This quote is from Rödl's response — J

I reject the idea that judgment is a propositional attitude.

From Wikipedia - propositional Attitude

a propositional attitude is a mental state towards a proposition, such as "Sally believed that she had won"

From the Merriam Webster, the word "judge" includes: to hold as an opinion : guess, think
"I judge she knew what she was doing"

From this it seems that the word "judge" can be a mental state towards a proposition, and could be a propositional attitude.

But is Rodl using the word "judge" in a particular way?

If the only thing Pat can be certain of is that they have thoughts, then what use is communicating those thoughts if what she thinks she experiences might not be the case, which would be just as true for other human beings as it is for shedding oak trees? — Harry Hindu

Of what use is it for Pat to say "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" if she thinks that there is a possibility that it may not be the case that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Even if the oak tree is not shedding its leaves, Pat is nevertheless still communicating a lot of worthwhile information

i) Pat thinks
ii) Oak trees have leaves
iii) Oak trees may or may not shed their leaves
iv) There are things such as oak trees
v) Pat is asking a question she is hoping will be answered
vi) Pat is an English speaker
vii) Pat probably lives in the UK, Canada, Australia or the USA
===============================================================================

Why learn language at all if all you have access to is your thoughts? — Harry Hindu

Suppose all that existed was my mind. Would I still learn a language. Probably I would, as language enables me to have more complex thoughts than I could otherwise have without language. The ability to have more complex thoughts would be an end in itself.

Perhaps this is perhaps why people learn unusual languages such as Latin, even though they are not able to use it in everyday life. It is an personal intellectual exercise rather than being of practical use.
===============================================================================

Isn't you learning a language and then using it to communicate with others exhibiting a degree of certainty that there are things that exist (like other human beings) independent of your thoughts? — Harry Hindu

I am pretty certain that a world exists independent of my mind, but am not certain beyond a shadow of a doubt. As Kant argued, what knowledge can we ever have of things-in-themselves. However, my working hypothesis is that there is a mind independent world out there, and I may as well continue under my hypothesis unless it is shown to be wrong.

What does The Lord of the Rings tell us about reality?...................The difference between reality and fiction is their relative locations. — Harry Hindu

The article Ralph Waldo Emerson: Fiction reveals truth that reality obscures explains it better than I could:

The quote by Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Fiction reveals truth that reality obscures," encapsulates the notion that fiction has the unique ability to uncover hidden truths that may be misunderstood or even obscured by reality. In a straightforward interpretation, this quote suggests that the stories we create in fiction offer a deeper understanding of human nature, societal dynamics, and the complexities of life. Fiction has the power to shine a light on truths often overshadowed or ignored in the hustle and bustle of everyday life. It allows us to explore different perspectives, question assumptions, and delve into the depths of human experience. Through narrative and imagination, fiction becomes a vehicle through which reality's intricacies can be unraveled and its truths made visible.

I agree when you say that trying to separate the body from the environment is an impossible feat, in that trying to separate the subjective from the objective is a fundamental problem within philosophy.

A view is information structured in a way to inform an organism of the state of the environment relative to the state of its body. A view is always relative and the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity lies in trying to separate the body from the environment - an impossible feat. — Harry Hindu

For example, I have the subjective experience of perceiving the colour red. But does the colour red have an objective existence in the world independent of any observer? Is the colour red part of a subjective fiction or part of an objective reality?

Calling them "realities" would be a misuse of words. They are fictional stories, and I don't see any relevance between the words, "fiction" and "reality". — Harry Hindu

Wolfgang Iser in The Reality of Fiction: A Functionalist Approach to Literature makes the point that fiction and reality are often very difficult to separate, as we can see in today's mainstream media.

If fiction and reality are to be linked, it must be in terms not of opposition but of communication, for the one is not the mere opposite of the other - fiction is a means of telling us something about reality.

Going from "The oak tree is shedding its leaves" to "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is going from thinking in the visual of an oak tree shedding its leaves to thinking in the auditory experience of hearing the words (you talking to yourself) "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves". — Harry Hindu

It's also going from certainty to uncertainty

We only need language to relay information, not to create reality. Only language that relays relevant information is useful, else it's the ramblings of a madman or philosophy gone wild. — Harry Hindu

Does that include the realities created by To Kill a Mockingbird by Harper Lee, 1984 by Orwell, The Lord of the Rings by Tolkein, The Great Gatsby by Fitzgerald, Anna Karenina by Tolstoy, etc.

I often wonder, what makes a person interested in philosophy? — Rob J Kennedy

The main reason I became interested in philosophy was because of my interest in art.

How is it possible to create art without knowing what art is?

What art is is a philosophical problem.

What our present goal is determines what we try to point to with language. — Harry Hindu

I've been assuming that this thread is about the philosophical implications of "thought", rather than how "thought" is used in language, though it is true that ambiguities in language make the task of philosophy more difficult.

Language use is not a requirement for thinking. — Harry Hindu

True, but it would be difficult to know Kant's and Frege's insights about thoughts without language.

I am not quite sure what you mean by a metaphysical problem. I asked you about it already, but didn't get replies on that point. What is a metaphysical problem, and why is it a metaphysical problem? — Corvus

Given the sentence "I think I think the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall"

Linguistically it could mean "I think the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall, but I'm not sure"

Metaphysically, what does "I think I think" mean. Can a thought think about itself. If it can, does this infer free-will, where a thought causes itself to come into existence, an example of spontaneous self-causation. Or what about the infinite regress homuncules problem used against Direct Realism. Where do thoughts exist in the physical brain. Do thoughts exist, or are they just illusions. Things like that.

p and I think p — J

I am assuming that Pat's problem is metaphysical rather than linguistic. Pat said:

When I look out the window and say to myself, ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ I am not aware of also, and simultaneously, thinking anything along the lines of ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’

1) I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves
2) I am thinking the thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves

Consider "I think x", where x = the oak tree is shedding its leaves. All three words are important within the sentence.

The sentence cannot be "I think"
A thought must be about something. For Frege a thought has a content, in this case that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

The sentence cannot be "I x"
There must be a relation between "I" and x. For Frege there must be an act, whether I am standing next to x or I am thinking about x.

The sentence cannot be "think x"
There must be a subject, whether "Patachon thinks x" or "I think x".

I can only say "I think x", if I am aware that the "I" refers to me, and it is me that is doing the thinking, rather than someone else, such as Patachon.

When I say "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves", I am aware that I am thinking the thought rather than Patachon, for example.

Pat and her belief
Pat is mistaken in her belief.

In order for Pat to say to herself "that oak tree is shedding its leaves", Pat must be aware that she is thinking the thought, rather than someone else, such as Patachon.

The reply to Pat should be response 1, "“I think” must accompany all our thoughts"

If we didn't know who was thinking our thoughts, our identity as a person would no longer exist.

There doesn't seem to be difference between saying,
1) The oak tree is standing there. and
2) You think that the oak tree is standing there.
You would only say 2), when you are asked why you said 1). — Corvus

OK. How about Pat's problem, which presumably is a metaphysical rather than linguistic problem.

When I look out the window and say to myself, ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ I am not aware of also, and simultaneously, thinking anything along the lines of ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ — J

1) Pat says "the oak tree is standing there"
2) Pat says "I think that the oak tree is standing there"

Linguistically these are different, but metaphysically the same.

What about the metaphysical problem?
3) Pat is thinking about her thinking that the oak tree is standing there.

When I think, I am thinking in either sentences or images...But if I try to think about my thoughts, I don't have any content but the thought is my object of thought. Because the contents of the thought is either shielded by the thought, or is empty. — Corvus

The equivalence of thinking and being consciously aware

When I think of an oak tree, I am consciously aware of an oak tree.

Rather than say "I am thinking of an oak tree", I can equally say "I am consciously aware of an oak tree".

I don't say "consciously aware of an oak tree", which would be ungrammatical, because I am consciously aware that it is "I" that is looking at an oak tree.

Therefore, I am consciously aware of two things, consciously aware not only of the oak tree but also it is "I" that is consciously aware of the oak tree.

But thinking is equivalent to being consciously aware

So I can also say, I am thinking of two things, thinking not only of the oak tree but also thinking about the "I" that is thinking about the oak tree.

This is why the "I" is included in the proposition "I am thinking of an oak tree", rather than just "thinking of an oak tree".

In other words, not only thinking about the oak tree but also thinking about the "I" that is thinking about the oak tree.

IE, not only thinking but also thinking about thinking.

I don't think you can think about your thinking. — Corvus

It hinges on the ambiguity of the word "thought". We commonly use the word to mean two distinct things: a mental event occurring at a particular place and time, and the content or import of said event ("proposition," in Fregean terms). — J

Linguistically
Linguistically, I can think about my thinking. For example, I can think about my thought that Paris is always crowded. A thought must be about something, even if that something is my thought that Paris is always crowded.

The problem
Pat says that when she has the thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves, she is not simultaneously thinking that she has the thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves. IE, when I think, am I simultaneously thinking that I think?

Metaphysically, what are thoughts
The act of thinking is inseparable to what is being thought about. As we cannot have an act of thinking without an object of thought, we cannot have an object of thought without the act of thinking. The act of thinking is the object of thought.

In the same way, the subjective act of thinking about the colour red cannot be seperated from the objective red that is being thought about

When stung by a bee, I am immediately conscious of pain. Subsequently, I can have the thought "bees sting". A thought may be regarded as a proposition that is potentially shareable as an objective fact, such as "bees sting", rather than a subjective feeling that is unshareable, such as pain (Britannica - Thoughts and Propositions).

The relation between "I" and thoughts
"The oak tree is shedding its leaves" is a valid proposition but not a thought. "Think the oak tree is shedding it leaves" is not a valid proposition, as it doesn't indicate who is having the thought. "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves", "they think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" and "he thinks the oak tree is shedding its leaves" are valid propositions expressing thoughts.

A thought cannot be had without someone having that thought.

It is the case that "I am my thoughts", rather than I have thoughts. If it were the case that "I have thoughts", not only would lead into the infinite regress homuncules problem but also would lead into the problem of how the "I" could have a thought that was external to it.

The relation between thoughts and consciousness
If I were not conscious I would have no thoughts, and if I had no thoughts I would not be conscious.

The relation between "I" and consciousness
If I was not conscious there would be no "I", and if there was no "I" there would be no consciousness.

The relation between "I", consciousness and thoughts
Therefore, "I", being conscious and thoughts are all aspects of the same thing. "I" cannot exist without being conscious or having thoughts. Being conscious wouldn't be possible without an "I" and thoughts. Having thoughts would not be possible without an "I" and being conscious.

Conscious beings are able to think, and self-conscious beings are able to think that they think
When stung by a bee, I am my immediate consciousness of pain, such that I am the pain. When subsequently I have a propositional thought, such as "bees sting", I am the propositional thought "bees sting".

As I am both conscious of pains and thoughts, but at the same time I am these pains and thoughts, I am a self-conscious being.

As a conscious being I think, but as a self-conscious being I think I think.

However, when you say "I think Paris is crowded," you can be saying either of two things. — J

The first could be an Illocutionary Act, perhaps "expressive of doubt" (Wikipedia - Illocutionary Act)

The second could be an Illocutionary Force, with the intention that the listener doesn't take their next holiday in Paris.

Both these are linguistic aspects.

Can you say why this next level of reflexivity is needed to make the situation clear? — J

I would put my money on:

p = Pat thinks that the oak tree is shedding its leaves
I think p = Pat thinks about her thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves

Pat thinks about her thought has two meanings:

Meaning one = linguistic, which makes sense.

Meaning two = metaphysical, which gets philosophical. How can one thought think about another thought?

If language is expression of thought, then every statement and proposition you make must be based on "I think" even if you didn't say it out loud. — Corvus

As you say, when I say "Paris is crowded", this infers that I must think that Paris is crowded.

The problem arises with the word "think".

When I say "I think", does this also infer that I must think that I think?

And if so, what does this metaphysically mean?

Isn't it a tautology? When you say P, it already implies you think P. — Corvus

Nearly.

Let "p" = "I think that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall"

When I say p, when I say "I think that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall", this means that "I think that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall."

When I think p, when I think "I think that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall", this has two different meanings.

Meaning one = "I think that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall". A tautology, as you say.

Meaning two = "I think about my thought that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall."

In ordinary language, "I think about my thought that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall" means "I think that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall, but I am not sure"

In metaphysics, "I think about my thought leads to an infinite regress, so cannot be valid.

It becomes difficult to separate metaphysics from ordinary language.

So with these recent posts, we’re going a bit deeper into the question of “I think p” and its relation to p. — J

p and "I think p"

An interesting post, but I am getting unclear about the meaning of p.

Suppose p = "the oak tree is shedding its leaves".

From page 1, Pat said "I think p and am not aware of thinking "I think p""

Therefore, the relation must be between "I think p" and "I think "I think p"", not the relation between "I think p" and p.

The relation between "I think p" and p is the relation between "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" and "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", which is not what the OP is about.

Am I right in thinking that p = "the oak tree is shedding its leaves"?

p and I think p. — J

Let p = the thought that "the oak tree is shedding its leaves".

When I think, it must be about something, as all thoughts must be about something.

"I think" necessitates a self that is conscious of thinking. "I" is synonymous with the self.

Possibility one = p is external to the self, internal to the self but not a part of the self or accompanies the self. If this were the case, the self would have no way of knowing about p.

Possibility two = p is part of the self. If this were the case, the self is the thoughts it has.

In other words, I am my thoughts. This solution avoids the infinite regress of the Homunculus problem.

Am I able to think of these two entirely unrelated things at the same time? I would think so — Patterner

:100:

Am I thinking about leaves falling from the tree and the height of the Empire State Building when I say, 'The leaves are falling from the tree, and, when you include the antenna, the Empire State Building is 1,454 feet (443.2 m) tall"? — Patterner

Possibly yes.

When thinking about "The leaves are falling from the tree" you are thinking about two things connected by the common thought of leaves, allowing you to think about them both at the same time.

When thinking about "the leaves are falling from the tree and the Empire States Building is 443.2 m tall", you are thinking about two things connected by the common thought of height, also allowing you to think about them both at the same time.

There are many different things we can think about at the same time, such as the speed of my car and how many pedestrians are on the road, the price of a restaurant meal and when I was last paid, writing a post knowing that dinner is waiting on the table, etc.

And you pointed out that it is (what might be called?) a compound lower level thought. — Patterner

The question was whether it is possible to think about two things at the same time.

So then is the question "Can you think A and B at the same time?" — Patterner

The compound lower level thought "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" shows that it is possible to think about two things at the same time, "the oak tree" and "is shedding its leaves"

Do the quotes around "I" mean that there is literally no self without thoughts, or only that the "I" of philosophy, so to speak -- the self-conscious cogito -- is constructed from our thoughts? — J

As I see it, there could be no self without thoughts. The self doesn't have thoughts, the self is the thoughts that the self has.

If you had no thoughts, would it be possible for you to have a self?

How could you express your self without thoughts?

As regards the word "constructed", in the same way that a wooden table is constructed of wood, the self is constructed of thoughts. The self is neither external to, internal to or accompanies thoughts, but rather the self is the thoughts that the self has.

Whereas "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is a combination of two lower level thoughts. — Patterner

But you have said that "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is the lower level thought.

Is it possible to think ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ without thinking ‛The oak tree is shedding its leaves.’? The words are actually in the sentence, after all. The higher level thought cannot exist without the lower level thought. — Patterner

So then is the question "Can you think A and B at the same time?" rather than "Can you be A and B at the same time?"? — Patterner

As you say:

I can think the lower level thought without the higher. — Patterner

The lower level thought is "the oak tree is shedding its leaves". Let A be "the oak tree" and let B be "is shedding its leaves"

Then yes, one can think A and B at the same time.

Because if you only thought A, "the oak tree", then you couldn't have the thought "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", and if you only thought B, "is shedding its leaves", then also you couldn't have the thought "the oak tree is shedding its leaves".

To have the thought "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" requires thinking about not only "the oak tree" but also "is shedding its leaves" at the same time.

Or is there another response that seems better? — J

The easiest solution is that I am what I think, in that "I" am my thoughts. None of 1 to 4 apply.

I am neither external nor internal to my thoughts, nor accompany my thoughts, in that I am my thoughts. If I had no thoughts, "I" would not exist. "I" could not exist if I had no thoughts.

"I" am the thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Our subjective thoughts "I think p" cannot be about objective facts "p", as objective facts are unknowable, and are in Kant's terms, unknowable things-in-themselves. P, that an oak tree is shedding its leaves, exists in the mind as a thought, where "I" am the thought p.

This idea goes back to at least Aristotle's Material Cause, where, for example, if a table is made of wood, the wood is the Material cause of the table. The wood is neither internal nor external nor accompanies the table, but rather the table is wood.

Similarly, what is being thought about is the Material Cause of the thought. A thought is neither external nor internal nor accompanies what is being thought about, but rather the thought is what is being thought about.

I am what I think.

Anyhow, most of the phenomenology I am familiar with attempts to rebut Kant, not support him. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The OP is whether without 1, 2 could not exist. But exist where? In the mind or in a world outside the mind. This leads into the question of phenomenology.

When talking about phenomenology, it depends whether we are referring to the disciplinary field in philosophy or the movement in the history of philosophy (SEP - Phenomenology).

Phenomenology as a study of thought, stretching back several thousand years, may well be at variance with Kant's dualism of phenomena and noumena. However, Phenomenalism as a 20th C movement may well not be.

Phenomenology as a movement got underway in the first half of the 20th C because of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, et al. (SEP - Phenomenology)

Plotinus and Aquinus
Therefore, for Plotinus (204/205 CE to 270CE) and Aquinus (1225 - 1274), phenomenology was still a discipline studying experience and consciousness.

Sokolowski
It is perhaps not a surprise that Monsignor Robert Sokolowski (b. 1934), a Roman catholic Priest, rebuts Kant's dualism, and considers that Indirect Realism and Representationism are misguided (Wikipedia - Robert Sokolowski)

Whilst it is true that Sokolowski wrote Introduction to Phenomenology, explaining the major philosophical doctrines of phenomenology, this does not mean that he is a proponent of Phenomenology as a modern movement. I don't know whether he is or isn't, but would suppose that he isn't, and therefore cannot be held as an example of a Phenomenalist who rebuts Kant's dualism (Wikipedia - Sokolowski)

I would guess that half of those on the Forum today reject Indirect Realism in favour of Direct Realism, thereby rejecting Kant's Representationalism.

Hegel
Hegel was interested in phenomenology as the study of experience and consciousness, but was neither a Husserlian Phenomenologist nor supporter of Kant's dualism between thought and being. For Hegel, in order for a thinking subject to be able to know its object, there must be an identity between thought and being, otherwise the subject would never have access to the object (Wikipedia - Absolute Idealism)

Husserl and Phenomenology
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was the principal founder of the movement of Phenomenology.

Husserl's Ideas, Volume One.(1913) is the true foundation of Phenomenology. In this book Husserl presented phenomenology with a transcendental turn. In part this means that Husserl took on the Kantian idiom of “transcendental idealism”, looking for conditions of the possibility of knowledge, or of consciousness generally, and arguably turning away from any reality beyond phenomena. (SEP - Phenomenology)

For example, when I see a tree, I don't need to concern myself with whether he tree exists or not, my experience is of the tree, not whether such a tree exists. As Husserl writes, we "bracket" the question of the existence of any world around us.

The word "phenomenology" has two uses
I am sure that Phenomenology as a movement founded by Husserl doesn't rebut Kant's dualism of phenomena and noumena, whilst I agree that phenomenology as a general discipline stretching back thousands of years, studying experience and consciousness, is more than likely to both support and oppose Kant's "transcendental idealism".

Isn't that the essence of deductive logic, where premises necessitate a conclusion? Isn't this arguably a form of "mental causation" ? — Pantagruel

Depends on what you mean by "cause".

There could be Aristotle's "Material Cause", where a table is made of wood, and the wood is the material cause of the table.

There could be Aristotle's "Efficient Cause", where a sculptor chisels away at stone to make a statue, and the sculptor is the efficient cause of the statue.

Material cause is contemporaneous and efficient cause is sequential in time.

However, today, in general language, using cause as material cause is an archaic use of the word, and what people mean today by cause is efficient cause.

Deductive logic:
P1 - All dogs have ears
P2 - golden retrievers are dogs
C1 - therefore golden retrievers have ears.

The above is an example of cause in the sense of material cause, but not a cause in the sense of efficient cause.

Therefore, in today's' terms, the above example of deductive logic is not an example of causation.

However this isn't the place to address that as we are veering OT for this thread — Pantagruel

The OP asks whether 1 causes 2.

The first thing to work out is where 1 and 2 exist, in the mind or in a world outside the mind.

The answer as to whether 1 causes 2 depends on where 1 and 2 exist.

To be able to answer this question, I am sure that topics such as Phenomenalism and Enactivism, Kant and Collingwood, are relevant.

My belief is that 1 and 2 only exist in the mind.

The enactivists I am aware of tend to be harsh critics of Kantian representationalism. It gets offered up as a way to avoid Kant's problems, not a way to recreate them. The article you're citing mentions phenomenology as a means of dissolving the very Kantian dualism you are claiming this approach represents. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Phenomenology
Kant is a dualist when he makes a phenomenal-noumenal distinction, between Appearance and the Thing-in-itself.

Kant's approach seems similar to that of Phenomenology, where we have knowledge of Appearance but not of Things-in-themselves.

From SEP - Phenomenology

Literally, phenomenology is the study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience..................... When Descartes, Hume, and Kant characterized states of perception, thought, and imagination, they were practising phenomenology.

In this sense, Phenomenology is supporting rather than dissolving Kant's "Transcendental Idealism".

Enactivism
Enactivism is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment (Wikipedia - Enactivism)

The key phrase is "dynamic interaction between".

Enactivism is not the position that cognition arises from direct contact between an organism and its environment.

For Enactivism, there is an indirect contact between an organism and its environment mediated by a dynamic interaction.

For Kant also, cognition is mediated by Appearance, which stands between cognition and Things-in-themselves.

Actually that is exactly what embodied-embedded cognition implies, represents a definition of knowledge as much as anything. — Pantagruel

Embodied cognition is knowledge of interactions with the environment, not knowledge about what in the environment caused those interactions

Embodied cognition is the idea that the body or the body’s interactions with the environment constitute or contribute to cognition (SEP - Embodied Cognition)

This is why embodied cognition has been inspired by the phenomenological tradition

Another source of inspiration for embodied cognition is the phenomenological tradition. (SEP - Embodied Cognition)

Literally, phenomenology is the study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience. (SEP - Phenomenology)

In Collingwood's terms, it is knowledge about the sensations, not whatever in the world caused those sensations.

In Kant's terms, it is knowledge about Appearances, not knowledge about Things-in-themselves.

In language, the clause "that Lydia sang" is embedded within the clause "Wanda said that Lydia sang". The embedded clause "that Lydia sang" gives no information about the clause it is embedded into, "Wanda said that Lydia sang"

In geology, silver may be embedded in copper. The embedded silver gives no information about the copper it is embedded into.

Embodied cognition has knowledge, but knowledge of thoughts and sensations, not knowledge about what in the world caused those thoughts and sensations.

He is the metaphysical grandfather of the idea of the embodied mind. — Pantagruel

Do you have a source for this?

That an organism is embodied in the world does not mean that the organism necessarily has knowledge about the world.

True. Except that he relentlessly fuses these: — Pantagruel

The fusing of thought and sensation. A seemingly Kantian approach, where the principles of pure understanding allow the very possibility of experience (CPR B293).

Collingwood writes in Speculum Mentis

Again, when I speak of a sensation, imagination, thought, or the like, I sometimes mean an
object sensated, sometimes the act, habit or faculty of sensating it, and so on.

Such thought and sensation exist in the mind, rather than outside the mind as things-in-themselves.

Collingwood writes "Mathematics is thus the one and only a priori science", inferring that, for Collingwood, numbers, as part of mathematics, exist in the mind rather than outside the mind.

I don't really subscribe to this idea of the sublime (awe and wonder?).........................The experince is not transcendental. It's a personal reaction. — Tom Storm

There is no one meaning of the word "sublime". From Wikipedia - Sublime (philosophy)

For 1st C AD Longinus, the sublime is an adjective that describes great, elevated, or lofty thought or language, particularly in the context of rhetoric.

In an early work (of 1764), Immanuel Kant made an attempt to record his thoughts on the observing subject's mental state in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. He held that the sublime was of three kinds: the noble, the splendid, and the terrifying.

For Schopenhauer, the feeling of the sublime, however, is when the object does not invite such contemplation but instead is an overpowering or vast malignant object of great magnitude, one that could destroy the observer.

Not only is it a personal reaction to which definition of the word "sublime" one accepts, but even if accepting one particular definition of the "sublime", it remains a personal reaction to one's experiences of the "sublime" as defined.

The long quote I made from Collingwood is its own best evidence and equates with my claims. — Pantagruel

Collingwood also says:

Mathematics is thus the one and only a priori science. It has nothing to do with space or time or quantity, which are elements of concrete experience ; it is simply the theory of order, where order means classificatory order, structure in its most abstract possible form.

This seems to suggest that for Collingwood, numbers, being part of mathematics, exist in thought rather than sensation.

Obviously there is not a unique set of two "proto-digmatic" entities.........................On the other hand, any pair of things can exist in a state of "two-ness" given the appropriate abstraction. — Pantagruel

I don't know what a "proto-digmatic" entity is.

Does two-ness exist in the world or in the mind of the observer?

Suppose two-ness exists in the world.

If two-ness exists in the world, then so must one-ness.

Suppose an observer sees two things in the world that are spatially separate.

What determines whether there is one two-ness or two one-nesses?

IE, if two-ness exists in the world, how does a particular thing in the world "know" whether it is related to another thing or not?

each member being simply another instance of the universal..............This indeterminate multiplicity is the mathematical infinite (RG Collingwood). — Pantagruel

There are an infinite number of possible numbers, such as 1, 1.1, 1.11, 1.111, etc.

If numbers exist in the world, they must exist either as abstract entities, such as 1, 2, 3, etc or concrete entities, such as 1 atom, 2 atoms, 3 atoms, etc.

Suppose 2 exists as a concrete entity, such as 2 atoms. As there an infinite number of possible numbers, but only a finite number of concrete entities in a finite world, then there are some possible numbers that cannot exist in the world. In this event, a mathematical infinite in the world is not possible.

A mathematical infinite can only exist in the world if numbers exist as abstract entities, independent of any concrete entities. This raises the question as to what relates the number 2 to 2 atoms rather than relating the number 2 to 5 atoms, for example?

Without 1, 2 could not exist, though the reverse doesn’t hold. Since it is because of the existence of 1, or one thing, that there can be 2, or two things, then the former can be said to be the cause of the latter. — Pretty

Without meringue, the Australian dessert containing meringue, whipped cream and fruit couldn't exist.
The Australian dessert containing meringue, whipped cream and fruit is named Pavlova.
Therefore, without meringue, the Pavlova couldn't exist.
The Pavlova couldn't exist without meringue, because by definition, a Pavlova contains meringue.

Without 1, 1 + 1 couldn't exist
1 + 1 is named 2
Therefore, without 1, 2 couldn't exist
2 couldn't exist without 1, because by definition, 2 is 1 + 1

As "Pavlova" is a name, "2" is a name.

As meringue didn't cause the Pavlova, 1 didn't cause 2.

"Sherlock Holmes" is also a name. That something has a name doesn't of necessity mean that it exists in the world. We can talk about "Sherlock Holmes" even though "Sherlock Holmes" doesn't exist in the world. We can talk about 2 even though there is no necessity that 2 exists in the world.

That we can talk about 2 does not necessarily mean that 2 exists in the world.

Wouldn’t gravity be a perfect example of one? — Pretty

No, not at all. Ontological relations and gravity (and forces in general) are two very different things.

Wikipedia - Gravity

In physics, gravity is a fundamental interaction primarily observed as mutual attraction between all things that have mass.

SEP - Relations

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80). Rather the relation must somehow share the divided locations of Glasgow and Edinburgh without itself being divided.

There may be a relation between 1 and 1 without there being a force between them.

Aristotle speaks of a certain priority in which two things exist contemporaneous to each other yet still have a causal-effective relationship — such as the existence of a thing and an affirmation of that thing. — Pretty

As regards Aristotle's Material Cause, which is an intrinsic cause, for example a table is made of wood and a statue is made of bronze.

I agree that the table is contemporaneous with the wood it is made from, and is described by Aristotle as a cause.

Aristotle also describes an Efficient Cause, which is an extrinsic cause, for example a sculptor who chisels at a block of marble to transform it into a statue.

The OP asks "Is the number 1 a cause of the number 2?"

There are different meanings to the word "cause", whether intrinsic cause or extrinsic cause.

If ontological relations don't exist in the world, then 2 cannot exist, meaning that there can be no cause of 2 whether intrinsic or extrinsic.

If relations do exist, taking the example of Material Cause, as a table is made of wood, 2 is made of the relation between 1 and 1.

The next question is, are there any good reasons for supposing that ontological relations do exist in the world?