously, thinking anything along the lines of ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ — J

In what ways does some work of fiction shed light on reality that some work of non-fiction does not? — Harry Hindu

As The Lord of the Rings is one of the best-selling books ever written, with over 150 million copies sold, more people have learnt about the nature of friendship and struggle from the Lord of the Rings than the relatively small number of people who read books on sociobiology and psychology.
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Right, so Pat is making a statement about their uncertainty, not about the actual state of some oak tree. — Harry Hindu

No, She is making a statement about her uncertainty about a fact.
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It is only useful if I'm not there looking at the same tree Pat is, or if I'm interested in what Pat is thinking, not what the oak tree is doing. — Harry Hindu

Most of what we hear and read is about things we were never present, whether about Caesar or events in Alaska.
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Which thought bears more truth, a visual of an oak tree shedding its leaves, or scribbles of your own voice in your head saying, "I think the oak tree shedding its leaves." — Harry Hindu

Truth is about the relationship between language and the world, such that language in the absence of a world can be neither true nor false, and the world in the absence of language can be neither true nor false.

We can think about the meaning of words such as "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", and we can think about what we see, such as the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Language is useful in that most of language refers to things and events we could never be present for, such as Kant's thoughts, the moon landing or Caesar's march into Rome

There is no truth or falsity in my seeing an oak tree shedding its leaves. There is no truth or falsity in the sentence "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves".

There is only truth if the sentence is "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" and I see the oak tree shedding its leaves.
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How do you determine if some string of scribbles bears truth? — Harry Hindu

"The oak tree is shedding its leaves" is true IFF the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

"x" in language is true IFF x in the world

The problem is in knowing what exists in the world.

For Kant, what exists in the world are things-in-themselves which are unknowable, meaning that truth as a correspondence between language and the world is unknowable.

For Wittgenstein, there is language and the world, but he never specifies where this world exists, inside or outside the mind. Wittgenstein can be read both as an Idealist and a Realist. Therefore, for Wittgenstein truth is a vague concept.

Consider "the postbox is red" is true IFF the postbox is red. For the Indirect Realist, the objective colour red in the world is no more than a projection of the subjective colour red onto the world. The colour red only exists in the mind and not the world, meaning that truth becomes a relation between a language that exists in the mind and a thought that also exists in the mind.

If truth is a relation between language in the mind and a mind-independent world, the fundamental problem is how a mind can know about something that is mind-independent.